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This volume is part of the results of a research project on ‘The negotiation of law
in the peripheries of southern Ethiopia’. It was funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG) and hosted at the Frobenius Institute at the Goethe University
in Frankfurt/Main. Susanne Epple – a social anthropologist – was the principal
investigator of the project and did her own research in the very south of Ethiopia.
In order to widen the scope of the research and get an interdisciplinary perspective,
she invited Getachew Assefa – a lawyer and expert on constitutional law and legal
pluralism in Ethiopia – to cooperate. Together they organized two interdisciplinary
events: an international conference organized at Jinka University (JKU) in Jinka,
southern Ethiopia in January 2018, and a panel at the 20th International Conference
of Ethiopian Studies (ICES) at Mekelle University, northern Ethiopia in October
2018. Both were titled ‘Legal pluralism in Ethiopia: The interplay of international,
national and customary law’. Most of the papers in this volume are results of these
events; some joined the group at a later stage.
We are grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the generous
funding of the project, the conference and panel, andmost of the publication costs.
We would also like to take the opportunity to thank the staff at Jinka University for
their great support in making the conference in Jinka possible, and express our
gratitude to the organizers of the ICES 20 in Mekelle.
We are also indebted to the Frobenius Institute, which hosted the project from
2016–2019. The institute has a long history of research and has shown continued
interest in the ethnic diversity and cultural complexity of Ethiopia. Since its expe-
ditions into Ethiopia in the early twentieth century, numerous well-known pub-
lications have come out of the institute, by authors such as Adolf E. Jensen, Eike
Haberland, Helmut Straube, Werner Lange, Elisabeth Pauli and Ulrich Braukäm-
per, to mention only a few.1 Professor Karl-Heinz Kohl, the then director of the
Frobenius Institute, offered to host the project in 2016.We would like to thank him,
1 For an overviewof the engagement of the Frobenius Institute in Ethiopia seeDinslage, Sabine
and Sophia Thubauville (eds.), 2017 Seeking out wise old men: Six decades of Ethiopian studies at
the Frobenius Institute. Berlin: Reimer
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and the current director, Professor Roland Hardenberg, as well as the staff of the
Frobenius Institute for their welcoming and indefatigable cooperation, and also for
co-financing the publication of the book. Special thanks go to SophiaThubauville, a
colleague at the Frobenius Institute and a co-researcher in Ethiopia, who has been
very helpful throughout in many different ways.
To address the complexity of customary law and legal pluralism in contem-
porary Ethiopia from an interdisciplinary perspective, the editors invited experi-
enced scholars from both of their disciplines – social anthropology and law – to
contribute.We wish to thank all the authors for their great efforts and the patience
they have shown in the course of publishing this volume.
Finally, we are grateful to the many informants in the field, both private people
and government officials. Through their trust and openness to discuss partly very
sensitive topics they have given us an insight into the problematic and conflicting
aspects of their lives.




Ethiopia is currently facing a delicate challenge, as it attempts to balance different
priorities in the country: respecting religious and cultural diversity, ensuring the
implementation of state law throughout its territorial domain, and committing
itself to international standards of human rights through the ratification of global
conventions and agreements.
With more than eighty officially listed ethnic groups (Central Statistical
Agency/CSA 2008) and languages (Lewis 2009), there exists a great plurality of
livelihoods, social organisations, belief systems, and political and legal systems
in the country. For the first time in Ethiopian history, this cultural diversity
has been officially acknowledged and respected in the new Constitution of 1995.
Through the Constitution, each ethnic group has been given the space to promote
its own culture and language, and legal pluralism is officially recognized. Today,
conflicts in the areas of family and civil law can legally be resolved using local
laws, procedures and mechanisms, as long as the Constitution is not contradicted,
international humans rights standards are not violated and all the parties in
conflict have agreed. The same rights and respect have been given to religious
laws, so that Sharia law and courts have received a special place in contemporary
Ethiopia.1
The existing legal arrangement seems to offer many advantages, as it seeks to
combine the diverse interests of its inhabitants and the government. It is, there-
fore, generally welcomed and appreciated by many people, especially as previous
1 See the Ethiopian Constitution (FDRE 1995), especially Art. 34(5) which says that ‘the adju-
dication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with [religious or]
customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute’ shall not be precluded by
the Constitution, and Art. 78(5), which grants the right to ‘establish or give official recogni-
tion to religious and customary courts’ to the House of Peoples’ Representatives and State
Councils. See also the Cultural Policy (endorsed in 1997), in which the government clearly
distances itself from previous governments, who are said to have followed a discriminatory
policy by seeding enmity among peoples and promoting the domination of the culture of
one nation or nationality at the expense of others (http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/fact%
20file/a-z/culture.htm), and the recent publication by Getachew, Yonas and Muradu (2016)
on Economic, social and cultural rights in Ethiopia.
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Ethiopian governments ignored and forbade the application of customary law,
though it nonetheless continued to operate unofficially and partly in hiding. How-
ever, in practice, the multiplicity of the often opposing and competing norms of
the different legal forums poses a challenge to both legal practitioners and jus-
tice seekers. As will be shown in this volume, certain gaps in the law have left the
system open to abuse and exploitation for personal advantage. There are also ex-
amples of power being accumulated by individuals who hold prominent positions
in more than one legal system, and in some places offenders are being sanctioned
more than once for the same wrongdoing. The criminalization of certain cultural
practices that contradict the state law and international human rights - labelled as
‘harmful traditional practices’ – has caused disappointment among local commu-
nities and occasionally led to avoidance of and resistance to the state law. At the
same time, state institutions have remained difficult to access especially in rural
areas, not only because police stations and courts do not exist everywhere and of-
ten lack staff and equipment where they do, but also because local acceptance is
still low. In addition, in some places pressure is put on individuals to not take their
cases outside the community.
A lot of the existing literature on legal pluralism places an emphasis on contra-
dictions between the legal systems, and on the problems arising from the imple-
mentation of state law and international law in local communities. However, as one
can see from the case studies in this volume, in places where the communication
between the different legal forums is open and respectful, the various stakeholders
do cooperate and the legal institutions and procedures complement rather than
contradict each other – at least to some extent.Where mutual distrust and insuffi-
cient communication prevail, problems among the customary, religious and state
legal forums are abundant, and many complaints arise.
The intention of this volume is therefore not only to shed light on the diverse
connections between various legal actors and their day-to-day experiences, but also
– and particularly – to highlight the conditions that contribute to the cooperative
co-existence of different legal systems. It includes the views, perspectives and opin-
ions of government representatives (e.g. legal practitioners, administrative person-
nel, other officials), various representatives of local communities (both customers
seeking legal services and practitioners of customary law and administration), and
religious actors (Muslim and Christian legal practitioners and communities). The
case studies examine how state law is implemented locally, partly accepted, com-
bined with local and/or religious law, or rejected. They also look at how state of-
ficials make use of local institutions, norms and actors in order to ‘make things
work’ and apply state law in their daily practice. While friction, contradictions and
clashes are not denied, a closer look is taken at the potential of legal pluralism,
in the hope of identifying how the existing and inevitably plural legal setting can
become a win–win situation for all.
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The interplay of plural legal orders
Legal pluralism
Early studies in legal anthropology looked at ‘traditional law’, that is, at the ques-
tion of how people maintained social order without Western law (Malinowski 1926,
Nader 1969). Later, the focus shifted to the co-existence and intersections of cus-
tomary and European law in the colonial context, nowadays referred to as ‘classical
legal pluralism’. Studies in the ‘new legal pluralism’, in which scholars looked at the
existence of plural normative orders in non-colonized states, emerged in the late
1970s, mainly in the USA and Europe (Merry 1988:873).
Since then it has been widely agreed that legal pluralism is a ‘situation in which
two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field’ (Pospisil 1971, Griffiths
1986, Moore 1986). Concepts of legal pluralism and law have been debated and
redefined in the last decades by anthropologists, sociologists, lawyers and oth-
ers. In the social sciences, most scholars now generally agree that every society
is legally plural ‘whether or not it has a colonial past’ (Merry 1988:869), as official
and unofficial social orderings operate side by side everywhere (Macaulay 1986 in
Merry 1988:868–869). While there has been intense debate on whether the term
‘law’ should be reserved for state law only (Woodman 1996, Griffith 1986, Tamanaha
2007), the concept of ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ introduced by Moore in 1973
focuses instead on the arenas (economic, social, political etc.) that operate with
their own specific sets of formal and informal norms.These norms are partly newly
created within the given social field itself. They originate partly from the spe-
cific environment (formal laws, rules determined by the economic system, cultural
norms etc.), and partly from other social fields with which they are interconnected
and interdependent (Moore 1973:720). As Moore emphasizes (1973:723), there is no
presupposed hierarchy between different normative orders interacting in the same
social field. This means that state law is not necessarily or automatically dominant
over other normative orders, and other social arrangements can be stronger in de-
termining individuals’ actions. It also implies that new legal systems brought into
or imposed on a specific social field can have unpredictable results.
Human rights and local contexts
Legal systems have always been dynamic and have always influenced each other.
Since the mid-1990s, the transnational flows of legal models in the context of glob-
alization have become a focus of scholarly interest (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann
2006, Tamanaha 2007, Nader 1969). In particular, the promotion and implemen-
tation of human rights standards have been widely discussed. Since human rights
standards have become a kind of benchmark for the quality of governments in the
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developing world, national and international NGOs have begun exerting direct and
indirect pressure to ensure that such rights are enforced (F. von Benda-Beckmann
2009). Issues pertaining to gender equality and the protection of women and chil-
dren (number 5 in the Sustainable Development Goals) have been given high prior-
ity. Indeed, they were already strongly addressed in the ‘Convention on the Elim-
ination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (CEDAW) adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1975, which gave a clear priority to women’s rights over
the protection of cultural diversity.2
Running parallel to discussions on the implementation of human rights stan-
dards has been concern about the universality of human rights (Goodale 2009).3
The widespread incompatibilities of human rights and customary laws and values
have been discussed in various theoretical publications (Eriksen 2001, Kinley 2012,
Preis 1996), and some authors have accused human rights of Western bias (An-
Na’im 1992, 2002). Merry (2003a) has even identified certain parallels between the
transnational transfer of law in times of globalization and during colonialism. She
argues that, in both instances, the transfer of legal ideas, institutions and tech-
nologies was justified with the argument that it would contribute to an improved
society.Moreover, the ‘reformers’ involved –both colonial and contemporary –were
convinced they were doing a morally right thing: contributing to a better life and
more civilized society by overcoming primitivism in the colonial context, and pro-
moting the rule of law, democracy and human rights today. Merry also points out
that the diffusion of new legal ideas has been taking place among countries and
peoples of extremely unequal power and resources, e.g. in relations where eco-
nomic, political and cultural considerations also play a role (Merry 2003a:570).
Scholars who have studied how law and human rights are discussed in interna-
tional forums have complained that, especially in reference to rural communities
or developing countries, ‘culture’ is still presented as something static and a hin-
drance to change and development.4 As such, ‘culture’ appears to be an obstacle to
2 The Convention is very clear about its aims to eradicate all practices discriminating against
women, even if that means changing cultural values, and even if women belonging to a spe-
cific culture do not perceive them as harmful (see www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw).
3 Anthropologistswere long aware of but onlymarginally involved in the debate onhow ‘global
law can be translated into the vernacular’ (Merry 2006:2). It was only after the end of the Cold
War in the late 1980s that anthropology engaged actively in research and debates around In-
ternational Human Rights (Goodale 2009:2). The ‘Declaration on Anthropology and Human
Rights’, voted on and approved by the general membership of the American Anthropologists
Association (AAA) in 1999, clearly expressed the ‘commitment to human rights consistent
with international principles’ and declared it mandatory for anthropologists ‘to be involved
in the debate on enlarging our understanding of human rights on the basis of anthropologi-
cal knowledge and research’ (Goodale 2009:7).
4 Conversely, in anthropology it has long been agreed that culture is something fluid, con-
tested, dynamic, and fundamentally hybrid.
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the realization of human rights (Merry 2003b). In viewing culture as the source of
all problems, attention is drawn away from other sources of subordinate groups’
suffering, such as economic or political problems, which might actually be caused
byWestern countries’ domination (Merry 2003b:63). Only in the context of heritage
management are ‘culture’ or ‘cultural diversity’ internationally declared as worth
protecting. The 2003 UNESCO ‘Convention for the safeguarding of intangible her-
itage’ promoted the idea of ‘cultural rights’ and declared the right to live accord-
ing to one’s own traditions as a form of human right, albeit only provided that
those traditions do not contradict existing human rights instruments and meet
the requirement for mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals
(Langfield et al. 2010). Once the rights of less powerful individuals like women and
children, stateless persons, the weak or destitute are violated, cultural rights are
no longer protected (Logan et al. 2010:14).
Many case studies have looked at the problems of implementing human rights
in local contexts (Cowan et al. 2001, Foblets and Yassari 2013, Langfield et al. 2010),
and have uncovered how women’s rights and gender equality in particular are of-
ten contradictory to local values and customs (Merry 2006, Hodgson 2011). One of
the main reasons why human rights and local culture do not easily converge is that
there is a contradiction between individual rights and group rights. As Foblets et
al. (2018:6) have elaborated, a general principle in human rights is that an individ-
ual cannot renounce his or her fundamental human rights. This rule is especially
applied in cases involving the interests of children, gender equality and fair trials.
In the name of human rights, any practices considered as deviant or contentious
can be prohibited under state law.This ‘imposed protection’ can lead to individuals
being prevented from following their traditions. This, in turn, can mean that they
are denied the capacity to renew and adapt their cultural practices in their own
way and at their own pace. In practice, Foblets et al. (2018:6–7) conclude, this is
itself a denial of personal autonomy5 that can – as a side effect – give rise to the
unintended marginalization of those who decide to avoid courts in order to be able
to follow their own traditions.
As certain cultures do not support personal autonomy, Foblets et al. (2018:8)
question whether individual autonomy should realistically be a universal goal. In-
dividuals feel strongly attached to their groups and often find it impossible tomake
a decision independent of, or against, the interests of their family, clan or commu-
nity. This explains why people refrain from abandoning certain aspects of their
culture (ibid.:2). When an individual in a case voluntarily renounces the freedom
granted to them by international law, the legal practitioners involved face an ethical
5 Foblets et al. (2018:2, fn9) define ‘autonomy’ as a ‘person’s capacity to make independent
decisions and exercise choice’, and differentiate it from ‘agency’, which refers to a person’s
‘acting on decisions made’.
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dilemma in deciding how to deal with someone who has personally chosen a path
prohibited by law (ibid.:5).
The dilemma of government officials
Within any given legally plural social field, diverse actors operate and pursue their
individual interests. Many studies on legal pluralism have investigated the deci-
sion-making processes of justice-seeking members of local communities, and have
explored how the specific background, gender, age, or profession of individuals
influences their decisions about which legal forum to choose or ‘shop from’ (K.
von Benda-Beckmann 1981).6 However, the perspective of state actors, the ‘para-
dox’ (Zenker and Hoehne 2018) of their having to deal with custom in order to get
their work for the state done, their background and personal interests, their actions
and choices, and the contexts in which they work have only become of interest in
the decade (Lentz 2010, Bierschenk 2014, Olivier de Sardan 2008, 2015; de Herdt
and Olivier de Sardan 2015, Beek et al. 2017).
In their day-to-day work, government officials act in ‘complex normative uni-
verses’, and they undergo an informal professional socialization in order to be able
to navigate in a rather unpredictable environment (Bierschenk 2014). They have to
comply with contradictory messages stemming from official norms – including
rules of law, conventions, local regulations, professional or administrative proce-
dures, all of which are formalized or codified in public action or professional prac-
tice – (Olivier de Sardan 2008:4, fn 15) and from practical norms that are ‘absent
from the public discourse, absent from the official moral rhetorics and absent from
the teaching’ but that are nevertheless important to know (ibid.:15). State officials
therefore flexibly orient themselves towards these ‘rules of the game’ to get their
daily work done. At the same time, they also change them strategically. They play
the ‘game of the rules’ in a way that can be seen as ‘skilful and flexible manoeuvring
within and between norms and modes of engagement’ (De Herdt and Olivier de
Sardan 2015:25). Aside from the external framework and constraints, the personal
backgrounds of the individual officials influences their behaviour and decisions
as they put state law into practice locally, determining their way of interpreting,
implementing and also innovating norms ‘in the interest of accomplishing the or-
ganizational goals’ (Lentz 2010:5).
6 Studies have shown, for example, that females prefer to turn to new forums, as state law and
its ‘non-traditional’ values can be an important resources in the struggle for emancipation,
while the local law is often the law of local elites and/or the senior male population (K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2001:50). At the same time, gender can also limit access to legal forums
(Griffith 1997, Hirsch 1998).
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Demise or rise of customary law in Africa?
Customary law continues to play an important role in Africa, and is now officially
recognized inmany African constitutions, although –due to differing histories and
colonial experience – the degree of recognition and the legal areas recognized vary
greatly (Merry 1991:891). In a comparative analysis of 190 constitutions worldwide,
Cuskelly (2011) found that African constitutions offer the highest level of recogni-
tion of customary law: of 52 African constitutions, 33 referred to customary law in
some form, with good recognition of traditional and customary institutions and
customary law in the courts and relating to land issues. An even larger number of
African constitutions generally protect culture or tradition (Cuskelly 2011:6–11, see
also Gebre, this volume).
What is customary law?
Although regularly used in the literature, the term ‘customary law’ has been crit-
icized for being misleading. What is actually meant by the term depends on the
contexts it refers to. In the literature, three types of customary law referred to by
authors can be discerned.
First, there is the precolonial non-written law of the past: the ‘customary law’
described by many anthropologists in the first half of the twentieth century. It is
seen as a continuation or remnant of precolonial cultures and traditions, and some
authors perceived it to be ‘timeless and static’ (Zenker and Hoehne 2018:5). Since
the 1970s and 1980s this view has been questioned. Researchers have emphasised
that law (like culture in general) is dynamic, and that a second kind of custom-
ary law found in post-colonial Africa (and elsewhere) was actually created out of
the struggles between and among colonizers and colonized during the colonial pe-
riod.7 Emerging African elites – mostly those who were educated, lived in towns
7 A dual legal systemexisted inmost African colonies: one (imported European) law for the col-
onizers, and one (indigenous African) for the colonized (Merry 1991:890). Despite the room
given to the local law to regulate the lives of the colonized, local lawwasnevertheless strongly
influenced by the imported European legal system: indigenous structures and institutions
were integrated into the colonial administration and regional authorities were identified
and made responsible for regional administration (Kohlhagen 2008:79). European law was
used to handlemajor criminal cases, control the local labour force, exploit local resources and
establish an administrative structure that facilitated national and international trade. Local
practices that contradicted key values of the colonizers were forbidden. In British colonies
this was enforced through the repugnancy doctrine, which prohibited courts from enforcing
any customary law considered ‘uncivilized’ or inhuman’ by British standards and values or ‘re-
pugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience’ (Ibhawoh 2007:60–63). The central
works highlighting the creation of ‘customary law’ are by Snyder (1981), Gordon and Meggitt
(1985), Chanock (1985) and Moore (1986). Merry (1991) provides a detailed overview and re-
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and tried to adapt to the lives and values of the colonizers – supported this process.
The adaptation of the local law to imported law not only changed the local law’s
content, but also its general character, as the originally very flexible and adapt-
able local law was substantively transformed by codification (Merry 1991:891–893).8
Thus, many authors consider the codified customary law used to handle the cases
of the colonized in former colonies to be distinct from the pre-colonial law, and
they speak of the ‘creation of a customary law’ (Zenker and Hoehne 2018:5–7) or
‘invention of tradition’ (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1989).9
A third version of the local law continued to exist next to the codified customary
law (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1984). To distinguish between the second kind, e.g.
the transformed versions of codified African law that developed under colonial rule
and the third, that is the normative orders that actually guide daily lives in contem-
porary Africa, some scholars use the term ‘customary law’ or ‘official customary law’
(also ‘lawyers’ customary law’ or ‘judicial customary law’) for the former, and ‘living
customary law’ (also: ‘sociologists’ customary law’, ‘practiced customary law’) for
the latter (Woodman 2011:224–225). The ‘living customary law’, Himonga (2011:48)
emphasizes, is also dynamic, though the changes it undergoes come from within
the community instead of being enforced by any external authority.
Other terms used in the literature for unwritten or non-state legal systems in-
clude ‘people’s law’, ‘traditional law’, ‘folk law’ and ‘indigenous law’. All of these
terms have been discussed and partly discarded for different reasons.10The expres-
sions ‘traditional law’ and ‘customary law’ have been criticized for suggesting non-
state law is unchanged and static, while law is – like other aspects of culture – dy-
namic and subject to continuous change (K. von Benda-Beckmann 2001).The terms
‘people’s law’ and ‘folk law’ have been rejected for romanticizing and minimizing
the forms of non-state law (Roberts 1986, inMerry 1988:877).The expression ‘indige-
nous law’ has been seen as giving the wrong impression, as indigenous societies
view of important literature on the emergence of customary law under colonialism in Africa,
pointing out that the indigenous law changed from a ‘subtle and adaptable system often un-
written, to one of fixed, formal and written rules enforced by native courts’ through adaption
to the imported European law (Merry 1991:897).
8 This pattern of adaptation of the subordinate law to the dominant one, Merry (1991:893) ar-
gues, is also found in other contexts of domination, for example, when states incorporate
ethnic minorities.
9 Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1989) describes how theMinankabau developed a legalistic ver-
sion of their customary adat system,which they present and refer towhen they communicate
with state bureaucrats. By claiming that certain practices (such as land ownership or trans-
fer) were violating one of their customary laws they could defend their interests against the
dominant state in a convincing way. If they simply claimed that land ownership did not exist
or was disliked among them, they would appear as backward and uncivilized.
10 See Merry (1988) for an overview of the discussion.
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that seemed untouched by European influence at the time of early ethnographic re-
search had, in fact, already been vulnerable to outside influences (Fitzpatrick 1985
in Merry 1988:876–877). The rather neutral term ‘local law’ has been suggested as
‘a generic term for law that is being used and maintained at a local level, from
whatever source it is derived’ (K. von Benda-Beckmann 2001).
Alongside the diverse forms of customary law, the imported European law
has also been reinterpreted and transformed into local versions (F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1984) – a process that Merry and Levitt (2017) have called the ‘vernacu-
larization of law’. Thus, in reality, there exists a much greater variety of normative
orders in Africa than just ‘state law and ‘customary law’.
Discussions on the correct terminology referring to the various forms of local
and imported law channelled into the notion that the boundaries between different
systems of ordering are fluid and that the systems are not separate but constitute
a continuum (Galanter 1981 in Merry 1988:877). Moore’s concept of the ‘semi-au-
tonomous social field’ (1973), which can generate rules and norms internally but is
also influenced by external forces, has been widely accepted and has endured.
Despite all the criticism, the term ‘customary law’ is still widely in use, not only
in academia but also in national and international laws and policy documents. It
is also commonly used in the Ethiopian context, both by scholars and legal practi-
tioners and policy makers, though the context is slightly different to that of other
African countries. Ethiopia was never colonized and there exist no codified versions
of local normative orders (though some indigenous notions are reflected in areas
of family law, successions and property law (Vanderlinden 1966/67:59 in Getachew,
this volume). Most of Ethiopia’s numerous non-state normative orders continue to
be functional today, and run in parallel with the state system. When used in the
Ethiopian context, the expression ‘customary law’ is therefore only used to refer to
those local laws that are a dynamic continuation of past forms of legal ordering.
While these local laws have certainly changed over time, inmost cases, the extent to
which a given customary legal system has been shaped or influenced by the law of
previous and/or the current regimes remains to be explored. With all this in mind,
the term ‘customary law’ is also used in this volume.
The presence and future of customary law in Africa
Many scholars acknowledge that customary justice systems, despite their oft-
claimed fundamental differences and incompatibility with state law (Woodman
2011:20), are resilient and continue to be relevant in the lives of many people
worldwide, especially among the poor (Ubink 2011a:7).
As Gebre (this volume) has pointed out for Ethiopia, customary laws are deeply
rooted in cultural and religious values. Customary conflict resolution mechanisms
have been praised not only by the local communities using them, but also by state
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legal practitioners. The proximity of customary courts or elders’ councils and their
speedy handling of cases at low or no cost make customary conflict resolution at-
tractive and easily acceptable to the public. Local legal practitioners are personally
known and respected, and procedures are embedded and legitimated in local values
and beliefs. Customary law is seen as highly credible and transparent because cases
are usually handled in public and with the involvement of community members as
observers, witnesses and commentators, and final decisions are usually publicly ac-
cepted and respected. This limits the chance for corruption and unfair judgment.
In addition, individuals who do not conform to the verdicts of elders or customary
courts risk being considered as rebellious against community values and interests.
Customary institutions are also often more successful in finding out the truth in
criminal cases than the formal justice system, as the social pressure to tell the truth
within communities is very high. Besides, customary institutions can employ reli-
gious or spiritual pressure, for example, by asking a suspect to speak under oath.
As lying under oath is believed to bring misfortune or disease, this tactic is usually
succesful. Furthermore, while the state courts aim to punish wrongdoers, custom-
ary insitutions primarily intend to restore broken relationships. This again means
that their decisions are usually well accepted and supported by the community,
which hopes to avoid coercive measures and enhance social cohesion (Pankhurst
and Getachew 2008a:260). As the restoration of social order often includes the rel-
atives or clans and communities from both the perpetrator’s and the victim’s sides,
possible relapses and spill over effects are avoided and community peace is ensured
(Gebre, this volume). Alongside its role in dispute settlement and conflict resolu-
tion, Ubink (2011c) emphasizes that customary law has particular value in the way
it regulates daily life, the management of and access to land and natural resources,
as well as social life and family issues. As customary legal institutions reduce the
workload of formal courts and are known for their effectiveness, they are often co-
opted by government officials.
However, for all their positive attributes, customary laws and norms have also
been criticized, especially for their frequent incompatibility with the modern state
and international law. As mentioned earlier, some aspects of customary law do
not comply with human rights standards because they contradict ideas of gender
equality, the rights of women, children and minorities, and the rights of the indi-
vidual. Yet, many voices claim that despite the shortcomings of customary laws,
their strengths can be used to shape Africa’s future (Mgbako and Baehr 2011) and
contribute to its legal development in the twenty-first century. Himonga (2011) sees
potential not in the ‘official codified customary law’, as used by magistrates and
courts in postcolonial Africa, but rather in the ‘living customary law’, i.e. the non-
encoded normative orders people live by.The ability of the ‘living customary law’ to
adapt to changing circumstances, he argues, will enable it to live on despite the fact
that it often contradicts national laws and international human rights standards
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(Himonga 2011:34).While efforts should bemade to reconcile ‘living customary law’
with human rights, its local values and fundamental features should be retained as
much as possible (Himonga 2011:48).
Adding to the voices in support of customary systems, Ubink and van Rooij
(2011:8) have pointed to the contribution made by customary laws and adminis-
tration, natural resource management and local knowledge on food security to the
enhancement of sustainable development in Africa. The authors’ hope is that the
involvement of local people and their normative systems should not be seen as a
hindrance, but as assets in the creation of a fruitful link between state and cus-
tomary law and institutions.
The potential of legal hybridity
Legal hybridity is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, it is rather the norm, as legal
institutions – whether state or customary – have always been dynamic and bor-
rowed from and been influenced by other legal institutions. However, the focus in
academia on legal hybridity is somewhat recent, probably because the number of
legal forums coming into contact with each other has been increasing with global-
ization.
Santos (2006:46) uses the words ‘porosity and interpenetration’ to describe ‘legal
hybridity’, and sees it as the result of the bringing together of distinctive and often
contradictory legal orders or cultures that leads to the emergence of ‘new forms
of legal meaning and action’. In a wide sense, ‘hybridity of law’ refers to a legally
plural situation, in which ‘two or more legal systems coexist in the same social
field’. More specifically, it means that ‘two legal traditions blend in the same social
field’ – something sometimes referred to as ‘mixed jurisdictions’ or ‘hybrid systems
of law’. This is the case, for example, in countries or jurisdictions where both civil
law and common law traditions coexist (De Cruz 1999:202). ‘Legal hybridity’ can
refer to the whole justice sector, but also to individual (state or customary) legal
institutions. When they borrow from each other or function in a hybrid manner,
this is often referred to as ‘internal hybridity’ (Clark and Stephens 2011).
In contemporary Africa, the complexity of legal forums is greater than in the
past (Santos 2006). Due to the transformative processes at play in Africa’s states in
the context of globalization, the focus of research has shifted from the intra-state
legal orders that coexist with official, national law, to the influence of the emerg-
ing supranational legal orders. Today, we find today subnational legal plurality in
combination with supranational legal plurality in many African countries (Santos
2006:7).While the interaction between the local, national and global (each of which
has its own rationale and norms) often creates tensions, it always also leads to mu-
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tual influence. Thus, each legal order can only be defined in relation to the legal
constellation of which it is part (Santos 2006:45–46).
As Clark and Stephens (2011:70) have shown for Indonesia and the South Pa-
cific, this borrowing of elements occurs in both directions. Their work elaborates
how on one hand customary authorities tend to codify their rules and structures
in order to ‘be seen like the state’ and thus to be respected and not regarded as
‘backward’. On the other hand, the state also borrows from non-state normative
traditions to apply state law more effectively. The creation of hybrid institutions,
the authors argue, can be a chance to blend the strengths and mitigate the weak-
nesses of formal and customary systems. Also, in contexts where neither state nor
non-state justice system can fully deliver justice, hybrid institutions can help over-
come the weaknesses and injustices of both systems (Clark and Stephens 2011:68).
Berman (2007) also sees the normative conflicts among multiple, overlapping legal
systems as a potential source of new ideas that can lead to the creation of a wide
variety of procedural mechanisms and institutions. The gacaca courts in Rwanda,
for example, are an oft-mentioned recent example of a creative and resourceful
hybrid of ‘retributive, deterrent and restorative justice with the ultimate aim of
being restorative and reconciliatory’ (Clark 2007:61–62). This hybrid form of court
was launched to handle the less serious cases related to the 1994 genocide, and
combined ‘prosecution with national unity and reconciliation’ (Hermann 2012:90).
Mgbako and Baehr (2011) mention the constructive role played by paralegal orga-
nizations, which are usually comprised of non-lawyers – for example, paralegal
experts who receive some training in formal law and at the same time have inti-
mate knowledge of customary law –who assist communities and individuals in the
resolution of justice disputes. These non-lawyers’ knowledge of both areas of law
enables them to assist communities in navigating between the formal and custom-
ary systems. Harper (2011) has highlighted some examples of productive engage-
ment with customary law in Africa, and has shown that impediments to accessing
equitable justice through customary forums can be addressed by the creation of
alternative institutions. These include i) NGO-created forums for dispute resolu-
tion based on customary values and procedures that can be expanded and built on;
ii) paralegals (laypersons with some legal knowledge and skills to negotiate with
court system) who can provide a bridge between the formal legal system and soci-
ety; and iii) legal aid services and mobile courts designed to extend the reach of the
state’s justice services to remote communities (Harper 2011:35–38). Ubink (2011b)
has explored the positive effects of participatory codification of customary law in
Namibia, and uncovered a successful attempt to bring customary and state law to-
gether. In the 1990s, traditional Ovambo authorities of northern Namibia selected
a number of the most essential and procedural customary norms for codification.
Even though some of these codified norms (for example, on the status of widows)
were adapted to conform to the constitution, local acceptance of their legitimacy
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still seems to have been rather high. The fact that the norms chosen for codifica-
tionwere selected by local elders and not enforced by the government had an overall
strengthening effect on the Uukwambi (traditional kingdom of Ovambo) custom-
ary justice system (Ubink 2011b:145–147). The formalization of customary law has
not, however, contributed to the legal empowerment of women in either customary
or state court contexts (Peters and Ubink 2015). In South Africa, the philosophical
and legal concept of ubuntu, ‘the right to be treated with respect and dignity’,11 is
frequently used in state court cases (Himonga 2011:45–46).
Preconditions for productive cooperation
Transferring laws from one cultural context to another often means interfering
with communities’ key values, and carries the risk of knowingly or unknowingly
creating disturbance and irritation. Such transfers mostly also occur in unequal
relationships: they are usually initiated by a dominant state imposing new laws on
local communities, even if both sides influence each other in the long run. How-
ever, even though the state seems to be in the more powerful position, if the tar-
geted recipients cannot be convinced that the legal innovations are to their benefit,
the imposition of new laws can lead to disappointment, withdrawal, resistance and
conflict.Mutual recognition is one of the bases for peaceful relations and trust (Tay-
lor 1997).12 Thus, respectful and polite forms of interaction must be found in order
to avoid distrust, disrespect and perceived insult. As trust, respect and deference
are rather complex social and culture-specific phenomena (Broch-Due and Ystanes
2016, Finkelstein 2008), mutual knowledge about cultural values and practices are
important for success. In addition, the character of social relationships, whether
interpersonal or between groups, radiates from the past as much as the present,
so successful intercultural encounters need careful and open-minded approaches,
especially when negative experiences have shaped perceptions and stereotypes.
11 Ubuntu has been translated as ‘humaneness’, ‘human dignity’. Being a traditional concept, it
has to some extent influenced the way people are treated in the state legal system.
12 In his discussion on the contemporary politics of ‘multiculturalism’, Charles Taylor (1997:99)
acknowledged the importance of ‘recognition’ as a ‘vital human need’ and not just a ‘courtesy
we owe people’. The absence of recognition (i.e. misrecognition) can actually be considered
as a formof oppression, and can inflict harm (ibid.:98–99). In the politics of equal recognition,
this has led to two forms of conceptions. The first, based on the perception that all humans
are the same, equal recognition is commonly understood as an offering of equal rights for all.
The second acknowledges the need to recognize difference and the need for special rights
and entitlements for groups who have been disadvantaged or whose culture is at stake if
they are to preserve their personal and cultural integrity (ibid.:105–107).
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Customary law and legal pluralism in Ethiopia
The normative systems in Ethiopia are highly diverse.They include the formal state
system, the customary normative orders of more than eighty ethnic groups, the
Sharia courts, the certified commercial arbitration forums, and spirit mediums
operating as mediators between humans and supernatural forces (Gebre 2014). In-
ternational law now also has a place in Ehtiopia’s legal landscape, as Ethiopia has
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and related conven-
tions and treaties, and has included laws protecting human rights of the individual
in its 1995 Constitution and in numerous government and NGO programmes. Con-
cepts
As mentioned earlier, customary laws and conflict resolution mechanisms con-
tinue to be applied both in the absence and presence of state institutions in both
rural and urban contexts. Efforts by earlier regimes to ignore or forbid local norma-
tive orders, institutions and authorities have been rather unsuccessful in Ethiopia
(Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Getachew, this volume). Unlike in former colonies,
Ethiopia’s customary legal systems have continued to function unimpeded by out-
side influence inmany places (especially in the peripheries).However, as elsewhere,
changing conditions and external influences have led to changes in customary con-
flict resolution that have, especially in the twentieth century, led to new forms, hy-
brid institutions and some cooperative interaction between state and customary
institutions (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:73).13
The first Ethiopian Constitution was enacted in 1931 and revised in 1955 (Aberra
2012:166, 170). The country’s first modern codified law was developed in the late
1950s and early 1960s. It was inspired mainly by various European civil law models,
with efforts made to blend Ethiopian concepts of justice into the civic law (Aberra
2012:183ff). However, despite these efforts, it is clear that the incorporated elements
were very limited and did not represent the diversity of customary laws in the coun-
try; customary legal institutions were also not given any recognition (Pankhurst
and Getachew 2008:5). Similarly, the socialist Derg regime’s (1987–1991) consitution
emphasized the formation of a unitary state under one national law (ibid.:5–6).
The current Ethiopian Constitution, created in 1995, emphasizes cultural and
ethnic diversity in a federal state. Article 34(5) makes direct reference to settlement
13 In some areas state law was extended, especially in areas of serious crime (such as homi-
cide, breaches of law and order, and after 1975 in relation to land issues). The introduction of
the balabat institution (local leaders selected for local administration) constituted a form of
indirect rule. The formalization and monetization of economy led to changes in compensa-
tion payments –no longer given in kind but in cash – and the influence of writing led to the
codification of law. Besides, the monotheistic religions (Islam and Orthodox and Protestant
Christianity) replaced customary law in some places or removed some of its key elements
(Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:73ff).
Introduction 25
of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordance with customary laws,
and Article 78(5) states that the House of People’s Representatives and State Coun-
cils can give official recognition to customary courts.14 Local institutions and courts
are thus officially recognized and, in some contexts, even considered as more cost
and time effective than the state system (Gebre et al. 2012a).While there exist many
studies on customary conflict resolution in Ethiopia (see the collected essays in
Fekade et al. 2011, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Gebre et al. 2011, 2012b, Tarekegn
and Hanna 2001, and the monograph by Nicolas 2011) – both appreciative and cric-
ital – there are very few on legal pluralism. Most of the case studies on customary
dispute resolution in Pankhurst and Getachew (2008) have a short section on the
interaction between state and customary legal institutions of half a page or so.Only
Dereje (2008, in the same volume) gives a more detailed example, in his discussion
of the sefer shum, a kind of hybrid legal institution (court) among the Nuer. Some
very recent publications look specifically at the cooperative coexistance of state and
customary laws and the emergence of hybrid institutions and procedures. Among
the very few offerings from anthropology are the works of three authors: Seidel
(2013), who examines the coexistence of Sharia law and state law; Kairedin (2018),
who looks at the very complex situation in Siltie, where Sharia, state and customary
legal institutions function and interact; and Prigge (2012), who describes the real-
ities of legal pluralism among the Amhara. Legal experts, meanwhile, have made
efforts to develop models of how the various legal systems could cooperate produc-
tively and contradictions be eliminated. Among them are Donovan and Getachew
(2003), who discuss the handling of homicide in the context of legal pluralism in
Ethiopia from a legal perspective, Mohammed (2011), who discusses the position
of Sharia courts in the constitutional framework of Ethiopia, and several authors
in the volume edited by Stebek and Muradu (2013), who examine the role of legal
pluralism in the process of development and modernization of the Ethiopian state.
Somewhat paradoxically, it was with the introduction of ethnic federalism in
1995, and the official recognition of cultural diversity and customary laws in the
constitution, that major changes in local normative orders began to occur. Since
1991, the current government has been putting increased effort into integrating all
areas and people into the state apparatus. The penetration of the state into the
local communities has taken different forms. First, the decentralization process
has empowered local people to administer their own affairs using the national and
subnational law. Second, the government has practically come to the ‘doorsteps’
of many rather isolated communities through major development and investment
projects, the improvement of local infrastructure (construction of roads, establish-
ment of telecommunication networks), and the expansion of social services (educa-
14 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (accessible online at http://www.
ethiopia.gov.et/constitution, last accessed 22 October 2018).
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tional and healthcare institutions, awareness-raising programmes). This has been
accompanied by government efforts to increase enforcement of the state law,which
meant that state law has come to be seen as offering a viable alternative legal forum
for local communities.
Given that the federal decentralization of power was inspired by the right to
self-determination of the ethno-cultural communities, one might expect that cus-
tomary justice systems would have been given robust recognition. However, the
formal state’s approach to customary justice systems has not in fact shown much
change from the pre-1995 scenario. While the state seems to be continuing with
its policy of creating a pervasively applicable formal legal system (to the exclusion
of customary institutions), many researchers have the impression that customary
institutions not only continue to exist but are, in fact, flourishing. Although their
position has been altered, customary leaders continue to play important roles in
managing community affairs in many parts of the country, especially in the South-
ern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), parts of Oromia region
and the border regions of Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, where
most pastoral groups live (Tronvoll and Hagmann 2012a:7–8). Local legal institu-
tions and courts are appreciated by both, the communities and state officials, who
value them for their cost and time effectiveness and their sustainable resolution of
conflicts (Gebre et al. 2012).15
The co-existence of different legal systems has led to constant negotiations
across normative divides between state, religious and customary legal practition-
ers, government officials, justice-seeking members of local communities, local
leaders and political functionaries. The provision that parties to a dispute have
to agree to have their case handled in a particular legal forum makes communi-
cation between justice seekers and government officials necessary. The fact that
a growing number of government officials are native to the area in which they
work has led to a merging of knowledge about different value and legal systems;
although, the normative dilemma for native government officials of having to
serve different sides necessitates great sensitivity, flexibility and tolerance. The
high caseload in state courts and an awareness of the effectiveness of customary
conflict-resolution mechanisms motivates many legal practitioners to send cases
back to the customary or religious legal forums for resolution, and this demands
at least a certain degree of knowledge of, and respect for, customary laws. As
the case studies in this volume will show, the better the communication, mutual
respect and knowledge about the differences between the values and laws of
the existing legal systems, the more sustainable and satisfying the outcome of
15 There are many appreciative and also critical studies on customary conflict resolution in
Ethiopia (see the collected essays in Fekade et al. 2011, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Gebre
et al. 2011, 2012, Tarekegn and Hanna 2001, and the monograph by Nicolas 2011).
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resolved conflicts. Misunderstandings, resistance and conflict are common – and
previously abandoned harmful traditional practices might even be taken up again
(see Epple, this volume, on infanticide in Bashada and Gabbert 2014, on female
genital cutting in Arbore) – where dis-
trust continues to prevail, cultural differences are great, and the flexibility of legal
practitioners is low (see for example Aberra, Yohannes, this volume).
Finally, the study of legal pluralism in contemporary Ethiopia needs to be un-
derstood in the context of its history, which has long been marked by the dom-
ination of the centralist state over the country’s diverse cultural groups. Some
studies looking at the continuities and changes of the mutual perceptions of lo-
cal populations and the government under subsequent regimes have shown that
past experiences still influence the way present day Ethiopian citizens relate to
their government.16 As Strecker and Lydall (2006a:1) put it, in situations of cultural
contact, ‘notions of pride, honour, name and self-esteem come into play, which –
once people are hurt – have great explosive power leading to destruction and self
destruction’. However, people have the chance to ‘act imaginatively and creatively’
if given enough space and time to understand and adapt, even if the changes they
experience are unwanted and painful (Strecker and Lydall 2006a:3).
Organization of the book
The contributions were made by lawyers and social anthropologists working on
legal pluralism in Ethiopia. The book is divided into four thematic sections. Fol-
16 See the collection of articles in Strecker and Lydall (2006b), which examine how the different
peoples in the Ethiopian south remember their past, especially their forced inclusion into the
Ethiopian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century under Emperor Menelik II, and their
lives under a dominant central state until the end of the socialist Derg regime in 1991. The one
hundred years of unequal cultural contact between government and local populations led to
various mutual conceptions and stereotypes, which still influence the way people think of
each other, interact, communicate, adapt, avoid or reject each other. For example, Miyawaki
(2006) has shownhow thememories of the Ethiopian conquest still shape theway theArbore
people interpret present-daydisturbances in their country. Taddesse (2006) recounts theGuji
experience of past humiliation and strongly suggests that minority groups must be given
opportunities for voluntary rather than enforced assimilation. Strecker (2013) published the
memories of a Hamar elder about the Ethiopian conquest and the Italian occupation. Lydall
(2010) depicted the relationship between theHamar and the government and described it as
paternalistic in that Hamar traditions are challenged by the dominant ‘highlanders’ with the
assumption that they know better what is good for them than the Hamar themselves. Epple
(2012) showed that, in the context of modern education, the Bashada cooperate with the
government as long as the people feel they are being taken seriously and treated respectfully,
and do not fear that the key values of their culture are under threat.
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lowing the introduction, which constitutes chapter one, the first section gives an
overview of the history and constitutional context of legal pluralism in Ethiopia,
a critical view on the international status of indigenous rights, and a conceptual
discussion of customary law in the context of legal pluralism. The second, third
and fourth thematic section provide insights into the experiences and daily prac-
tice of justice-seeking individuals and legal practitioners. Based on original and
recent fieldwork, they show that the relationships between the existing legal fo-
rums in Ethiopia are very dynamic and prone to constant negotiation by the actors
concerned, who strive to achieve their rights, keep their personal and cultural in-
tegrity and defend their interests.Many of the authors have alsomade efforts to in-
dicate the historical context for their case studies. Descriptions of customary legal
systems and the normative differences and tensions with state and international
law are provided as these create the framework in which actual interactions take
place. However, the greatest emphasis has been given to the real-life experiences
of justice seekers and legal practitioners.
The first section on The interplay of international, national and local law contains
three contributions. First, Getachew Assefa discusses the past and continuing re-
lationship between the formal and customary justice systems in his chapter enti-
tled ‘Towards widening the constitutional space for customary justice systems in
Ethiopia’.He begins by providing an historical overview of the relationship between
the two justice systems up until the early 1990s, and explains the formal linkages
created among them by the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution. He argues that the con-
stitutional position, which requires that only customary (and religious) family and
personal laws are recognized and only customary and religious courts only have
power to preside over such matters, and not – for example – criminal matters does
not reflect the reality in the country. He suggests that the vibrancy of customary
justice systems in all areas of dispute settlement in all corners of the country must
be reflected in the formal legal institutions. The author cautions, however, that the
de jure recognition of customary justice systems must be done in a way that en-
sures customary justice is not subordinated to the formal system, and that only
mechanisms – such as a constitutional review system – be put in place to ensure
that customary justice systems function consistently with constitutional and inter-
national human rights standards.
The next chapter, written by Gebre Yntiso, aims at ‘Understanding customary
laws in the context of legal pluralism’. While the plural legal orders in Africa are
the object of growing attention from researchers, the author argues that better and
more comprehensive knowledge is needed for comparative analysis, scientific gen-
eralization and policy application.The deficiency liesmainly in the inconsistent use
of terminology, especially around conceptual issues in the study of customary law.
In his contribution, the author clarifies the meaning of concepts borrowed from
the literature on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and examines the extent to
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which these concepts could be used to refer to customary legal practices. Next, he
identifies and organizes the core values, structures and procedures of customary
laws, and examines their relevance in the analysis of legally plural situations.
Karl-Heinz Kohl looks at the UN ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples’, and examines whymany African governments remain reluctant to accept it as
a basis of policy. Unlike in many former colonial settings around the world, where
‘indigenous’ peoples usually form a minority, the vast majority of people in Africa
are indigenous to the continent: they were born there and regained freedom to live
according to pre-colonial tradition after independence. Consequently, labelling all
African peoples as indigenous would mean that there is no need to protect and
privilege some of them. However, Kohl argues, the situation of smaller groups in
Africa is comparable to, if not worse than, that of indigenous groups on other con-
tinents, as they are often considered as an obstacle to development and modern-
ization, their cultures discriminated against and their access to natural resources
and traditional lands threatened.
In the first of three thematic sections, the case studies explore Cooperation and
competition between legal forums, and look at the productive aspects of the interplay
between various legal forums in urban and rural contexts, which have led to the
sustainable resolution of conflicts to the satisfaction of all parties involved, though
not without elements of competition and abuse of gaps in the law. More specifi-
cally, the case studies presented look at i) the continued strength and widespread
popularity of customary law; ii) the efforts made by legal practitioners and the jus-
tice-seeking clientele of parallel legal systems to communicate and cooperate, learn
and be inspired from each other; iii) the daily handling of legal plurality, the ne-
gotiations between the actors, and the strategic application and manipulation of
law.
The first case study in this section looks at ‘The handling of homicide cases in
the context of legal pluralism: Cooperation between government and customary
institutions in the Gamo highlands’. The author, Temechegn Gutu, looks at how
state and customary institutions cooperate in the area of criminal law. Although
officially the exclusive domain of the government, in practice, homicide cases are
also handled locally. This is not only because the Gamo people believe that rituals
of purification are needed to restore social order and prevent misfortune, disease
and natural calamities caused by the offender’s pollution, but also because state
institutions need the local population to cooperate in the collection of evidence
and to help identify and detain suspects. As he shows in several case studies, the
police and courts not only give local communities room to restore and maintain
peace through their own conflict resolution mechanisms, but also make creative
use of customary mechanisms to get hold of perpetrators and thus to serve the
state’s interests in prosecuting criminals.
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The next contribution, by Melaku Abera, is on ‘The interplay of customary and
formal legal systems among the Tulama Oromo: Cooperation and competition’. Us-
ing several cases as examples, he highlights cooperative as well as problematic as-
pects of the relationship between the two legal systems. The author shows how
the transfer of cases and notification of decisions made between jurisdictions con-
tribute to mutual recognition and respect between state and local courts. Their ac-
tivities even overlap at times: disputes may be settled jointly, or legal practitioners
may be part of both systems, as elders in the local elders’ court and judges in state
courts, for example. At the same time, he points out, this emerging cooperation is
vulnerable, especially when customary and state courts fail to respect each other’s
decisions, which leads to a lack of mutual trust and, in some cases, to wrongdo-
ers being punished by both legal forums. The absence of clear regulations over the
responsibilities of state and customary courts in some areas of law has led to the
rejection of both systems in the handling of certain disputes.
In his chapter on ‘Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa’, Mohammed Abdo looks at the
nature of the cases, the kinds of litigants and the procedures used in Sharia courts
in Ethiopia’s capital. After giving a detailed account of the history of Islamic courts
in Ethiopia, he examines their current condition and how well accepted they are in
light of recent developments, such as the growing consciousness of human rights
and women’s rights and the increasing Muslim demand for self-autonomy over re-
ligious matters. His findings show that most cases submitted to the Federal Sharia
Courts – whose jurisdiction is confined to personal and family matters – concern
divorce, with the great majority being submitted by well-educatedMuslim women.
Despite their modern outlook and economic independence, many Muslim women
prefer to have their marriages dissolved in Sharia courts out of religious convic-
tion. Mohammed also shows that Sharia courts have developed ways to interpret
and employ the state procedural rules, by which they are bound, so that they appear
to be in line with Sharia procedures.
Desalegn Amsalu has done research on the ‘Use and abuse of “the right to con-
sent”: Forum shopping between shimgilinna and state courts among the Amhara
of Ankober, north-central Ethiopia’. The transfer of a case from state court to cus-
tomary legal forum demands the consent of all parties in dispute, and cases can
be transferred back to the formal court if one of the parties withdraws consent.
However, the author demonstrates, the lack of further elaboration of this rule in
law has left room for manipulation and abuse. Plaintiffs or defendants may give
and rescind their consent several times during the course of litigation, switching
between courts in the hunt for a favourable decision. In Ankober, wheremany cases
have been moved back and forth several times between the state court and the el-
ders’ council, this abuse of the right to shop between different legal forums has led
to a general weakening of both the customary dispute resolution culture and the
formal justice system.
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The third thematic section looks more specifically at the Emerging hybridity of
legal institutions and practices, examining how the boundaries between legal forums
can become less rigid, and how new forms of legal concepts, values and practices
can emerge through the effects of close cooperation, mutual understanding and
influence. Case studies focus on i) the creativity of legal actors and recipients/users
in making national and international law applicable to the local context; ii) the
emergence of hybrid forms of law and legal procedures in some places, and iii)
cross-cutting legal procedures.
Susanne Epple looks at ‘Local strategies to maintain cultural integrity: The ver-
nacularization of state law among the Bashada and Hamar of southern Ethiopia’.
She argues that local communities have developed different kinds of mechanisms
to handle unavoidable change brought from outside with the aim to protect their
key values and cultural practises. As could be demonstrated, these strategies of
avoidance range for very soft ones, such as hiding crimes or criminals and pretend-
ing cooperation to open confrontation when the pressure gets very high. Wher-
ever possible, people try to avoid government interference in areas where they feel
their cultural integrity is threatened. Innovations that cannot be turned away are
adapted to, reinterpreted or customized in ways that allow the people to be, or at
least to feel in control of their own affairs.
Julian Sommerschuh writes about the role of religion. In his chapter on ‘Legal
pluralism and Protestant Christianity: From fine to forgiveness in an Aari com-
munity’, he demonstrates that, alongside customary conflict resolution mecha-
nisms and state courts, Protestant churches offer an additional forum for dispute
resolution. In an area where about 60 per cent of the population has converted,
Protestantism has become an important player in the legal arena. By privileging
forgiveness over retribution, prohibiting litigants from going to court without ask-
ing permission, and introducing Protestant logic into the formal courts through
the judges’ personal religious convictions, the author argues, the Church is gain-
ing influence over the functioning of local formal institutions.
Muradu Abdo’s chapter on ‘Kontract: A hybrid form of law among the Sidama’
discusses three legal forums that are used to govern land transfer among the
Sidama: Sidama customary norms and institutions (utuwa), state land laws, and
a hybrid form of land rental agreement (kontract). Examining the genesis and
nature of kontract, he shows that it holds elements of both customary practice and
legal contracts used for land transfer. He then elaborates on the related processes
employed during land transference, and on their implications for the livelihoods
of smallholder farmers who are suffering from agricultural land alienation and
loss. He presents two contrasting theoretical perspectives to interpret the prac-
tice of kontract: i) efficiency-oriented thinking, which characterizes kontract as a
practice that gives free juridical expression to a peasant’s demand for the lifting of
state-law-imposed restrictions on the transferability of farmland; and ii) the legal
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positivist view that kontract emerged as an effective legal regime with detailed,
clear and specific rules sanctioning those who enter into land sales is lacking. He
then develops a third approach that sees kontract as constituting a third layer of
the land tenure regime, lying between utuwa and state land law.
Kairedin Tezera looks at ‘Legal pluralism and emerging legal hybridity: Inter-
actions between the customary, state and religious law among the Siltie of south-
ern Ethiopia’. He first provides a detailed description of the intra-plurality of the
religious, state and customary legal forums among the Siltie and then explores
how actors from the different courts communicate and complement, support and
compete with each other for local power positions. His findings show that dispute
settlers from the three courts borrow norms and legal concepts from each other
in order to pass verdicts in their respective courts. This points to the porousness
of the boundaries between the various legal systems, and to the emergence of a
hybridized legal practice in the area.
Andrea Nicolas looks at how the normative and legal systems of Amhara and
Oromo people influence each other. In chapter thirteen, ‘A matter of perspective:
Of transfer, switching and cross-cutting procedures. Legal processes amongOromo
and Amhara of East Shewa Central Ethiopia’, she introduces different forms of le-
gal institutions co-existing in the study area. These include traditional Oromo law
and legal forums, the Orthodox Church, the courts of spirit followers, the federal
state law, courts and village tribunals, as well as some ‘intermediate’ forms, such as
newly founded ‘clan assemblies’ andmodern NGOs. By providing several case stud-
ies, she shows how justice seekers cross the institutional boundaries and consecu-
tively appeal to different legal institutions – in her view possibly a legitimate choice
for those involved. Alongside the option to forum shop, she suggests that a kind
of ‘meta-procedure’ has emerged, such as when, for example, Amhara priests and
Oromo legal experts jointly participate in common settlement procedures. Here,
the cross-cutting of different legal institutions is no longer the exception but has
become the standard, in that different legal institutions have become ‘elements’ of
one and the same legal procedure.
Despite the many efforts to cooperate and develop mechanisms to cope with
the diversity of legal forums in Ethiopia, disparities often end in miscommunica-
tion and mutual disappointment.The fourth thematic section therefore focuses on
Incompatibilities and conflict between legal forums in Ethiopia, and shows that the way
things are handled often depends on the goodwill and flexibility of individuals on
the ground. Thus, the contributions in this part focus on areas where legal forums
have been unable to come to satisfying solutions, either because the contradic-
tions are too great, or because the parties involved are exploiting, denouncing or
working against each other. More specifically, the authors explore i) the difficulties
stakeholders face in attempting to harmonize international, national and local law;
ii) the conflicts that arise when communication fails or the involved parties treat
Introduction 33
each other with disrespect or ignore each others’ needs and constraints; and iii) the
negative effects on the local population when legal systems fail to cooperate.
Aberra Degefa’s chapter titled ‘When parallel justice systems lack mutual
recognition: Negative impacts on the resolution of criminal cases among the Bo-
rana Oromo’ looks at the competition between the two justice systems in the area
of criminal law, and the negative effects this has on the community. The Borana
have fully functional laws and procedures based on their Gada age-system, where
clan elders make sure that all clan members respect the customary laws. Criminal
cases, though handled by the state courts, continue to be treated locally as well.
As is shown in several case studies, the denial of mutual recognition has meant
that many offenders have been subjected to the jurisdictions of both systems and
have, consequently, been sanctioned twice: through imprisonment by the state
and through compensation payments in the community.
In ‘Combatting infanticide in Bashada and Hamar: The complexities behind a
“harmful traditional practice” in southern Ethiopia’, Susanne Epple explores the
problems that arise from contradictions between international law/human rights
and customary laws and values in local contexts. Specifically, she examines the
negotiation on harmful traditional practices (HTPs) in Hamar Woreda, looking at
the perspectives and priorities of both local communities and external agents. Af-
ter elaborating the cultural meaning and explanations of infanticide among the
Bashada and Hamar people, she explores the views and priorities of state repre-
sentatives: administrative personnel at the zonal and district level, and legal practi-
tioners (prosecutors and judges). Examining the different strategies that have been
employed to eliminate infanticide in South Omo, as well as the population’s reac-
tions and various local strategies, she shows that certain changes could be achieved
through the creativity, flexibility and patience of actors on both sides, even though
frequent set backs are part of daily reality.
Yohannes Yitbarek’s research on ‘Clashing values: The 2015 conflict in Hamar
district of South Omo Zone, southern Ethiopia’ constitutes chapter sixteen. The
author explores the causes of certain major conflicts between the Hamar people
and the local government, the reasons for their escalation in 2014/15, as well as the
efforts made by both sides to resolve the crisis. As he demonstrates, differing per-
spectives on what it means to live a good life, how local resources should be used,
and how conflicts should be resolved led to many deaths during violent encounters
in 2015. Such deaths, he suggests, could be avoided in the future if differences in
values are respected and solutions sought through equitable communication.
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The interplay of international, national
and local law

2. Towards widening the constitutional space for
customary justice systems in Ethiopia
Getachew Assefa
Introduction
Ethiopia exhibits a typical feature of many non-Western societies, wherein the for-
mal state sponsored legal system functions alongside amultitude of non-formal le-
gal systems.The state judicial system, which began in a rudimentary way at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, took a definite shape in 1942 with the enactment
of the first proclamation on judicial administration. Through this law, Emperor
Haile Selassie’s government intended to create a judicial system with jurisdiction
throughout the country. With the enactment of six codified laws (Penal Code, Civil
Code, Commercial Code, Maritime Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Pro-
cedure Code) from the late 1950s to mid 1960s, the imperial government made it
clear that legal relations in Ethiopia would no longer be governed by any customary
legal system.
The drafters of the codes, especially those of the Civil Code of 1960 (with a total
of 3367 articles), attempted to incorporate some customary norms in areas dealing
with family, successions and property (Vanderlinden 1966–67:259). The Civil Code
then declared that any rules –written or customary – dealing with matters covered
in the Code that had not been saved by explicit reference or incorporated into the
Code were repealed (Art. 3347). Although the other codes did not include such clear
repeal provisions, they were enacted with the aim of bringing about the complete
displacement of any non-formal sources of law that were hitherto in operation.
The Ethiopian government’s policy of derecognizing customary justice systems
continued until the fall of the military government (also known as Derg or Der-
gue) in 1991. But, contrary to the official policy of the government, the custom-
ary justice systems of the various ethno-cultural communities of Ethiopia have
never stopped functioning. As studies by Gebre et al. (2012), Donovan andGetachew
(2003), Pankhurst and Getachew (2008) and others show, most of the non-urban
population of the country – about 85 per cent of its population – primarily uses
the customary justice system to settle their disputes.
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The government led by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF), which ousted the Derg and came to power in 1991, introduced – among
other things – a policy of cultural self-determination for the ethno-linguistic com-
munities of the country. As part of this policy shift, the 1995 Constitution recog-
nized the right of customary and religious laws and courts to preside over cases
in the areas of family and personal matters where the disputants have given con-
sent to be heard by these forums.The Constitution is, however, silent regarding the
place of customary justice systems in other areas of civil law and in criminal law.
The central argument of this chapter is that Ethiopia needs to undertake a legisla-
tive reform at both federal and state levels to clearly recognize customary justice
systems in criminal matters and additional areas of civil law. At the same time, leg-
islative reform needs to put in place mechanisms for creating and sustaining har-
monious cooperative relations between the formal and customary legal systems.
Any law enacted should also make sure that the interpretation and application of
customary law is undertaken in a manner consistent with the fundamental rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Ethiopian Constitution and international human
rights standards applicable to Ethiopia. The chapter makes suggestions on how
these legislative aims could be met.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (section two) presents a suc-
cinct summary of the trajectory of customary justice systems to the coming into
force of the 1995 Constitution. Section three explores the space given to customary
justice system under the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia. Section four presents argu-
ments and options for the full recognition of customary justice system in Ethiopia.
Finally, the chapter closes with a brief conclusion.
Customary justice system in Ethiopia before the 1995 constitution
Ethiopia has more than eighty different ethno-linguistic communities.These com-
munities have memberships that range from millions to a few hundred. Each of
them has its own indigenous governance and dispute settlement institutions, laws
and mechanisms that have enabled them to live harmoniously and at peace inter-
nally as well as with others with whom they share land, water or other resources.
Each cultural community may have more than one internal dispute settlement in-
stitution, each of which applies to certain sections of the group and has developed
separately owing to geographical or other reasons.
Customary dispute settlement institutions and norms have been in existence
for perhaps as long as the communities themselves and certainly long before the
formal state laws and institutions were created and applied to these communi-
ties. Based on the existing evidence, the history of customary justice systems in
Ethiopia can be categorized into four broad eras: the whole period preceding the
mid-fourteenth century; the period between the mid-fourteenth century and early
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twentieth century; the period from the early twentieth century to the ratification
of the Ethiopian Constitution in 1995; and the post 1995 constitutional order.
Before the fourteenth century justice was predominantly administered on the
basis of the Biblical precepts of the Old Testament (Fetha Nagast:xvii). Although not
much is known about the legal norms utilized by most of the non-Christian parts
– including those professing Islam–of the population during that time, it is safe to
assume that the cultural groups applied their own norms to govern their relations
internally and with their neighbouring groups. This, however, is not to say that
customary norms were not in use in the Christian or Judeo-Christian parts of the
country. Rather, customary norms were used alongside the Old Testament precepts
to fill gaps or otherwise supplement the royal sources of law (Bililign 1969:152). It is
also known that, at least from the Aksumite period (around the tenth century BC),
the monarchical regime exerted its control over the populace through royal edicts
and proclamations to collect tax, declare war and make peace.
In the mid-fourteenth century, the Fetha Nagast (‘Law of Kings’) was imported
from Alexandria Egypt at the request of Emperor Za’ra Ya’qob (r. 1434–68) for use in
the Christian part of the country (which had large Judaic community before the ad-
vent of Christianity in the fourth century1). According to Abba Paulos Tzadua2, the
Fetha Nagast ‘was originally written in Arabic by the Coptic Egyptian writer Abu-l
Fada’il Ibn al-Assal’ in the 1230s (Fetha Nagast:xv). It replaced the Old Testament of
the Bible as the main source of law at the formal level for the Judeo-Christian part
of the Ethiopian society and remained so until the early twentieth century. But, for
various reasons, the application of the Fetha Nagast was not pervasive. In fact, its
application is said to have been limited to the clergy, the imperial court and limited
sections of the Christian community. The ecumenical code was not readily acces-
sible to those who were in charge of the administration of the law, both physically
as there were few copies of the code in the entire country and because most people
did not understand Ge’ez, the language in which it was expressed (Singer 1970:74).
Thus, again, most people continued to use their customary dispute settlement in-
stitutions and laws to maintain peace and order and to go about their daily lives
(Fetha Nagast:xxvii).
The third era began with the coming to power of Emperor Menelik II (r.
1889–1913). In 1907, for the first time in the country’s history, ministerial depart-
ments were established. Hitherto, at least theoretically, the Emperor made all the
1 Kaplan (1992:17) for example notes, that “according to some Ethiopian traditions, half the
population of Aksum was Jewish prior to the advent of Christianity”.
2 Paulos Tzadua is a Catholic bishop who translated the Fetha Nagast from Ge’ez to English,
originally published in 1968 by the Law Faculty, Haile Selassie I (current Addis Ababa) Uni-
versity. ‘Ge’ez’ (also sometimes referred to as ‘Ethiopic’) is a classical language of the Chris-
tian and Jewish population of Northern Ethiopia. It is currently a liturgical language of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido and also Catholic churches in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
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decisions single-handedly with the help and advice of some very close personnel.
The Emperor’s decision to create various departments was motivated by his desire
to ‘modernize’ the governance and justice system of the country for the benefit of
all its inhabitants (Mahteme-Selassie 1970:53). Among the ministries established
was the Ministry of Justice. It was declared that the Minister of Justice was to serve
as the head (chief) of all the judges in the country and that he was responsible
for ensuring that all judgments conformed to the Fetha Nagast. From that time
on, the formal institutions for the administration of justice were more pervasively
applied, at least in theory.
The establishment of the ministries was followed quickly by the creation of a
division of courts under the Minister of Justice known as Afe Negus, (lit. ‘mouth of
the king’, Amharic), that were to preside over every territory in the country. Before
this, appeals within a particular province were passed to the provincial governor,
who acted as both administrator and high court judge. In the new courts, appeals
from the provinces were heard by the Afe Negus himself, while appeals regarding
the death penalty were heard by the Emperor. Accordingly, six divisions of courts,
with two judges each, were created to have local jurisdiction over the parts of the
country that were placed under their remit. This court structure continued until
the Italian invasion in 1935. It was formally replaced through a law promulgated in
1942 by four tiers (mikitil woreda,3 woreda, awraja4, high courts) below the Afe Negus,
with the Imperial Supreme Court presiding over the latter. A decree issued after
the 1942 judicial administration law allowed governors and lower officials to sit as
presiding judges in the lower (mikitil woreda, woreda and awraja) courts (Geraghty
1970:443).
Attempts were also made to enact procedural and substantive laws especially
in the areas of criminal justice. The Penal Code enacted in 1930, and the judicial
administration decree of 1943, are the two important laws worth mentioning in
this regard.The 1930 Penal Code drew heavily on the criminal law part of the Fetha
Nagast (Singer 1970:131) and superseded it. It is also noteworthy thatHaile Selassie’s
policy of legal unification set in motion with the enactment of the 1942 judicial
administration law left room for Sharia law and customary law, the latter of which
was to deal with small claims and petty offences. A law passed in 1942 (replaced
by another law enacted in 1944), allowed khadis and naibas councils5 to adjudicate
cases based on Islamic law (Singer 1971:136). This law was replaced by a subsequent
law on the same subject passed in 1944 (ibid.).
3 The mikitil woreda court level was later abolished by Judicial Administration Proclamation
No. 195/1962.Mikitil woreda was an administrative unit below woreda (district) level.
4 Awraja was an administrative unit encompassing some woredas under it. It is not in use cur-
rently.
5 Khadi (also qadi) was a mid-level Sharia court judge, and naiba was the lowest Sharia court
judge.
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In 1947, a proclamation (No. 90) was passed establishing local judges called at-
bia dagnias. Proclamation No. 90/1947 allowed the atbia dagnias to adjudicate civil
claims up to the value of 26 Ethiopia Birr (about 9 USD at the time), and to im-
pose a criminal fine of up to Birr 15 (Singer 1970:313). The men appointed as atbia
dagnias were highly regarded local people, such as large landholders, who had al-
ready been unofficially exercising the power formally given to them by Proclama-
tion No. 90/1947.The atbia dagniawas empowered to settle disputes by compromise
(Amharic ‘erq’) within his local jurisdiction without limit as to the amount or type
of dispute. If unable to broker a compromise in a dispute within his material ju-
risdiction, he could then move to adjudicate the case, but if the case exceeded his
material jurisdiction, he would pass it to the appropriate court (Singer 1970:313).
Between the late 1950s and mid-1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie I (r. 1930–1974)
made a comprehensive move, on a revolutionary scale, to replace all existing laws
(customary or otherwise) with codified formal law. This was the pinnacle of the
drive to ‘modernize’ Ethiopia’s legal system begun by Emperor Menelik II. It seems
ironic, however, that while maintaining that ‘no modern legislation which does not
have its roots in the customs of thosewhom it governs can have a strong foundation’
(Fetha Nagast: Preface), Emperor Haile Selassie instructed foreign experts who had
no or very little knowledge about Ethiopian society to draft the major codes of law.6
The Emperor believed that ‘law is a unifying force in a nation’ and that ‘one of the
goals sought to be attained by the enactment of modern codes and other legislation
is that the law be uniform throughout the Empire’ (Haile Selassie I 1964:vi). He also
averred that although the codes drew in part on foreign sources, they were drafted
to accord with Ethiopia’s needs and ancient legal traditions’ (ibid.).
However, it is questionable whether Emperor Haile Selassie’s convictions res-
onated with the drafters of the codes who, it seems, understood their task to be
to create a new set of laws for Ethiopia. For example, Rene David, speaking about
the civil law, stated that Ethiopia’s approach was aimed at the total abolition of
customary law (outside those customary rules that would be incorporated into the
code) and the enactment in its place of a ready-made system of foreign law (David
1962/63:188–189). David made an assumption that ‘Ethiopians do not expect the
new Code to be a work of consolidation, the methodical and clear statement of ac-
tual customary rules. They wish it to be a program envisaging a total transforma-
tion of society and they demand that for the most part, it set out new rules appro-
priate for the society they wish to create’ (David 1962/63:193). David also spoke about
the fact that some customs might not be worth preserving as they were repugnant
6 The 1957 Penal Codewas drafted by Professor JeanGraven (Swiss); 1960 Civil Codewas drafted
by the French comparative law jurist Rene David; the Commercial Code (also of 1960) was
drafted by professors Escarra and Jauffret (also French jurists); 1961 Criminal Procedure Code
by Sir Mathews of the UK (Sand 1974:12,14).
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to justice and likely to be rejected by the people in the future (David 1962/63:194).
David further justified the almost wholesale importation of foreign civil law into
Ethiopia by the fact that there was no custom at all in certain areas of the civil
law, such as contracts, and that the multiplicity of cultures with diverse custom-
ary laws in Ethiopia made it impossible to codify or follow custom in the country
(David 1962/63:195).Thus, except in certain areas of the Civil Code dealing with fam-
ily law, successions and property law, where the rules reflected indigenous notions
(Vanderlinden 1966/67:59), most of its provisions were essentially based on Euro-
pean legal rules. It needs to be noted that the Civil Code made it poignantly clear
in its repeal provision (Art. 3347) that it abrogated or replaced all laws, written or
customary, previously in force.
The ideas reflected by Rene David with regard to the Civil Code were shared
by all the foreign experts that drafted Ethiopia’s legal codes at that time. Indeed,
it seems they were acting on instructions from the Emperor’s government to draft
the laws based on the legal systems of developed nations (Sand 1971:5). The Penal
Code (1957) and the Commercial Code (1960) hardly gave any regard to the custom-
ary laws and institutions of Ethiopian society. The only reference the Penal Code
made to ‘customary law’ was in Art. 10 dealing with transitory issues, which states
that applications for the cancellation and reinstatement of judgments made under
penal legislation repealed by this Code or ‘customary law fallen into disuse’ shall
be governed by the Penal Code. The expression ‘customary law fallen into disuse’
makes it clear that the intention of the Code was to supersede customary law. In
a few other places (Art. 97, confiscation of property; Art. 550, duels; Art. 770, dis-
turbance of work or rest of others; and Art. 806, petty theft) the Penal Code refers
to ‘custom’ as fact, not law. The fact that the 2004 Criminal Code, which replaced
the 1957 Penal Code, does not have provisions analogous to Art. 10 of the 1957 Pe-
nal Code makes it clear that customary law in criminal law areas had already been
nullified by the 1957 Penal Code, and that the Criminal Code had no intention of
reviving it.
The same was the case with the Criminal Procedure Code of 1961, which –
aside from its incorporation of a section on the atbia dagnias, entitled ‘Atbia Dag-
nias with summary jurisdiction’7 – was almost totally based on European (mostly
Anglo-American) rules of criminal procedure. The atbia dagnias, as earlier noted,
were established in 1947 as local judges to hear very minor civil and criminal cases.
7 Arts. 223 and 224 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the atbia dagniaswere empowered towhen-
ever possible settle by compromise all cases arising within their local jurisdiction of minor
offences of insult, assault, petty damage to property or petty theft where the value of the
property stolen does not exceed 5 Birr. If he cannot bring about a compromise, the atbia dag-
nias can then move to adjudicate the case with the help of two assessors and, on conviction,
can impose a fine not exceeding 15 Birr. His decisions are appealable to theworeda court with
local jurisdiction.
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While the Criminal Procedure Code maintained the atbia dagnias and gave them
jurisdiction over minor criminal offences, the Civil Procedure Code enacted in 1965
did not mention them as having any civil jurisdiction. A Ministry of Justice circu-
lar sent out to the provincial governors immediately after the adoption of the Civil
Procedure Code did, however, state that the atbia dagnias courts could continue to
exercise their civil jurisdiction if the parties agreed to submit their disputes to them
(Geraghty 1970:428).
The dominant paradigm of replacing customary law with foreign-influ-
enced formal laws and institutions of justice continued under the Derg regime
(1974–1991). The defining character of the Derg was its importation of a socialist-
oriented legal system based on Marxist-Leninist teachings, and its rejection of
the liberal notions of the West. But when it came to customary justice systems,
the Derg’s policy position had the same effect of relegating and disregarding
customary justice systems as that of the previous regime.
The fall of the Derg and coming to power of the EPRDF in May 1991 ushered in
the current era in the development of the relationship between the Ethiopian state
and the customary justice system. The EPDRF government clearly distanced itself
from earlier regimes by proclaiming, among other things, the cultural self-deter-
mination of the country’s ethno-cultural communities as official state policy. The
EPDRF’s interim constitution, the 1991 Charter of the Transitional Government (the
Charter), states that every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia is, among other
things, guaranteed the right to: preserve its identity and have it respected; promote
its culture; and administer its own affairs within its own defined territory (Art. 2).
However, while the Charter openly embraced the cultural and other rights of self-
determination of nationalities, it did notmake specific reference to customary laws
or courts. In this regard, it followed suit with all the earlier Ethiopian constitutions.
Moreover, one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted during the tran-
sitional period (1991–1995) under the ambit of the Charter was Proclamation No.
7/1992, which organized the national/regional self-governments of the country and
divided up judicial power between central and regional formal courts without any
mention of non-formal courts (see Art. 10(9) and Arts. 23–24). The 1995 Constitu-
tion, on the other hand, reflected a clear policy shift in its embracing of customary
(and also religious) laws and courts, albeit only in the areas of family and personal
matters.The next section of this paper will explore the relevant constitutional, legal
and policy regimes regarding customary justice under the current constitutional
dispensation.
Customary justice system and the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia
As earlier noted, the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia signalled a move away from the
abolitionist position with regard to non-state justice system pursued by Ethiopia’s
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governments since Haile Selassie’s time. The framers of the Constitution adopted
an approach that opened up space for the application of some customary laws and
courts on the basis of subject matter. Accordingly, Art. 34(5) of the 1995 Constitution
states:
This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to per-
sonal and family laws in accordance with [religious or] customary laws, with the
consent of the parties to the dispute. Particulars shall be determined by law.
To go full circle on the matter, the Constitution makes provisions for religious and
customary courts in Art. 78(5), thus:
Pursuant to sub-Article 5 of Article 34 the House of Peoples’ Representatives and
State Councils can establish or give official recognition to religious and customary
courts. Religious and customary courts that had state recognition and functioned
prior to the adoption of the Constitution shall be organized on the basis of recog-
nition accorded to them by this Constitution.
Art. 34 of the Constitution, which is part of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution,
deals with ‘marital, personal and family rights’. Other provisions of this article en-
shrine constitutional standards that need to be respected regardless of religious
or cultural or communal considerations. Thus, it is declared that men and women
without any distinction as to race, nation, nationality or religion, have equal rights
while entering into, during marriage and at the time of divorce, and that marriage
shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
The Constitution also makes clear that the recognition of marriages concluded un-
der systems of religious or customary law must be based on normative standards
to be specified by law. Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates that laws shall be
enacted to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of children at the time
of divorce.
The Constitution’s substantive standards in its other provisions are likewise
noteworthy. Art. 35 enshrines the rights of women, underscoring their complete
equality with men in the enjoyment of constitutional rights and their right to pro-
tection by the state against harmful customs.The Constitution explicitly states that
‘laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily ormental harm to women
are prohibited’ (Art. 35 [4]). In its declaration of the cultural objectives of the coun-
try (Art. 91), the Constitution also states:
The Government shall have the duty to support, on the basis of equality, the
growth and enrichment of cultures and traditions that are compatible with fun-
damental rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideals, and the provisions of the
Constitution (emphasis added).
Constitutional space for customary justice systems in Ethiopia 51
Added to these is the Constitution’s supremacy clause, which emphatically states
that ‘any law, customary practice … which contravenes [the] Constitution shall be
of no effect’.
Therefore, the statement in Art. 34(5) of the Constitution, cited above, needs to
be viewed within the context of the broad normative position taken in the Con-
stitution. The Constitution gives primacy to individual rights even in the face of
possible challenges to such rights from religious, cultural or communitarian po-
sitions. It has taken the position that the human rights standards enshrined in it
shall apply uniformly to men and women that come under the Constitution’s ju-
risdiction, regardless of their religious and cultural background. But at the same
time, the Constitution has also chosen not to force its rights’ standards on those
whomay want to settle disputes arising in the areas of family and personal matters
in accordance with the rules ordained by religion or custom. By allowing an excep-
tion to the uniform standards it espouses with regard to fundamental rights and
freedoms, the Constitution accommodates the wishes of those individuals who,
while being aware of their right to have personal and family matters regulated by
the country’s civil law, consent to having their disputes in these areas adjudicated
on the basis of religious or customary law.Therefore, the Constitution as such does
not subject individuals to the operation of religious and customary laws but rather
gives individuals themselves the right to choose.
The Constitution stated in Art.34(5) that particulars regarding the adjudication
of disputes by customary and religious laws would be determined by a law to be en-
acted on the matter. In pursuance of that, Proclamation No. 188/1999 (Federal Courts
of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation) was enacted by the House of Peoples’ Repre-
sentatives and deals comprehensively with the structures and hierarchies of the
Federal Sharia Court, the jurisdiction of each hierarchy, the applicable substantive
and procedural laws, the appointment of judges and the governance system of the
Court. However, to date, no law has been enacted regarding customary laws and
courts. Indeed, regulating the particulars of customary courts and laws in Ethiopia
is not an easy task because of the sheer number of cultural communities in the
country, each with their own customary norms. It is hoped that the suggestions
made later in this chapter indicate some ways of surmounting this difficulty.
The constitutions of the Ethiopian regional states have the same dispensations
as the Federal Constitution regarding the customary and religious laws, courts and
other normative standards discussed in the preceding paragraphs. As is the case
at the federal level, although most regional states have enacted legislation on the
Sharia courts, none has enacted laws regarding customary laws and courts.
Now that we have seen the place of customary (and religious) family and per-
sonal laws and courts in the Ethiopian constitutional order, the next question is
whether the customary justice system has any de jure place with regard to other
civil matters and in criminal matters. The answer to this question is not readily
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available in the constitutional texts. And the issue has been further complicated by
the discrepancy between what seems to be the position of the constitutions (both
federal and regional) and the provisions of some sub-constitutional laws enacted
by the regional states’ legislative councils.
To begin with, the Federal Constitution – to which all regional constitutions
conform – does not make any further reference to customary laws and courts be-
yond its reference to them in relation to family and personal matters in Arts. 34(5)
and 78(5). The Federal Constitution empowers the federal legislature, the House of
Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR), to make major laws such as penal law – although
the state may enact penal laws on matters that are not specifically covered by the
federal penal legislation – commercial law and labour law. The HoPR is also em-
powered to make laws on the utilization of land and other natural resources, inter-
state commerce and foreign trade, patents and copyrights, and to enact civil laws
that the House of the Federation deems necessary for establishing and sustaining
the economic unity of the federation (if not decided as such by the House of the
Federation, civil matters remain part of the states’ competences).
The laws that fall under the law-making competence of the federal legislature
are applied nationally: they apply throughout the territory and to all persons that
happen to be within the territorial jurisdiction of Ethiopia. This by implication
means that, except for the customary family and personal laws (which have been
clearly given formal space by the Constitution), all other matters – civil and crimi-
nal – fall within the remit of formal laws and are governed by them.Thus, because
of the silence of the Federal Constitution – and, as they currently stand, of all re-
gional state constitutions – regarding the place of customary law in areas other
than family and personal matters, it would be plausible to conclude that custom-
ary law is not given any formal (de jure) recognition to deal with matters falling
outside family and personal laws.
While the above-presented reading of the federal and regional states’ constitu-
tions is correct, I hasten to add three important points. First, many studies have
shown that, in reality, the customary justice systems of Ethiopia’s ethno-linguis-
tic groups have always exercised jurisdiction over all kinds of disputes involving
family, personal, civil and criminal matters without any jurisdictional limitations
based on the matters in dispute (see for example Gebre et al. 2012, Pankhurst and
Getachew 2008, Melaku 2018). Thus, although the formal constitutional structure
ignores the vitality of customary justice systems, the reality has always been that
most disputes – from the simplest to the most complex, such as homicide cases
(see Donovan and Getachew 2003, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008) – especially out-
side urban locations, get resolved through customary systems. This makes it plain
that the formal constitutional position does not reflect reality.
The second point regards a development that emerged after the 1995 Federal
Constitution came into force and that is a reason for optimism about the grad-
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ually widening space for customary justice systems. As earlier noted, the Federal
Constitution seems to be in favour of a uniform application of the formal legal sys-
tem with regard to all matters other than family and personal matters. This is also
the position of regional state constitutions. However, of late, there seems to have
been a policy shift on the part of the federal government in the direction of being
more accommodative towards customary justice systems in the area of criminal
matters. In 2011, the federal government of Ethiopia endorsed a ‘Criminal Justice
Policy’. The Policy declared the government’s resolve to recognize the customary
justice system as an integral part of the country’s criminal justice system. The two
relevant paragraphs of the Policy read as follows:
Even if the crime committed is a serious crime, if theAttorneyGeneral (AG) is of the
opinion that the settlement of the dispute by customary means brings about the
restoration of lasting harmony and peace among the victim and the wrongdoer
than it would be the case if the case was to be resolved by the formal justice av-
enue, then the AGmay in consideration of public interest decide not to prosecute
such a crime. In cases of crimes that are punishable with simple imprisonment
or upon complaint, the investigation or prosecution can be interrupted if the dis-
puting parties have settled their differences through reconciliation and upon the
initiation or request of the parties (FDRE Criminal Justice Policy 2011:14–15).
The Policy underscores that any decision by the Attorney General not to prosecute
crimes shall be based on public interest considerations. It further states that what
constitutes public interest shall be stipulated in the criminal procedure law and
directives to be issued by the Attorney General. The Policy does not specify how
the formal and customary justice systems should communicate and interact in the
event that the Attorney General decides to leave a case to the customary justice sys-
tem. Thus, although the Policy suggests the government has shifted its policy to-
wards embracing customary justice systems, more concrete steps need to be taken
to work out the relationship between the two systems.Themost effective way to do
this would obviously be through legislative reform, which could be effected at the
sub-constitutional level without necessarily involving an amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
The third point is that, through their sub-constitutional legislation, the regional
states have already entrusted customary justice institutions with certain jurisdic-
tions in areas other than family and personal matters. This, again, arguably does
not accord with what seems to be the shared position of the federal and regional
states’ constitutions. But, in my view, these legal developments show the policy
shift towards opening up space for customary justice systems, which was not the
case in the early 1990s when the constitutional norms were being negotiated.
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The customary justice system in states’ sub-constitutional laws
As earlier noted, laws passed by regional states, notably in relation to rural land
administration and utilization and social courts, have bestowed different levels of
jurisdiction on customary institutions. A few examples are presented here.
The lowest judicial structures found in the kebeles, the lowest administrative
units, are the social courts. Some regional states have established and defined the
jurisdiction of the social courts, empowering them to settle disputes based on cus-
tomary law. For example, the Amhara Social Courts Proc. No. 246/2017 stipulates
that one of its objectives is to enable the settlement of disputes amicably through
the shimgilinna8 process. The proclamation also states that social courts shall un-
dertake their activities based on the local custom, tradition and practices, and that
the judges of social courts shall be directed solely by formal (state enacted) law or
local tradition and custom. Similarly, the Social Courts Proclamation No. 127/2007
of Oromia Region states that judges in social courts can settle disputes based on
the regular law or through customary means.
Rural land use and administration laws provide another set of laws through
which regional governments allow customary institutions to settle disputes.
According to the Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation No.
130/2007, anyone who has a land-related case should first apply to the kebele
administration where the land is situated. Then, the disputing parties should
select two arbitral elders each, after which they should agree on a chairperson for
the elders’ panel. The chairperson may also be co-opted by the four elders. If both
the parties and the elders can not agree on the presiding elder, the kebele admin-
istration will appoint one. The law states that the elders’ panel is to be given 15
days to submit a written decision on the dispute. Once submitted, the decision of
the elders’ panel should be registered, and officiated copies given to the disputing
parties. Dissatisfied parties can lodge an appeal – attaching the copy of the elders’
decision –with the woreda (district) court with local jurisdiction, and they also
have the right to appeal to the high court with local jurisdiction. The Afar Regional
State’s Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation No. 49/2009 takes a
similar approach to that of Oromia, except that it does not require the decision of
the arbitral elders to be submitted in writing. Likewise, the Amhara Rural Land
Use and Administration Proclamation No. 252/2017 provides that if disputing
parties fail to settle their disputes amicably, they can entrust their case to elders of
their choosing. If that fails, the case can be taken to the woreda court, with a right
to appeal to the high court. The Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation
No. 110/2007 of SNNPR sets forth an almost identical procedural approach to the
settlement of land-related disputes. The above examples of regional land-use and
8 Reconciliation through local elders.
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administration laws regarding the use of social courts give a clear indication that
formal government institutions at the regional level have determined to extend
the jurisdiction of customary justice institutions beyond what seems to be allowed
by their constitutions. Of course, this still represents only a fraction of the variety
of disputes that customary institutions settle in reality.
Challenges faced by customary justice systems
As noted earlier, although the formal legal system at the regional state level does
carve out more space for customary justice systems beyond family and personal
matters, there is still a huge gap between what these institutions do in reality and
the recognition accorded to them. This situation has created many challenges for
the customary justice institutions and for people who happen to be disputants be-
fore them, especially those who benefit from the decisions that are handed down
by these institutions (see Desalegn and Melaku, this volume).
In addition, customary justice systems continue to face challenges even in the
areas of family and personal matters. The main reason being that the legislation
that was supposed to formally establish customary courts and delineate their ju-
risdiction, composition and the substantive and procedural laws they may apply,
as well as their relationship with the formal laws and institutions, has yet to be
enacted. This has made their legal standing very precarious. It has exposed them,
for example, to abuse and exploitation by disputants who strategically engage in
forum shopping, i.e. those who move back and forth between the customary and
formal courts (see Desalegn, this volume).
Disputants in a case also live through a state of uncertainty, as one side may
have addressed their complaint to the formal justice system while the other ap-
proached the customary justice institutions. This results in the matter ping pong-
ing between the courts and the customary institutions. Since the formal courts
do not consider customary legal systems as a legitimate avenue for dispute settle-
ment, they do not take into account any processes that might have begun before
the case was brought to them. So cases can start afresh with the formal courts after
having been ‘settled’ through customary justice avenues. This raises the possibility
that wrongdoers might be subjected to punishment twice for the same wrongdo-
ing. In the case of homicide or grave bodily injury, a wrongdoer tried by the formal
criminal justice system could still be subjected to the customary justice process of
compensation payments, and vice versa (see Aberra, this volume). These are just
some examples showing the challenges brought by the current imperfect recogni-
tion of customary justice system as part of the country’s justice system.The need to
workout the most acceptable and productive way of creating an interface between
customary and formal justice systems is clear, and the next section explores ways
in which the two systems could be productively integrated.
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Options for an interlink between formal and customary justice systems
Theproblem of integrating formal and customary justice systems is shared bymany
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia that were at the receiving end of le-
gal transplantation, primarily from the legal systems of the colonial powers of the
West. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, although Ethiopia does not share
this colonial history, it has the same problem as a result of its voluntary borrowing
of legal norms from the West.
Upon independence, many post-colonial states – and others like Australia and
the USA– that inherited plural legal systems adopted various approaches to accom-
modating the non-formal legal system of their native communities. In the USA, for
example, Indian Americans are generally subject to tribal law (not state or federal
law) when the offender and victims are both Indians (18 USC § 1152). However, un-
der the Indian Major Crimes Act, violent crimes are exempted from this exclusive
grant of jurisdiction (18 USC §1153). In Papua New Guinea, under the Native Cus-
toms (Recognition) Act 1963, custom is recognized as a cultural fact (not law) in the
formal court’s determination of the guilt of a native offender (Dinnen 1988:25–26).
Yet, at the same time, it should be noted that some people in the country, including
judges, argue that customary compensation should be considered as a legitimate
form of punishment and that courts should be seen ‘as a consensual forum inwhich
people actively participate in restoring harmony in communities disturbed by law
breaking’ (Dinnen 1988:9–10).
The state of various customary systems in Ethiopia is fundamentally different
from those in Africa’s postcolonial countries. There, customary systems were sub-
ject to various kinds of interference from the colonial administrators and their legal
institutions (Pimentel 2010, Snyder 1981, Ige 2015). Various attempts were made to
codify the local law, thereby creating a state version of customary law, different
to the living or unofficial version of customary law. In Ethiopia, however, the cus-
tomary justice system never lost its original character because the formal state
remained aloof from the functioning of the customary systems and kept them at a
distance from state institutions. For example, at no point in Ethiopia’s history have
customary court personnel been appointed by the government. As a result of this
autonomy, the customary justice system has maintained its integrity and natural
character.
The natural state of the customary law and institutions of Ethiopia’s various
communities needs to be maintained in any attempt to link customary and for-
mal justice systems in the future. It is advisable for any government policy or legal
intervention to allow customary institutions to be the sole interpreters and en-
forcers of customary law, but procedures need to be put in place to ensure that the
workings of the customary justice system are consistent with constitutional human
rights standards. This approach, as Pimentel (2010:4) observes, enables customary
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justice systems to maintain their vitality and adaptability. It also rejects the cre-
ation of customary divisions within formal courts, such as were in place in Eritrea
when it was federated with Ethiopia (Geraghty 1970:450), in which it is the formal
court/judge who interprets and applies the customary law, and not the customary
court.
Following David Pimentel (2010:15), I suggest that the linkages between formal
and customary justice systems need to be guided by the following considerations:
(1) the need to recognise and respect traditional cultures and customs; (2) the need
to ensure that customary law and institutions do not violate the fundamental rights
and freedoms enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution, and those protected by the
international human rights standards applicable to Ethiopia; and (3) the need to
uphold the rule of law.These considerations will no doubt require some trade-offs,
particularly as some cultures do not treat women as equal to men or have practices
that violate fundamental rights of children (see Epple, chapter 14, this volume).
But, this needs careful handling and any trade-offs should not strike at the heart
of the fundamental rights of women and children. One of the most effective ways
through which the primacy of the fundamental rights of women and vulnerable
groups such as children and minorities can be protected is – as noted below –
by empowering the reviewers of constitutions to uphold the constitutional human
rights standards against any contrary rules in the communities’ customary justice
systems.
The above suggestion calls for the maintenance of the separation between the
customary and formal justice systems (what Pimentel 2010:23 calls ‘the equal dig-
nity approach’), but at the same time for the creation of a review mechanism to
ensure that the former upholds constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.
There is no rational reason why the formal justice system should crush the cus-
tomary systems and become the sole justice dispenser, so long as the customary
systems conform to the minimum standards of human rights protection (Donovan
and Getachew 2003:539).What the formal state machinery must be concerned with
is ensuring that those subject to its jurisdiction benefit from the minimum human
and group rights protections guaranteed by the Constitution. With a mechanism
to achieve this in place, customary justice systems should generally be left alone to
evolve, adapt and change through their own internal dynamics, as they have always
done.
As stated above, the creation of a productive interlink between formal and in-
formal justice systems demands that customary justice systems should not be sub-
ordinated to the formal system through appeal or other such means. The question
arises, thus, of how it is possible to check whether customary courts and institu-
tions are observing the minimum human rights guarantees outlined in the Con-
stitution if their decisions are not appealable to the formal courts. There are ways
to do this. First and foremost, it is necessary to believe in the capacity of custom-
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ary justice systems to change and adapt to keep abreast of the world in which they
function and with which they interact (Pimentel 2010:25, Donovan and Getachew
2003:550). Then, the constitutional review system, whereby the decisions of cus-
tomary courts are reviewed for violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights and
international human rights standards, can be used. My suggestion is that the deci-
sions of customary courts should not be subjected to the appellate review of federal
or regional state courts but rather should be subjected directly to the constitutional
review process. The constitutional reviewer – in Ethiopia’s case, the House of the
Federation with the technical recommendation from the Council of Constitutional
Inquiry (Ethiopian Constitution: Arts. 62(1):83–84) – could then fashion its decision
in a manner that respects the autonomy of the customary system involved and al-
lows its adherents to engage in what Abdullahi An-Na’im (1992:27) calls ‘internal
cultural discourse’ to readjust its position vis-à-vis the constitutional standards.
I believe that, as part of the above suggestion, it is also possible to design a co-
operative system in which jurisdiction over serious crimes that endanger national
security and social harmony and that jeopardize constitutionally protected rights,
such as the right to life,may be either ceded to the formal justice system or handled
by the two legal systems jointly, and in a manner that allows the traditional justice
system to fully embrace any joint activity.This limited intrusion into the territory of
customary institutions is justifiable given the state’s constitutional responsibilities
to maintain a minimum protection of rights (Donovan and Getachew 2003:538).
The realization of the above suggestions would inevitably call for new laws at
both federal and state levels detailing the interlinkage, cooperation and autonomy
of the two legal systems. The requirement to be consistent with the minimum hu-
man rights standards of the Constitution would, of course, also need to be clearly
spelled out in the law.
The question of how to determine the jurisdiction of the formal and customary
justice systems is another major issue that needs to be settled in law. The sugges-
tion that the customary justice systems should be kept separate from the formal
system normally creates a situation whereby both the formal and customary courts
can have concurrent jurisdiction over a given case. For example, in a civil dispute
involving a hire-purchase contract, both the formal court with local jurisdiction in
the area and the customary court of the community there have jurisdiction over
the case. How then should a disagreement between the plaintiff and the defendant
on the legal forum to be used be resolved? Is it plausible to state in the law that the
forum where the case was filed first has the jurisdiction? Or should the law provide
that the court, whether formal or customary, where the case was filed should de-
cide whether it should decide the case or transfer it to the other court? These are
very difficult questions that the law needs to somehow settle. One way to deal with
this – at least for most civil law disputes – is to extend the consent requirement in
article 34(5) of the Constitution, whereby both parties are required to formally give
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their consent to their case being lodged with a customary court.The law could also
make provision for the transfer of cases from the formal court to the customary
courts when both parties demand it. It might also be possible to explore whether
there are circumstances under which customary institutions would voluntarily re-
linquish jurisdiction over certain individuals that do not abide by the customs of
the community (see Aberra, this volume).
Summary and conclusion
This chapter has shown the state and development of customary justice systems
in Ethiopia, and explored the relationship between the formal (state) law and legal
institutions and the informal (customary) ones. As explained, from the late 1940s
the Ethiopian government directed its attention to putting in place legal institu-
tions following the model of Western legal systems.This attempt was accompanied
by a policy of uprooting customary justice systems and replacing them with codi-
fied law.With the coming into force of the 1995 Constitution, the policy of hostility
to customary law and institutions was replaced by an accommodative policy that
explicitly recognizes customary family and personal laws and courts. However, as
we have seen, the space given by the Constitution to the various customary justice
systems in Ethiopia does not match the practical vitality of these systems, which
encompass all areas of law. Therefore, recognition of customary justice systems
should be widened to acknowledge the fact that they work on cases from all areas
of dispute, including criminal cases. In order to do so successfully and sustainably,
the government should formalize this recognition through a well-crafted law to be
made by the federal, and regional, legislatures. It is hoped, the suggestions made
in this chapter will assist policy-makers in accomplishing that task.
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3. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and African Societies
Karl-Heinz Kohl
Introduction
Alongside the institutions of local, national and international law, the United Na-
tions also plays an important role in currently on-going legal disputes in Ethiopia,
as well as in other African nations, even though it does not want to interfere di-
rectly in the internal affairs of these states. Since its direct interventions are strictly
limited to peace-building activities and involve long and complicated bureaucratic
procedures, one of the UN’s preferred means of contributing to such and other
disputes are through the declarations adopted by its General Assembly. These dec-
larations have the character of recommendations and do not contain any legally
binding obligations. In the terminology of the UN, they are only ‘documents of in-
tent’.1 Nevertheless, they try to formulate some principles according to which legal
decisions should be taken. This is the case with the UN ‘Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples’. As I will show, its primary intent was to grant more rights
to the marginalized and long-disenfranchised indigenous peoples of the former
European colonies in North and South America, Australia and New Zealand. But
the extent to which its principles can also be applied to African societies remains
a controversial point of discussion. On the one hand, the Declaration contains a
moral appeal to Africa’s political leaders to help their many small-scale local com-
munities to preserve their language and cultural traditions and to protect them
from land robbery at the hands of the big international agricultural corporations.
On the other hand, there is also the wish of African governments to unify all soci-
eties within a given country under one national law.
1 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migra-
tion/glossary/declaration/ (last accessed 28 February 2019)
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The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
After debating for more than 25 years, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in autumn 2007.The
Declaration grants a special status to indigenous peoples inside the state to which
they belong, emphasizing their right to speak their own language, tomaintain their
social and cultural institutions, to preserve their cultural heritage and above all to
control and use their traditionally owned land. Today, more than ten years later,
the Declaration is regarded as one of the cornerstones of the international Human
Rights Movement.
The Declaration’s beginnings go back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
Native Americans in the United States, First Nations in Canada, Australian Abo-
rigines and New Zealand Maoris joined the worldwide civil rights movement
and protested against their on-going oppression and discrimination. Other au-
tochthonous groups, especially in Latin America, followed them. But it was still a
long time before the United Nations decided to support their demands. In 1985,
the UN set up a Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Populations. In
1993 this Working Group prepared the first draft of the Declaration. But it had
to be revisited more than ten times in the following years because a number of
UN member states expressed concern about some of its key issues such as self-
determination and exclusive land use. These reservations were also shared by a
group of African states, which then prompted a formal decision by the African
Union in December 2006 that almost blocked the final adoption of the Decla-
ration.2 After new negotiations, on 13 September 2007, 143 members of the UN
General Assembly voted for the Declaration;3 14, including Nigeria and Kenya,
abstained; and 4, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States,
voted against it. But a very high number of UN members, at total of 34, did not
participate in the vote at all; of these, 15 were African states, including Ethiopia.
Since then, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have revised their decision and
have transposed some of the Declaration’s principles into national law. In the US,
the situation seems to be more complicated. On December 2010, President Barack
Obama declared that the United States would ‘lend its support’ to the Declaration.
Yet, as the recent events in the Lakota Standing Rock Reservation have shown, Pres-
ident Trump is unwilling to fulfil his predecessor’s promise. On the African conti-
2 According to Pelican and Maruyama (2015:51) the adoption of the Declaration ‘has been par-
ticularly problematic for southern African states, such as Botswana and Namibia, which ex-
cluded the provision for any differential treatment of their citizens based on race or ethnicity
to distance themselves from apartheid politics.’
3 See the United Nations Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues 2006:Declaration on the rights
of indigenous peoples (accessible online at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf).
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nent too,many governments remain reluctant to accept the Declaration’s principles
as a basis of policy. What are the reasons for the African States’ enduring scepti-
cism?
We may find an answer to this question in the African Union’s aforementioned
decision from December 2006. Besides noting the many political problems that
self-determination and the recognition of indigenous land-ownership may cause
for national and territorial integrity, the decision named explicitly ‘the lack of a
clear definition of indigenous peoples’, although it affirms at the same time, ‘that
the vast majority of the peoples of Africa are indigenous to the African Continent’.
This is, without doubt, a contradictory statement. If there is ‘no clear definition
of indigenous peoples’, one cannot contend that almost all African peoples are ‘in-
digenous’. Where does this contradiction stem from?
Actually, how to define indigeneity and indigenous peoples had been one of the
biggest problems in the period when the Declaration was being prepared. From
an etymological point of view, ‘indigenous’ means nothing more than having been
born in the land or territory where one lives, in contrast to all the people who came
later, be they migrants or conquerors. Historically, however, the English word ‘in-
digenous’ and other derivations from the Latin word ‘indigena’, such as ‘indigène’ in
French or ‘indigéna’ in Spanish were derogatory. European colonizers and settlers
applied them to the subdued inhabitants of their colonies and associated them
with backwardness and primitiveness. Yet, during its long struggle for recogni-
tion, which began half a century ago, the international indigenous movement has
been very successful in purifying the word ‘indigeneity’ of these old racist stereo-
types.What once was an insult has now become a title of honour. Today,more than
5,000 ethnic groups all over the world share the term ‘indigenous’ as a common de-
nominator.
Yet, there is such a great diversity between these groups that one may ask one-
self what main features the Kwakwaka’wakw of the American Northwest Coast,
who live mainly from fishing, share with the Aranda hunters and gatherers of the
Australian Desert, the crop-growing Yanomami of the Amazonian rain forest, the
Pokot pastoralists of Kenya or the Sami reindeer herders of Finland? This was ex-
actly the problem that the UN’s suborganizations were confronted with when they
looked for a clear and distinct definition of indigeneity. It proved to be very dif-
ficult, indeed, almost impossible. Instead of defining in legal terms what indige-
nous peoples are, they could only give a description of what most of them have in
common. One of the most cited of these descriptions or working definitions was
drafted by José Martinez Cobo, the former Special Rapporteur on the Problem of
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in 1986. It reads as follows:
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Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those, which, having a histor-
ical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies considers themselves
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or
part of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are de-
termined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and le-
gal systems.4
Since then, a number of other characteristic features, such as their strong mainte-
nance of their cultural traditions, language and belief systems have complemented
José Martinez Cobo’s description and found their way into the final version of the
Declaration adopted in 2007. The most important of these new features concerns
the indigenous peoples’ ‘distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas’,
as expressed in Article 25 of the UN Declaration. This ‘distinctive spiritual rela-
tionship’ is so important because it also legitimizes those peoples’ right ‘to own,
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by
reason of traditional ownership’. Actually, this passage contains political dynamite,
because it grants to indigenous peoples not only absolute usage rights of the ter-
ritories they live in, but could also be used as a legal basis to claim back from the
majority population the land once stolen from their ancestors. This was, without
any doubt, one of the main concerns and reasons why four former British colonies
voted against the UN Declaration in 2007.
Indigenousness (or indigenity) and African society
Against this background, we can understand better the reluctance of so many
African states to adopt the UN Declaration, as well as the contradictions in the
text of the African Union’s decision of 2006 mentioned above. On the one side, the
African Union states that ‘the vast majority of the peoples of Africa are indigenous
to the African Continent’ because they were born there and became victims of
European colonization. On the other side, however, all of them have also regained
their freedom to live according to their pre-invasion and pre-colonial tradition
4 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Problem of Discrimina-
tion against Indigenous Populations’ (1986) UNDoc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 1–4, quoted by
Lidetu 2016:6. Cobo is also the author of 1986’s important three-volume Study on the problemof
discrimination against indigenous peoples, ‘where he promotes the use of the word ethnicity and
group rather than race’ and ‘initiated a shift in focus away frommainly biological definitions
of indigenous peoples’ (Lidetu 2016:25).
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after the fight for independence and the end of the European rule. The corollary
of this is: if all African peoples are indigenous, all of them also stand in a special
spiritual relationship to their homeland and it is not necessary to protect and
privilege some of them.
The inherent logic of this argumentation shows where that the problem lies
in the difficulty of applying the UN Declaration’s categories of ‘indigenous’, ‘indi-
geneity’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ to African societies. These difficulties stem from
the fact that these categories grew out of the historical experiences of the abo-
riginal inhabitants of the former British colonies in North America, Australia and
New Zealand, as well as the Spanish and Portuguese conquests in Latin Amer-
ica. Not only some small parts but all of the land of these vast continents and is-
lands belonged to them before the arrival of European conquerors and settlers. It
is largely forgotten that the biggest genocide in history of humankind happened
after Columbus’s so-called discovery of the New World. According to recent esti-
mations, between 7 and 20 million native people lived in the territory of what is
now the United States of America before the arrival of the Europeans. At the end
of the nineteenth century their number had decreased to 500,000, while the total
population of the US had grown to 62 million. Today less than 1 per cent of the US
population identify themselves as Native Americans (United States Census Bureau
2011). In Australia, the aboriginal population rate is 2.7 per cent, and in Canada
4.3 per cent. This means that in those countries, in which the indigenous move-
ment came into being in the early 1970s, indigenous peoples had been reduced to
very small and unimportant minorities, living at the margins of a white major-
ity society, strongly discriminated against and denied full citizenship. Indeed, in
Australia, Aborigines remained under state guardianship until 1976.Their rights to
the small territories and reservations in which they had lived for generations were
recognized by the national governments only after decades of struggle.
Conclusion
At its core, talking of indigeneity and indigenous peoples is a Eurocentric con-
struction. Both categories are meaningful in states that grew out of colonial settler
societies in which the progeny of the foreign invaders represent the vast major-
ity, while the descendants of the aboriginal landowners have become small and
insignificant minorities. But it is hard to transfer this dichotomous model to most
African states, because – with some exceptions – there was no such overwhelming
dominant or racially different sector of society that succeeded in the course of his-
tory in subduing all other ethnic and linguistic units under its rule. And there is
still another, even more important, difference. In the U.S., Australia, Canada and
New Zealand, the aboriginal populations’ traditional forms of life and even their
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languages were largely destroyed under the pressure of the white majority. Among
most African peoples identifying themselves as indigenous, such a radical rupture
never took place.
In the final analysis, however, it is not only a question of terminology whether
you call these local communities indigenous peoples or not. Although indigenous
political activists in the former colonies have appropriated the term, it has gained
international political recognition and became an effective weapon in the world-
wide fight against oppression and ruthless exploitation. The African local commu-
nities with their own languages and traditional ways of life share their fate with
marginalized indigenous populations in Asia, South America and other parts of the
world. In Africa, their situation seems to be even harder because national politi-
cians and urban elites regard them as an obstacle to development and moderniza-
tion. Instead of recognizing their traditional land rights, they ban them from their
ancestors’ lands and support the activities of international agricultural agencies
exploiting it for commercial purposes. This happened to the pastoralist and semi-
sedentary societies in Southern Ethiopia, where Government officials tried to force
them to give up their traditional way of life in order to transform them into agri-
culturalists and wage labourers, as we can see in Human Right Watch’s staggering
report on ‘Abuses against the Indigenous Peoples of Ethiopia’s Lower Omo Valley’
(2012). As already stated in 2006 by the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights already, the cultures of African indigenous peoples are also
under threat, in some cases to the point of extinction. A key characteristic formost
of them is that the survival of their particular way of life depends on access and
rights to their traditional lands and the natural resources thereon. They suffer
from discrimination as they are regarded as less developed and less advanced
than other more dominant sectors of society. They often live in inaccessible re-
gions, often geographically isolated, and suffer from various forms of marginal-
ization, both politically and socially (African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (ACHPR 2006:11).
While indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US remind
the white majority society of their forefathers’ sins, and measures taken to pro-
tect their customs and reinstall their rights can be regarded as making amends
for the crimes done to them, Africa’s indigenous peoples have another, more im-
portant, significance and deserve protection even more, because they stand in a
continuous relation to the contemporary African societies whose great cultural
and social heritage they represent. Leading African politicians of the independent
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Jomo Kenyatta or Léopold Sedar Sen-
ghor, and leading intellectuals, such as Chinua Achebe or Amadou Hampâté Bâ,
were convinced that the true African values and norms, with their complete gov-
ernance and restorative dispute settlement institutions, could still be found in the
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villages. But this was almost two generations ago. Since then, things really have
fallen apart. The urbanization process is speeding up considerably, and modern
techniques are infiltrating agriculture in some rural areas. Nevertheless, there are
still many semi-autonomous, small-scale societies, subsistence farmers, pastoral-
ists, hunters and gatherers who have shown an astonishing resilience to the seduc-
tive power of modernity and have succeeded in maintaining central parts of their
traditions. And obviously, they did it by their free will, because they are so far out
of our world that they do not know the possible alternatives to their way of life.
I freely confess that my view may be a deeply romantic one. But who knows: if
the endeavours to solve the continent’s economic problems by a globally oriented
neo-liberal policy should fail, a new African Renaissance may come, comparable
to what happened fifty years ago. And then, everybody will be glad that not all of
these small-scale societies have been sacrificed on the altar of modernity.
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Legal pluralism, which is defined as the co-existence of more than one legal system
in a given social field (Pospisil 1971, Griffiths 1986, Moore 1986 in Merry 1988:870),
is prevalent in contemporary Ethiopia, as in other parts of Africa. Five normative
legal regimes (one state law and four non-state laws) can be identified in the coun-
try.The codified state lawwas introduced from Europe in the 1960s and subsequent
laws were issued later. The non-state legal systems include: i) the numerous forms
of customary law characterized by both commonalities and differences between
and within ethnic groups operating independently; ii) the Sharia courts that have
been in existence for a long time, have been recognized by three successive gov-
ernments, and currently operate with jurisdiction over family and personal issues;
iii) the certified commercial arbitration forums that provide arbitration and medi-
ation services in commercial, labour, construction, family and other disputes; vi)
the spirit mediums believed to operate as mediators between humans and super-
natural forces.
The customary laws operate in parallel with the other forms and, despite pres-
sure from the state law, have proved to be resilient and dominant in the entire
continent. Hence, it is tempting to investigate the persistence, the characteristics,
the effectiveness and the prospects of these popular legal systems. Despite identifi-
able gaps and drawbacks, customary laws have been recognized as the best option
for handling group conflicts and ensuring peaceful coexistence among families and
communities.
However, due to certain inadequacies studies on customary laws run short
of informing theory and policy. First, concepts borrowed from Western alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) literature have been used interchangeably and
confusingly. Hence, a lack of conceptual clarity has hindered communication
and prevented in-depth understanding of the functional differences between
the various legal orders. Second, the absence of efforts to identify and analyse
customary laws systematically has constrained our knowledge about which of
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the core values underlying customary laws are worth appreciating and which
key challenges are worth addressing. In other words, the lack of comprehensive
knowledge has prevented the development of theoretical frameworks and concrete
policy ideas. This paper, therefore, intends to shed light on these two issues by
drawing illustrations from a few countries, with a special focus on Ethiopia as a
case study.
Prior to colonization in the nineteenth century, customary laws governed all the
affairs of the people of Africa. Following the introduction of codified modern legal
systems from the West, legal pluralism became the reality in African legal systems.
Many customary laws survived colonialism and marginalization by formal justice
systems(Kariuki 2015, Mutisi and Sansculotte-Greenidge 2012). These deep-rooted
and widely accepted institutions are likely to remain relevant and crucial in ad-
dressing intra- and inter-group conflicts on the continent (Mutisi and Sansculotte-
Greenidge 2012).The popularity of customary lawsmay be explained with reference
to the qualities that make them preferable to the state law, as will be shown further
below.
Many African states have given constitutional recognition to customary laws.
For example, in South Africa, Section 166(e) of the Constitution and Section 16(1) of
Schedule 6 recognize the judicial powers of traditional leaders. Likewise, Articles
34(5) and 78(5) of the Ethiopian Constitution make reference to customary laws. In
Rwanda, where the famous gacaca courts handled genocide cases, the integration
of abunzi mediation into the legal system (Organic Law No. 31/2006) is one of the
recent developments that point to the relevance of customary courts in contempo-
rary Africa. According to Cuskelly (2011:6)
The highest level of recognition of customary law is found in African constitutions,
both in terms of the number of countries with relevant provisions and the breadth
of aspects of customary law covered. Of 52 African constitutions analysed, 33 re-
ferred to customary law in some form…. there is a high level of recognition of tra-
ditional and customary institutions, as well as a broad recognition of customary
law in the courts and relating to land. At the weakest level of recognition of cus-
tomary law, a large number of African constitutions have provisions relating to the
protection of culture or tradition.
Besides the recognition, in many countries the actual relationship between the
state law and the customary laws has been inadequately articulated.The Ethiopian
Constitution (Articles 39:2 and 91:1) provides, in broad terms, for the promotion of
the cultures of nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. Article 34:5 makes
more specific and direct reference to adjudication of disputes relating to personal
and family matters in accordance with customary laws, with the consent of the
parties to the dispute. Article 78:5 also states that the House of People’s Represen-
tatives and State Councils can give official recognition to customary courts. Thus
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far, the particulars of Article 34:5 have not been determined by law and the official
recognition stipulated in Article 78:5 has not been given.
The inadequate constitutional provision in Ethiopia led to the existence of dif-
ferent views about the relevance of customary laws in the country: while the pro-
ponents of the state law want the customary legal forum to give way to the modern
unitary legal forum, the advocates of customary laws argue that the state-centred
unitary approach must give way to different alternative paradigms. Many legal ex-
perts justify the relevance of non-state law by the fact that it reduces the caseload
of formal courts. Ordinary people welcome the existence of legal pluralism because
it provides multiple options to justice seekers. And still others (scholars, practition-
ers, etc.) advocate for a reform of the legal system in order to create a hybridized
brand that contains elements of the formal and the informal laws.
Customary dispute and conflict handlingmechanisms have received increasing
scholarly attention as evidenced by the growing number of studies and publica-
tions. The regional level comparative works of Zartman (2000), Ogbaharya (2010),
Mutisi and Sansculotte-Greenidge (2012) and Kariuki (2015), among others, deserve
mention. Country-specific studies and publications are also numerous. The depth
and breadth of studies in Ethiopia have been revealed by the edited volumes on
customary conflict handling mechanisms by Alula Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa
(2008), Gebre Yintiso et al. (2011, 2012) and Elias Stebek and Muradu Abdu (2013).
However, as Kane et al. (2005:3) rightly argue, research on African customary laws
has not been systematic and comprehensive:
[I]t is important to note that insufficient research has gone into understanding
both the dynamics and the operation of customary law tribunals and into assess-
ing the content and status of most customary laws to ensure that they in fact re-
flect the values and mores of the communities (…). We recommend comprehen-
sive research into the universe of dispute resolution services (…). We recommend
that a participatory assessment of the contemporary status and content of cus-
tomary laws be carried out in order to open up knowledge of customary laws and
ensure that the voices of all stakeholders are actually heard as these laws naturally
evolve.
It is equally important to acknowledge the weaknesses of customary legal prac-
tices, which can be challenged on grounds of gender insensitivity, discrimination
against minorities, breach of other human rights, weak procedural fairness in ad-
judication and punishment, lack of uniformity and lack of records. The practices
are sometimes incompatible with national laws and international standards and
norms. Some of the most serious weaknesses, such us gender insensitivity, dis-
crimination against minorities and breach of human rights, have to do with es-
tablished cultural values and practices that perpetuate social inequality. In soci-
eties where men are viewed as superior to women and the participation of the lat-
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ter in customary legal practices remains limited or non-existent, customary laws
tend to disregard or violate the rights of women. Similarly, in cultures where mi-
nority groups such as artisans or hunters experience social exclusion, customary
laws tend to reinforce the existing inequality and discrimination. On the whole,
breaches of human rights in the application of customary legal practices emanate
from structural factors that warrant change through awareness creation and the
legal enforcement of laws protecting the rights of disadvantaged groups. In today’s
world, where transnationalism, multiculturalism and rapid social transformation
are bridging the global – local divide, the incompatibility of customary laws with
the changing context in which they operate has become an issue that must be ad-
dressed.
This chapter has been written with the firm conviction that its approach will
enable researchers to generate knowledge amenable to comparative analysis, sci-
entific generalization and/or policy application.1 I recognize that a comprehensive
study of African customary laws would be extremely difficult and rather unrealistic
given their vastness and their diversity. However, systematization of the existing
knowledge we have will lead to a consolidation of perspectives on the communal-
ities and differences of the customary laws, to an identification of the essential
underlying values worth promoting, and an evaluation of the principles and prac-
tices viewed as unfavourable in today’s world.
Towards conceptual clarity
As stated in the introduction, the undifferentiated and at times confusing use of
certain concepts has hindered our understanding of and communication about the
functional differences between the various legal orders. The key terms often used
to describe customary laws – dispute, conflict, negotiation, mediation, arbitra-
tion, conciliation, dispute settlement, conflict resolution, conflict management,
and conflict transformation – come from the ‘alternative dispute resolution’ (ADR)
literature of theWest.This section, therefore, attempts to reflect on themeaning of
these terms and the appropriateness of their use in the context of customary laws.
Before discussing each term, it is important to present briefly the context and the
historical background of ADR.
ADR was conceived in the United States by legal practitioners and law profes-
sors with the intention of reforming the justice system through the introduction of
1 This paper is based on my own research on customary conflict resolution in various parts of
Ethiopia (see Gebre 2012, 2016a, 2016b) and extensive literature review. Earlier versions were
published in the Journal of Ethiopian Law (Gebre 2014) and in an edited volume I co-edited
with Itaru Ohta and Motoji Matsuda (2017).
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non-litigious methods (Nader 1993). The early advocates of ADR in the US turned
for inspiration to customary laws,which were viewed asmore humane, therapeutic
and non-adversarial (Avruch 2003:352). Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader (2008:77) ar-
gued that ADR was used as a disempowering tool, ‘to suppress people’s resistance,
by socializing them toward conformity by means of consensus-building mecha-
nisms, by valorising consensus, cooperation, passivity, and docility, and by silenc-
ing people who speak out angrily.’ In England, the history of voluntary conciliation
and arbitration goes back to 1850, where these methods were used to address in-
dustrial disputes, with ‘the highest hopes of abolishing strikes completely by the
most ruthless application of arbitration’ (Hicks 1930:26).
ADR as applied in the West is different from the customary laws practised in
Africa. For example, the Western institutional settings focus on individuals, while
African cultures consider the collective as the unit of social organization (Grande
1999). Accordingly, ADR procedures in the West are closed, while African conflict
handling procedures are open to the public, and therefore transparent. Because
of the differences in focus, context and procedures, the terminology used in ADR
cannot be transferred to customary laws without customization. In theWest, there
are four common ADRmethods: negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitra-
tion. During mediation, mediators do not propose a solution, while conciliators
can suggest non-binding agreement ideas during conciliation. During arbitration,
arbitrators apply the law, start the process by receiving a written consensus from
the parties, and have the power to administer a legally enforceable award, even in-
ternationally. ADR also differentiates between dispute settlement, conflict resolu-
tion, conflict management and conflict transformation. Simply transferring these
concepts from ADR to customary laws without explanation leads to confusion and
misunderstanding.
Half a century ago two prominent anthropologists – Paul Bohannan and
Max Gluckman – espoused a debate on whether universal categories and ter-
minologies should be used to depict the legal systems of different societies.
Bohannan (1969:403) advocated for the use of native terms to be accompanied
by ethnographic meaning, arguing that the use of universal categories acts as a
barrier to understanding and representing the legal systems in different cultures.
Gluckman (1969:535), on the other hand, argued in favour of translating native
concepts into English, stating that the excessive use of local terms was serving as
a barrier to cross-cultural comparison of legal practices. As Kevin Avruch (1998:60)
rightly stated, the etic approaches that allow comparative analysis and the emic
approaches that provide much deeper and contextualized insights are equally im-
portant in dealing with dispute/conflict. Since terminological usage has discrete
implications for the outcome of a dispute/conflict situation, ensuring conceptual
clarity is indispensable.
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For analytical purposes, the terms that require differentiation are categorized
into three: types of incompatibility (dispute and conflict); methods of handling
incompatibility (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation); and ap-
proaches to ending incompatibility (dispute settlement, conflict management,
conflict resolution, and conflict transformation). This section attempts to clarify
the meanings of these concepts to find out whether they have equivalent practices
in Ethiopia and to reflect on the aptness of their use in the literature on Africa.
In this chapter, as part of the knowledge systematization effort, the concept
of ‘customary laws’ has been used, intentionally avoiding the interchangeable use
of such terms as ‘indigenous law’, ‘traditional law’, ‘informal law’ and ‘customary
dispute/conflict resolution mechanisms’.The term customary laws is preferred be-
cause of its common use in law schools, legal documents (e.g., constitutions), and
major international publications.
Types of incompatibility
There exists a lack of uniformity in the literature in the use of the terms ‘dispute’
and ‘conflict’. While some writers stress the differences between the two, others
use them interchangeably. In the Ethiopian literature on customary laws, dispute
and conflict have not been adequately differentiated. In Grassroots justice in Ethiopia
(Pankhurst and Getachew 2008), the titles of ten out of eleven chapters carry the
term dispute, but nowhere in the volume is it made clear whether the choice was
meant to convey the message that the issues discussed are specifically about dis-
putes and not conflicts. Likewise, the two volumes on Customary dispute resolution
mechanisms in Ethiopia (Gebre et al. 2011) failed to differentiate between the two
concepts. Many chapter contributors to these two books and others published in
Ethiopia have used dispute and conflict without providing operational definitions,
and at times interchangeably.
In order to ensure conceptual clarity in the field of dispute/conflict handling
research, this chapter adopts John Burton’s (1990:2) approach, which describes dis-
pute as a short-term disagreement between two persons or groups over a specific
set of facts and/or issues that are negotiable in nature, and conflict as a long-term
and deeply rooted incompatibility associated with seemingly ‘non-negotiable’ is-
sues between opposing groups or individuals. Non-negotiable issues include the
denial of basic human rights and deprivation of essential economic resources such
as land and water. If not settled, a specific dispute could turn into conflict, but a
conflict cannot turn into a dispute.
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Methods of handling incompatibility
Themethods commonly employed to address individual or group disputes/conflicts
outside of the formal court include negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbi-
tration.The fourmethods of alternative dispute resolution, as practised inWestern
societies, vary in their respective meanings and approaches. For example, in the
context of Western ADR mediators do not suggest solutions, conciliators suggest
non-binding agreement ideas, and arbitration results are final and legally binding.
Scholars describing customary laws in Africa have used the terms listed above
without questioning them. For example, Francis Kariuki (2015:13) wrote, ‘conflict
resolution amongst African communities has since time immemorial and contin-
ues to take the form of negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration by el-
ders’, without elaborating on the meanings of these terms in the African contexts.
It is incumbent on researchers of African customary laws tomake sure that the con-
cepts they borrow from the ADR or other international literature adequately repre-
sent the local realities. In the literature on Ethiopia, these terms are also not suffi-
ciently differentiated from each other and from their usage in the ADR literature.
Tirsit Girshaw (2004:49), for example, states: ‘Mechanisms like reconciliation and
arbitration are common features of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.’
Wodisha Habtie (2011:438–440) notes that negotiation, mediation and arbitration
exist as distinct methods among the Boro-Shinasha. Among the Nuer, according
to Koang Tutlam (2011:412), kinsmen and elders arrange mediation to determine
the fine and ask the culprit to pay compensation to the victim. However, these and
many other authors do not explain what they mean by concepts like mediation,
reconciliation and arbitration.
This section therefore discusses the meanings of the four concepts (namely,
negotiaion,mediationreconciliation and arbitration) and ADR proceedings (private
in nature), so that researchers can establish whether there is a resemblance with
the proceedings of the customary laws (public in nature) that they are studying.
In ADR, ‘negotiation’ is a mechanism whereby the parties that are directly in-
volved in a dispute/conflict meet to resolve their differences, and reach an agree-
ment without the involvement of a third party (Assefa 2012:245). If conducted with-
out influence and intimidation, negotiation is known to be the most efficient and
cost effective approach to handle a dispute/conflict. Since it is conducted on the
principles of give-and-take and willingness to ease tension, private negotiators are
expected to opt for compromise. Apart from this specific and narrow usage, the
term negotiation is flexibly and broadly employed to refer to any discussion aimed
at finding a middle ground, be it in the context of mediation, conciliation or an
early phase of arbitration.
Mediation as a dispute/conflict handling method involves the appointment of
a neutral and impartial third party, e.g. a mediator, often a trained person or a
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legal expert. He facilitates the dialogue between the parties in conflict and helps
them reach a mutually acceptable agreement. It does not impose a binding solu-
tion (Le Baron-Duryea 2001:121). Mediation is often preferred to litigation because
it is confidential, faster, fairer, cheaper, more efficient and addresses the unique
needs of parties. The guiding principles of mediation are that it be voluntary, non-
binding, confidential and interest-based.The parties are free to reach or withdraw
from negotiated agreements. In order to facilitate the resolution of a conflict, a
mediator performs a series of activities. He is expected to understand the perspec-
tives of the parties, set ground rules for improved communication, encourage them
to discuss in good faith and articulate their interests or concerns, remind them to
make decisions on their own, and convince them to remain committed to a peace-
ful result. In mediation, parties may be represented by lawyers who argue their
case, advocate for their clients and negotiate on their behalf. One might wonder
whether mediation as practised in the West is consistent with African customary
laws, where non-professionals handle disputes/conflicts in public.
The 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia does not clearly recognize a mediation pro-
cedure. According to Assefa Fiseha (2012:247), it appears that the Ethiopian Civil
Code combines mediation and conciliation. Researchers of African customary laws
should bear in mind the fact that a mediator in the ADR context would not dictate
the process, make a judgment, or suggest any solution.
Conciliation (or reconciliation) is another dispute/conflict handling method
that involves the appointment of a neutral and impartial third party – a concilia-
tor – to help parties reach a satisfactory agreement. Conciliators are appointed on
the basis of their experience, expertise, availability, language and cultural knowl-
edge. Louis Kriesberg and Bruce Dayton (2012:305) have stated that parties expect
four important dimensions to be present in reconciliation for it to succeed: truth,
justice, regard and security.
Conciliation and mediation have a lot in common, and sometimes the two
terms are used interchangeably. In both methods, the parties retain the power to
select their conciliators, the venue, the language, the structure, the content and the
timing of the proceedings. Both techniques are flexible, time and cost-efficient,
confidential and interest-based.The parties also retain autonomy to make the final
decision without imposition by a third party. The difference between conciliation
and mediation is that a conciliator can play a direct/active role in providing a non-
binding settlement proposal. The Ethiopian Civil Code (Articles 3318–3324) duly
recognizes conciliation and provides, among other things, details about the role of
conciliators and conciliation proceedings.
Arbitration is the fourthmajor dispute/conflict-handlingmethod.Here, parties
voluntarily present their disagreement to an unbiased third-party arbitrator or ar-
bitral tribunal. Arbitrators are expected to apply the law, and start the proceedings
after receiving a written consensus (arbitration agreement) from the parties on the
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content of their disagreement and their willingness to accept the ‘arbitral award’ in
advance – the verdict issued after the hearing. Arbitral proceedings are conducted
under strict rules of confidentiality, e.g. they are not open to the public. Like me-
diation and conciliation, arbitration is supposed to be more efficient, easier, faster
and cheaper than litigation, and to be relatively flexible. Parties are free to choose
their arbitrators, the venue, the language and the timing of the arbitral proceed-
ings. Arbitration is different from mediation and conciliation in that: i) arbitrators
have the power to administer a legally enforceable award; and ii) parties lose con-
trol over their ability to make a decision on their own. Arbitral awards are enforced
even internationally because of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. As practised in the West, the deci-
sions of arbitrators are final and binding, and they cannot be reversed, even by the
formal courts, unless the arbitration agreements were invalid. It would be interest-
ing to know whether there exist customary courts in Africa that apply the formal
law, require the submission of written arbitration agreements, and conduct private
hearings away from the public.
Arbitration as an ADR method is legally recognized in Ethiopia and has been
used to handle different disputes/conflicts (Tilahun 2007). Although the procedure
seems to be similar to Western practices, Assefa (2012:25) notes that arbitration in
the Ethiopian context is becoming more expensive than litigation and that arbitral
awards are not necessarily final and binding, as courts tend to accept appeals from
parties dissatisfied with the decisions of arbitrators. Such court interference is in-
consistent with the principles of arbitration and unfairly diminishes the relevance
and the credibility of the method.
Approaches to ending incompatibility
The ending of a conflict takes four major forms: dispute settlement, conflict man-
agement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In the Ethiopian litera-
ture, the terms dispute settlement, conflict resolution and conflict management
are not sufficiently differentiated, while conflict transformation is a new concept,
the local equivalent of which is yet to be found.Hopefully, the following discussions
will clarify the common usage of the four terms, therby avoiding future confusion
and interchangeable use.
Dispute settlement is an approach that removes dispute through negotiation,
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. A dispute is settled – rather than resolved,
managed or transformed – because it represents an easily addressable short-term
problem that emanates from negotiable interests. Establishing the facts of the dis-
pute and satisfying the interests of disputants are among the basic conditions that
need to be met for successful dispute settlement. Depending on the methods em-
ployed, a third partymay use persuasion, inducement, pressure or threats to ensure
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that the disputants arrive at a satisfactory settlement. Dispute settlement strate-
gies aim to end the dispute through compromises and concessions, without ad-
dressing the fundamental causes of the dispute or satisfying the basic demands of
the disputants (Burton andDukes 1990:83–87). Since it does not change the existing
structures and relationships that cause disputes, the efficacy and durability of the
settlement approach, compared to the resolution and transformation approaches,
are considered to be limited.
Conflict management refers to the process of mitigating, containing, limit-
ing or temporarily controlling conflict through the intervention of a third party.
Conflict management steps are taken with the recognition that conflicts cannot be
quickly resolved, andwith the conviction that the continuation or escalation of con-
flicts can be somehow controlled as an interim measure. The conflict management
process can succeed only when the conflicting parties have respect for the integrity,
impartiality and ability of the third party. However, the strategy neither removes
a conflict nor addresses the underlying causes (Lederach 1995:16–17). As Morton
Deutsch (1973:8) notes, the main intention is to make the situation more construc-
tive to the conflicting parties through lose–lose, win–lose, or win–win results.The
management of a conflict must therefore soon be followed by other strategies that
resolve the problem permanently.
Conflict management as defined in ADR has equivalent cultural and religious
practices in Ethiopia. For example, among the Orthodox Christians, a priest might
place a religious injunction on adversaries in order to temporarily halt offensive
actions. In some cultures, offenders take refuge with individuals and institutions
believed to be culturally and religiously sanctified to protect them against revenge
(Alemu 2011:41).
Conflict resolution is an approach that decisively removes the underlying
causes of conflict. Peter Wallensteen (2012:8) defines conflict resolution as ‘a sit-
uation where conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central
incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all
violent action against each other.’ From this definition it is apparent that conflict
resolution follows a mutual understanding about the problem to be solved and a
firm commitment to address the root causes of the conflict. This can be accom-
plished through changes in the behaviours, attitudes, structures and relationships
that incite or perpetuate conflict. A third party facilitates communication and
enables the conflicting parties to come to a comprehensive agreement. Generally,
the resolution approach leads to a long-term solution, as resolving conflicts – as
opposed to settling disputes – demands more than just establishing the facts or
satisfying the interests of the parties. However, it is important to note that conflict
resolution may not remove all differences and may not lead to major structural
changes that would avoid a relapse into conflict.
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Conflict transformation provides the deepest level of change, which results
from an improved and accurate understanding of the conflict in question. Conflict
transformation underlines the need for major structural and relational change to
address similar causes that might prompt a relapse into conflict. The structures,
relations, issues and interests that have led to a conflict are all expected to change
and allow the establishment of a new system and a new environment. In this re-
gard, the transformational approach seems to have an interest in the aftermath of
conflict and or post-conflict peace-building processes. John Paul Lederach (1995:17),
the leading advocate and proponent of conflict transformation, writes:
Transformation provides a more holistic understanding, which can be fleshed out
at several levels. Unlike resolution and management, the idea of transformation
does not suggest we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather points de-
scriptively toward its inherent dialectic nature. Social conflict is a phenomenon of
human creation, lodged naturally in relationships. It is a phenomenon that trans-
forms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs, and indeed its very cre-
ators. It is a necessary element in transformative human construction and recon-
struction of social organization and realities.
The gist of Lederach’s argument is that conflict – created by people in some kind of
relationship – transforms the creators and their relationship. If unchecked or left
alone, it can have destructive consequences for the people involved in the conflict.
However, the adverse effects of hostile relations and negative perceptions can be
modified through long-term and sustained processes that involve education, ad-
vocacy and reconciliation, and that improve mutual understanding and transform
the people, relationships and structures for the better. Hence, conflict transforma-
tion is explained in terms of healing and major structural change, and as having
positive implications for social transformation and nation building.
Values and virtues of customary laws
Thestudies undertaken thus far in Ethiopia indisputably reveal that customary laws
are deeply rooted in cultural and religious values and are widely practised through-
out the country. Especially in the countryside of Amara and Oromia Regions, it
seems that comparatively few cases are taken to the state court (Woubishet 2011:194)
and thatmost plaintiffs (more than 76 per cent according to Dejene) withdraw cases
filed with formal institutions before proper investigation (Dejene 2011:271). It ap-
pears that the degree of resistance to the formal law depends on the intensity of
state influence, which gets weaker from the centre to the periphery.
In 2011, I had the opportunity to coordinate research on customary laws in
Ethiopia and organize a series of validation workshops in different regions. Many
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of the professionals and practitioners in the justice sector who participated in the
workshops acknowledged that customary courts have been helpful in reducing the
workload of formal courts. As often seen on TV screens, in their efforts to address
inter-ethnic conflicts, government officials have been openly co-opting influential
customary authorities and judges. It is apparent that legal experts and authori-
ties, who in the past were antagonistic towards customary laws, have now begun
to recognize their virtues.This section therefore focuses on the underlying core val-
ues that may have contributed to the perpetuation, resilience and, in some cases,
dominance of customary laws.
Restoration of social order
In places where people live in settings with strong networks of kinship, clanship,
ethnicity, and other social groupings, disputes/conflicts between individuals are
likely to engulf much larger groups. Unlike the formal courts, which define justice
in terms of the penalization of perpetrators, customary laws focus on the larger
groups (e.g., families, communities, clans, etc.) from both the perpetrators’ and the
victims’ sides who may have been drawn into the trouble. This is because discord
is viewed not only as a matter of individual differences that should be addressed,
but also as something that disrupts the social order.The restoration of social order
can therefore only be ensured when the larger groups drawn into a dispute/conflict
come to grips with it and move forward, leaving the trouble behind them. Hence,
the deliberations of customary laws often end with the repentance of the perpetra-
tor’s group and the forgiveness of the victim’s group, which help bridge the social
divide and heal the social scar.
Frommany case studies on customary laws in Ethiopia (Gebre et al. 2011, 2012),
it is apparent that families and large groups in many parts of Ethiopia are in-
volved during the handling of disputes and conflicts initiated by individuals or
small groups. To give an example, in 1999 I witnessed the reconciliation process in
an adultery case involving two Gumz families, in which a young married woman
admitted to having been impregnated by a young man in the same village.The case
was brought to the attention of elders and clan leaders, who immediately sum-
moned the family and relatives of the impregnator and those of the young woman’s
husband (who was away from the village at the time, in education). The problem
between the two families was resolved through repentance and forgiveness in the
absence of the husband, who was expected to agree to the deal upon his return to
the village.
The staging of a forum for group involvement in customary peace-making pro-
cesses is meant not only to resolve the dispute/conflict itself but also to help avoid
possible relapses and spill over effects, and to ensure social order and community
peace. Hence, justice and peace are served at the same time. It could be argued that
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in communities with a strong sense of social bonding and group loyalty customary
laws are well suited to transform hostility to solidarity at both the individual and
group levels without creating a winner–loser situation. In this respect, customary
laws exhibit irrefutable advantages over the formal law, which focuses only on the
prosecution of the perpetrator, a measure that does not lead to community peace.
Quest for truth
The second important quality of customary laws is their unique and unparalleled
strength in discovering the truth, which often poses a challenge for the formal
justice system.The police often finds offences committed in secret and lacking evi-
dence makes it difficult or even impossible to investigate. In the context of custom-
ary law, the victim’s side is not expected to be open to discussion and forgiveness
before the truth has been disclosed. Hence, the primary role of the actors who de-
liberate in cases under customary law is to discover the facts through a confession
of the perpetrator or through investigation. In closely organized communities, peo-
ple do not hesitate to expose culprits, and it is not uncommon for family members
to testify against loved ones involved in unlawful acts. Thus, alleged perpetrators
are rarely convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and offenders rarely
get away with wrongdoing for lack of witnesses or evidence.
Telling the truth is given high value for practical and religious reasons. On the
practical side, the social life of people in communities is built around mutual trust.
People make agreements and entrust things to each other without witnesses and
without formal records. If the social contract of trust was allowed to crumble, the
consequences for the individuals and the society at large would be grave. For exam-
ple, untrustworthy individuals risk being dishonoured and disgraced among their
own families and communities. A society would become dysfunctional without the
basic principles that govern the behaviours and actions of its members. Hence,
there exists a great deal of social pressure to tell the truth.
Regarding the religious aspect, telling lies while under oath is associated
with a betrayal of faith that might have supernatural consequences. The case of
the Nuer, for example, reveals the value attached to truth and its association
with belief systems. There, ‘(t)he disputants swear an oath of innocence and the
person who doesn’t tell the truth is bound to suffer misfortune’ (Koang 2011:425).
Among the Woliso Oromo, ‘customary courts attempt to prove the truthfulness of
cases through the flow of information, directly from the disputants. Both parties
are expected to be honest in providing information. (…) It is believed that the
waaqa (higher spiritual being) easily identifies the truthfulness and falsity’ (Dejene
2011:261–262). In short, while state legal institutions struggle to find the truth as
people do not feel indebted to them, customary institutions can employ social and
religious pressure to learn the truth from a community.
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Public participation
As opposed to the closed and confidential ADR proceedings of theWest, customary
laws allow people to attend the publically held deliberations into disuputes/con-
flicts and to provide opinions on the validity or falsity of the evidence provided
and/or the fairness of the verdict reached. Before Ethiopia was occupied by Italy in
1936, this was also the case for the customary justice system of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment: the Imperial Courts invited bystanders and passers-by to attend hearings
and air their opinions.
Participation in the administration of justice characterizes the customary laws
of many Ethiopian people (see for example Assefa Fiseha (2011:366–7) on Tigray
and Abraham Tadesse (2011:123) on Sidama). Dejene (2011:261–276), who studied
the Woliso Oromo, writes: ‘Apart from direct participation, the community pro-
vides information and suggests ideas on the issue under litigation. Such informal
discussions and public views are important to arrive at consensus at the end of the
day. The final decisions are the outcome of these various views and suggestions
from the community.’ In addition, the openness of customary procedures and the
participation of the community members in the administration of customary jus-
tice tend to limit opportunities for corruption and nepotism, as Koang (2011:429)
noted about the Nuer.
Why is popular participation so important? First, the involvement of commu-
nity members as observers, witnesses and commentators increases the credibility
and transparency of customary laws. Second, non-confidential proceedings help
to put public pressure on parties to honour and respect agreements. Non-compli-
ance to decisions is rare, mainly because nonconformity is likely to be interpreted
as a rebellion against community values and interests. Finally, since decisions are
passed in the presence of community observers, the possibility for corruption and
prejudiced judgment is limited.
Collective responsibility
Collective responsibility refers to a situation where social groups take the blame
for offences perpetrated by their members and take responsibility for the conse-
quences. This principle is widely common in cultures where group identification
and group control mechanisms are strong, and where the idea of the individualiza-
tion of crimes is uncommon. In such societies, members of a perpetrator’s family
may be subjected to retaliation as a form of collective punishment. Hence, to avoid
such retribution, the families and relatives of wrongdoers often take the initiative
to make peace.The perpetrator’s family, lineage or clan may be required to take re-
sponsibility, express repentance as a group, and contribute towards compensation
for the victim. In Dassanech and Nyangatom, South Omo Zone, even government
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authorities seem to employ the principle of collective responsibility to put pressure
on communities to apprehend and bring criminals to justice.
From a Western perspective, collective responsibility for any wrongdoing does
not seem fair or appropriate.Onemight well challenge the appropriateness of hold-
ing communities/groups responsible for offences committed by individuals. Yet,
in an African context, blame-sharing seems to serve important purposes that are
worth appreciating. First, blame-sharing represents a tacit recognition that the
family or the group to which the perpetrator belongs failed to detect, discourage,
stop or report an unjustified offence, and as such, they should take some respon-
sibility. Second, when a verdict involves costly compensation being awarded to the
victim’s group, the principles of reciprocity, solidarity and sharing are often evoked
to help members in trouble. Third, in a situation where the group (rather than the
individual offender) is the target of retribution, the cost of not taking collective re-
sponsibility could bemuch higher than that of sharing the blame and jointly paying
the fine.
One might also wonder whether sharing of the consequences of wrongdoing
might encourage further crimes. However, it is unpleasant for a group to go
through such trials and tribulations, which tarnish the group’s reputation and
image in society.Thus, repeated offences may strain the relationship between the
perpetrator and his group, leading to harsher measures, such as humiliation, os-
tracism, expulsion from the community, capital punishment, etc. In other words,
there are internal mechanisms that discourage and control offenders.
Accessibility, efficiency and affordability
In Ethiopia, the formal legal institutions are largely inaccessible to a significant
proportion of rural communities.Most rural communities lack easy physical access
to the formal courts because the district courts are located in the woreda (district)
capitals, far away from most villages. Travelling to a woreda (district) capital to file
a case would, undoubtedly, incur costs: money, time and energy. Moreover, deal-
ing with the district courts can involve having to face unfamiliar and intimidating
judges, return visits to the court, unexpected delays, and issues with language, for
example, if local languages are not used in the courts. Although quasi-formal social
courts exist in villages, their mandate is limited to civil cases and petty crimes, the
punishments for which do not exceed one-month in jail and a 500 Birr (US $18)
fine.
Conversely, customary laws provides alternatives that fairly adequately address
these gaps and challenges. The people who apply customary law, often elders who
speak the local languages and are appointed and entrusted by the parties, are read-
ily available in every locality and provide speedy services free of charge (or for a
nominal fee). Hence, customary law provides a more affordable and accessible way
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to settle disputes than the formal courts. Unlike the formal courts, which are com-
plicated and known for their rigidity, customary forms are characterized by flexibil-
ity and simplicity, making themmore efficient.The inconvenience and dissatisfac-
tion associated with repeated court appearances, unbearable delays, intimidating
court procedures and corruption are also limited in the customary context.
Systematic and comparative research
Studies on customary law may be undertaken in a variety of ways depending on
their purpose and design. In this section, with the idea of knowledge systematiza-
tion in mind, attempts are made to outline and explain the salient variables useful
for understanding the structures and procedures of customary law and the state of
legal pluralism in Ethiopia. It is assumed that systematic study of customary law
requires a structured research approach that ensures the collection and analysis of
comparable data.
The structure of customary courts
This sub-section attempts to identify the judicial levels and frameworks, and the
identity, legitimacy and terms of office of the people who handle cases. It needs
to be noted that despite the constitutional provisions (i.e., Articles 34:5 and 78:5,
discussed later), the customary legal systems operate independently of the formal
court. Hence, the structure discussed in this section relates only to the customary
legal order.
Regarding court levels, some societies have customary courts that are hierar-
chically organized and have procedures for appeal, while others lack fixed courts,
hierarchy and the possibility of appeal. The absence of hierarchical structure does
not necessarily deter complainants from taking their cases to other parallel levels
for rehearing (Debebe 2011:348, Mesfin 2012:181). Some customary courts, such as
themad’a of the Afar people, handle different types of cases (Kahsay 2011:326), while
others, such as those among the Woleyta, specialize in handling only specific cases
(Yilma 2011:106).
In customary legal systems, the customary court judges are influential clan
leaders, ritual specialists, religious leaders, senior elders, village administrators
and lineage heads. These well-versed individuals are known for their wisdom, im-
partiality, knowledge of their culture, rhetorical skills or power to convince, and
rich experience in handingling disputes/conflicts.
The power of the customary judges and others handling conflicts emanates
from at least one of four sources: i) the consent of the parties to have their case
handled by them; ii) an administrative position (e.g., clan chief) in the society; iii)
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participation in certain rituals that entitle them to become judges, as is the case
among the Sidama (Abraham 2011) and the Dassanech (Gebre 2012), or iv) leader-
ship in religious institutions, as in some parts of Amhara (Birhan 2011). The legiti-
macy of legal authorities and their power are derived from secular and/or spiritual
sources.
The terms of office of people who handle dispute/conflict vary depending on
the sources of their authority. The role of those appointed by the parties in a dis-
pute/conflict ends the moment the discord is dealt with. However, judges who ac-
quire their authority by virtue of their religious or administrative posts, or by per-
forming rituals, may continue to serve until they are formally replaced, unless they
are required to step down for legitimate reasons, such as inability to function, poor
performance or malpractice. While individuals with an excellent record of service
are invited to handle cases repeatedly, those who fail tomeet expectations are rarely
given another chance. In all cases, those who handle disputes are under close public
scrutiny and this helps to ensure their impartiality and competence.
The procedures of customary courts
This sub-section focuses on the events/activities that occur between when a dispute
arises and when it is resolved. These include: reporting cases, evidence collection
and verification, deliberation and verdict, closing rituals, and enforcement mecha-
nisms. Reporting cases to customary courts is a collective responsibility rather than
amatter to be left to those directly involved. Family members, relatives, neighbours
or anyone who has knowledge about the dispute/conflict is expected to report it.
In many cases, the culprit or his/her kin will admit their guilt and report incidents
to ensure quick conciliation. It is also common for the party of the victim to file a
case with the judicial body instead of resorting to vengeance.
The ultimate objective of customary courts is to achieve genuine conciliation af-
ter the disclosure of the truth. The truth is expected to surface through confession
or public investigation, which may involve a review of the evidence and witness
testimony. Thanks to the high value accorded to truth, serious offences committed
in secret and in the absence of witnesses are often solved through customary pro-
cedures.The handlers remind disputants to restrain themselves from doing things
that can derail the process, hurt feelings or exacerbate social disorder. Apart from
those directly involved in a dispute/conflict and their witnesses, representatives
of the parties (often family members) and ordinary spectators of the deliberation
may be asked to air their views and comment in the interests of reconciliation and
community peace.
When guilt is admitted or proven with evidence, the case comes to a close, and
a verdict will be passed, often by consensus between the parties involved, although
it does not preclude coercion by customary judges (when persuasion fails). The of-
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fender’s group may have to pay compensation to the victim’s side, and express sin-
cere repentance, which is often reciprocated with forgiveness by the victim’s group.
Regarding compensation, there exist significant variations across cultures. In some
societies, fixed payment regimes exist, while in others, fines are determined later
based on the severity of the offence and sometimes the economic capacity of the
offender. Compensationmay be paid immediately, in piecemeal over a short period
of time, or as a long-term debt inherited by generations.
Most customary court rulings end with closing ritual performances that in-
volve sacrificial animals, the expression of a commitment to the agreements made,
curses for wickedness and nonconformist behaviours, and blessings for righteous-
ness and conformity. Such rituals of partly divine content are believed to deter re-
bellious tendencies and avoid a relapse into discord. Alongside the spiritual harm
that such rituals are believed to inflict on the defiant, social pressure (e.g., defama-
tion, ostracism, etc.) and physical measures (e.g., punishment, property confisca-
tion, etc.) may be used to enforce customary court decisions. Handing an offender
to the formal justice system provides another way of dealing with the disobedient.
Summary and conclusion
The plural legal orders of Africa came into being as a result of three processes:
transplantation from Western countries, imposition from authoritarian states,
and derivation from local values and traditions. Compared to the transplanted
and imposed law, the local level customary laws seem to enjoy widespread accep-
tance throughout the continent and especially in rural areas, where the majority
of African population resides. Moreover, they have received growing attention
by researchers, as evidenced by an increaing number of research reports and
publications.
However, this unprecedented study of customary legal practices has not led to
comprehensive knowledge amenable to comparative analysis, scientific generaliza-
tion, or policy application because of gaps in the use of terminologies, identifica-
tion of the virtues of customary laws, and articulation of research strategies. This
has warranted the need to systematize knowledge about customary laws.With this
in mind, this chapter hopes to have accomplished the following. First, besides clar-
ifying the meaning of concepts borrowed from the ADR literature, attempts have
been made to shed light on the comparability of the various terms to customary
legal practices. Second, the core values of customary laws worth recognizing have
been identified and organized. These include the restoration of community peace,
transparency, accessibility, efficiency, affordability, flexibility, simplicity, familiar-
ity, and sense of belongingness. Third, the variables useful for understanding the
structures and procedures of customary laws have also been discussed. In this way,
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the chapter hasmade amodest contribution to better understanding and informed
appreciation of customary laws.
Customary law faces existential challenges that have put it at crossroads. It is
criticized for gender insensitivity, weak procedural fairness in adjudication and
punishment, breach of human rights, lack of uniformity, and incompatibility with
changing contexts.The application of some customary laws obviously violates clas-
sic liberal rights, such as privacy, personal dignity and bodily integrity. The breach
of the rights of women and minority groups in the application of customary legal
practices are structural problems that largely emanate from the established cultural
norms in every society and culture. In order to remain relevant and effective in the
twenty-first century, the custodians of customary legal practices should demon-
strate adaptation, flexibility and sensitivity.
In Ethiopia, the constitutional recognition of customary laws remains inade-
quate in that the particulars of Article 34:5 have not been determined by law and the
official recognition stipulated in Article 78:5 has not yet been given. Consequently,
the interactions between state law and customary law are arbitrary, inconsistent,
unregulated, and quite unpredictable. In some cases, the two legal systems unof-
ficially recognize each other and cooperate to the extent of transferring cases or
exchanging information. There are instances where government authorities and
custodians of customary laws work together in addressing inter-ethnic conflicts.
There are also situations where the formal and customary courts operate side-by-
side exhibiting indifference and tolerance. Sometimes, both get antagonistic, es-
pecially when one intervenes in the domains and activities of the other. The inad-
equate constitutional provision and the consequent anomalous practices have led
to the existence of different views about the relevance of customary laws.
There is a need to regulate the relationship between the two legal systemswithin
the context of legal pluralism and avoid anomalies within a country. Policy makers
have to reckon with the relative indispensability and the manifest irreplaceability
(in addressing group conflicts) of the customary laws discussed in this paper, and
fulfil the constitutional promises without further delay. Given the historical fac-
tors, the cultural differences, and the limitations of the state law, the ideal strategy
would be to maintain and strengthen legal pluralism to provide multiple legal ser-
vice options to citizens.
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5. The handling of homicide in the context of
legal pluralism
Cooperation between government and customary
institutions in the Gamo highlands
Temechegn Gutu
Introduction
In the Gamo highlands, as in many parts of Ethiopia, customary law continues to
be applied, even in areas where the constitution does not allow it.The current study
attempts to understand how the Balta community in the Gamo highlands handles
homicide and makes use of the availability of parallel legal systems: the customary
and state law.
In the Gamo worldview, taking human life is believed to be gome – a trans-
gression of a social norm or sin that leads to the pollution of the wrongdoer and
can cause misfortune, disease and natural calamities. Therefore, when someone is
killed, a ritual of purification is enforced to cleanse the wrongdoer and to restore
the social order violated by the act. While customary law perceives homicide as
an issue that affects the whole group and therefore emphasizes the restoration of
normal social order between the families and clans of the slayer and the deceased,
state law defines it as an individual wrongdoing and punishes the criminal.
While the Gamo people’s philosophical position in relation to homicide sets its
customary legal system apart from the formal state law, this chapter shows that
the two legal systems work together in the process of handling homicide cases in a
number of different ways.The cooperation between the police, the ogade (mediator
between two or more communities), and the elders of the community in the collec-
tion of evidence is a case in point. Moreover, based on the findings, it seems that
the attention given to reconciling the victim’s and the slayer’s sides in the custom-
ary dispute settlement process makes an indispensable contribution in restoring
andmaintaining peace and harmony in the community, an effect that is also valued
and supported by government officials.
Legal anthropology in the colonial context often viewed state and customary
law as co-existing but separate areas of authority and adjudication, which used
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different procedures rooted in distinct moralities. Recent studies have conceptual-
ized the interplay between state and customary law in increasingly sophisticated
ways: seeing each as pursuing its own interests and creating a complex hybrid of
overlapping legal jurisdictions (Mann and Roberts 1991:264). However, the existing
body of knowledge on this issue is still limited.
Many scholars from different backgrounds have studied the indigenous conflict
resolutionmechanisms that Ethiopian societies in different regions have developed
(Donovan and Getachew 2003, Gebre et al. 2011, 2012; Pankhurst and Getachew
2008, Dejene 2002, Ayalew 2012). Gonfa (2014), for example, reported that among
the Oromo people, the court, police and the prosecutors encourage conflicting par-
ties to resolve all simple criminal cases through their traditional jaarsummaa (elder’s
council) system.With the consent of the conflicting parties, such cases are formally
referred to the elders with an appeal to resolve the conflict and report the result.
Some authors have demonstrated that formal and customary institutions are work-
ing closely on homicide cases, despite the fact that the law stipulates they should
be handled exclusively by the state courts. Esayas (2015:104–108) has shown that,
among the Gofa, the council of elders is closely cooperating with the police, the
prosecutors and the court to provide evidence or witnesses in, for example, homi-
cide cases.
However, only a few anthropologists are engaged in comparative studies of cus-
tomary law and the coexistence of customary and state law (see Gebre et al. 2011,
Alemayehu 2004). This chapter attempts to contribute to the scientific knowledge
on legal pluralism in Ethiopia from an anthropological perspective by exploring the
experiences of the Balta community of the Gamo highlands in south Ethiopia.
The Gamo people
The Gamo ethnic group lives in Gamo Gofa Zone in the Southern Nations, Na-
tionalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). Predominantly, they live in nine
districts of the zone and its capital, Arba Minch. The term Gamo refers to both the
people and the land where they live (Gebreyohannes 1993 E.C).
Much of the Gamo territory is highland, where the people grow ensete (false
banana), barley, wheat, peas, beans, potatoes and cabbages. In some lowland areas
they herd cattle and grow sorghum and maize (Freeman 1999, 2001). Ensete is a sta-
ple food grown across the highland communities and every house in the highland
is surrounded by an ensete grove. However, recently introduced cash crops, such as
bananas, mangos and avocados, have become the main source of livelihood in the
lowlands. Besides agriculture, weaving is also an important activity in many parts
of Gamo (Getaneh 2014).
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TheGamo people have more than 200 clans, and Gamo society is further subdi-
vided into different social classes or strata, some of which are based on occupation
and descent, including farmers (malla), craft workers (mana, tsoma or digela) and
slave descendants (ayle) (Arthur 2013, Bosha 2013, Weedman 2013, Olmstead 1975,
Freeman 2004).
Before the introduction of Orthodox Christianity to the highlands in the fif-
teenth century, the Gamo people followed only their own belief system (Getaneh
2014). Despite the influence of Christianity, the local people managed to maintain
their own beliefs until the twentieth century, when Protestant Christianity was in-
troduced to Gamo with the help of the Sudan Interior Missions (SIM), who visited
the area in the 1920s and 1930s (Freeman 2004).
The Gamo highlands have some forty self-administered communities (dereta)1
(Bureau 2012). According to Freeman (2004), every dere has its own kawo2 (heredi-
tary ruler), its own halaqa (initiate in small-sized dere), huduga (initiate in medium-
sized dere) or maga, as well as its own dubusha (assembly place), where the public
assembly (dere dulata) meets to discuss communal matters. Each dere also has its
own ogade (spokesman),3 responsible for inter-dere affairs and official communica-
tion with other dere on various socio-economic and political issues. As such, each
dere is a self-administrating unit. Though there exist many parallels, there are also
slight differences in the way conflicts are handled and resolved in each dere.
The Gamo highlands were incorporated into the Ethiopian state in the second
half of the nineteenth century. As stated by Freeman (2004), knowing that their
neighbours found it difficult to withstand Menelik II’s forces, the Gamo people
quickly submitted to the emperor’s soldiers in 1897, though – as several Gamo
elders recounted – there was some unorganized resistance in different places. Fol-
lowing the subjugation of the Gamo, the soldiers established their administrative
centre at Chencha, a small town that served as the capital of Gamo Gofa Province
before the centre was shifted to Arba Minch in the 1960s (Freeman 2004:37). Since
their incorporation into the Ethiopian state, the Gamo have experienced many
changes in their socio-political and economic life (Freeman 2004, Zenebe 2014,
Mahe 2013). These can be summarized as changing power relations, an increase
in religious alternatives, and improvements in transport and trade (Freeman
2004:31–38).
Under imperial rule (1897–1973)many local dignitaries received new titles (Free-
man 2004:31–32). In Gamo, the kawo became balabat – a title given to the landlords
1 Dereta is the plural form of dere.
2 Zenebe (2014), citing the GamoGofa Zone Culture and Information Department, argued that
the title of kawo or kati was introduced in Gamo indigenous governance in the sixteenth
century. My own research in 2008 E.C showed that not all Gamo deretawere ruled by a kawo:
ten dereta were ruled by a halaqa and Ganta was ruled by a kati (king).
3 In some dere this office is called gaanna.
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responsible for managing a territory and collecting tax from tenants. As such, the
local leaders retained their local power but, at the same time, had to be loyal to the
centre. In turn, they were given certain different privileges and positions, becom-
ing, for example, juridical officials or being put in charge of the local police. While,
in principle, all criminal cases were to be brought to the newly established courts,
at first they were heard by the balabat (Bureau 1978:282, Abeles 1981:62).
In this way, the people of the Gamo highlands were exposed to the state legal
system from the early years of their incorporation into the Ethiopian state. How-
ever, the newly introduced courts and police were not positively accepted by the
local people (Bureau 2012). Rather, as Bureau has described, there was little inter-
action between the newcomers and the local population: the Gamo people generally
avoided visiting the new markets established by the newcomers and continued to
use their own courts and Orthodox churches. In terms of settlement, the northern-
ers were confined to garrison towns while the local people stayed in the rural areas
(Bureau 2012). Besides Chencha, the main administrative centre of Gamo, several
smaller towns – such as Ezzo, Gulta, Gerese, Baza and Kamba – were founded
elsewhere in the highlands as local administrative outposts; each had its own state
institutions (Freeman 2004).
The Balta community of the Gamo highlands was exposed to this new admin-
istration through the garrison town of Kamba, which is some 15 km away from
the Balta area. While the regimes of emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassie were
based on indirect rule, when the Derg regime took over in 1974, many local institu-
tions central to the life of Gamo people – such as the public places (dubusha), ritual
places, and the traditional palace (gadho) – were destroyed. Since the coming of the
FDRE government to power in 1991, many Gamo institutions have been revitalized
(Zenebe 2014:31).
The research for this chapter was undertaken in Balta dere, one of the eleven
dereta in Kamba district of Gamo Gofa Zone. Balta was chosen because traditional
institutions for conflict resolution, including those for cases of homicide, are still
central to the life of the local people and now work side-by-side with state law.The
aim is to understand how this community handles homicide cases in the context
of plural legal system, with a focus on the cooperation between government and
customary institutions.
The traditional political and legal system of Balta dere
In the Gamo political system, each dere has various offices with specific duties
that are hierarchically structured. As mentioned above, although they are gener-
ally similar, there exist slight differences between the different dere (see Freeman
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1999, 2000; Getaneh 2006, Wondimu 2010, Zelalem 2016).4 In the following I will
describe the political offices as found in Balta and most other dere.
At the top of the hierarchy is the kawo, a politico-religious leader who is of-
ten referred to as ‘king’ in the literature (Abeles 1981, Freeman 2004, Zelalem 2016).
Succession to this position is hereditary and usually governed by the rule of pri-
mogeniture. The office holder has different administrative and religious duties.
Accordingly, the kawo is a senior office holder politically and a senior sacrificer in
Balta traditional religion. He makes the final decisions in the internal matters of
the community of his jurisdiction, adjudicates over serious crimes and adminis-
ters the territory (Freeman 2004, SNNPR Council of Nationalities 2008 E.C, Gamo
Gofa Culture and Information Department 2004 E.C).
Below the kawo is the huduga, a politico-religious position. The title is acquired
through an initiation ceremony. The huduga is responsible for governing the sub-
administrative unit within the dere and making sacrifices on behalf of the com-
munity under his jurisdiction. The office holder is accountable to the kawo and his
community. Below the huduga is the ogade (also: gasaamaga), a kind of spokesman or
mediator between different dere. The position is hereditary and passes from father
to eldest son on the father’s death. The ogade is responsible for handling all mat-
ters concerning inter-dere affairs, more specifically inter-dere conflict and homicide
mediations. The ogade is followed by the maga, a kind of mediator within one dere
who has to handle conflicts and homicides within the dere.Working closely with
these officials on multiple social issues is the dere cima (council of elders). It plays a
central role during social gatherings and public assemblies and works closely with
the maga, the ogade and the police on conflict resolution.
Conceptualizing conflict and homicide in Gamo
As explained by one of my informants,5 the term ‘conflict’, ooshsha in the Gamo
language, refers to a condition in which disagreement over a particular issue has
occurred between two or more individuals or groups. Conflicts in Gamo may be
inter-personal, inter- and intra-family, inter- and intra-clan, inter and intra-dere.
Their causes lie in the economic, political and social life of the people. Whether
interpersonal or at the inter-group level, conflict is perceived as a group issue; and
a conflict between individuals from two families, clans or dere can easily become a
4 The reason for the differences in the traditional political structure (but also some other as-
pects of life) of the dereta is that the Gamo dereta used to be relatively autonomous.
5 Wondifraw is a native Gamo from Dorze village and an experienced researcher in the Gamo
Gofa Zone Culture and Tourism Department. He was field assistant in the research project
entitled ‘Shared Values of the Gamo, Gofa, Gidiccho, Zayse and Oyda ethnic groups’ in
2015–2016.
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conflict between the respective groups. Less serious crimes can be settled through
mediation and compensation payments, after which social peace is re-established
between conflicting parties. Homicide cases within Gamo6 are handled differently,
as killing someone from the same ethnic group is believed to lead to a state of
pollution for the perpetrator that has the potential to affect the well-being, health
and fertility of both humans and animals belonging to his family and clan. Being
gome (polluted) is also believed to affect the natural order. As such, it can cause
drought, disease and, therefore, harm to the whole community.Thus, the homicide
of a Gamo by another Gamo must be followed by ritual purification of the slayer.
The procedure for handling intra-dere homicide is slightly different to that used for
inter-dere homicide.
Intra-dere homicide
In the past, when homicide occurred within one dere, the slayer reported the case
to his/her family and then took refuge in the kawo gadho (residence of the kawo),
seeking protection from the deceased person’s family, whomight come for revenge.
Not only the slayer but also his relatives would take refuge in another place and stay
in exile until the families had been reconciled. Nowadays, once the slayer’s family
have reported a case to maga, the perpetrator is kept in the police station rather
than in the kawo gadho. Then the reconciliation process between the two families is
initiated through the maga.
In consultation with the kawo, the maga identifies the elders of the community
(dere cima) with whom he will progress the reconciliation ritual. With the selected
elders, he then travels to the residence of the deceased person’s family, where they
explain that the crime constitutes a violation of the customary law (dere woga) and,
as such, is an unacceptable act. They also condemn the homicide as gome. Further,
they outline the position of the slayer, his family and clan, who regret what has
happened, feel guilty and wish to reconcile. It is common for the family of the de-
ceased to initially reject the request to forgive the killer. However, the social norm
obliges them to accept in the end. As Solomon, a retired teacher from Kamba town
stated, failing to accept themaga’s request to forgive the family of the slayer poten-
tially brings gome to the family members of the deceased person, so they eventually
accept.
Once the family of the deceased has agreed to reconcile, the ritual of purifica-
tion and re-integration of the slayer’s family and clan into the society is carried out
on the dubusha (‘public meeting place’). After this, they can return to their houses
6 This applies only when a Gamo kills a fellow Gamo; killing a member of a group considered
an enemy turns the killer into a local hero and brings fertility to him.
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and continue their lives as before. After finishing his time in prison, the slayer
himself can never return to his dere and has to settle elsewhere.
Inter-dere homicide
Adala, the ogade of Balta dere, explained that when homicide occurs between two
dere, the case is handled by the ogade through ayidama, a customary mechanism for
resolving conflicts between the different Gamo communities. Ayidama is carried
out in special places, also called ayidama,which are located at the boundary between
two adjacent dere.These places exist at every corner of each dere so that local people
do not have to travel far.7
The reconciliation process is initiated by the ogade of the slayer’s dere. He rubs
his body with mud and ashes before he travels to the ayidama, thereby expressing
that a particular group in his community (i.e. the culprit and his entire family and
clan) is impure. He walks on his knees to show that someone from his group has
done wrong and therefore cannot stand upright and be equal with those who are
free of wrongdoing. Standing on the ayidama he shouts, ‘I made a mistake, I killed
a person, I am dirty, please forgive me!’ until his counterpart from the deceased
person’s side approaches him. The ogade from the deceased person’s side cannot
refuse to meet the other ogade, as it is believed that this would turn him gome.
Upon his arrival, he is received by the ogade from the slayer’s dere. While on the
ayidama, they discuss the issue with each other and agree on a date for resolving
the case. Once back home, the ogade from the dere of the deceased person informs
his community about his counterpart’s request and convinces them to accept. On
the agreed date he takes them to the ayidama, where they meet the other ogade
and the slayer’s family. From the first contact between the two ogade until the re-
integration of the slayer into the community, all the steps in the process of resolving
inter-dere killing cases take place on the ayidama.
When the purifying ritual is performed, a member of the maakka clan – which
has spiritual power to purify wrongdoers – spears the abdomen of a live sheep.
When the chyme comes out, the clan head of the slayer is ordered to touch it with
his foot.While approaching the chyme, he must hide himself from the public gath-
ered to attend the peace-making ceremony.8 Then the clan head of the deceased
7 There are five ayidama places at the borders of Balta dere: Mucalo (between Bonke and Balta),
Eshata (between Kamba and Balta), Maazee (Sorba and Balta dere), Gongolo (Balta and Kole)
and Qeqello (Haringa and Balta).
8 This man should not expose himself to the general public before the ritual is accomplished.
If he is seen, he might be killed by the family of the deceased person out of revenge. If he
or any relative of the slayer are killed before the clan head has touched the chyme of the
speared sheep, the ritual ends immediately as it is believed that both families have thus
equally harmed each other and blood has been compensated with blood.
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person is told to touch the chyme, but he does not have to hide himself from the
public.
After this, the maakka cleanses the family and the clan of the slayer by using er-
cho, a kind of grass, to purify the wrongdoers and their relatives from gome. Finally,
compensation (susaa qantso) – currently about 150 ETB – is given to the relatives
of the victim for the spilling of his blood. The family of the slayer do not hand the
compensation payment directly to the relatives of the victim; both families are in-
stead represented by their respective ogade. While handing over the compensation,
the ogade of the slayer walks on his knees, kissing the ground until the money has
been accepted by the ogade of the deceased person. This ritual cleansing is crucial
for re-establishing peace and thereby allowing normal social interaction between
the families of the slayer and the deceased. It symbolizes the accomplishment of
the resolution and is still performed today; although, while traditionally the slayer
had to hide somewhere until the process was over, today it is done while he is in
police custody or prison.
Prevalence of government institutions in the study area
Administratively, Ethiopia is divided into nine regional states and two city admin-
istrations. The regional states are sub-divided into zones, districts (woreda), and
kebeles (smallest administrative unit) in order to decentralize power to the grass
roots level as specified in the 1995 FDRE constitution (FDRE 1995).
As noted earlier, Balta dere is located in Kamba district in Gamo Gofa Zone.
In Kamba district, there are a number of government institutions, including of-
fices for the police, women and children’s affairs, education, health, social affairs,
agriculture and rural development, culture and tourism, and the court. A number
of schools, police stations and posts, a court, health centres and posts have been
established under these different offices in order to ensure that their services are
accessible to the communities. Over time, the traditional geo-political administra-
tion of the Gamo highlands has undergone some significant changes. Accordingly,
the former Balta dere was restructured and now consists of nine kebeles in the cur-
rent administrative structure of Kamba district. However, as the local people con-
tinue calling it Balta dere,9 I have decided to use this name throughout this chapter
to refer to all nine kebeles.
9 In most cases, but not necessarily all, the dere are bigger than the kebele. For instance, like
Balta dere, which consists of nine kebeles, Dorze dere consists of thirteen kebeles.
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Several different government agencies operate at the kebele level in Balta dere,
including the kebele administration, the kebele social court,10 the kebelemilitia, and
schools, a health centre and police stations have been established to serve the local
communities. These agencies are headed by various personnel, such as the kebele
chief, the social court committee, local militia, development agent workers, teach-
ers, nurses and policemen.The majority of them are from Balta and only a few are
from other dereta in Kamba district or other parts of the Gamo highlands. Specifi-
cally, the chairman of the kebele, local militia, social court workers, teachers, nurses,
development agent workers and the policemen are from the Gamo ethnic group.
As one informant stated, the duties of these personnel and institutions are highly
integrated. As an example he mentioned that the school principal participates in
kebele administration affairs in the belief that he should participate in the affairs
of the community in which the school is established.
Cooperation between government and customary institutions
in handling homicide
In collaboration with traditional leaders and elders, state institutions at different
levels engage directly or indirectly in conflict resolution for crimes ranging from
the minor to the serious, including homicide. As mentioned above, customary in-
stitutions have continued to exist side by side with government institutions. As
I was informed by several policemen in Kamba and during interviews with local
authorities in Arba Minch, state institutions need to cooperate with customary in-
stitutions and vice versa to resolve certain conflicts. In the following, the factors
that make their cooperation necessary as well as the areas in which they support
each other will be described in more detail.
Factors contributing to cooperation
(i) Preference for customary mechanisms
As is the case in many other places in Ethiopia (Gebre et al. 2011, 2012; Pankhurst
and Getachew 2008), customary conflict resolution mechanisms in Gamo continue
to be preferred over state institutions by the local population. The accessibility,
restorative power and participatory nature of the Gamo people’s customary in-
10 The social courts can be categorized as what Ayke and Mekonnen (2011:201–215) call ‘semi-
formal institutions’, that is, institutions that have both formal and informal features. They
seem formal since they are established by proclamation, but look informal since the so-called
‘judges’ are untrained and receive no salary.
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stitutions, as well as the transparency of their processes and impartiality of the
decisions made, all work to make them preferable to state institutions.
The restorative effect and potential to bring sustainable peace is achieved
through the ritual of purification and reconciliation. My informants emphasized
that the families of the slayer and deceased family can engage in the same social
arena after the ritual: members of the two families can intermarry and attend the
same market without any fear, and the family of the slayer can also freely travel in
the dere of the deceased person.
The participatory nature of customary conflict resolution lies in the fact that,
for example in the context of homicide, all family members from both sides take
part in the reconciliation process. As crime itself is perceived at the collective level,
its resolution requires the participation of all family and clan members, who are
represented by their respective clan heads.
The transparency and impartiality of the customary institutions stems from
the fact that, throughout the whole process of reconciliation, the discussions are
carried out in public places, where every witness presents their evidence in the
presence of the public. Both victim and perpetrator are given an equal chance to
talk about the case. Nothing is hidden from the public on this stage, and this forces
the traditional leaders and elders to be impartial. As both sides receive the decision
after they have contributed to the discussion, it is felt that there is no winner and
loser.
Finally, when compared to the state institutions, customary institutions are
more easily accessible to local communities. Travelling to and staying in towns in
order to access a state court is costly, while customary reconciliation takes place
locally, on either the dubusha or ayidama.
State agents have duly recognized the local preference for customary law and
have also noted that it is difficult to restore peace and ensure stability in the area
if customary institutions are excluded. Understanding how much the customary
institutions are integrated into the local culture and recognizing the importance
of their social capital in peace-building processes, the state institutions collaborate
with customary institutions in the resolution of conflict in general and homicide
in particular.
(ii) Shared interest in resolving cases of homicide
Both state and customary institutions perceive the act of homicide as the violation
of a norm. Views expressed by local elders and policemen revealed that neither
the local culture among the Gamo nor state law tolerate homicide. As described
above, among the Gamo the act of homicide is a violation that results in ritual
pollution (gome) and endangers the whole community if it remains unresolved.The
government rates homicide as a violation of state law and a disturbance of social
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order. As a result, both legal systems sanction any act of homicide on the basis of
certain normative orders, although the kinds of sanctions imposed are different.
The numerous interviews I conducted with local elders and state agents show
that, whenever homicide cases are reported, both customary and state institutions
intervene in order to settle them. Representing government institutions, the police
and local militia arrest the slayer and keep him at the police station until the court
comes to a final verdict. Representing customary institutions, local leaders and
elders get involved and engage in reconciliation efforts with the aim of healing the
relationship between the families of slayer and deceased. One policeman expressed
how working with local agents enables the police to be more effective:
We [the police] are from Gamo and we understand that crime is not limited to
an individual perpetrator. It is a matter of the family and the clan of the criminal.
Therefore, the reconciliation process should address the needs of all stakeholders.
In this context, elders and traditional leaders approach the crime to reconcile the
family and their clan. Quite the opposite, in our context [government institutions
and state law], crime is perceived as a matter of an individual criminal and thus
we have to punish the individual. (Summary of an interview, 26 October 2017)
As can be seen, while sharing an interest in avoiding and resolving conflicts related
to homicide, in practice the state and community deal with different aspects of the
same problem.While state law deals with the individual criminal, the Gamo elders
are concerned with healing the social ill that was caused by the slayer at the group
level. Thus, when a case goes to court, the duty to reconcile and purify the family
and the clan of the slayer and the deceased rests on the shoulder of the local actors.
As the problem is thereby addressed both at the individual and the communal level,
ideally, the two systems complement each other.11 Although, it cannot be denied
that in practice there can be tension and conflict over areas of responsibility.
Areas of cooperation in handling homicide
(i) Handover of the slayer
The cooperation between customary and state institutions in the handling of homi-
cide can be observed at different stages from investigation to the conviction of a
wrongdoer, and has been confirmed during interviews with local elders and tra-
ditional leaders, as well as policemen in Kamba town, who particularly appreciate
the efforts of the traditional leaders. Adala, the ogade of Balta dere explained how –
under pressure from the government side – he and others made the handover of a
slayer to the police a precondition for the initiation of the reconciliation process:
11 See Lauth (2000) who emphasizes this positive impact of legal pluralism.
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In the past, after killing a personmost of the time a slayer took refuge in the home
of the kawo to escape revenge from thedeceased person’s relatives.Nowadays, the
government is taking care of slayers by hiding them in prison, which is a safe place
for them.We are working with the police in facilitating the handover of the slayer,
and do not initiate the reconciliation before this.
The police and other members of the peace forum have told us repeatedly
that we [the traditional leaders] are not allowed to initiate reconciliation for se-
rious criminal cases like homicide before the transfer of the slayer to the police
or local militia. As a result, in collaboration with a slayer’s family, we identify his
whereabouts and facilitate his handover to the police in case he hides in order
to initiate the reconciliation process. (Summary of an interview with Adala, 20
February 2017)
The following case illustrates such cooperation in the handover of a criminal.
Seo12 was a young man from Balta and aged 25. He was sentenced to seventeen
years in prison by the Arba Minch Area High Court for killing a man from a neigh-
bouring Kamba dere. During my interview he told me that he had already served
four years in prison office in Arba Minch. After killing the man, he had sent word
to his parents through amessenger about what he had done, in order to prevent a
possible revenge attack by the family of the deceased person. He spent the whole
night in the nearby forest and oversaw the on-going situation from there. After
understanding that the situation was difficult, he decided to take shelter with rel-
atives in a remoter place. However, after a week the police came and took him to
the police station. (Summary of an interview with Seo, 29 April 2017)
Seo’s father recounted the hardship the family underwent until things were settled:
I don’t want to remember those horrible months [referring to the six months he
had to take refugewith his family far fromhis residence]. I lost everything, houses,
cattle, sheep, horses, grain, everything I had accumulated since my childhood
within less than an hour. A week after the killing happened, two policemen and
militiamen visited me with the Balta ogade. We discussed and agreed on how to
initiate the reconciliation process, so I told them where my son was hiding. The
next day I heard that the police had taken him to the police station. Immediately,
the ogade initiated the reconciliation process. Thanks to everyone involved, the
policemen, the militia, the ogades and the dere cima, we managed to get back to
our residence after six months and pick up our life there from scratch. Once he is
released from jail, my son will also join and live with us [referring to his family,
community and clan], and nothing will happen against him since we have already
finalized everything. (Summary of an interview, 25 October 2017)
12 Pseudonym
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The case illustrates how local actors – that is, the ogade and the family of the slayer
– collaborate with state agents in identifying the whereabouts of the slayer and
thereby help prevent the post-homicide conflict escalating. It also shows the great
social pressure put on the family, whose members are ostracized along with the
slayer and forced to leave their home until reconciliation is over. Transferring the
murderer to the state institution is not really a matter of choice for them but a
duty, as it has become a precondition for the reconciliation process to begin.
(ii) Identification of the criminal
Identification of the slayer is another area in which state institutions depend on
the cooperation of the local community. By Gamo custom, people meet to take an
oath (chako) at the kawo’s public meeting place (kawo dubusha) in order to identify
a slayer. Assuming that he is at the assembly, the traditional leaders and religious
experts (demutha) instruct and advise the slayer to disclose himself. Most of the
time, as I was told by my informant Adala, slayers disclose themselves, fearing that
they might be cursed if they hide their identity. If no one gets up to admit their
guilt, the clan leaders and elders to go back home for a few days to consult their
respective clan members before they resort to performing a public curse at the
meeting place. If it comes to that, all the suspected individuals are presented in
front of the public. They are again strongly advised to speak the truth. This time,
if no one admits the wrongdoing, the elders sit down in two rows opposite each
other while the religious specialist speaks as follows:
Look at the God in the universe, look at the dubusha where we are sitting, carry
the spear and cross in between the public body sitting covering their faces in two
rows.
With this speech, the expert is saying that, while no personmay have seen what the
slayer did, God in the universe and the ground on which the slayer moves have seen
what he did and will judge him for it. The suspects are then asked to walk between
the two lines of seated elders; the assumption is that the innocent will do so, while
the real slayer will fear to pass between them and throw himself to the ground,
asking forgiveness to avoid being cursed by passing through knowing their guilt.
This traditional way of identifying a culprit is now being used by state officials,
who attend the oath-taking ceremonies. Policemen, local militia and security per-
sonnel document such events with photos and video, assuming that they lead a
suspect to speak the truth.
(iii) Preventing revenge and further escalation
As seen in the above case, the family of a deceased person will seek to avenge the
killing of one of their number. Sometimes, if the situation allows, revenge attacks
even happen during the reconciliation process. This inevitably leads to further es-
110 Temechegn Gutu
calation, so the police, local militia, local people and the mediators (maga, ogade)
work together to prevent this. The policeman who led the taskforce in Seo’s case
said that he often worked with traditional leaders and other potential stakeholders
in resolving serious criminal cases like homicide. As he recounted:
It happened four years ago. I was assigned to lead the taskforce established to
investigate and resolve the case. We had learned from the local people that the
killing happened around 7 pm. After collecting necessary evidence from the crime
scene, the body of the deceased person was sent to Addis Ababa for medical in-
vestigations.
At about an hour after midnight, we received the information that there was a se-
curity problem in the village of the slayer, and that his family was being attacked.
Together with local people, we managed to control the situation and forced the
relatives of the deceased to return to their village. Then I ordered all of the po-
licemen in the taskforce and the local militia to arrest the slayer, but we could not
find him.
After one week, four members of the taskforce together with the ogade contacted
Seo’s father in the remote villagewhere he had hidden.We offered to help initiate
the reconciliation process through the ogade if he would tell us where his son was
hiding. He agreed and on the basis of his genuine information we were able to
arrest the slayer. As promised, the reconciliation process was initiated soon after
that.
From the very beginning the police officers concerned attended every step of the
reconciliation process with three missions: the first mission was to collect addi-
tional information about the reasons behind the killing from the discussions held
by participants: whether it was intentional or not and how it was actually done.
The secondmission was to ensure that the reconciliation process was undertaken
only for the purpose of restoring the social peace between the families of the
slayer and the deceased, rather than to punish the slayer. The third mission was
to protect the family of the slayer from an unexpected attack during the ritual of
re-integration that would take place in the presence of both the slayer’s and de-
ceased person’s family.
The whole process took more than six months until the final reconciliation and
re-integration ritual marked the completion of mymission of restoring peace and
order. (Summary of an interview, 26 October 2017)
The police officer’s account shows the direct cooperation between his office and the
traditional leaders, who – in combining government pressure and the ritual power
of the ogade – are able to enforce the handover of a slayer as well as the start of
the reconciliation process. Their common interest here is the re-establishment of
social peace between the two families/clans, as well as the prevention of revenge
attacks that would result in further killing and destruction of property.
The handling of homicide in the context of legal pluralism 111
Summary and conclusion
As in many non-western societies, among the Balta community in the Gamo high-
lands, customary law continues to be practised alongside state law, even in cases
of homicide. The findings of this study show that, despite certain contradictions
in the values and practices underlying customary and state laws, their relationship
displays complementary and cooperative elements when it comes to their applica-
tion.
Looking specifically at the case of homicide, it was shown that the cooperation
between customary and state laws is based on a common view that intra-ethnic
homicide13 is a crime and should be sanctioned. While homicide is an individual
matter demanding the punishment of the murderer according to state law, it is
locally viewed as a crime that affects the wider social networks of slayer and victim,
which makes a ritual restoration of their relationship indispensable. Putting their
resources together, state and local community cooperate in identifying, arresting,
sanctioning and protecting the slayer, and in preventing further escalation.
The cases shows that, at the local level, the resources of both legal systems can
be used productively and in the interests of all the parties involved if enough space
is given for flexibility, mutual understanding and tolerance of difference.
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6. The interplay of customary and formal legal




Prior to their incorporation into themodern Ethiopian state in the 1870s and 1880s,
the Oromo had their own customary institutions that dealt with disputes under
the framework of the gadaa age and generation system. Following the conquest by
Menelik II at the end of the 19th century, the state law and other normative orders
were introduced into the Oromo land, which gave rise to plural legal settings for
dispute settlement (Mamo 2006). The aim of this paper is to examine the interplay
between customary and formal legal systems in dispute settlement at the district
and kebele levels in Jidda district, North Shewa, Oromia Regional State.1
There exist numerous studies in Ethiopia on customary law and conflict resolu-
tion, and some also tackle the question of how customary and formal law interact
in dispute settlement.2 However, most of these works have focused on the posi-
1 This paper is basedmainly on a total of 12months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted from
May 2014 to April 2016 for my PhD dissertation presented to the Department of Social An-
thropology, Addis Ababa University, in December 2017. It was conducted in Jidda district of
North Shewa Zone, Oromia Regional State. Data was collected through participant obser-
vation of customary dispute settlement and the formal law. Interviews and FGDs were also
held with elders, women, youth, kebele officials and legal practitioners of the formal law.
Besides, case studies were employed to reveal the cooperative and problematic aspects of
the relationships between the two legal systems. Furthermore, statistical reports of dispute
cases found in the formal courts and legal documents were consulted to augment primary
methods of data collection. For ethical reasons, the privacy of informants was kept anony-
mous. I am thankful to my advisors, Prof. Gebre Yntiso and Dr. Assefa Tolera, for their helpful
comments and advice during my PhD project. My thanks also go to Addis Ababa University,
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and Association of African Universities (AAU)
for their financial support of the fieldwork.
2 See, for example, Girma (2009), Mamo (2006), Melaku (2009), Meron (2010), Negash (2013),
Yihunbelay (2010), almost all chapter contributors in Gebre et al. (2011, 2012); cases studies
in Pankhurst and Getachew (2008), and Tarekegn and Hannah (2008).
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tive aspects of the relationships between the two legal systems while studies on the
competitive and problematic aspects are scarcer, especially in Oromo studies. As
such, the present study is in line with recommendations of previous scholars who
suggested a further investigation on the subject and appeal for a careful study of an
interface between the customary mechanisms of dispute resolution and the formal
structure (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:271, Gebre et al. 2011:471).The present pa-
per, therefore, aims at filling this gap about the state of legal pluralism in Ethiopia,
specifically in Oromia.
The focus is on the time since 1991 because it is only after the end of the Derg
regime that legal pluralism was officially recognized both in the 1995 Ethiopian
Constitution and in the 2001 Revised Constitution of Oromia.3 Since then, dis-
putants can choose whether to appeal to a customary or a formal court in matters
of concerning family or personal lawwhile other cases still have to be handled by the
state law. The recognition of legal pluralism was further extended by the 2004 Re-
vised Criminal Code of Ethiopia, which seems to leave the choice to the disputants
(mainly to the victims) to take crimes upon complaint to the forum of their own
choice. However, serious civil and criminal cases continue to be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the formal law. In practice, as will be illustrated in this paper, cus-
tomary law settles disputes covering a wider range of issues in addition to those
stipulated in the constitutions and the Criminal Code.
This paper is divided into five sections. This introductory section briefly pro-
vides issues that need further research and the time of the analysis. Section two
discusses the Tulama Oromo and their socio-political organization with particular
focus on Jidda district, the study area. On the basis of what has been discovered
in the fieldwork, section three and four deal with, in detail, the interplay between
customary and formal legal systems among the Tulama Oromo of the study area.
Section three examines the cooperation between customary and formal legal sys-
tems in dispute settlement while section four looks at the problematic areas and
competition between the two. Finally, the paper summarizes and concludes with
suggestions to improve the working relationships between customary and formal
legal systems.
3 As a result of the federal system of the government in place in Ethiopia since 1995, the re-
gional governments established their own constitutions in line with Art. 52(2) of the 1995
Ethiopian Constitution. Based on this, the Oromia Regional State established its own consti-
tution in 1995, which was later revised in 2001.
The interplay of customary and formal legal systems among the Tulama Oromo 117
The Tulama Oromo
The Oromo people are one of the largest ethnic groups in Eastern Africa (Asmarom
1973), constituting nearly 34.5% (a little over 25 million) of the Ethiopian population
in 2007 (CSA 2008). Most of them reside in the Oromia National Regional State.
TheOromia region is one of the nine regional states constituting the Federal Demo-
cratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is bordered with all the regions except Tigray. It is
also the largest of all the regions in Ethiopia in terms of population and land size.
Currently, the region is divided into 20 administrative zones, with North Shewa
being one of them. Jidda, the study area, is one of the thirteen districts in North
Shewa zone (see figure 1 below).
The Oromo are divided into two major groups: the Borana (senior) and the
Barentu (junior) (Gada 1988:8). The descendants of these two main groups later
formed major Oromo clans and sub-clans. The Borana section of the Oromo is
divided into three main branches, namely the Southern Borana, the Guji and the
Macha Tulama (Mohammed 1990:18). The settlement of the Tulama Oromo largely
occupies the Shewan plateau extending over vast areas between Lake Zeway in the
south and Wollo in the north, Macha lands in the west and the territory of Karayu
in the east (Alemayehu et al. 2006:137−145). Thus, the Tulama Oromo who occupy
the present day Jidda district are part of the Borana Oromo group.
Jidda district, the study area, is far from the main highway road connecting
Addis Ababa with Bahir Dar and Dessie towns. Its administrative seat, Sirti, is lo-
cated at about 110 km from Addis Ababa and 70 km from Fiche, the administrative
capital of North Shewa zone of Oromia Region. The town is where the formal le-
gal institutions like the district police, public prosecutor and court are found. In
2007, the total population of Jidda district was 53,658 with the overwhelming ma-
jority of the inhabitants being the followers of Orthodox Christianity (CSA 2008).4
Almost all inhabitants of the district are Oromo and speak Afaan Oromo as their
first language. According to the Jidda Agriculture office, the district is located at a
high altitude ranging from 2600−3500 meter above sea level. Topographically, it is
largely plain with some plateaus,mountains, valleys and rugged terrains.The same
office disclosed that Jidda from North Shewa is the leading district in animal pop-
ulation such as cattle, sheep, horses, donkeys, and mules. Because of its altitude
4 Although the central statistics show that the majority of the Oromo of the area claim to be
followers of Orthodox Christianity, most of them actually mix it with their indigenous faith,
waaqeffannaa. In their everyday social life, they make oaths in the name of their traditional
belief systems, calling upon the qaalluu instead of Christian Orthodox saints and the Ark of
the Covenant (tabot). When they face serious difficulties such as lack of rain and natural dis-
aster, they often go to their indigenous ritual sites (rivers and hills) to slaughter a bull, pray
and make a pleading (isgoota).
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and climate, wheat, barley, teff, beans, peas, and lentils are important crops grown
in Jidda.
Figure 1: Map of Jidda District (CSA 2008 )
Social and political organization among the Tulama Oromo is structured and
organized by their well-known age and generation system called gadaa (Blackhurst
1978, Knutsson 1967). Despite their inclusion into the Ethiopian nation-state, many
Tulama groups have sustained the gadaa system, or at least elements of it, and
activate it in religious, ritual social, economic and also legal contexts. In the study
area (and among other Tulama groups), the gadaa system still survives though it
is not strong as it was before. This paper confirms that the five class structure, the
gadaa assembly, the ten gadaa grades and the eight-year gadaa period are features
common to both the contemporary and the past systems of the Tulama. Gadaa
symbols and some ritual practices such as the foollee institution (one of the stages
in the gadaa grade) were recently reintroduced.
In the study area, there are twomajor customary legal institutions related to the
gadaa system.The first is the jaarsummaa, which can be translated as the ‘council of
elders’. The most important task of the jaarsummaa is dispute settlement, besides
other services.5 The jaarsummaa is formed by males of different age groups, but it
serves both sexes in the community. It is not a permanent council, but rather the
5 Elders play also important roles as go-betweens during marriage negotiations, and in times
of drought, disease and other disasters.
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elders meet on ad hoc basis whenever a certain dispute occurs. After achieving its
mission of dispute settlement, the council is disbanded.
The qaalluu, often translated as ‘ritual leader’ as well as the religious institu-
tion, is another customary system involved in dispute settlement6. According to
my observation, the qaalluu is divided into a court with three tiers. The first and
the lowest level is the court run by the elders (jaarsa) of the institution. Most cases
first appear before this court. Then, if disputants are not satisfied with the deci-
sion of this court, they can appeal to the second level court, which includes the
elders and the qaalluu himself. If one of the disputed parties is not satisfied with
the judgment of this court, he/she can appeal to the last and the highest level for
ritual judgment. This third level court is sacred and run by the qaalluu, who is pos-
sessed by a spirit.The verdicts of the qaalluu aremostly accepted since he is believed
to have the spiritual power to cause misfortune to the one that rejects his reconcil-
iation. Compared to the qaalluu located in other districts of North Shewa, its role
in dispute settlement is very limited in Jidda. Besides, its interaction and coopera-
tion with the formal legal institutions within the context of dispute settlement are
rather rare in the area.
Therefore, this study looks specifically at the council of elders (jaarsummaa),
which is currently the main local forum in dealing with a variety of disputes rang-
ing from civil to criminalmatters. Besides, the council of elders frequently interacts
with the formal legal system in the study area. The formal legal institutions7 this
study deals with include the district court,8 the police and the public prosecutor
that are located in Sirti town, the social courts9 and the kebele administration coun-
cils10 that exist in all villages (kebeles) of the study area. Thematically, the focus of
6 The qaalluu believes to be the intermediary between the people and supernatural power
called Waaqa. He exercises considerable influence in the economic, political and social life
of the Oromo people, as he is responsible for their spiritual well-being. The qaalluu institu-
tions are centers of healing, worshipping and administration. They are also the place where
children are given Oromo names.
7 District Administration, District Administration and Security, District Women and Children
Affairs, District Land Administration and Environmental Protection are other offices that ex-
ist in Sirti town and that deal with disputes in the area.
8 The formal courts have original jurisdictions over civil cases (excluding issues related to the
land boundary) which values exceed 1.500 ETB, as well as overall criminal cases and appeals
coming from kebele social courts and kebele administration councils.
9 The social courts are run by the local judges, who are not legally trained and salaried but
authorized by the Ethiopian law to provide justice to the local people free of charge. The
court has jurisdiction over civil disputes relating to property claims andmoney, which values
do not exceed 1.500 ETB (roughly 55.50 dollars) (see the 2001 Constitution of Oromia and
2007 Oromia Social Court Proclamation).
10 The kebele administration council together with elders has the original jurisdiction over land
boundary disputes as stated in the 2007 Oromia Land Proclamation.
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the analysis is both civil and criminal aspects of disputes, ranging fromminor civil
cases to homicide. In the following sections, the cooperative as well as the prob-
lematic and competitive aspects of the relationships between jaarsummaa and the
formal legal system will be discussed.
Cooperation between customary and formal legal systems
This section will show the cooperative areas in the relationships between customary
and formal legal systems including case transfer and notification of the decision
of the transferred cases of settlement to one another’s jurisdiction, joint dispute
settlement, the elders’ double role in both legal systems and collaboration in de-
escalation of disputes and crime prevention. For this, court statistics and selected
cases are used to illustrate the areas of the cooperation between the two legal sys-
tems.
Case transfer and notification of the transferred cases
One of the cooperative aspects between the two legal systems is case transfer and
notification of the decision of the transferred cases to one another.Though in prin-
ciple case transfer from one legal forum to the others happens in both directions,
most often the formal institutions (court, police and public prosecutor) transfer
cases to the jaarsummaa. This occurs in different contexts: when the disputed par-
ties invited elders or when the elders convince the disputants to move the case
from the formal legal system to the jaarsummaa and when the formal legal system
lets the disputants settle their disputes outside the courtroom, or when the formal
legal system itself transfers the case to the elders (see also Desalegn Amsalu, this
volume). Table 1 presents a summary of the total number of criminal cases over
five years reported to the prosecution office, those taken to the formal court by the
office, those referred to elders, and those dismissed due to various reasons.
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Table 1: Criminal cases reported to district public prosecutor from 2010/11 to 2014/15 (Jidda
District Public Prosecutor’s Office, 2016 )
Years
2010/11a 2011/12b 2012/13c 2013/14d 2014/15e
Total cases 366 1685 903 713 809
Cases taken to
court
223 231 210 221 250
Transferred cases
to elders
92 271 293 67 115
Interrupted casesf 51 1183 400 425 444
a: 11, b: 12, c: 13, d: 14, e: 15, f: 16
As can be seen from Table 1, a considerable number of criminal cases that were
reported to public prosecutor’s office were withdrawn. One factor for the with-
drawal of the cases was case transfer by the prosecution office to the jaarsummaa.
It should be noted that while Art. 212 of the 2004 Revised Criminal Code of Ethiopia
seems to leave the choice for the disputants (mainly to the victims) to take crimes
upon complaint to the forum of their own choice, there is no article in the criminal
code that permits the court or prosecutors to transfer upon complaint crimes to
the customary institutions including jaarsummaa. This means that public prosecu-
tors transfer criminal cases informally to the jaarsummaa, but actually without any
legal basis. The following example shows how a criminal case can be transferred
from the public prosecutor to the local elders.
Case 1: Beating
The plaintiff, who was struck on his head with a big stick and bled on 12 Septem-
ber 2015, accused two individuals: father (the first defendant) and son (the second
defendant) and took the case before the police, bypassing the customary institu-
tions. The case appeared before the office of the public prosecutor on 9November
2015. A public prosecutor and a policeman asked both defendants about the mat-
ter. The first defendant admitted having beaten the plaintiff as he had suspected
11 July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003 E.C.
12 July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004 E.C.
13 July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005 E.C
14 July 1, 2005 to June 2006 E.C.
15 July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007 E.C.
16 Cases were interrupted due to lack of supporting evidence, the disappearance of the defen-
dants or time lapse.
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him of having a sexual affair with his wife. The second defendant refused to ac-
cept the charge against him saying that hewas not involved. The public prosecutor
asked the disputants to choose between the court of law and the local elders to
settle their dispute. The disputants agreed to settle their differences through cus-
tomary procedures and selected six elders to look at the issue. Then, the office
sent the disputants with a stamped letter and a list of elders to deal with themat-
ter locally, urging elders to report the results of their endeavour back to the office.
The firstmeeting of the elders on thematter was on 15 November 2015, a few days
after the referral. The injured person refused to accept the reconciliation proposal
of the elders and took back the case to the prosecution office. However, elders so-
licited by the first defendant intervened. The public prosecutor agreed to with-
draw and return the case to the jaarsummaa. In their secondmeeting on 10 Febru-
ary 2016, the same elders settled the issue and the plaintiff was compensatedwith
2,000 ETB (125 dollars) for his injury. He was also restricted from getting close to
the house of the defendants. It was further agreed that in case one or both of the
parties violate the agreement (waligalte) and take back the case to the court, the
violator would have to pay 500 ETB (roughly 31 dollars) as a fine for the govern-
ment and another 500 ETB (31 dollars) to the local saving association (iddir). A
written agreement wasmade and a copy of reconciliation was sent to the office of
the public prosecutor.
Case transfer and notification of the decision of transferred cases of settlement
to one another’s jurisdiction is one aspect of the cooperative relationship between
the two systems. The above-mentioned case and those statistics shown in Table 1
demonstrate that in Jidda people use both legal forums: taking their disputes from
one forum to another. The interviews made with several people in the study area
showed that people take their cases to the formal law in order to give weight to
their cases before the elders. Subsequently, solicited elders approach the plaintiffs
to take the case out of the court of law and to settle through customary law.
Joint dispute settlement
The other area of interaction observable between jaarsummaa and the formal legal
institutions in the area is joint dispute settlement. In Oromia Land Proclamation
No. 130/2007, joint dispute settlement is described: when land dispute case arises,
disputants should first submit their application to the local kebele administration
council. Officials of the kebele then urge the disputants to elect the arbitral elders. A
chairman of the elders is elected by the disputing parties or by the arbitral elders.
If they cannot agree, a local kebele administrator shall assign the chairperson. One
representative from the kebele administration council will be involved in the elders’
meeting to record the result of the reconciliation. Once the case has been resolved,
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the result has to be documented and then given to the kebele administration by
the elders for registration. The administration also gives a sealed copy to both dis-
puted parties. Anyone dissatisfied with the result can submit his/her complaint to
the district court (see Proclamation No. 130/2007, Art.16, No.1). This kind of joint
dispute settlement exists also for other issues, not only for land disputes, as the
following case of a dispute over water use illustrates.
Case 2: Dispute over water use
One of the few group disputes over resource I encountered during my field stay
was associatedwith the usage ofwater fromAleltu River17 for irrigation andwater-
ing of animals in February 2015. The dispute involved seven kebeles of Jidda district
located along the river and thus a large group of people. The cause was over the
share of the water as the flow of the river significantly decreases every year dur-
ing the dry season in January, February, andMarch. At the same time, compared to
the previous years, there was no rainfall during the season. Therefore, the peas-
ants and kebeles living at the lower stream competed over the water with those
living further upstream, accusing them of arresting the flow of the water.
First, the Jidda elders tried to settle the matter. But, when they did not succeed,
the case was taken to the district court by a public prosecutor. The court was, how-
ever, also not able to settle the water issue since it involved many kebeles located
along the river. When the dispute approached the level of physical fighting with
clubs and rifles, the court transferred the case to the district administration and
the security office, recommending it to be settled together with the elders.
Then, officials from the district administration and the security office together
met with some respected elders and discussed the issue. I attended their final
meeting held on the bank of the disputed river on 16 February 2015. After a long
discussion, they were able to avoid the problem before it turned into violence.
All parties in dispute agreed to equally share the water of the Aleltu River and
elected a committee, which was assigned to supervise the activities and prevent
future disagreements. The reconciliation result was positive. Since then, I did not
hear any dispute related to the share of the water of the Aleltu River.
The major point we can draw from this case of joint dispute settlement is that
officials from the state system involve local elders when they face serious problems
to resolve a conflict, using them as an additional strategy to establish or keep peace.
As such, joint dispute settlement is another example of positive interaction and
cooperation between the local elders and the state system in the area.
17 Aleltu River is one of the tributaries of Abay (Blue Nile) that flows throughout the year. It
originates from Mount Baraki located in Bereh district, south of Jidda.
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The elders’ double role
When a case is handled in jaarsummaa in the study area, many actors are involved,
including elders, the disputants and their allies, guarantors, witnesses and com-
munity observers. Of all these, elders are the main actors. As will be shown in this
subchapter, they may also take over important roles in the state systems.
Below the district level, there are three state-based institutions that deal with
disputes at the kebele, the lowest administrative level in the area. These include the
social court, community policing committee and the kebele administration council.
Although the types of disputes, which found their way into these systems are not
many, the role of elders is important here.The following case reveals how the elders
can work in both systems in the capacity of dispute settlers.
Case 3: Dispute over grazing land
On Sunday, 24 January 2016, I attended a hearing of the social court at Siba Sirti
kebele. It was related to civil disputes that fell under its mandate. One case was re-
lated to grazing land. An elderly couple, e.g. a husband of more than 70 years and
his wife of around 65 years accused three men (one was a kebele official) whose
cattle had destroyed their grazing land. In line with the 2007 Social Court Procla-
mation No. 128,18 the judges of the court recommended the disputants to settle
thematter through the jaarsummaa. All agreed and the parties in dispute selected
five elders of their own choice whowere in the kebele compound at the time of the
hearing for their ownmatter. One of the judges of the social court himself became
a member of the ad-hoc council of elders with the consent of the parties in dis-
pute.
On the sameday, the appointed eldersmet to discuss thematter. Themeetingwas
held inside the compoundof kebeleadministration council andbegan at 11 am. The
first presenter of the casewas the aggrieved couple. In her statement, thewife pre-
sented the case by accusing the three men of deliberately grazing their cattle on
their land. The defendants responded to the case one after the other, all admit-
ting that their cattle had accidentally entered the grazing land and asking for an
apology. Following this, the elders fixed the amount of compensation to be paid
by the defendants to the plaintiffs. Later on, however, they requested the couple
not to accept it, saying, “For the sake of God (Waqqaf jeedhi), for the sake of earth
(lafaaf jeedhi) and for the sake of elders (jaarsaf jeedhi), please not take the compen-
sation!” The couple agreed to forgo the compensation, warning the defendants to
not let their cattle enter the grazing field again, as otherwise, they would take the
18 Art. 24 and 34 of the proclamation say that the kebele court shall first push parties to solve
their dispute through arbitration. If this is not possible, the court shall hear witnesses from
both sides and decide the case accordingly. Otherwise, decisions that do not follow these
procedures shall be null and void.
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case back to the social court. With this, the meeting ended quickly with a mutual
agreement at 12:30 pm.
In this case, one elder is acting in both systems in different capacities: being a
judge at the social court and also became a member of the council of elders. It was
he who had strongly pushed the disputing parties to settle their difference outside
the social courtroom. As the member of the council of elders, his influence was also
strong in convincing the disputants to come to the reconciliation. Playing such a
double role in both legal systems is common in the area, as often local elders are
chosen based on their experiences, age, knowledge, and impartiality to serve the
two institutions at the same time.They work at the interface between the systems.
This case is also another example of case transfer from the social court to the
elders. In this case, judges in the social court initiated the transfer and told the
disputants to choose the elders.This practice, as discussed in the previous section,
is common also in the area.
Cooperation in de-escalation of disputes and crime prevention
Both customary and state systems work in crime prevention and cooperate when
crimes occur to avoid escalation, sometimes even in the context of serious crimes.
The state law prescribes that elders report crimes in their locality to the community
police centre or the police station, as such cases have to be dealt with in the court.
The case of a girl’s abduction, which led to her death demonstrates the cooperation
between customary and formal legal systems.
Case 4: Abduction and related death
A young man with a disability was looking for a spouse. He had been without a
partner while his agemates were alreadymarried. People suspect that he was an-
noyed that he had remained a bachelor for so long, probably due to his disability.
One day, the boy observed a girl in a neighbouring village, while hewas visiting his
relatives. He decided to take her as his wife and told his relatives about his wish.
His relatives tried to get the consent of the girl’s family, but the latter rejected the
marriage proposal. When his request was turned down, the boy resorted to ab-
duction.
The teenage girl, by then 13 years old, was abducted on 11 April 2015 in Dega Golba
kebele, some 30 km from Sirti town where the district police are located. The per-
petrator chose a day when most local militias were in Sirti town for a training re-
lated to security issues. Taking the advantage of their absence, the boy secretly
contacted five friends to help him. The men had the information that the girl had
left home for the local mill. They waited for the girl to return home at 2 pm and
when she came, they beat her with a stick, urging her to move when she resisted.
The girl’s family immediately heard about the abduction and reacted with anger.
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Together with relatives and neighbours, they followed the abductors who had
taken refuge in one of their relative’s houses. The girl’s relatives surrounded the
house, some threw stones and others shouted at the abductors. When the abduc-
tors noticed that they were being surrounded, they bolted the door from within,
put a cloth in the mouth of the girl and sat on her head and face. Soon after, she
died of suffocation.
When the elders19 who had also come to prevent an escalation of the dispute
heard the rumour of the girl’s death, they immediately called the police from Sirti
town. Upon the arrival of the police and the local militia, together with the elders,
they convinced the girl’s relatives to leave, promising them to bring the abductors
to the court of law. The parents learned about the death of their daughter only, af-
ter the police had taken the corpse and the criminals to Sirti town. People in Jidda
and neighbouring districts were horrified by the girl’s gruesome death.
The following days, the police together with officials from the district adminis-
tration, security and other offices visited Dega Golba, attended girl’s funeral cer-
emony and held discussions with elders and relatives from the killers’ and vic-
tim’s families. Relatives of the killers also made cultural pleadings (isgoota)20 to
the family of the deceased on a nearby plateau. Their objective was to prevent
revenge upon them by the deceased’s sides and plead for peace talks. It was also
aimed at future reconciliation upon the release of the criminals from the state
prison.One year later, the abductor andhis accompliceswere formally prosecuted,
found guilty and sentenced each to 14 years in jail by the High Court in Fiche for
abduction and murder.
This case shows how the elders cooperate with the police when serious crimes oc-
cur. First, the elders reported the case to the police. They also prevented further
escalation by closely working with the police and district officials to cool down the
situation in the following days in order to prevent any revenge by the family of the
victim on the relatives of the abductors. The interview with the police who investi-
gated the case and FGD with the police revealed that had it not been for the elders’
involvement, things would have gone in the wrong direction and further escalated.
19 Some of these elders are members of community policing committee.
20 When homicide happens deliberately or accidentally, the first step in Tulama Oromo culture
is organizing the pleading ceremony by which the side of the killer plea for reconciliation.
It lasts for several days until the family of the deceased shows a sign of their readiness for
peace talks.
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Problematic areas and competition
While the previous section showed various areas of cooperation, this section look
at problems and competition between customary and formal legal systems and
dispute settlement mechanisms focusing on five major areas though not exclusive
ones: mutual undermining, confusion and dispute over jurisdiction, double jeop-
ardy, lack of mutual trust and failure of both systems to settle certain disputes.
Selected cases are used to illustrate the issue.
Mutual undermining
Despite their numerous areas of cooperation, the two legal systems also under-
mine each other in various ways and in both directions. The formal legal institu-
tions hinder the activities of the jaarsummaa by disregarding the elders’ decisions.
Many cases have been reported in which disputants resorted to the state court after
having been found guilty by the decisions of the elders.This was especially the case
with disputants who allegedly did not have the truth on their side and hoped to
win a case through corruption, as local informants told me.There were complaints
by the elders who felt that dissatisfied parties could sometimes refuse to comply
with their decisions. They also realized that at the end of the day it was the court,
and not them, who make final and binding decisions (see also Desalegn Amsalu,
this volume).
Complaints have been made especially in the context of land issues. As men-
tioned above, the Oromia Land Proclamation Art. 16, No.130/2007 gives an original
jurisdiction for elders to deal with rural land disputes. Accordingly, elders selected
by disputants should arbitrate the matter under the supervision of the kebele ad-
ministration council. However, anyone dissatisfied with the results of the elder’s
decision can bring the case before the district court. During an interview with sev-
eral elders, I was told that they were dissatisfied with the state court for repeatedly
not taking their judgments into consideration,which affected their role in local dis-
pute settlement. This was confirmed by an interview made with one of the judges
of the district court, who stated that the decision of the elders had little or no value
in the court’s decision.
On the other hand, the customary court may also obstruct the activities of the
formal court in many ways. As indicated above, many criminal cases reported to
the police or court actually ends up in withdrawal. Elders use different techniques
to intimidate disputants to withdraw their complaints before or even after inves-
tigations or prosecutions have started. The local people and elders know that for
cases like rape and abduction, a wrongdoer would be sentenced to several years of
imprisonment. As interviews with police officers and public prosecutors revealed,
a considerable number of such cases are withdrawn or never reported after the
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family members of a victim reportedly have faced pressure from elders and the
families of the perpetrators.
I was told and also observed situations in which the community made it dif-
ficult for the police and public prosecutors to collect evidence. When the formal
institutions (police, public prosecutor and court) refuse to accept the withdrawal,
elders may resort to other measures, such as pushing the parties in dispute to drop
pursuing the case in the court, advising witnesses not to testify in the court, and
stopping any support to the formal law enforcement agencies. This, as police offi-
cers and prosecutors told me, can occur at all stages of a court proceeding. Elders
are also sometimes reluctant to handover serious criminal cases such as domestic
violence against women and girls to the formal legal system, despite the clear obli-
gation by law. The following case illustrates how the actions of elders undermine
the activities of the police and public prosecutor to bring criminals before the state
court.
Case 5: Beating and injury
A man lost one of his front teeth when a neighbour beat him with a club. After
the victim reported the case to the police officer assigned to their area, the pros-
ecution office opened a file against the offender. The victim also already brought
a charge against the perpetrator. However, the elders intervened and forced the
victim to withdraw the case. Thus, the process was interrupted without the con-
sent of the public prosecutor, and the matter was settled locally in March 2015.
After the reconciliation, the victim told me that he had been pressured several
times by the elders to withdraw the case and to settle it locally, arguing that he
would gain nothing by accusing the defendant before the court of law andmaking
him get arrested. Finally, he agreed to withdraw the case from the prosecution.
This case reveals clearly how the elders involved in criminal matters, which are not
under their jurisdiction by interfering with the formal legal system to exercise its
mandate. During an interview with elders who participated in the reconciliation,
they expressed their belief that if the case had been seen at the court, the result
would have been different: the offenders would have been sent to prison.
Confusion and dispute over jurisdiction
There exist cases that neither the formal nor the customary legal systemwish to deal
with, as they are considered as trivial. As locals told me, plaintiffs have complained
to the court that the police and public prosecutors do not accept cases that they
consider unimportant, such as verbal insult, personal quarrels,minor assault, petty
theft and petty damage to property. Instead of taking the plaintiffs’ statements,
they usually send them back to the community to have the case resolved by elders.
The elders, however, are also sometimes reluctant to deal with such minor cases.
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Disputes between spouses provide another kind of cases that both systems do
not like to deal with.When, for example,women reported that theywere insulted or
harassed by their husbands or close relatives without being able to provide strong
evidence, the offices of prosecution and women’s affairs sometimes sends them
to the elders, whom they consider better suited to settle private disputes. Elders,
however, are sometimes reluctant to deal with marital and domestic disputes. One
elderly informant told me that elders prefer to deal with homicide case rather than
dispute that arises between husband and wife. He argued that husband and wife
are sometimes unwilling to accept the decisions of the elders if they are not in
his/her favour and then take their case to the formal court.
Another confusion is caused by the fact that aspects of the civil law fall into
the sphere of personal and family law. The 1995 FDRE Constitution and the 2001
Constitution of Oromia have allowed customary laws to deal with personal and
family matters, with the consent of the parties in dispute. They left particulars to
be determined by law, but this issue has so far not been addressed by the concerned
bodies.Thus, there is some uncertainty and confusion on the side of elders to clearly
identify matters that fall within their jurisdiction.
Similarly, in the case of homicide, the handling is not clear. While such cases
are usually handled in the state court and the killer is imprisoned, in order to avoid
revenge, the family and close relatives of the killer additionally conduct a customary
settling of the issue. Accordingly, the elders set certain rules to be respected by the
families of the killer and the victim until blood price (gumaa) has been paid upon the
release of the killer. One of the rules is preventing direct contact between the two
families until the payment of gumaa. The prohibitions include avoiding drinking
from the same bar, fetching water from the same spring and eating together in
order to avoid any possible further hostilities between the two parties. The police
and public prosecutors criticize the rule of avoidance, claiming that it is in conflict
with the country’s law. Elders, on the other hand, argue that the rule of avoidance
prevents further disputes until customary reconciliation is held upon the release of
the killer. Thus, they do not feel comfortable with the officials intervening in their
affairs under the pretext of ensuring the observance of laws.
Double jeopardy
In the case of serious crimes (homicide, bodily injury, rape, and abduction), dou-
ble jeopardy can be observed even though Art. 23 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitu-
tion and the 2001 Revised Constitution of Oromia state that no one will be sub-
jected to double jeopardy for the same offense if found guilty. At the same time,
the Ethiopian law gives an exclusive jurisdiction over such criminal cases to the for-
mal law. In response to this, elders deal with such cases after they have undergone
through the formal law.
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The findings of this study show that ‘double jeopardy’ is particularly common
in homicide and serious physical injury when a victim has lost part of his body
(teeth, eye or hand). Because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of law over
homicide, the Tulama Oromo created their own way of dealing with such issues.
The following homicide case reveals how a defendant was punished twice for the
same crime: first by the court of law and then by the customary law (see also Aberra
Degefa, this volume).
Case 6: Homicide
In 2003, a man killed his neighbour. The cause of their original dispute was as-
sociated with the land lease. The neighbour rented a plot of land belonging to
the man’s father. The man objected the land rent, which later led to the death of
the lessee. When the killer was put in prison, his relatives and neighbours started
a plea to the family of the deceased. However, the process of pleading was inter-
ruptedwithout any further negotiationwhen the killer told others to stop, arguing
that the case had already been brought before the court of law. Sometime after his
imprisonment, his wife left home, leaving her three children with her husband’s
father and mother.
The killer was released in 2009 after serving six years in prison. He then lived in
town and visited his children and parents only occasionally. After his release, he
was reluctant to agree to the elders’ plea to reconcile with the family of the de-
ceased, arguing that he had already been punished by the state system. When
in 2013, his mother died, his wife returned home to take care of their common
children and the children’s grandfather though her relationship with her father-
in-lawwasnot good.On 12December 2014, the killer’s aged fatherwas founddead
in his home. When it came out that he died after he had been beaten on his head
by a stick, she was suspected of having killed the man and was arrested, since no
one else had been at home on that day. Jidda district police and public prosecutor
who had investigated the case told me that the suspect later admitted the crime
and was sent to the High Court at Fiche where found guilty and sentenced to 12
years in prison.
The local people argued that the death of the killer’s mother, father and the im-
prisonment of hiswifewere signs ofmisfortune that occurred due to the killer’s re-
fusal to settle thematter according to the local culture. It iswidely believed among
the locals that receiving and paying blood compensation (gumaa) is mandatory in
Oromo law and failure to do so may result in misfortune, as evidenced in what
happened to this family. Fearing further future calamities, close and distant rel-
atives of the first killer urged him to contact respected elders of Jidda. Then, the
man asked the elders to reconcile him and his family with the family of the de-
ceased. As a result, the process of pleading, which had been interrupted for 12
years, resumed. 
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The local elders started the negotiation process. The elders later called an expert
of customary law (caffee ta’icha)21 to theirmeetingwithoutwhom they cannot han-
dle serious crimes like this. A date and place for the reconciliation were fixed for
13 June 2015 in Gango kebele, at which both the killer’s family and the family of
the victim met after a long time. Various rituals were conducted on this day, in-
cluding the slaughtering of a sheep, ritual hand holding in the sheep’s stomach of
the slayer and the deceased’s relatives to symbolize reconciliation and a washing
of hands between the slayer and the deceased families. Then, a pot was thrown
to the ground by the killer, spilling the remaining water. Next, both sides took an
oath under the leadership of the caffee ta’icha. The blood price was also given on
this day. Lastly, the participants in attendance consumed food and drink prepared
at the homes of the deceased and killer.
This homicide case illustrates that the formal and customary legal systems deal with
different aspects of the same case. While the state court sentences the offenders
to some years in prison with the intention of punishing him, the local community
believes that true justice is only achieved through customary reconciliationwith the
aim of re-establishing social justice. The formal law focuses on the killer while the
family of the victim is marginalized and the community is neglected. On the other
hand, the Tulama customary law is more inclusive by involving many stakeholders
including the family of the victim and the community at large.
The above case (as other similar cases) demonstrates that the criminal was sub-
jected to double jeopardy for the same crime he had committed. The court sen-
tenced him to six years in prison. After his release, he was punished locally again,
underwent various ritual procedures and paid the necessary blood price necessary
to reconcile with the family of the deceased before being fully accepted back to the
society.
Lack of mutual trust
Mistrust is another aspect of the conflicting relationship between elders and the
state officials. This mistrust is on both sides: actors in the formal legal system do
not trust local elders because of the latter’s involvement in disputes that do not
21 Caffee taa’icha, also called jaarsa caffee, is an Oromo judge and expert of customary law.
He is from the ruling gadaa class. One can acquire this position after having participated
in the Tulama caffee assembly at Odaa Nabee, East Shewa, which is held every eight years,
where he acquires the necessary knowledge to judge over cases of homicide, serious injury
and disputes between groups or lineages after listening to the caffee assembly meeting. His
term of office lasts gadaa period that is eight years.
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fall within their jurisdiction.22 Similarly, the elders expressed disappointment that
actors of the formal legal system violated the promises they made to them to the
disputes they settled in a customary manner already.
Duringmy fieldwork, I came acrossmany instances when actors within the two
legal systems were blaming each other and expressing their mistrust.The following
case illustrates how the police arrested a criminal after his case had been settled by
jaarsummaa, breaking their promise to let the case be resolved by the elders.
Case 7: Theft
Twenty years ago, a man had stolen a weight balance of another man from a mill
house. The case had initially been brought before the police by the complainant.
A suspect was arrested and brought before the court of law, but he denied having
stolen the balance. The efforts of the police to further investigate failed since the
crime had happened at night and there were no witnesses.
When the elders approached thepolice to let themsettle it locally, the suspectwas
released from police custody. Initially, the accused person denied the deed before
the elders, but when they threatened they wouldmake him an oath of innocence,
the suspect admitted his guilt. They promised to keep him safe from any arrest
related to this case and the stolen weight was returned to the owner. After he
asked for forgiveness andpaid compensation to the victim, the elders blessedhim.
When the elders reported to the police that the case had been settled, the police
arrested the man again.
I was told about this case by the elders. One of them expressed his disappointment
by the broken promise of the police.When themanwas prosecuted, found guilty by
the court and sent to prison, this angered the elders who had handled the case and
who felt that they had been betrayed.The case further shows that the elders play an
important role in investigating cases that are difficult for the police to handle for
lack of evidence: had it not been for them, the truth may not have been revealed.
Yet, their judgment was ignored by the court and actually led to double punishment
for the same crime: first by the elders and then by the state court.
Failure of both systems to settle certain disputes
Nowadays, disagreements over land are one among the most significant sources of
disputes in the area. They are often also the most contested and lengthy cases, as
people neither accept decisions of the elders nor the lower state court if decisions
are not in their favour. Rather, they take their cases through appeal to the next
level court. While I was in the fieldwork, I gathered many cases in the context of
22 There are cases of elders who were criticized and even brought before the court of law for
dealing with cases that were not under their jurisdiction.
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land disputes.The following example shows a case both systems failed to settle and
which has therefore been pending for decades.
Case 8: Borderland dispute between two kebeles
This dispute initially emerged during the final years of Emperor Haile Selassie’s
rule. During this time, the disputed landwas under the control of the government.
It was locally called the land of Empress Menen (lafa etege), the wife of the em-
peror, who had large tracts of her personal estate land in the area where a large
number of imperial cattle used to graze.23 However, two local notables claimed
the land arguing that they had ancestral rights over it. The two notables not only
disputed between themselves but also against the imperial government.
Following the fall of the imperial regime, the cattle were confiscated by the newly
formed local administration and distributed to the local population.When the ke-
bele administration was established by the Derg, the disputed cattle grazing land
was left undivided because of the claim over the land by residents of the then
two neighbouring kebeles: Qore Agabani and Abu Doye. The two individuals with
their close associates who were already in dispute over the land continued their
litigation before the state system. Later, other peasants who own adjacent land
to the disputed land joined the litigation. Because of this, the boundary between
the two kebeles along the disputed border was not demarcated.
The administrations of the two kebeles made several attempts to settle the mat-
ter and demarcate their boundaries. Jidda district administration, the responsi-
ble organ regarding land disputes at the time, also visited the area several times
but their attempts did not end the dispute. The data I consulted from the district
court shows that a committee was formed, representing officials from the district
administration and agriculture office and the two kebeles. Finally, the committee
gave the land to Abu Doye. That was on 10 February 1979. However, their decision
was never implemented because of the resistance from the other kebele. Jidda se-
nior elders also met several times to bring an end to the border dispute between
the two kebeles.
After the fall of the Derg in 1991, two or more kebelesweremerged for administra-
tive purpose in Jidda. Accordingly, Qore Agabani was merged with other kebeles
and called Wanya Qore, and Abu Doye was united with the neighbouring kebeles
and took the present name Horo Abu. Since then, the disputed land became a
boundary dispute between the two newly emerged kebeles: Horo Abu andWanya
Qore (see figure 1 above). When the land registration and certification started
in 2005, many farmers from both kebeles included the disputed land into their
certificates. This has contributed to further complication in the settlement of the
23 This cattle grazing land was allocated for the purpose of keeping dairy cows and beef cattle
for the palace. The area was selected for its good climate, availability of sufficient fodder and
geographical proximity to Addis Ababa.
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dispute. Totally, over 70 people had claimed over the land and sometimes the dis-
puted land is called the land of 70 people (lafa abba torbbaatama).
On 11 May 2015, a directive letter was written from the District Court to Jidda Dis-
trict Land Administration and Environmental Protection to search for a final so-
lution. After visiting the area, the office replied to the court that it was beyond
its capacity to deal with the matter alone and recommended the court to estab-
lish a special committee composed of different sectors. The court wrote letters to
various offices to work with district land administration over the matter. Officials
from the land administration and environmental protection together with other
staffs representing district administration, district police, and district security of-
fices visited the site where the disputed land was located. These officials together
with representatives from local kebele administrations and local militia of Horo
Abu and Wanya Qore as well as elders representing the two kebeles made a visit
to the field and arranged several meetings. Totally, the committee was composed
of 15 persons (nine government officials and six elders).
Finally, the office for Land Administration and Environmental Protection reported
thedecisionof the committeebyfileNo.1390/07 to thedistrict court on July 3, 2015.
In the letter, the office wrote that the boundary between the two kebeles (Wanya
Qore andHoro Abu)was not known. It also reported that the dispute over the land
started during the last years of Emperor Haile Selassie's rule. Besides, what many
people included the disputed land into their certificate in 2005 and the investi-
gated reality on the ground by the committee are contradictory.
Relying mainly on the report of the committee, the district court decided by file
No.15399/07, contrary to the expectation of the parties in dispute, that the dis-
puted land should be shared between the two kebeles and subsequently given to
the landless youth. But, those people who have been claiming the land appealed
and took the case to the high court. A final solution to the old disputed land has
not yet given by the concerned bodies.
This particular case (and other many examples frommy file of cases) illustrates the
inherent weaknesses of customary and formal legal systems to settle land disputes,
which involve a large group of people. The findings show that both systems tried
to settle the case on a number of occasions, but each time the disputants refused
to accept the proposed settlement. The case also demonstrates the failure of joint
dispute settlement by representatives from customary and formal legal systems to
find a satisfactory way of resolving it. Although this problem is not widespread, it,
however, shows there is a need for the two systems to work closely.
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Summary and conclusion
The paper showed that both customary and state laws and legal institutions have
weaknesses and in some ways complement, in others contradict each other. The
relationship between customary and formal legal systems in the research area has
cooperative, competitive and problematic aspects.
The cooperative aspects include case transfer and notification of the decision of
the transferred case of settlement to one another’s jurisdiction, case transfer from
the formal legal system to the customary one being more frequent. As could be
shown, the two systems sometimes settle cases jointly such as when government
officials face serious problems in resolving disputes in their own and seek support
from local elders. Cooperation also occurs in the de-escalation of dispute and crime
prevention. Elders can play double roles when serving as judges in state-based
institutions at the village levels and at the same time serve as the main actors in
jaarsummaa.
On the other hand, there are various competitive and problematic aspects. The
first one is mutual undermining, e.g. when the activities of the customary legal
system are undermined by the actors of the formal one and vice versa. The second
problem is the unclear and incomplete jurisdiction, which causes among elders
who fail to clearly identify matters of family or personal law that fall within their
jurisdiction on one hand, and an unwillingness of the actors in both systems to deal
with certain marital and minor crimes. In cases of homicide, even if handled in the
court and the killer sent to prison, elders apply certain customary practices tomake
sure peace between the two parties is re-established, such as setting certain rules
what the disputed families should and should not do until blood price (gumaa) is
paid upon the release of the killer. Though the intent is to restore social harmony
in the community, legal actors in the state system criticize elders for interfering in
such cases, which leads to ambiguity and uncertainty on the side of the users of the
systems.Third, in cases of homicide and some others, one can also observe double
jeopardy, e.g. that the same case is dealt with in both systems and a perpetrator
is punished twice for the same crime. Fourth, there exists mutual mistrust, e.g.
elders and government officials do not trust each other, as when elders feel that
police is violating the promise they had made to them. Finally, both legal systems
fail to settle certain disputes and hence pending for years.
To minimize contradiction and confrontation and to productively make use of
complementary aspects, the following suggestions are made:
1) Both Constitutions of Ethiopia and Oromia region in their Art. 34(5) did not
provide the details of personal and family matters that fall within the remit of cus-
tomary laws and left those particulars to be determined by law. To date, however,
the House of People’s Representatives and Oromia Regional State Council have not
yet addressed these matters. Consequently, this has contributed to dispute and
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confusion over jurisdiction between customary and formal legal systems in the
area. This paper suggests that the legislatures should specify by law detailed lists
of personal and family matters that fall under the customary legal system.
2) The current FDRE Constitution and the Constitution of Oromia give exclu-
sive jurisdiction for the formal legal system in criminal cases and other aspects of
the civil law that do not fall within the sphere of personal and family laws. How-
ever, the 2004 Revised Criminal Code of Ethiopia states the types of crimes that
are prosecutable upon complaint and seems to leave the choice of the forum to
the disputants. As discussed above, the police, public prosecutors, and judges in
the study area informally transfer a considerable number of cases involving upon
complaint crimes to the jaarsummaa. However, the Ethiopian law does not clearly
give any legal basis for the formal legal system to do so.Therefore, a new law should
be enacted by the House of People’s Representatives and State Council of Oromia,
which clearly governs the level of the working relationship between customary and
formal legal systems over these crimes punishable upon complaint.
3) Under Ethiopian law, customary institutions have not yet been given official
legal recognition to deal with serious criminal cases. Such cases continue to be un-
der the exclusive jurisdiction of the formal legal system since the state regards them
as offenses against the public interest.The Tulama Oromo of the study area wanted
to deal by themselves with most serious criminal issues. They also felt that cus-
tomary legal system should be legally allowed to be involved in such cases. For this
reason, there is commonly a customary reconciliation after the cases have passed
through the process of the state system in the area. This means the perpetrator
is subjected to double punishment in reality since each system deals with differ-
ent aspects of the same case. Thus, the paper suggests that Ethiopian legal system
should officially recognize customary laws to deal with these customary matters,
such as homicide, bodily injury (loss of body parts like eye, tooth, leg, hand, etc.)
and arson as far as they are not in conflict with the country’s constitution and in-
ternational human right standards. For this, there should be clear guidelines on
the operation of customary reconciliation ceremonies after cases have been dealt
with by the formal court system.This paper further proposes that the formal court
should take the future customary reconciliation into account while punishing the
criminals. In other words, the court should pass a lesser sentence on the criminals.
This view is supported by many elderly informants and discussants in focus groups
who argued that the amount of punishment (including the prison sentence) by the
court should be reduced considerably.
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7. Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa
Their administration and the application of law in the
light of recent developments
Mohammed Abdo
Introduction
Sharia-based law in Ethiopia gained greater political and legal prominence with the
political liberalization that followed the regime change in 1991.However, almost two
decades after they were formally constituted, Sharia courts have received limited
academic attention and only a small number of research works focus on their ju-
risprudence and day-to-day operation.This chapter examines the nature of Sharia
case law, litigants and the procedures for settling cases. Besides providing an anal-
ysis of the statistics of Sharia courts and a description of court proceedings, most
importantly, it will look at two recent developments affecting the Muslim com-
munity: growing human rights and women’s rights consciousness; and increasing
Muslim demands for self-autonomy over religious matters, and their influence, if
any, on Sharia court rulings. The research shows that, despite the fact that Sharia
law prescribes a patriarchal tendency in marital ties and sanctions a sex-based dif-
ferential treatment of divorce and post-divorce matters, young, educated and eco-
nomically independent women form the overwhelming majority in suits brought
before Sharia courts in Addis Ababa. It also shows that Sharia courts tend to apply
civil procedure rules rather leniently but that their proceedings appear consistent.
Shafie Islamic jurisprudence, which is said to be relatively less conservative over
family and divorce matters than other schools of thought, guides their judgments.
However, attempts by the Sharia courts to expand their jurisdiction to matters be-
yond those delineated by legislation has been kept in check by the state’s judicial
and quasi-judicial organs.
Islamic law in Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s current legal system reflects the legacies of foreign laws (civil law and
common law traditions), Christianity, authoritarian political heritages and the
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Muslims’ struggle for recognition. Long relegated to the status of second-class cit-
izens, Muslims have struggled to gain recognition in public spheres but over time
they have managed to win small concessions from successive regimes, including
the first official recognition of Sharia courts in the 1940s.
A federal republic since the 1990s, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic nation with a size-
able Muslim population and a constitution that established a parliamentary system
and that guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of re-
ligion and the equality of all religious groups. While the current constitution em-
phasizes secularism, it includes customary and religious laws in the constitutional
order. The recognition given to religious and customary dispute settlement mech-
anisms seems deliberately designed to accommodate religious autonomy and to
promote diversity. This recognition does not, however, repudiate the secular na-
ture of the nation and its constitutional dispensation.
While Sharia-based law gained de jure recognition in the early 1940s, it has ex-
perienced greater momentum since the regime change of the early 1990s and the
adoption of multiculturalism and political liberalization. A distinct law setting up
a separate Islamic judicial sector, based on constitutional provisions, was enacted
in 1999 (Proclamation No. 188/1999) at the federal level and successively in all re-
gions except Gambella.1 The law implies that Islam is seen as an important source
of legal, social and cultural values. Having been put in legal limbo by the 1960 Civil
Code, which essentially repealed the 1944 proclamation on Sharia courts, Muslim
personal and family law and the Islamic courts have been elevated by this new legal
development, which symbolically gives Islamic law its due place in Ethiopian law.2
The symbolism of official Islamic courts being implicitly anchored in the constitu-
tion and applying an Islamic law has proved appealing to the Muslim community.3
1 Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE 1995): ‘This Constitution shall not
preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in accordancewith
religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute. Particulars shall
be determined by law.’ Article 78(5): ‘Pursuant to sub-Article 5 of Article 34 the House of Peo-
ples’ Representatives and State Councils can establish or give official recognition to religious
and customary courts. Religious and customary courts that had state recognition and func-
tioned prior to the adoption of the Constitution shall be organized on the basis of recognition
accorded to them by this Constitution.’
2 Article 3347 of the 1960 Civil Code reads: ‘Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules
whether written or customary previously in force concerning matters provided for in this
Code shall be replaced by this Code and hereby repealed.’ This provision is said to have re-
pealed the 1944 proclamation setting up Sharia courts (see also Mustapha 1973:140, James
and Clapham 1971:849).
3 In November 1994, before the current constitution was adopted, the Muslim community in
Addis Ababa took to the streets demanding, among other things, the inclusion of Sharia law
as one of the bases of the new constitution (Østebø 2007:3). The referencemade in the FDRE
constitution to religious dispute resolution and the subsequent promulgation of legislation
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Non-state normative sources (customary and/or religious) are still influential
in Ethiopia in settling disputes. They form a strong alternative to state institu-
tions and may even be the first resort for justice for many people in rural areas.
This chapter focuses on the Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa and their func-
tion as dispensers of justice.4 Studying the practices of the Federal Sharia Courts
in applying Sharia law in Addis Ababa is significant for demographic, political,
economic, and legal reasons. The Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa were the
first Sharia courts to be set up following the regime change in 1991. They serve the
largest Muslim community in an urban setting in Ethiopia: Muslims account for
more than 16 per cent of the total population of Addis Ababa.Many wealthy, promi-
nent Muslim community figures and religious scholars, as well as relatively better-
educated members of the Muslim community, live in the city. As Addis Ababa is
the economic and political powerhouse of Ethiopia, studying the functioning of
the Federal Sharia Courts casts light on their standing with the Muslim commu-
nity in Ethiopia in general as well as on their relationship with the state. Moreover,
studying their practices, uncovers the functioning of ‘law in practice/action’ rather
than ‘law in text’, revealing the courts’ inner workings and understanding of the
jurisdiction granted to them.
Accordingly, this chapter examines the nature of cases, litigants and procedures
for settling cases. The research is not merely an analysis of statistics on Sharia
courts or a description of the courts’ proceedings. It also looks at recent develop-
ments affecting the Muslim community, such as the push for an independent body
to administrate religious affairs – manifested, among other events, in recent ten-
sions relating to themajlis election – and the growing consciousness of human and
women’s rights and their influence, if any, on the proceedings and final rulings of
the courts.5
establishing Sharia courts to some extent addressed Muslim concerns in that regard. In the
past, Sharia courts were set up by secondary legislation and Muslims used to call for their
establishment on the basis of primary legislation.
4 Sharia courts at the federal level are located in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city. Apart from
housing the Federal Sharia Courts, Addis Ababa is also the seat of the Supreme Sharia Courts
of Oromia National Regional State, since the city serves as the capital of the region as well.
5 Tensions have been simmering betweenMuslims and the government since December 2011.
These tensions flared up following the closure of awoliya and a campaign launched by the
Ethiopian Supreme Islamic Affairs Council (commonly known as majlis) to instil Al-Ahbash
beliefs and undertaken with the alleged direct and/or indirect support of the government
authorities. This resulted in a call for a free and fair election to an independentmajlis. There
are generally two opposing narratives on the problem. A considerable number of Muslims
believe that they are contesting their constitutional rights, enabled by secularism and exer-
cising their right to administer their own religious affairs.However, the government contends
that extremism has been taking root in the country, forcing it to take legitimate measures
to tackle it, and that it has not interfered in the freedom of religion in general and in the in-
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Qualitative in nature, this study employed key informant interviews with the
personnel of the Federal Sharia Courts (judges and Registrar) in Addis Ababa; inter-
views with randomly selected women who appeared before the courts on the dates
set for interviews; literature review; review of the archive of Sharia courts; and
analysis of relevant laws. Personal observation was also used to reflect on some of
the issues that demanded explanation. To conduct meaningful interviews, a semi-
structured list of key questions was prepared beforehand.
Historical perspective on Sharia courts in Ethiopia
Sharia as a normative system, along with customary norms and foreign laws, has
impacted the Muslim community and influenced the development of state laws
in Ethiopia. The unique legal position of Sharia courts is rooted in the Muslim
community’s on-going quest for self-governance in the personal matters intrinsi-
cally governed by Islamic law. To understand the existing jurisdiction of the Sharia
courts and their relationship with state laws, it is important to understand their
history.
The relationship between state laws and Sharia courts presents a challenge
for states with a sizeable Muslim community. The political recognition of Sharia
courts, the scope of their power and their relationship with state laws are inter-
twined with government attitudes and policy towards the Muslim community,
which have often hinged on regime changes. The scope of Sharia-based law in
Ethiopia has not, however, oscillated with regime changes as it has, for example, in
Nigeria and Indonesia, where the power of Sharia courts has changed with shifting
popular and government attitudes over the years (’Kola-Makinde 2007:186–190;
Ostien and Dekker 2010:571–577; see also Huis 2015:8,45).That is to say, in Ethiopia
the political discourse on the Sharia courts has followed a consistent trajectory in
the sense that the subject-matter of Sharia courts’ jurisdiction has remained the
ternal affairs of the religious community in particular. In some instances, the tensions led to
violent protests that claimed lives and destroyed property. The prominent Muslim commu-
nity figures,who spearheadedattempts todefuse the tensionswere roundedup, charged and
finally convicted of attempting to commit terrorist acts and forming an illegal committee to
incite conflicts. They were eventually pardoned. The tension that flared up and the unprece-
dented perseverance of Muslim forces to have an independent majlis seems to have caught
government officials by surprise and revealed the extent of the government’s desire to keep
religious institutions under its watch. On the other hand, there is a growing consciousness
of human rights in general and women’s rights in particular, ascribed to civic education and
campaigns by government and NGOS. Although discriminatory attitudes and practices are
still widespread in many rural parts, in urban areas women are becoming better educated
and are thought to be in a better position to assert their rights and to demand equality in
many spheres.
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same and has not been significantly affected by regime changes in the years since
their formal inception in 1942 (Mohammed 2011:86, 2012:273).
The Sharia courts gained official recognition and unprecedented support dur-
ing Italy’s brief occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941) and flourished throughout the
country during that period. They constituted part of a grand colonial scheme de-
signed to attract the support of the marginalized Muslim community and thereby
to enervate the Christian-dominated government (Markakis 1990:74, Trimingham
1965:77, Mohammed 1999:8).
Fearing a reversal of policy after the end of the occupation, the Muslim com-
munity pleaded with Emperor Haile Selassie to officially sanction the operation
of the Sharia courts as before. The Emperor heeded their plea and introduced a
law, enacted in 1942, which provided the basis for the creation and procedures of
the first official Islamic courts.6 These courts administered Sharia law in personal
status cases and in litigation regarding pious foundations (awqaf ). Their indepen-
dent functioning was however compromised by the state’s hand in appointing their
judges (qadis). Qadis serving in Islamic courts during the imperial period were ap-
pointed according their allegiance to the government.7
Haile Selassie’s fall from power in 1974 marked the demise of the privileged
political position enjoyed by the Orthodox Church and Christian elites under his
government and ushered in a new era for the Muslim community. The subsequent
Derg regime made a pivotal move in relation to religious matters and in the po-
litical recognition of the Muslim community, rescinding the Orthodox Church’s
status as official state religion, declaring that all religions are equal and adding
three Muslim holidays to the list of official holidays to be honoured. Also, an in-
stitution administering Muslim affairs (popularly known as majlis) – the first of
its kind in the nation’s history – was created in 1976, although it remained tightly
supervised by the state authorities. Sharia courts were permitted to operate as be-
fore. Cognizant of the Ethiopian Muslims’ long marginalization and in the wake
of an unprecedented Muslim protest demanding recognition that occurred on 20
April 1974, the Derg sought legitimacy through reaching out to theMuslim commu-
nity.8 There was however no significant legal or institutional mechanism designed
to advance Islamic normative principles introduced by the Derg. In other words,
the Derg undertook no new legislative measures regarding Islamic personal law
6 The Proclamation to Establish Kadis’ Courts, Proclamation No. 12/1942, Negarit Gazeta, No.
2/1942.
7 Miran 2005:211.
8 On 20 April 1974, Muslims in Addis Ababa took to the streets calling for changes to the status
of Muslims and publicly demanding that the Imperial regime implement a series of actions,
one of which was the establishment of Sharia courts by proclamation, as their legal status
had been placed in limbo by the 1960 Civil Code (see Ahmedin 2015:272–273).
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or Islamic courts because the regime retained its predecessor’s policy as far as the
status of Sharia courts was concerned.
The Derg’s downfall in 1991 marked the revival of religious activism in Ethiopia.
A combination of national and foreign factors, one of which is political liberaliza-
tion, has enabled the resurgence of religion. In 1991, the country embarked on a
new path, shifting away from earlier restrictive laws and policies and introducing
a new legal and political discourse that underscored a democratic system and fun-
damental rights in general and religious equality and freedoms in particular. The
rapid expansion of religious institutions (for example, mosques and seminaries)
and the increasingly visible character of Muslims – manifested in dress codes and
increasing representation in public sectors – are often offered as proof of religious
resurgence following the regime change. Over the last two decades, Muslims in
Ethiopia have thus attained, among other things, a symbolic language of identity
and normative distinction that is implicit in, among other things, their assertive-
ness over religious self-administration and issues relating to the Sharia courts.9
With regard to the Sharia courts, personal status law became a bone of contention
and Muslim figures passionately debated the draft law that preceded the adoption
in 1999 of the Sharia courts’ establishment legislation.10 So far, a law relating to
personal and family matters is the only domain of legislation where Islamic legal
norms are recognized for application by Sharia courts.
While the FDRE constitution emphasizes the secular character of the state as
well as the equality of adherents of different religions before the law, it makes no
reference to Islam or Sharia courts. However, Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the Con-
stitution set conditions for state-recognized and state-funded religious courts11
that suggest that the provisions were designed specifically for Muslim courts. The
9 Aside from personal status law, another contentious issue between the Muslim community
and state authorities is related to the administration of the Muslim community’s internal
affairs: that is, the establishment and running of themajlis and its powers. On efforts to free
the majlis from alleged government control, see Jemal 2012:72–100. To counter the growing
clout of Muslims, the government adopted a policy on management of religious issues fight
against counter what it designated ‘growing fundamentalism and extremism’ taking root in
the nation (see Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs 2015).
10 A committee set up by themajlis to study the status of Sharia courts and to come upwith sug-
gestions to strengthen themwas chaired by aMuslim scholar. OtherMuslim scholars took an
active part in the debate to shape the draft law establishing Sharia courts. A conference on
strengthening and consolidating Sharia courts was organized by the House of Peoples’ Rep-
resentatives and the Ethiopian Supreme Islamic Affairs Council (majlis) and took place from
12–14 September 1999. Five paperswere presented for discussion by scholars, all of themwere
prominent Muslim figures. Also, most participants were knowledgeable Muslims, including
qadis, lawyers, academics, elders, and well-known personalities (see Ethiopian Supreme Is-
lamic Affairs Council 1999:35; see also Jemal 2012:39, note 13).
11 See note 1 on Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia.
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provisions offer legitimacy to courts that were in operation well before the cur-
rent constitution and that had been recognised by the state in the past. The Sharia
courts fulfilled these criteria and were thus reorganized and officially instituted
by virtue of Articles 34(5) and 78 of the Constitution. By contrast, the Christian
courts had been abolished in the 1960s and were therefore not in operation before
the FDRE constitution. Thus, it seems that the government may not set up state-
funded Christian courts within the meaning of the two provisions.
Contending principles relevant to the status of Sharia courts
The recognition accorded to Sharia courts involves the balancing of tricky legal and
political issues, such as secularism, the equality of religious groups, civic citizen-
ship, the accommodation of diversity and the relationship between state and reli-
gious courts. An understanding of the basic contending principles relating to the
functioning of Sharia courts and their status in Ethiopia’s legal system is impor-
tant in casting light on the institutional structure of the courts and their standing
as justice providers. This section does not, however, purport to offer an exhaustive
list of these principles, but focuses rather on the crucial ones.
Sharia as a normative system incorporates rules that contradict state laws, es-
pecially around the notions of equality and non-discrimination on the basis of gen-
der and religion.The recognition given to Sharia courts involves conflicts, real and
perceived, with the government’s mandate to ensure fundamental rights. The gov-
ernment’s decision to grant the Sharia courts a specific mandate may be viewed as
a political overture, and it is not subject to judicial review.This means that the gov-
ernment has come to terms with the fact that Sharia laws contradict certain state
laws so that it can accommodate religious diversity and address the Muslim com-
munity’s continuing quest to govern the personal matters that are intrinsically tied
to their religious values. Weighted against this position is the perception of state
endorsement or sanctioning of a particular religion at the expense of the equality
of other religious groups.
Although one might marshal many legal justifications against the recognition
of the Sharia courts, the very existence of such courts does not negate secularism
nor amount to the adoption of a state religion within the meaning of Article 11 of
the FDRE Constitution.12 Article 11 does not in and of itself preclude a degree of
accommodation of religious norms for dispute settlement, as long as individuals
are guaranteed the freedom to choose a forum. Generally, as the courts function on
12 Article 11 of the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia reads: ‘Separation of State and Religion: 1.
The Ethiopian State is a secular state. 2. There shall be no state religion. 3. The State shall not
interfere in religious affairs; neither shall religion interfere in the affairs of the State.’
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a voluntary basis and are not intended to replace the ordinary courts of the country,
their establishment does not affect the secular nature of the state.
The Sharia courts are composed of a three-tiered structure at both federal and
regional levels, and administer Islamic law on matters falling within their jurisdic-
tion.They function separately and independently of Ethiopia’s ordinary courts, but
function as ‘state’ courts in that they are subject to statutory law, accountable to
the state judiciary and subject to review by the Supreme courts at both federal and
state levels. While they are independent entities and apparently operate in paral-
lel with the state courts of law, they lack inherent self-governing powers and rely,
in terms of human and financial resources, on the ordinary courts of the land.13
Unlike ordinary courts, the Sharia courts report to the Federal Supreme Court on
their performance and utilization of budget and not to the parliament.
Regarding jurisdictional issues, Sharia courts have a defined mandate, which
is specifically stated under Article 4 of the enabling legislation. This provides that
the courts have common jurisdiction on any question regarding marriage, divorce,
maintenance, guardianship of minors and family relations, provided that the mar-
riage to which the question relates was concluded in accordance with Islamic law
or the parties involved consent to be adjudicated in accordance with Islamic law.
The Sharia courts can adjudicated over questions regarding wakf,14 hiba and gift
succession of wills provided the endower or donor is a Muslim or the deceased was
a Muslim at the time of his death. If they exceed their jurisdiction, their decisions
may be subject to review by state courts once they have passed through the Sharia
court system and a final decision has been made by the Supreme Sharia Court.15
13 For the appointment of Sharia judges and hiring of other staff as well as funding, Sharia
courts depend on the Federal Supreme Court. See Article 20 of Proclamation setting up Fed-
eral Sharia Courts, No. 188/1999.
14 Wakf is equivalent in meaning to mortmain property. It is an inalienable charitable endow-
ment under Islamic law, involving, for instance, the donation of a property or a plot of land
or other assets for Muslim religious or charitable purposes with no intention of reclaiming
the asset.
15 Article 80(3) of the Federal constitution of Ethiopia: ‘Federal Supreme Court has a power of
cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law.’ Accordingly, the final
decision of the Sharia courtsmight be subject to review if they exceed their jurisdiction. Final
decisions rendered by Sharia courts may be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court only on
procedural grounds, such as when they exceed their jurisdiction or when they decide cases
without securing the consent of the defendants at the outset (see Mohammed 2011:19, note
8).
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Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa
Physical setting and overview of caseload
In 2015 the Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababamoved into their current building.
Before that, they were housed in crammed and dilapidated buildings that created
an environment unconducive to the work of the judges and other court personnel
and was unpleasant for anyone who visited. The condition of these buildings was
a cause for concern among Muslims, some of whom accused the government of
deliberately housing the Sharia courts in a rundown building in order to tarnish
the image of the courts and thereby diminish the Muslims’ appetite for making use
of them (Ahmedin 2015:230-231, note 12).
Today, the courts occupy a four-storey building, much larger than the previous
rundown buildings. The new building is spacious and conducive for the successful
conducting of proceedings. It has more amenities than the previous buildings and
has waiting areas for clients, a separate room for each judge, a wide room for the
Registrar, a room for old files and documents, and separate one for active ones. It
is physically pleasant and the qadis, Registrar and clients have all openly expressed
their happiness with the current building and its facilities, comparing it favourably
with past conditions. All three levels of the Federal Sharia Courts are housed in
the same building. The Federal First Instance Sharia Court has two benches, the
High Court has one bench and the Supreme Court has three benches.There are ten
qadis in Addis Ababa, including the chief qadi. The total annual budget for the July
2017–July 2018 fiscal year is about 13 million Birr.
For the last couple of years, the Sharia courts in Addis Ababa have handledmore
or less a similar volume of cases (Mohammed 2012:283): on average, a minimum of
7000 cases and a maximum of 8000 cases have been filed every year. Most cases
relate to matrimonial issues, including nikah (the engagement that happens before
the marriage ceremony) and permission to marry, marriage registration, divorce,
custody of children and inheritance. Divorce makes up the lion’s share of Sharia
courts’ caseload, while the number of cases relating to wakf is limited.
Practice in the application of subject-matter jurisdiction and substantive law
The jurisdiction of the Federal Sharia Courts is confined to personal and fam-
ily matters. On matters involving marriage, divorce and the maintenance and
guardianships of minors, Sharia courts are competent to hear suits when a mar-
riage was concluded in accordance with Sharia law or when all the parties involved
consent to having their suit adjudicated in accordance with Islamic law.16 This rule
16 See Article 4(1) of Proclamation No. 188/99.
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is highly significant as it not only limits the Sharia courts’ scope of competence
but also defines the nature of the parties over which they can preside. While it
does not expressly demand that all parties be Muslim, it emphasizes the form of
conclusion of marriage or consent of the parties at the time of the suit, rather than
their religious background per se. The authority of the Sharia courts may thus be
extended to non-Muslims, if they voluntarily subject themselves to Islamic law.
This is in direct contrast to the 1942 proclamation setting up same courts, which
stipulated that either all the parties should be Muslims or the marriage to which
the question related had to have been concluded according to Islamic law.17
However, in practice, Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa operate with the
assumption that parties to family suits are Muslims or that the marriage was con-
cluded as per Islamic form.The qadis take for granted that the parties are Muslims
and feel they are not obliged to inquire into the reasons why some defendants
refuse to have their cases heard by Sharia courts. Yet, the qadis are of the opin-
ion that defendants’ objections to their jurisdiction have little to do with religious
background.
In other personalmatters, Sharia lawmakes the religious background of a party
a pre-condition, along with consent, for a hearing in the Sharia courts. As men-
tioned, in wakf (inalienable charitable endowment), hiba (gift), and succession of
wills cases, the endower or donor has to be, or have been at the time of death, a
Muslim for Sharia courts to hear the suit. According to a qadi from the First In-
stance Sharia Court in Addis Ababa, the question of who is/was a Muslim has not
so far arisen in the Sharia courts.18 Unless challenged and the contrary is proved,
the court assumes that the endower or donor is/was a Muslim.
After securing the express consent of both of parties, Federal Sharia Courts
apply normative Islamic law to decide the matter in hand. While there are pri-
mary and secondary sources of Islamic law, there is no express rule on the par-
ticular school of thought19 that should be used for administering Sharia law in
17 See Article 2 of Proclamation to Establish Khadis’ Courts, Proclamation No. 12/1942, Negarit
Gazeta No. 2/1942.
18 Interview with Sheik Ali Mohammed, qadi of Federal First Instance Sharia Court in Addis
Ababa, 25 November 2017, Addis Ababa.
19 The four schools of thought are: Shafie, Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi. The school chosen mat-
ters when it comes to personal andmarriagematters. Of the four schools, the Hanbali school
of jurisprudence is often considered the most restrictive when it comes to personal status
issues. The Hanbali doctrine ‘advocates a particularly patriarchal family structure. Among
other things, it provides women with less justification for leaving a marriage. Accordingly,
a wife can obtain a judicial divorce only on very limited grounds, namely the husband’s in-
capacity to consummate the marriage, his apostasy, or in cases of a ‘fraudulent marriage
contracted prior to puberty’. The Shafie doctrine is said to be less conservative in comparison
with other doctrines on personal and family matters (see Moussa 2005:11–13).
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Ethiopia, unlike in Sudan20, for instance. Nor is there a compilation of Islamic law
that should be used as the main legal source for judgments.The absence of specific
doctrine allows, in principle, parties to make use of the diverging opinions of the
available schools of thought for litigation purposes. The heterogeneous nature of
the Islamic community in Ethiopia in general and Addis Ababa in particular may
be the rationale behind this non-specification of a particular school of thought.
Consequently, Muslims make use of different schools of thought, often depending
on their geographical location. In the northern part of Ethiopia (Wollo and Tigray
areas), the Hanafi School is prevalent; in areas bordering Sudan and Eritrea, Malki
is the dominant school; while Shafie is found across Ethiopia and is the influential
doctrine in many well-known Islamic seminaries in the country (Abdella 2017:159).
The qadis of the Federal Sharia Court in Addis Ababa tend to subscribe to the Shafie
school of thought but occasionally resort to another doctrine if a particular issue
justifies it, for instance, if another doctrine prescribes a lesser punishment than
Shafie doctrine.21
The lack of a formally adopted Islamic doctrine to guide proceedings, in princi-
ple, paves theway for a reliance on the judges’ discretion and puts the consistency of
judgments at risk, which impacts upon predictability of judgments and legal cer-
tainty. However, if discretion-based interpretations are consistently applied over
particular matters, they develop into case law and this mitigates the potential for
unpredictability and uncertainty in judgments. Fortunately, the existing practice,
which is tilted in favour of one doctrine, seems to have moderated the use of dis-
cretion and favours a degree of uniformity in judgments.
Cognizant of the interpretation problems that might arise from the Islamic law
not being administered according to one particular school, a rule in the establish-
ment proclamation gives the Chief qadi of the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia the
power to form a temporary division, composed of at least five qadis, to look into
cases involving fundamental differences between divisions of the Federal Supreme
Court of Sharia with regard to interpretation of Islamic law. This measure helps
to mitigate the use of discretion by the qadis and rein in divergent interpretations,
thereby helping to maintain a uniform case law.
The personal and family matters that fall within the Sharia courts’ ambit are
open to interpretation and have implications for the scope of the courts’ author-
ity. Through adjudication, the Sharia courts provide interpretations of such open
20 The law governing the Sudanese Islamic courts, stipulates that the decisions of the courts
should be in accordance with the authoritative doctrines of the Hanafiya Jurists unless di-
rected otherwise by the grand qadi through a judicial circular or memorandum. In which
case, the decisions should be in accordance with the doctrines of the Hanafiya or other Mo-
hammedan Jurists as are set forth in the circular or memorandum (see Akolawi 1973:155).
21 Interview with Sheikh Ali Ahmed, Judge of Federal Sharia First Instance Court, 27 November
2017, Addis Ababa.
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rules and when those interpretations are applied consistently in the court system,
they become case law. In the following, an attempt is made to see how Federal
Sharia Courts deal in practice with matters falling within their jurisdiction. Doing
so sheds light on howSharia courts go about defining the scope of their competence
in adjudicating Islamic personal matters.
Article 4 of the Sharia courts’ establishment legislation provides the list of mat-
ters Federal Sharia Courts are competent to deal with.22 However, the provision is
not clear on whether the list is exhaustive or merely indicative of major matrimo-
nial and personal matters envisaged as subject to the jurisdiction of Sharia courts.
The issue is: Do Sharia courts have full jurisdiction over all matrimonial and per-
sonal matters, for instance, over matrimonial and inheritance property, which are
not explicitly specified under their subject-matter jurisdiction? To bemore specific,
do they have a mandate to hear cases involving the consensual division of marital
property, and are they authorized to deal with the division of inheritances aside
from determining who the inheritors are?
In practice, Federal Sharia Courts, while acknowledging the limits to their
power, tend to assume jurisdiction over matrimonial property and division of
inheritances if parties raise such issues in a particular suit. As long as the parties
consent, the courts seem to believe they can legitimately take on these matters,
even though they are not specifically outlined under their subject-matter juris-
diction as defined by the enabling legislation. However, some of their decisions
in such cases have been challenged by parties who have lodged petitions before
the cassation division of the Federal Supreme Court, alleging that the Sharia
courts committed fundamental errors of law in expanding their jurisdiction. The
Federal Supreme Court then rendered the decisions of Sharia Courts made while
expanding their subject-matter jurisdiction to cover, for instance, ownership of
property and division of inheritance, invalid on the grounds that they exceeded
their jurisdiction.23 The decisions of the Supreme Court set a precedent and are
binding on any court . They demarcate the extent of Sharia courts’ subject-matter
jurisdiction and confine the provisions of the establishment law, purportedly
creating room for widening the scope of the Sharia courts’ competence in practice.
In general, based on the aforementioned case law of the Federal Supreme
Court, Sharia courts are not entitled to expand the meaning of family and per-
sonalmatters beyond that specified under Article 4 of the establishment legislation.
22 See Article 4 of the establishment proclamation mentioned earlier.
23 A case between Shamsi Yenus and Nuriya Mami over possession of a plot of land was heard
first by the Federal Sharia Court in Dire Dawa city. It finally reached the Federal Supreme
Court after the Federal Sharia Supreme Court had given a final ruling. The Federal Supreme
Court held that Sharia courts could not expand their jurisdiction and hear cases not specifi-
cally indicated in their enabling legislation and they could not hear cases over possession of
a plot of land. See Federal Supreme Court, Cassation File No. 36677, 2009.
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The case law indicates that Article 4 is couched in exhaustive terms to preclude
the expansion of subject-matter jurisdiction under the guise of interpretation
and/or consent of parties, implying a strict limit to the scope of the Sharia courts’
jurisdiction. This is in line with the intent of the Constitution’s framers, who
envisaged Sharia justice with competence limited to the matters specifically laid
down in their legislation.24
Another interesting issue is whether regional states establishing Sharia courts
can expand their reach to cover matters not specifically listed in the proclamation
establishing Federal Sharia Courts. For instance, the legislation instituting Oromia
regional state’s Sharia courts envisaged competence to hear suits on matrimonial
property.25 To avoid expanding the discussion on this matter is important because,
in addition to being a potential area of conflict between federal and state laws, it
involves issues around the competence of the regions over personal matters in the
federal setting.26
24 The minutes of constitutional assembly on Articles 34(5) indicate that Sharia courts would
assume a strict mandate confined to those specified by law (Minutes of Constitutional As-
sembly 1994:10–26).
25 Article 5 of the Oromia Sharia Courts Establishment Proclamation, No. 53/2002, Magalata
Oromiyya, 9th year, No. 2, 2002.
26 The question is: is a region justified in enlarging the jurisdiction of Sharia courts under the
guise of competence to legislate on civil matters? If a region’s attempt to widen Sharia courts’
competence is found to be in conflict with the federal constitution and federal legislation,
what is its legal effect? According to the division of power stipulated by the Federal Constitu-
tion of Ethiopia (Article 52(1)) residual powers belong to the units of the Federation. States as
a result are competent to legislate on matters not included in the legislative list of matters
that are exclusively reserved or concurrently granted to both federal government and the
states. The matters falling under Sharia courts’ power are obviously personal matters, and
states are competent to legislate on personal matters as they are not expressly reserved for
the federal government. However, it is unclear whether states can enlarge the Sharia courts’
competence beyond the specific personal and family matters covered by the Federal Sharia
Courts’ enabling law. In Nigeria it was held that Sharia courts had restricted jurisdiction, con-
fined tomatters specified by the federal constitution (Ostien and Dekker 2010:581–582, note
3). Admittedly, while the Nigerian constitution gave the Sharia courts a specific mandate,
the Ethiopian federal constitution failed to do so (see Article 262 of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999). However, case law from the highest judicial body has
cast light on the meaning of personal and family matters not only under the enabling law
but also under the provisions of the federal constitution sanctioning the very establishment
of Sharia courts. The FDRE constitution may not outline the scope of matters falling under
the jurisdiction of the Sharia courts, but its framework seems to have intended Sharia courts
to have limited competence to deal with the matters specifically falling within their power,
as defined by legislators both at federal and state level (see theMinutes of Constitutional As-
sembly by the House of Peoples Representatives’ 1994). States in Ethiopia, while competent
to legislate on personal matters, may not therefore go beyond the personal matters defined
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Federal Sharia Courts’ case statistics and gender issues
Gender relations are undergoing changes in Ethiopia in urban settings, particularly
in big cities like Addis Ababa. Women now tend to be educated and have jobs both
in the public and private sectors, although their representation in the public space
is not yet on a par with men. Education paves the way for an increasing aware-
ness of the civic matters, especially regarding gender roles in society, espoused
by government and human rights activists in general and women’s rights activists
in particular. Given that the law applied by the Sharia courts embodies patriar-
chal ideology and recognizes a sex-based preferential treatment regarding divorce
and post-divorce issues, it is important to see what influence, if any, the assumed
growing empowerment and awareness of Muslim women has had on case law in
the Sharia courts.
A judicial divorce obtained through either the civil or Sharia courts is the only
one recognized by Ethiopian law. The Sharia courts have thus been dealing with
the issue of women’s divorce and post-divorce rights, which are laden with gender
sensitivity and involve normative differences and tensions between statutory rights
and obligations on the one hand and religious norms and values on the other. The
application by Sharia courts of religious norms in divorce and post-divorce pro-
ceedings thus attracts the attention of interest groups, researchers and activists. It
is interesting to examine the practice of Addis Ababa-based Federal Sharia Courts
in divorce and post-divorce claims in terms of gender, and question who resorts to
these courts, given that women in Ethiopia tend to be economically dependent on
their husbands.
Most of the suits filed to federal Sharia courts in Addis Ababa are related to
marriage issues, including confirmation of consent for marriage, marriage reg-
istration, and divorce. Although the exact figure is difficult to come by, divorce
accounts for up to 90 per cent of marriage suits.27 Looking at their caseload, one
could be justified in calling the courts ‘divorce courts’. In the last years there has
been a dramatic change that seems to have baffled the Sharia courts and cur-
rently around 85–90 per cent of divorce petitions are filed by women.28 Most of
the grounds for divorce include irreconcilable differences, abuse and violence, the
husband’s absence, and husbands marrying second wives without their first wives’
consent.Most of the petitioners for divorce are young, employed, educatedwomen.
They tend to be economically independent and do not seem to encounter economic
by federal legislation and judicial bodies. Sharia court jurisdiction ought to be strictly con-
strued as it forms an exceptional recognition of religious norms for dispute settlement.
27 Interview with Sheik Ali Mohamed and Registrar, 25 November 2017, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
28 Ibid.
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hardship in sustaining their post-divorce lives. Such women are thought to be bet-
ter informed and in a better position to assert their rights before the state courts,
which could provide them better post-divorce terms, but they refrain from doing
so.
According to female informants, seeking justice before the Sharia courts has
more to do with religious conviction. They believe that the ruling of a civil court
would not religiously end their marital ties.They also express that, from a religious
point of view, it is not appropriate to submit claims for divorce to regular courts.
As their entry into marriage in the first place was made according to a religious
ethos, their exit from it, they believe, should be through the same route. Based on
personal observation, the religious renaissance among Muslims seen in Ethiopia
over the last two decades might underpin their decisions.
Sharia courts tend to mediate between the parties with the aim of reconciling
them, in line with Islam’s general decrial of divorce. According to the qadis and the
Registrar of the Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa, it is usually the women who
insist on getting divorced, while the men often agree to reconcile or withdraw their
cases after having filed an application for divorce. While the rationale is subject to
speculation, better economic independence might explain women’s insistence on
divorce and their refusal to reconcile.
Should reconciliation fail, the courts issue a divorce verdict, the effect of which
depends on the petitioner. If a women petitions for the divorce, it takes effect as
soon as the presiding judge pronounces his verdict. If the husband is the peti-
tioner, he has to come to the court in person to pronounce the talak (unilateral
divorce or release of his wife from marriage) before the judge in order for the di-
vorce to come into effect. After the divorce decree has been issued, women often
make post-divorce claims for things such as spousal and child support and child
custody. The courts make their decision based on Islamic law and husbands tend
to comply with their rulings. Accordingly, the courts do not – in principle – award
any spousal award if it was the woman who petitioned for the divorce. According
to qadis, parties sometimes refrain from pursuing post-divorce claims, probably
to avoid further confrontation and/or in the belief that ex-husbands will provide
spousal and child support through their own volition. Parties also tend to make in-
formal/private arrangements for post-divorce claims to avoid washing their dirty
linen in public. Sharia court decisions settle such issues should informal arrange-
ments fail to work out.
The qadis and the Registrar of the Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa sug-
gest that divorce has been shifting from the man’s domain to become a women’s
practice. Indeed, several of the women I interviewed at the Federal First Instance
Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa said they believed they had the right to divorce.They
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stated that they were neither afraid of the stigma attached to divorce nor were they
be worried about their post-divorce life.29
Application of procedural laws
Generally, the Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa, as a state institution, render
justice based on laws.While they apply substantive Islamic law to settle cases, they
are bound by state procedural rules that govern their proceedings.30 By determin-
ing the procedures regulating the Sharia courts proceedings, the state seems to
disengage religious law from its religious source and confine the scope of the laws
to be applied by the courts. This seemingly strange combination of two distinct
laws appears to be a mechanism designed to assert state control over religious law,
probably with the intention of ensuring due process and fairness.
The qadis of the Federal First Instance Sharia Court in Addis Ababa state that
they have no objection to using civil procedure rules for their proceedings, believing
that it is somehow in line with Sharia rules on procedures. They apply a civil pro-
cedure with some necessary changes while acknowledging that they largely follow
Sharia procedure, which they in turn believe is predominantly in line with the rules
of civil procedure.The main procedural steps include confirmation of the presence
of both parties, securing the consent of the defendants, reading the statement of
claims followed by the statements for the defence, hearing the witnesses, securing
the production of evidence if deemed necessary, and finally delivering judgment.
Sharia courts in practice seem to comply with the procedure of securing con-
sent before hearing cases, as it is prescribed by the Constitution and the enabling
legislation. Accordingly, they normally ask for confirmation of the defendant’s con-
sent at the opening of proceedings. However, after consent is secured, the proce-
dure in use does not seem to strictly follow the rules prescribed by the civil proce-
dure. Proceedings are somewhat less formal than in regular courts of law.However,
the procedure in use in Sharia courts seems to be consistent and applied consis-
tently. A breach of, or non-compliance with, civil procedure does not necessarily
affect the outcome of the proceedings, and a decision may be rendered invalid only
if the procedural irregularity committed is a substantial one.31
The full-fledged application of civil procedure by Addis Ababa’s Federal Sharia
Courts is hampered by at least two factors. One is the belief that Islamic procedure
laws ought to govern the application of Islamic personal law administered by the
courts. The other has to do with a lack of basic knowledge among the qadis of state
29 Four anonymous womenwere interviewed at the court compound, 26 November 2017, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
30 Article 6(2) of the enabling legislation (Proclamation No. 188/99).
31 On procedural irregularity and its effect, see Articles 201–211 of the Civil Procedure Code. See
also Mohammed 2010:164–165.
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law in general and procedural law in particular. This problem stems from a lack of
training on basic state laws. In fact, the enabling legislation does not make knowl-
edge of basic state procedural laws a pre-condition of appointment as a judge.
Pursuant to the establishment legislation, Sharia courts are supposed to en-
sure openness of proceedings.32 However, most of the cases falling within the ju-
risdiction of the Sharia courts relate to private matters that often dictate a closed
hearing.33 Despite this, the Sharia courts hold open hearings whenever the parties
do not object.
Evidence
Sharia law itself incorporates rules on evidence, the most important of which is the
testimony ofwitnesses.However, there are normative differences between religious
and state laws regarding witnesses, and the number of witnesses used by Islamic
law in some cases is different for men and women.34
The proclamation establishing the Sharia courts is silent on the rules of evi-
dence to be used by the courts. While they ask for witnesses and the production
of written or other forms of evidence deemed necessary for particular cases, it
seems that evidence production is regulated by the normative rules of Sharia law.
The qadis seem to assume that, as matters within their jurisdiction are governed
by religious norms, the relevant Sharia rules of evidence ought equally to apply to
evidence issues.
Legal counsel
According to the qadis interviewed, in an overwhelming number of cases parties
are not represented by lawyers. Most applicants to the Sharia courts handle cases
by themselves or are assisted by family members and/or friends. Parties hire legal
representatives in some instances, such as when appealing a decision made by the
lower Sharia courts. There is no clear rule that governs legal counsel before Sharia
courts. The establishment legislation is silent on this matter as well. However, the
general rules governing legal counsel before civil courtsmight apply,with necessary
changes having been made, to Sharia courts.
32 Article 15 of the Establishment Proclamation, Proclamation No. 188/99.
33 The Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation allows closed hearing for private matters.
See Article 26 of Federal Courts Establishment Proclamation 25/1988.
34 For instance in financial transaction the Qur’an (2:282) says the following:‘... and call in to
witness from among your men two witnesses; but if there are not two men, then one man
and two women from among those whom you choose to be witnesses, so that if one of the
two errs, the second of the two may remind the other...’
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As matters heard by Sharia courts are governed by Islamic laws per se, legal
counsel is limited to procedural issues. Often, as one qadi from the First Instance
Sharia Court told me, lawyers (mostly non-Muslims) who offer legal counsel en-
courage the defendants to rule out the Sharia court, and succeed in turning parties
away from Sharia justice.35
The need for legal representation is apparently scuttled partly because Sharia
court proceedings are not as formal, confrontational and complex as civil court
proceedings. Another factor that may curtail the use of legal representation is a
lack of lawyers with a sound knowledge of Islamic law, or their lack of interest in
appearing before Sharia courts. Finally, the lack of representation might be simply
because Sharia law does not encourage its use, especially in civil cases.
Administrative issues related to Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa
As a state institution, Sharia courts are funded and staffed by the government. Re-
cently, there has been an improvement in the management of the budget by Sharia
courts. In the past, they had to apply to the Federal Supreme Court for operational
costs on the basis of need, which often caused a delay in the procurement process.
Nowadays, the Federal Supreme Sharia Court has its own account and managed
the entire budget for the Sharia courts. This has significantly reduced the delays
to payments to the courts. However, the Sharia courts continue to report to the
Federal Supreme Court on the utilization of the budget.
Nevertheless, the remuneration for judges serving in the Sharia courts is lower
than for those working in the regular courts, and Sharia judges do not receive any
housing or transport allowance. There are no assistant judges and no training is
available to the judges before they take the bench, unlike in the state courts. While
the Sharia court qadis and Registrar are appreciative of the gradual improvements
to their physical working environment and financial management, they still feel
the courts are treated as inferior/second-class. To bolster this contention, they also
point to a rule on contempt of court that is aimed at ensuring respect for the courts.
Although in practice contempt of the court is uncommon. Qadis complain that the
fine or punishment for it is lower in the Sharia courts than in the regular courts,
and complain it suggests they are seen as less deserving of respect.36
The Addis Ababa-based Federal Sharia Courts do not seem to proactively seek
to improve their image with the public.The reason for this, as a qadi at the First In-
35 Interview with Sheikh Ali Mohammed, 25 November 2017, Addis Ababa.
36 According to the establishment proclamation, any personwho, inwhatsoevermanner, shows
improper conduct in the course of any proceedings or who, without good cause, fails to com-
ply with an order of the court shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to one month or
to a fine of up to Birr 1.000 (One thousand Birr).
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stance Sharia Court told me, may have to do with a general problem of leadership.
The leadership of the Sharia Supreme Court is said to be unwilling and incapable
of improving the courts’ image.37 While the leadership have arranged some sem-
inars for qadis on particular issues, it has not taken the initiative to reach out to
prominent Muslim community figures and scholars to conduct debates on issues
affecting the courts’ operation.The Sharia courts do not publish their cases in elec-
tronic or print form to generate debate or to ensure transparency. Nor is there a
research unit that undertakes studies on the functioning of the courts in order to
make suggestions for improvement.The Sharia courts remain, as a result, obscure.
Appointment procedure for qadis vs. Sharia courts’ application
of Islamic law
The qualifications for Sharia courts’ qadis and the procedures for their appointment
are set forth in the enabling legislation. Any Ethiopianmay qualify for appointment
as qadi if he has been trained in Islamic law in an Islamic educational institution or
has acquired adequate experience and knowledge in Islamic law.38 Other appoint-
ment criteria include personal qualities, consent, and age.39 The same criteria are
used for all levels of the Sharia courts, and thus any eligible candidate may be ap-
pointed at any level of the courts.40
Except for a training in Islamic law, the establishment law does not expressly
require qadis to have any educational qualifications or credentials. It does not spec-
ify prerequisites to determine an applicant’s knowledge or experience of Islamic
law. The rationale for not insisting on any academic credentials or formal edu-
cation/training might be in consideration of the reality in Ethiopia, where there
exists only one Islamic higher academic institution offering formal training or ed-
ucation in Islamic law.Consequently,manywould-be Islamic scholars travel abroad
in search of formal religious education.The Awoliya College in Addis Ababa, which
used to offer Islamic education, was accused by the government of being a breed-
ing ground of ‘Wahhabism’ or ‘fundamentalism’ (Jemal 2012:34–35, note 13).41 It was
sealed off by themajlis, with the alleged backing of the government, who dismissed
37 Anonymous qadi interview and personnel of the Federal Sharia Courts, 27 November 2017,
Addis Ababa.
38 See Article 16(1) of Proclamation No. 188/99.
39 Diligence and good conduct, consent and aminimum age of 25 are required to become a qadi
(see Article 16(2–4) of Proclamation 188/1999).
40 In other countries, for instanceMalaysia, criteria for appointmentmight bedifferent depend-
ing on the level of Sharia court, (see Zin 2012:119–120).
41 See also the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs 2015: 211–215.
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its teaching staff and banned its curriculum.42The closing of the college was one of
several reasons for the recent confrontation (2011–2013), pitting government and
large segments of the Muslim community. The college was reformed, with new
teaching staff and a new curriculum that suits the majlis’ interests and is aimed at
producing students who will counter the so-called ‘Wahhabi’ doctrine.43
In practice, most of the qadis currently serving in Sharia courts received Is-
lamic ‘training’ or ‘education’ in traditional ways, attending traditional religious
seminaries (madrassas) common in rural parts of Ethiopia. Except for three qadis
in Addis Ababa, who secured formal credentials from foreign Islamic educational
institutions, all of the sitting qadis do not have formal religious education.
The appointment procedure for qadis involves three bodies: the majlis, the Fed-
eral Supreme Court, and the Federal Judicial Administration Commission.The ap-
pointment of qadis is made by the Federal Judicial Commission, which follows the
advice of the majlis and the recommendations of the Federal Supreme Court. In
fact, the process is controlled by the majlis, which is in charge of recruiting the
would-be qadis and submits the list to the Federal Supreme Court. Unlike state
courts, the appointment of qadis does not involve the final approval of the House of
Peoples’ Representatives: the approval by the Judicial Administration Commission
is sufficient.44
Historically, the appointment of qadis was manipulated by the state. The same
seems to hold true today. People who have resisted the involvement of state au-
thorities in Islamic affairs and in Sharia court business have faced reprisals, being
either dismissed or systematically excluded from Muslim institutions in general.
Sheik Khiyar Mohammed, a former President of the majlis, for example, was dis-
missed after publically detailing the direct interference of the government in Mus-
lim affairs and manipulation of the majlis to advance government interests.45
As a result, candidates with a religious orientation other than the one approved
by themajliswould not be allowed to assume any position in themajlis and impliedly
in Sharia courts as well. This is particularly the case when candidates have creden-
tials from ‘Wahhabi’ religious schools, including Awoliya College. The constraints
of formal education and themajlis’ control of the appointment process for qadis are
said to have weakened the Sharia courts’ capacity to fully apply Islamic law to cases
(Abdella 2017:135–136, note 27). Consequently, some Muslim scholars and figures
have challenged the dominance of majlis and called for the rescinding of its power
in that regard (Jemal 2012:35, note 13).
42 Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs 2015: 214.
43 Ibid.
44 Article 17 of the enabling law.
45 For information on his interview see the weekly newspaper Addis Admas from 23 June 2018
and Ghion Magazine, 9 June 2018.
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The qadis serving in Federal Sharia Courts in Addis Ababa seem to be circum-
spect of the Hanbali school of thought, which is said to be more conservative on
many issues, including family and personal Islamic law.The existing orientation of
Sharia courts inclined to Shafie jurisprudence which might have to do partly with
the majlis’ preference for Shafie-inclined traditional Islamic teaching prevalent at
at many Muslim seminaries in Ethiopia or the requirements for appointment of
qadis tend to downplay formal religious education and favours traditional Shafie-
inclined nominees.
Concluding remarks
Although secularism is a fundamental constitutional principle in Ethiopia, the
Sharia courts are recognized as the independent Islamic judicial body dealing
with family and personal matters, and as forming an integral part of national
law. Their establishment does not deviate from a secular constitutional order
that is considered to be the most appropriate political and legal mechanism for
multicultural and multi-confessional society.
The paper has shown that while the mandate of the Sharia courts is couched in
general terms, their attempt to expand its scope as defined by law has been kept
in check by the decisions of ordinary judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
held that Islamic law can only be applied to personal matters in the limited areas
specifically designated to them.
Based on the case law of Sharia courts, divorce has today become a women’s
practice as opposed to being part of men’s long-held sphere of influence over mar-
ital ties. Better economic conditions, religious conviction, and/or changing societal
attitudes to divorce propel women to forgo the relatively better protection that may
be afforded by state courts.
Influenced by substantive Islamic law and a lack of basic knowledge of state
laws, Sharia courts apply civil procedure rules rather leniently. Nevertheless, their
proceedings are largely consistent. Yet, a lack of visibility is the hallmark of Sharia
courts, and this has, to a certain extent – prevented them from becoming subject
of academic discourse. To rectify this lack of transparency, it is important to re-
visit the existing requirements for appointment to the courts, so that candidates
with formal education could become judges. Issues arising from the majlis’ control
over the appointment process for qadismay be addressed if and when free and fair
elections deliver an independent majlis.
The state courts also need to engage Sharia courts through platforms relevant
to their functioning and to enhance their knowledge of basic state laws.
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8. Use and abuse of ‘the right to consent’
Forum shopping between shimgilinna and state courts
among the Amhara of Ankober, northcentral Ethiopia
Desalegn Amsalu
Introduction
This study examines how the local community in Ankober handles its right to con-
sent to enter into customary court or switch to the formal one. The only condition
attached to resolving disputes through customary court is that both parties in the
conflict should agree to it.This sounds like a fair arrangement. But, as there are no
laws that regulate how consent, already given, should be sustained or terminated,
the right to choose and shift between courts is open to abuse.1
Article 34(5) of the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE 1995)
Constitution stipulates that disputes relating to personal and family laws can be
dealt with in accordance with customary or religious laws ‘with the consent of par-
ties to the dispute’. Article 34(5) of the 2001 Revised Constitution of the Amhara
National Regional State (ANRS 2001) is a verbatim copy of the analogous provi-
sions of the FDRE Constitution. However, neither the constitutions nor any of the
subsidiary laws give any details on how to apply the constitutional notion of con-
sent. Both constitutions stipulate that ‘Particulars shall be determined by law’, but
this has not been done so far.
1 The idea for this paper came in February 2012 when I was doing a research in Ankober on tra-
ditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, with particular reference to shimgilinna (conflict
resolution through elders). It is commonly known that local institutions enjoy respect among
the Amhara people, but duringmyfieldwork, I noticed that people’s obedience to shimgilinna
had changed. What struck me was how people were manipulating the institution using the
legal right of consent. After I received an offer to contribute a chapter to this book, I visited
Ankober for a second time, from 12 June 2017 to 10 September 2017, to undertake more fo-
cused data collection. This time, I specifically looked at the use and abuse of consent in the
community. I conducted several interviewswith shimagillés (elders), disputants and judges at
AnkoberWoreda Court, women and youths. I attended court cases and organized focus group
discussions with shimagillés. I also made use of my notes and interviews from my fieldwork
in 2012.
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Though there is an abundant literature relating to customary dispute resolution
mechanisms (CDRMs) in Ethiopia since 1991, there is a dearth of research on the
legal and practical role of ‘consent’ in CDRMs. Generally, the literature focuses on
the legal framework for CDRMs (see for example, Tesfa 2009, Temesgen 2010, Tekle
2009) and case studies (see for example, Alemayehu 2009, Asnake 2010, Assefa 1995,
Ayke and Mekonnen 2008, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Tarekegn and Tsadik
2008, Tolosa 2010, Wodisha 2010). An annotated bibliography edited by Fekade et
al. (2011) listed 136 research outputs related to CDRMs, of which 19 were written in
Amharic and 117 in English. Since the publication of this list,more researchers have
written on the subject matter (Solomon 2014, Mekuanint 2015, Esayas 2015, Tasew
2016, Balew 2016). However, the relationship between customary law and formal
law is not much discussed and no significant research is available on how ‘consent’
is being used to transfer a claim from one legal forum to another.
Conflict resolution among the Amhara of Ankober
Overview of the people and the area
In line with the state structure effective since 1995, most Amhara people live in
Amhara National Regional State (ANRS), but many are found in other regions.2The
Amhara of AnkoberWoreda,3 in particular, are found within a sub-regional division
known as Semen Shewa Zone. The woreda (district) headquarters are in Gorebella
town, some 172 kilometres away from Addis Ababa. The historic town of Ankober4
lies three kilometres to the east of Gorebella.
According to the Ankober Woreda Government Communication Affairs Office
(AWGCAO 2016), the population of Ankober Woreda in 2016 was 89,691. In its last
census in 2007, the Central Statistics Agency determined that the population of
Ankober was made up of Amhara people (92.77 per cent), the Argobba (7.04 per
cent), and other ethnic groups (0.19 per cent). The census also shows that the
Amhara are predominantly Orthodox Christians, while the Argobba and Afar are
2 According to the 2007 national census of Ethiopia, the Amhara numbered 19,867,817 individ-
uals, comprising 26.9 per cent of Ethiopia's population.
3 Woreda (English pl. woredas) is the third level administrative unit in the current state struc-
ture of Ethiopia. ‘District’ is often used in the literature as an English equivalent. Theworedas
are subdivided into several smallest units, kebele (English pl. kebeles). Several woredas form
higher-level units known as zones, which in turn form regions (kilil).
4 Today’s Ankober townwas chosen as the royal place of the Kingdomof Shewa in the late eigh-
teenth century for its strategic position as a border station. It was the base fromwhich Nigus
Sahala Sellase (r.1813–47) stretched his control over Argobba, Afar and Oromo. It also served
as the seat for Emperor Menelik II (r. 1889–1913) when he was the king of Shewa (1866–1889).
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entirely Muslim (CSA 2008).The Amhara predominantly live to the west of Ankober
town, in the Amhara community of Shewa. To the east live the Argobba and Afar
ethnic groups. The Amhara settlement area lies in the highland climatic zone, the
Argobba in the midlands, and the Afar in the lowlands. In terms of subsistence, the
Amhara are ox-plough agriculturalists, who produce highland crops like barley,
peas, and teff. The Argobba are also cultivators but they also weave and trade. The
Afar are pastoralists.
Figure 1: Location of Ankober Woreda (Desalegn 2018 ) 5
Shimgilinna
Shimgilinna is the ‘most common’ CDRM among the Amhara people (Pankhurst and
Getachew 2008:14). However, the local practices relating to this institution seem
to vary from one area to another, and there are institutions particular to certain
5 The Central Statistics Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia provided GIS data, collected in 2007, for
this map. Bamlaku Amente, an expert in GIS at Addis Ababa University, assisted me with
mapping the data. 
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Amhara groups. For example abegar, a conflict resolutionmechanism employing el-
ders who claim to have hereditary divine power, is practised among the Amhara of
Wollo (see Uthman 2008). Among the Amhara of North Shewa, people seek reme-
dies to conflict before a wofa legesse, a spirit medium (see Melaku and Wubshet
2008). These and other CDRMs are traditionally used to resolve conflicts varying
from simple interpersonal disputes to the most serious cases of homicide.
The terms shimgilinna and shimagillé carry two different meanings: biological
and cultural. In the biological sense, shimgilinna (lit. ‘aging’) refers to getting old,
that is growing grey hair, getting wrinkles and becoming weak. The term shimag-
illé (lit. ‘old’) refers to an aged person. Shimgilinna in the cultural sense refers to a
CDRM institutionwhile shimagillé (Amharic pl. shimgilinnawoch; English pl. shimag-
illés) refers to a council of elders taskedwith resolving conflicts for free. In this latter
sense, shimgilinna is a wider institution that includes shimagillé.
Shimgilinna as a CDRM has normative and procedural aspects. The normative
aspect refers to the long-established system of beliefs, values, and norms used
for promoting peace and resolving conflicts. In the Amhara community, they are
known as ye’abatader hig (lit. ‘the laws of the fathers’) (Yohannis 1998). The proce-
dural aspect refers to the steps taken in the process of conflict resolution. Tradi-
tionally, conflict resolution through shimgilinna followed a certain procedure that
began with identifying the causes of conflict and ended with the restoration of
an amicable relationship between the disputants. In most cases, members of the
council of elders are elderly people, although age is not an exclusive requirement:
younger people can also be called shimagillé and assume a role in conciliation, for
they are the ‘wise of the young’. Shimagillés need the respect of the society in which
they live in, wisdom, the oratory skills to convince people, and a sense of fairness
in arbitration.
There are different types of shimgilinna. Yegiligil shimgilinna is conciliation be-
tween parties in an on-going disagreement. Erq refers to conciliation between dis-
putants whose relationship had already broken down in an earlier conflict. There
is also dem adreq shimgilinna, which usually refers to conciliation aimed at stopping
a lengthy conflict between families, involving a cycle of retaliatory killings, hence
dem adreq (lit. ‘to stop bloodshed’). Finally, there is yebetezemed guba’e (lit. ‘family
council’), which settles disputes that arise between husbands and wives.
Shimgilinna is integrated into different levels of societal organization in
Ankober. If a conflict occurs in a neighbourhood or village and is small in mag-
nitude or relatively uncomplicated, elders in the village will handle the case. This
type of conciliation is called yesefer (lit. ‘village’) shimgilinna. On the other hand,
larger and more complicated conflicts are resolved by more influential elders
selected from the wider community in what is called yehager (lit. ‘country level’)
shimgilinna. There is also a version of shimgilinna that resolves conflicts between
subscribers to the informal insurance arrangements known as iddir. Similarly,
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yesebeka guba’e shimgilinna operates between church members. Each parish of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church has different committees, one of which is yesebeka
guba’e shimagillé (lit. ‘council of parish elders’), made up of respected members of
the community and the Church. People sometimes prefer to bring disputes to the
Church council of elders.
Shimgilinna in Ankober is and has always been male-dominated. First, there is
no direct participation of women as shimagillés, since – as a well-known Amhara
proverb says – ‘Man (belongs to) to the public and woman to the kitchen’. Second,
women’s interests are suppressed when they are parties to a dispute. According
to the head of Ankober Woreda Women’s League, when a woman brings a case to
shimgilinna, shewill be told by the shimagillés: ‘You are awoman, you need to tolerate
this’; or ‘You don’t have to bring this case in public’; or, if a woman challenges a
decision of shimagillés, ‘You have to accept the decision because you are a woman’.
In shimgilinna, conflict and its resolution is often seen from a male perspective.
Co-existence of shimgilinna and the formal justice system
For each tier of administration in Ethiopia’s regional states, there is a correspond-
ing tier of court. The regional states have a supreme court, the zonal administra-
tions have high courts, and the woredas have a first instance court. This means that
the entire woreda of Ankober has one woreda court. Woreda courts are located in
towns that are usually administrative centres and are thus more accessible to ur-
ban than rural residents.
However, there are also kebele level social courts6 that deliver justice at the low-
est level of the community. In Ankober Woreda, there are twenty-two kebeles, each
with a social court. The jurisdiction of the social courts in Amhara Region in Au-
gust 2017, according to the presiding judge of a kebele social court in Gorebella town,
was over civil matters whose value is not more than 1,500 Ethiopian Birr (ETB).The
maximum punishment social courts can impose is 300 ETB or one month’s impris-
onment.The courts cover small-scale crime such asminor theft and insult, but they
do not resolve disputes involving bodily injury or bleeding. Any party dissatisfied
with the decision of the social courts can appeal to a committee of three shimagillés,
6 Social courts are kebele-level courts in Ethiopia that address minor claims at the grassroots
level. Each of the nine regional states and the two city states (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa)
determine the jurisdiction of social courts, hence their competence differs slightly from state
to state. For example, according to Article 9(3)(d) of Proclamation No. 361/2003 (The Addis
Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation), Addis Ababa City’s social courts have
jurisdiction over disputes whose monetary value is not over 5,000 ETB (Art. 50(1)), while the
jurisdiction of Amhara Regional State social courts at the time of this research covered cases
not over 1,500 ETB. A kebele social court has usually three judges, one presiding judge, one
secretary and one member.
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selected and appointed by the community. If they are then not satisfied with the
committee’s decision, they can file their claim with the woreda court.
As well as working with the courts, shimagillés work with the kebeles quasi-for-
mal, state-initiated conflict resolution institutions known as gichit aswegaj com-
mittees (lit. ‘conflict prevention/resolution committee’), which consist of approx-
imately seven members.7 The committees are a common platform for the com-
munity police, security and administration office, and the community. Members
are drawn from shimagillés and representatives of government offices. After the
community policing officers report a case to the kebele police, the latter determine
which organ should handle the conflict. If it falls under their jurisdiction, cases are
forwarded to the gichit aswegaj committee.
Manipulation of consent
Giving and withdrawing consent at different stages of dispute resolution
In Ankober, dispute resolution through shimgilinna can be initiated by the court,
by the disputants, or by shimagillés. According to judges at Ankober Woreda Court,
the court encourages parties to settle personal or family cases through shimgilinna
because it reduces the burden on the court and also restores good relationships
between the disputants. Disputants themselves may also direct their case to
shimgilinna immediately, or after the case has been filed with the court. In the
latter case, they simply have to inform the court of their decision and then the
court authorizes the request. Finally, shimagillés themselves may initiate a dispute
resolution by indicating their willingness to arbitrate either to the conflicting
parties or to the court. In all cases, the results of the conciliation have to be
reported to, and approved by, the court.
However, cases from Ankober show that the sustaining of consent for cases to
be brought before the shimagillé is uncertain and slightly depends on who initiated
a case. If the court initiates shimgilinna, either or both parties in a dispute can
discontinue the process at any stage. Either party can also refuse to comply with
any agreement reached. This means that there is no end to the use of consent to
initiate or end a shimgilinna process and its outcome. The only limit is the formal
submission of a decision in writing to the court, on the basis of which the court
will give its judgment. Both parties then have to fill in and sign a form from the
court, confirming that their dispute has been resolved. As a judge from Ankober
7 Directives of Operation of Committee of Peace, No. 001/2002, The Amhara National Regional
State Administration and Security Affairs Office, Bahir Dar, document in Amharic.
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Woreda Court explained, after the signed form has been submitted to the court,
the parties cannot invoke consent to reverse the decision either jointly or severally.
When shimgilinna is invoked locally, without the prior authorization of the
court, the situation is slightly different. Even though parties can revoke their
consent at any stage of the conciliation process, they are obliged to abide to the
agreed decision of the shimagillé, which can be fixed either orally or in writing.
The decision is binding, without any form having to be signed and submitted to
the court. However, the Ankober Woreda Court judges have different views on
the legal enforceability of decisions of this type in cases where one of the parties
disagrees with the outcome. Some judges apply principles of general contract (see
Articles 1696−1710 of the 1960 Civil Code) and argue that, as long as the dispute
resolution is duly made and consent for conciliation was given by both parties, the
decisions of the shimagillés should be endorsed by the court. Any party who rejects
the decision should be forced to comply. Other judges say that the validity of such
contracts should be proved through new litigation if one of the parties denies its
performance by withdrawing consent to an agreement already reached or refusing
to give consent in the first place. There is no uniform practice among the judges in
the Woreda Court and each judge follows what he or she believes is right.
Reasons for and mechanisms of giving or withdrawing ‘consent’
Parties in a dispute use their right to give or withdraw consent to control the
shimgilinna/court process and/or results: (1) for their own personal benefit; (2) for
the benefit of others; (3) to harm others; or (4) to avoid a negative outcome when
they are uncertain of the decision that will be made. In the following, some of the
mechanisms of such an abuse are discussed.
Exploitation of chances from missing evidence
The principle of consent can bemanipulated in order to take advantage of someone
who is unable to produce the required evidence to prove their claim in court. This
may occur when an agreement, such as a contract, has not been made in a valid
form, or when one party has failed to preserve evidence relating to a given dispute.
Let us consider the following case, obtained from an interview of two informants
who were shimagillés in the case.
Nesibu,8 65, hereafter creditor, gave a loan of 5000 ETB to his friend, Asaminew,
54, hereafter debtor, in May 2010. According to the creditor, the debtor borrowed
themoney from him to cover the wedding expenses of his two children, a son and
a daughter, who got married in a joint ceremony. The debtor promised to return
8 The names mentioned in this paper are all pseudonyms.
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the money by the next harvest season. However, in the end, he refused to repay
the loan, denying he had received anymoney at all from the creditor. The creditor
approached shimagillés to resolve the case peacefully. The shimagillésmanaged to
persuade the debtor to enter into arbitration. In the course of the arbitration, the
debtor’s statements varied. At first, he admitted to having received money, yet a
smaller amount than the creditor claimed to have given him. At another time, he
denied having received anymoney at all. In the end, the debtor withdrew his con-
sent to be arbitrated by shimagillés. When the creditor took the case to court, the
court required written contractual evidence to prove the loan, which the creditor
did not have. Thus, in the end, the creditor lost the court case. According to the
shimagillés, this kind of case has become common (summary of an interview with
two elders, February 2012).
According to Article 2472 of the 1960 Civil Code, contracts for loans for sums over
500 ETB have to be made in writing. Moreover, Article 1727(1) provides that any
contract required to be made in writing ‘shall be of no effect unless it is attested
by two witnesses’, so that if the evidence is lost, witnesses to the written contract
can testify to prove a claim. In the above case, however, as there was no written
contract, no witness could be adduced to the court, including the shimagillés who
had attempted to resolve the case and before whom the debtor had admitted tak-
ing the loan. In cases like the above, the involvement of shimagillés is often more
successful as they do not rely only on evidence to prove a case. They use different
techniques, such as oratorical skills of persuasion, demanding oaths and threat-
ening with curses, to convince the conflicting parties to come to an agreement.
Therefore, from the perspective of the debtor, it was to his advantage to have the
case handled in the formal court, where disputes are won or lost on the basis of
evidence.
Exploitation of chances from an adversary’s level of social standing
Some disputants file their case with either the customary or formal court with
the intention of hearing the case from their adversary’s perspective in order to
assess the level of evidence he or she can produce. Someone who sees that their
adversary is more competent in the formal court may suggest moving the case to
the customary court.They may lobby or even force, by exerting social pressure – as
shown in the next paragraph – the other party to give consent for shimgilinna. If,
on the other hand, an adversary’s standing is strong in the customary court, the
other party can thwart shimgilinna by withdrawing consent and moving the case to
the formal court. The consent of both parties is required to enter shimgilinna, but
the withdrawal of one is enough to end it.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, an adversary’s level of social stand-
ing, by which I mean the ability to exert social pressure on an opponent, also deter-
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mines the provision and maintenance of consent to a particular legal forum. One
elder I interviewed remembered the following case, where one party maintained
control over a dispute resolution.
In June 2016, a dispute occurred between Sergew, 45, hereafter plaintiff, and Yi-
halem, 32, hereafter defendant, when the defendant damaged some of the plain-
tiff’s crops while the latter was ploughing on a bordering land with the former.
The plaintiff who had more family members than the defendant took the case
to shimgilinna. He exaggerated the loss and demanded compensation from the
defendant. Some of the shimagillés were the plaintiff’s supporters and the defen-
dant knew the decision would bemade against him.Moreover, the defendant was
scared of the opponent’s aggressive family members. Thus, at first, he rejected
the shimgilinna saying that the plaintiff can take the case to the court. However,
the plaintiff pressurized the defendant to give his consent to the shimgilinna. As
expected, the plaintiff was compensated with 1.200 ETB for his loss, a sum much
higher than the damage he had incurred. (Summary of an interviewwith an elder,
June 2017)
The above case illustrates that consent is used as a weapon by socially powerful dis-
putants, who employ their local connections by taking the case to the shimgilinna at
the expense of weaker adversaries. It shows that as much as socially powerful par-
ties benefit from the right to give and withdraw consent, those in weaker positions
may suffer through it.
Use and abuse of shimagillés as witnesses in the court
Some disputants enter shimgilinna intending to prepare the ground by using the
shimagillés as witnesses when the case is later taken to court. This may happen
with or without the knowledge of the shimagillés. Sometimes, one party may even
bribe shimagillés and misuse their influence. Such shimagillés may misguide other
shimagillés or the other party in the dispute during shimgilinna, and they may trick
them into exposing issues that can be later used as evidence against them in the
court. Though the shimagillés I talked to were not willing to give me concrete ex-
amples, they expressed a belief that it was becoming common for shimagillés to be
partisan and to serve as false witnesses in court.  
Breaking agreements on the choice of a forum
When two parties enter a contract, they sometimes agree on a legal forum to which
they will turn if dispute arises. Sometimes, they agree to use shimgilinna only. How-
ever, one party may bring an action in the court, betraying the terms of the agree-
ment and leaving the shimgilinna aside, if things turn out to be less favourable. In
the existing practice, there are no ways to enforce parties to use the legal forum
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agreed beforehand. Many of the shimagillés I talked to stated that they had experi-
enced this kind of cheating.
Effects on justice delivery and conflict resolution culture
The unrestricted freedom to use consent in forum shopping has consequences for
justice delivery and the conflict resolution culture of the people. Dispensation of
justice is often delayed as cases transfer to shimgilinna and return without resolu-
tion, or as they are transferred between the two forums more than once. Moreover,
the manipulation of consent and the position of adversaries lead to unfair results,
which in turn lead to secondary conflicts between disputants. It has also affected
the values and procedures of shimgilinna.
Delay in justice delivery
An examination of Ankober Woreda Court records shows that the court transfers
many cases to the shimgilinna whenever the parties involved agree. There are no
restrictions on this and sending cases to the shimgilinna means that, in theory,
the burden on the court is reduced. However, a major problem is that many cases
return to the court without having been resolved. The shimagillés’ efforts are ren-
dered futile and become an extra burden on the court. As the table below shows,
between 2011/2012 and 2016/2017, the number of cases transferred to the shimag-
illés increased, while the number of cases settled by them decreased. According to
a judge in Ankober Woreda, despite the judges’ efforts to keep disputes related to
personal and family matters out of the court, many of them return without getting
resolved.















2011/2012 693 28 4 28 - 0
2012/2013 592 145 24 95 50 35
2013/2014 791 221 28 67 154 70
2014/2015 779 104 13 69 35 34
2015/2016 1175 405 34 187 218 54
2016/2017 1377 475 34 120 355 75
9
9 Data was compiled from Ankober Woreda Court record management office.
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Justice delivery is further prolonged since there is no limit, at least theoretically,
to the number of times a case can be moved between the formal and customary
courts. As one judge stated, the same case can move back and forth between the
two fora up to ten times. A judge for over fifteen years, he had observed that the
time needed to resolve certain cases had increased due to their movement between
the two fora. There is no law that defines how many times a case can be trans-
ferred to shimgilinna. Judges send cases back to shimgilinna several times because
of the right of the parties to give, refuse and withdraw their consent to have them
handled through customary mechanisms. Judges may refer a case to shimgilinna,
disregarding the number of times they have already done so, when they believe, for
example, it is more just to do so, or when the nature of the case means it can be
better resolved through shimgilinna.The following case over marital property divi-
sion serves as a good example of a single case moving between the two legal forums
several times.
Plaintiff: Mebrat Ayele, wife
Defendant: Asaminew Demisse, husband
On 18 June 2017, the plaintiff filed a claim over a partition of marital property.
The court scheduled an appointment for both, the plaintiff and the defendant,
to appear ten days later. The court examined both the claim and the defence. At
this first appointment, the court advised the parties to end their dispute through
shimgilinna. It selected five shimagillés (names omitted) and, if they proved suc-
cessful in settling the dispute, ordered them to submit their decision in writing.
The court scheduled another appointment after three weeks, when it anticipated
it would receive the shimagillés’ decision. But in that time, the parties failed to
agree. Thus, at that second appointment, the court continued to hear the plain-
tiff’s case.
The plaintiff’s argument was as follows: ‘Regarding the steel house mentioned in
the suit, I have contributed 7.450 ETB from my own separate property. Our com-
mon property is 22.550 ETB. I ask the court to order the defendant to paymy share
from this sum. We also have a hop garden. The defendant falsely said we used
up the garden. But, the garden I am talking about is a different one. Even from
the one he said we had used it up, our agreement was that he would give me 400
ETB since he sold the hopswithoutmy knowledge. Thirdly, he borrowed 2.100 ETB
from me while we were still living together, so he should return the loan to me.
Fourthly, the defendant claims to have a separate land of his own, which is true.
But he ‘sold’ that land to a third party, and I bought it back. Now, I ask the court to
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order the defendant to pay tome 1.000 ETB to cover the expenses I incurred when
I reclaimed the land’.
The defendant’s argument was as follows: ‘Firstly, yes, when we constructed the
house of corrugated iron sheets, the sheetswere bought by the plaintiff’s separate
money of 7,450 ETB. The rest of the money was on an equal share. Thus, I will
give her the 7,450 ETB and will equally share the common expenses. Secondly,
regarding the hops, I sold the hops leaves for 800 ETB, and I agreed to pay the
plaintiff 400 ETB. The other hop garden shementionedwas estimated to beworth
300 ETB and I already agreed to pay the plaintiff half of that, 150 ETB. Bringing this
case to the court is not appropriate. Thirdly, she did not givemea loanof 2,100 ETB,
that money was used for common marital matters, so she should not ask me to
pay that back. Fourthly, it is true that she spent 1,000 ETB to reclaim the land I
sold, but, after that, we used the land in common for three years, so she should
not ask that money fromme.
The court scheduled the next appointment for eleven days later, but when both
of them appeared on that day, the court said the case had not yet been decided.
The two parties then asked the court to authorize them for a second time to end
their dispute through shimgilinna. The court allowed them to do so and authorized
them to come with a decision two weeks later. When they came back to the court
on the appointed day, the two parties reported that they had still been unable to
agree, so the court gave them another appointment another two weeks later. By
that day, again, they had not been able to resolve their dispute.
This time, the shimagillés themselves came and asked the court to extend their
deadline for the third time; they were given one more week. When they came
to that last appointment, the parties said they were not able to agree through
shimgilinna, so the court dismissed the case for another two weeks so the judges
could make a final judgment.
While the court was preparing its final decision, the parties involvedwereworking
on their own resolution to thedispute.On theday the judges expected to give their
verdict, theywere presentedwith awritten agreement by the parties involved. The
judge made sure the agreement was made with the full consent of both parties
and that the decision did not contradict morality.With this, the case ended (Sum-
mary of interviewwith a judge fromAnkoberWoreda Court July 2017 andAnkober
Woreda Court File Number 011/985).
Neither the case notes nor my informant spelled out the reasons behind the failure
of the shimagillés to resolve the case, or the parties’ motives for the case. However,
when talked to the shimagillés involved, they told me that the two parties were not
convinced of the need to dissolve their marriage. One of the shimagillés stated: ‘We
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knew of this and we tried to repair their relationship. However, having agreed to
our proposal in one moment, they refused in another.’ According to the shimagillé’s
view, by changing their minds many times, the parties bought themselves time in
which to decide whether or not they should divorce.
The AnkoberWoreda Court does not keep records of the transfer history of each
case, aside from the initial transfer. Even if a case is transferred to shimgilinna three
or four times, this information is not recorded. An archivist in the court, who I in-
terviewed in July 2017, told me that although they report the court’s performance
to the zonal court, the reporting format does not require the history of each case
to be recorded. However, by investigating each record with the help of some as-
sistants, I attempted to reconstruct the history of 475 cases that were transferred
to shimagillés in 2016/2017 (see Table 1 above). The results are as follows.10
Figure 2: Transfer frequency of individual cases (2016/2017) (Desalegn 2018 )
It was not possible to disaggregate cases for previous years in order to get a
comparative insight because it was unfeasible to deal with all the files in the time
10 Data has been compiled from Ankober Woreda Court record management office.
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available. However, the judges agreed that not only the number of cases transferred
(as shown on Table 1) but also the number of times they are transferred is increas-
ing.
Secondary conflicts
The number of secondary conflicts is recorded neither by the woreda nor the social
courts. However, many informants, including shimagillés, disputants, and judges,
believe that secondary disputes are often created or aggravated by themanipulation
of the right to give or withdraw consent.The following case, narrated to me by one
of the shimagillé involved in 2017, is an example of one such conflict.
On 3 December 2015, the cattle of Taddesse had trespassed onto Gezmu’s field
and damaged some of his crops. Two weeks later, a shimgilinna was organized to
bring the two parties to peace. After almost half a day of deliberations, the elders
decided that Taddesse should pay 1,000 Birr for damage. Taddesse, unhappy with
the result, withdrew from the shimgilinna. When Gezmu then filed the case with
the court, Taddesse immediately expressed his willingness to end the case again
through shimgilinna.
Following this, another conciliation event was organized by elders almost a
year later. Before the shimgilinna started, Gezmu is said to have spoken directly to
Taddesse, saying: ‘From the day of your birth, you are not bound by your words.
You are not reliable and have the character of the wicked since the wicked do not
respect shimagillés.’ The situation changed and the two parties could not go to a
shimgilinna at that day. After the conciliation was interrupted this time, the two
men started to seek to physically attack each other. On one day when Tadesse was
coming home from town late in the evening, Gezmu and some friends waited for
him and beat him up. Taddesse, who was severely injured by the attack, could not
take any legal action since he did not have witnesses. Instead, he took revenge by
beating Gezmu almost to death. Again there were no witnesses to this. The situa-
tion escalated into a group dispute when each of themmobilized more and more
supporters. The matter ended only in July 2017 when the shimagillés intervened
for a third time. Then, Taddesse paid Gezmu 800 Birr for the damages on the field
and loss of crops, and both men forgave each other for the beating (summary of
an interview July 2017).
So, we see that manipulation of consent can lead to secondary conflict and some-
times to verbal and/or physical confrontation when one of the parties feels ma-
nipulated, betrayed, or unfairly treated by the other. Such conflicts can arise at the
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individual level or between groups. Some people also resort to sorcery to take re-
venge when they feel unfairly treated.11
Loss of the culture of respect for shimgilinna
Elders and judges also outlined their view that the lack of restrictions on consent in
forum shopping has caused or exacerbated the loss of the conflict resolution culture
among the youth and the community at large in Ankober. The elders characterize
such changes as a ‘dilution of culture’ (yebahil meberez). The following section out-
lines the loss of the culture of respect toward shimgilinna and shimagillés in conflict
resolution.
The youth
The youth’s12 loyalty to shimgilinna decreased as a result of the latter’s attempts
to resolve conflicts over resources, particularly land. The youth strive for access to
land by every possible means.However, what used to work inmore stable, peaceful,
earlier times, many stated, no longer works. Elders also complained that the youth
act selfishly in land disputes: they do not respect their parents and do not respect
each other with other family members. A priest who is also a shimagillé told me:
‘Nowadays, it is common to observe family members fighting with each other. We
have even seen a youth who killed his father over a land dispute.’ Other researchers
(e.g. Balew 2016) have also shown that land is the leading cause of dispute among
the Amhara today.
Many elders complained that the problem with the youth goes beyond the ma-
nipulation of consent in resource disputes, claiming that they are abandoning their
culture.The change is so strong that families are not able to influence the youth any-
more. Informants expressed their discontent with the modern education system,
which does not teach children enough about respecting their own culture, includ-
ing shimgilinna. Instead, students have an incomplete notion that being modern
means disrespecting their own culture. The community is also critical of the influ-
ence of mass and social media. Elders also criticized modern law since it allows the
youth to leave shimgilinna any time, thus rendering the elders powerless.
11 One informant told me how, after he had moved his own case between the court and the
shimagillés andfinally got a favourable decision from the court, his adversary threatened him.
Oneday he foundbloodhadbeen sprinkled over his cattle in the night.Hewas convinced that
this was thework of the adversary who intended to kill his cattle ormake themunproductive.
He removed the alleged spell by sprinkling holy water over the animals.
12 The definition of ‘young’ and ‘youth’ differs based on who defines it. The Federal Ministry of
Youth, Sport and Culture, 2004, used the term ‘youth’ for individuals between 15 and 29 years
of age. The view of Ankober people suggests youth can also refer to a particular mind-set of
being educated and having a different style of hairdo, dressing and the like.
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Exploitation of the right to consent by other community members
Unreasonable exploitation of chances by giving and withdrawing consent can also
be observed among other age groups. According to judges in Ankober Woreda
Court, disputes often arise and are filed with the court over the dissolution of mar-
riage, inheritance, and breaches of fraudulent contracts. Disputants in these mat-
ters enter a win–lose suit by using the freedom of consent to move cases between
the two legal forums.
Corruption among elders
Some elders and members of the community complained about the shimagillés
themselves. One elder with experience in shimgilinna since the regime of Haile Se-
lassie I (r. 1931−1974) said that, in the past, there were many trustworthy shimagillés
in every village who worked for free. Nowadays, he complained, the spirit of eco-
nomic benefit is influencing shimagillés: less and less of them are willing to serve
for free.There are even several rumours about shimagillés being bribed to influence
the process or outcome of shimgilinna in favour of one of the parties. Corruption
and nepotism are increasingly interfering with the fairness of shimagillés, and it
is reported that unrestricted use of consent provides one loophole through which
they can operate.
Loyalty towards elders in urban and rural communities
Disadvantage to women
Interviews with judges and shimagillés suggested that loyalty to shimgilinna varies
between urban and rural communities. Rural people seem more likely to be loyal to
shimgilinna, while urban and more educated disputants often give more value to
economic rather than cultural issues. In Ankober Woreda, there are twenty-two
rural kebeles, while Gorebella and Ankober are labelled as towns. People’s loyalty
to shimgilinna seems to increase the further away from the towns they live. Access
to the Woreda Court also determines parties’ loyalty to shimgilinna. As an elder
informant who lives in a remote village said: ‘The Woreda Court is very far from
our village and shimgilinna is still our security.’ Rural communities’ preference for
traditional institutions and urban communities’ preference for the court is docu-
mented in several case studies though at various levels of emphasis (see for exam-
ple, Meron 2010, Demissie 2005, Fekade et al. 2011, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008,
and Tarekegn and Hannah 2008).
The disadvantage of women in shimgilinna has also been documented in many
studies. The studies show that women are not allowed to be shimagillés, and that
the decisions of shimagillés are more favourable to men (see for example Mekuanint
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2015, Tarekegn and Hannah 2008).13 What has not been discussed, however, is the
role played by the right to give andwithdraw consent on the ability to exert pressure
on women and other weak members of the society. Interviews with the head of the
Women’s Office in Ankober and the heads of other women’s associations in the area
showed that, although women today are asserting their legal rights increasingly,
they are still less influential than men. When men want to present a case to the
shimagillés, they often force women to accept and give their consent to resolve the
issue through customary law. In this way, there is an unfair treatment of cases,
for example, between divorcees. The head of Ankober Woreda Women’s Federation
expressed her feeling that the government’s enacted laws on equality for women
have still not been fully implemented. According to her, ‘You can discover many
horrible things made to women in villages as the result of them being exploited in
the name of consent!’
Changes in shimgilinna
The abuse of consent in shimgilinna has evoked changes in certain dimensions of
the institution itself. Shimagillés have begun to follow traditional procedure a bit
differently and some normative aspects of the process have become less accepted.
Inwhat follows, I will discuss selective acceptance of cases by shimagillés, changes in
the mode of hearing parties during conflict resolution, and the role of guarantors,
witnesses and coercive mechanisms in conflict resolution.
Selective acceptance of cases by shimagillés
When the parties in a dispute decide to resolve it through shimgilinna, theymust, in
the first place, choose shimagillés on whom they both agree. Some shimagillés have
a better reputation in the community than others and thus receive more requests
to sit for shimgilinna. However, they do not accept all invitations. They first collect
information about any disputes they are requested to resolve, about the parties
involved, and about their co-shimagillés. If they believe that there are bad motives
behind the shimgilinna, they may reject the offer.
One shimagillé I interviewed in August 2017 claimed that, on average, he re-
ceived five offers per month. Of these, he rejected about two per month on the
basis that he suspected dishonest motives or felt that either or both parties would
give up the arbitration at some stage if they feared an unwanted outcome. When
he believed his efforts would be fruitful, he would follow the disputants into the
court and suggest the latter send the case to shimgilinna, where he would serve as a
shimagillé. Conflicting parties rejected by him either approached other shimagillés
13 Many case studies in the edited volume by Tarekegn and Hannah (2008) identified that
women’s participation in the CDRMs of different ethnic groups is not active.
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or went to the court. As he stated, the selective acceptance of cases by elders is
becoming common due to an increased risk of manipulation of consent.
Hearing parties separately
There are two procedures for hearing disputants’ statements in shimgilinna: face to
face and separately. In a face-to-face hearing, the oratorical and persuasive skills
of the plaintiffs and respondents play a major role. The main characteristic of this
procedure is its adversarial nature, so the ability to succeed depends on the abil-
ity to persuade the shimagillés. However, cautious shimagillés no longer follow, or
follow carefully, this procedure since it may allow one disputant to make another
expose evidence that may later be used in court. Hearing disputants separately is
becoming more common, and the alleged wrongdoer is kept away until the victim’s
statements have been heard. The shimagillésweigh the two parties’ statements and
identify the relevant points, based on which they can resolve the dispute.
Another significant change is that the role of oral witnesses in shimgilinna is be-
coming unimportant. In the past, shimagillés required both parties to bring individ-
uals who would testify in a case. However, the credibility of witnesses is declining
nowadays. As one shimagillé said: ‘Today, false witnesses are ruining the country.’
Judges in Ankober Woreda Court also complained that it is a growing problem.
Lack or unimportance of guarantors
One stage of shimgilinna is when disputants choose yezemed dagna (lit. ‘judge of the
relatives’), who serves as a chairperson of the conflict resolution process. Though
the name seems to imply this, a yezemed dagna need not be a blood relative of any
of the parties or other shimagillés. The title has to be understood as a metaphor,
referring to the hopefully positive outcome of the arbitration, which ideally trans-
forms the hostile parties into relatives. A yezemed dagna is expected to be reputable,
impartial, and considered as trustworthy by the other shimagillés involved in the
case. If the parties do not reach a consensus with the yezemed dagna, the shimagillés
themselves can choose one from amongst themselves.
Traditionally, a yezemed dagna asked each party to name a guarantor of their
obedience to shimgilinna. But today, the shimgilinna functions only as long as the
consent of parties exists, thus, there is neither a need to name a guarantor nor to
penalize the parties if either breaches the agreed decision. People do not want to
act as guarantors anymore since the disputants can withdraw from shimgilinna.The
guarantors also know that they are responsible for ensuring payment of any fines
arising from the conciliation. One informant, who acted as a guarantor in 2015,
told me he was forced to buy five litres of local liquor (araqé) for the shimagillés
and pay 1,000 ETB to the disputant who had remained loyal to shimgilinna. Once a
guarantor enters an agreement, he explained, he remains bound by the obligation,
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while the original debtor can go free by invoking consent. He told me: ‘It was my
naivety to take the role as a guarantor. Now, people do not commit themselves to
this obligation.’
Social pressure and supernatural forces becoming less important
In the past, shimagillés could impose various social, moral or religious sanctions on
disputants and give weight to the conflict resolution through ritual ceremonies.
For example, after an elaborate conflict resolution process, one final ceremony tra-
ditionally involved stepping over guns. A gun or guns, preferably ones used in a
conflict, were placed on the ground and the disputants were made to jump over
themwhile making an oath to end the dispute.The disputants would say: ‘If I break
the oath, let the guns not miss their target on me. If one misses, let another not!’
Such oath-taking ceremonies were common in conflicts between the Amhara
and the Argobba/Afar,who follow different religions. If both disputants were Chris-
tians, a church ceremony was alternatively made. Disputants made an oath while
carrying a cross or opening a church door; to break the oath would be a sin and
meant being struck by an ailment calledmushro.This disease begins as a tiny wound
somewhere on the body, usually on a finger, and then expands rapidly to all parts
and eventually kills the person. According to one shimagillé: ‘This is the disease God
created for oath breakers.’
However, neither the gun nor the church ceremonies are nowadays as effective
as they used to be. One shimagillé explained: ‘Nowadays, the notion of sanctity is
decreasing; certain oaths said out loud during or at the end of a conflict resolu-
tion can be denied later when a disputant goes to court, rejecting progress made
through shimgilinna.’ Shimagillés cannot force parties to make an oath since they
can discontinue the settlement process at any time or simply ignore its result.
Conclusion
Since 1995, when the Federal Constitution and state constitutions have outlined
similar stipulations about consent as a pre-requisite for entering and staying in
CDRMs, shimgilinna has turned into a consensual transaction. Consent plays a key
role in a practical thinking of gain or loss that uses or abuses shimgilinna, impacting
the prompt dispensation of justice and changing the customary dispute resolution
culture of the people.This suggests the need for the regulative laws promised by the
federal and regional constitution. Several questions need to be answered, includ-
ing whether, once given, consent to dispute resolution through shimgilinna can be
withdrawn and, if yes, at what level of the conflict resolution spectrum.What kind
of test can we use to distinguish honest discontinuation of consent from dishonest?
Should determination of whether consent has been given be left to the shimgilinna
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itself, or should there be detailed legal provision? The application of consent in the
religious courts of Sharia could provide an example. Article 5(4) of ProclamationNo.
188/1999 on Federal Courts of Sharia states that ‘under no circumstance shall a case
brought before a court of Sharia the jurisdiction of which has been consented to, be
transferred to a regular court; nor shall a case before a regular court be transferred
to a court of Sharia’. Parties dissatisfied with a decision can appeal to the next level
of the Sharia Court, structured from lowest to highest: Federal First Instance Court
of Sharia, Federal High Court of Sharia, and Federal Supreme Court of Sharia (see
Article 3). The law also seems to create a hard line by which a party aggrieved by
the decision of a Sharia Court cannot appeal to regular courts. Whether or not the
Sharia courts can set a good example needs further investigation, but, one thing
that clearly emerges from the experiences of the community among the Ankober
Woreda is that there should be a law to reduce the negative effects associated with
the arbitrary giving and withdrawal of consent to shimgilinna and perhaps other
institutions in other parts of the country.
References
ALEMAYEHU Feyera, 2009The role of traditional conflict resolution methods in resolving
cross-border community conflicts: The case of Borena-Gebra and Garri across the Ethio-
Kenyan border. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
ASNAKE Menbere, 2010 Inter-group conflicts in the Awash valley of Ethiopia: The case of
Afar and Karrayu Oromo. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
ASSEFA Tolera, 1995 Ethnic integration and conflict: The case of indigenous Oromo and
Amhara settlers in Aaroo Addis Alem, Kiramo Area, North Eastern Wallaga. Addis
Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
ANRS 2001,The 2001 revised constitution of Amhara National Regional State. Bahir Dar:
ANRS
AYKE Asfaw and MEKONEN Feleke, 2008 “Customary dispute resolution in
SNNPR: The case of Sidama”, in: Alula Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa
(eds.), Grass-roots justice in Ethiopia. The contribution of customary dispute resolution,
201–215. Addis Ababa: CFEE
AWGCAO, 2016 Soreni: Ankober Woreda Government Communication Affairs Office Bul-
letin. Ankober: AWGCAO
BALEW Baye 2016 Traditional conflict resolution in Fogera Woreda: Documentation and
analysis of the discourse. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (PhD Thesis)
CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY (CSA), 2008 Summary and statistical report of the
2007 population and housing census. Addis Ababa: CSA
Use and abuse of ‘the right to consent’ 183
DEMISSIE Gudisa, 2005 Social network, conflict and indigenous conflict resolution mech-
anisms among the Debra Oromo of North Shewa. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa Univer-
sity (MA Thesis)
ESAYAS Awash, 2015 Indigenous conflict resolution institutions: A study among the Gofa
people of the Demba Gofa district, SNNPR. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University
(MA Thesis)
FEDERAL DEOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA (FDRE), 1996 Proclamation No.
25/1996, Federal Courts Proclamation 2nd Year No.13, FDRE: Federal Negarit Gazeta
1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: FDRE
FEKADE Azeze, ASSEFA Fiseha, and GEBRE Yntiso (eds.), 2011 Annotated bibliogra-
phy of studies on customary dispute settlement mechanisms in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa:
The Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Centre
IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA, 1960 Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia,
Proclamation No. 165/1960, Negarit Gazeta Extraordinary Issue, 1960-05-05,
Year 19, No. 2 (accessible online at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.
detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=52399)
MEKUANINT Tesfaw, 2015 “Ethiopian women: Agents and subjects in the Shimglna
(a customary conflict resolution institution): Amharas’ experience inMeket Dis-
trict, North Wollo Zone”, Sociology and Anthropology 3 (2):95−103
MELAKU Abate and WUBISCHET Shiferaw, 2008 “Customary dispute resolu-
tion in Amhara Region: The case of Wofa Legesse in North Shewa”, in: Alula
Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa (eds.) Grass-roots justice in Ethiopia: The contribu-
tion of customary dispute resolution, 107–21. Addis Ababa: CFEE
MERON Zeleke, 2010 “Ye shakoch chilot (the court of the sheikhs): A traditional
institution of conflict resolution in Oromiya Zone of Amhara Regional State,
Ethiopia”, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10 (1):63−84
PANKHURST, Alula and GETACHEWAssefa, 2008 “Understanding customary dis-
pute resolution in Ethiopia”, in: Alula Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa (eds.)
Grass-roots justice in Ethiopia: The contribution of customary dispute resolution, 1–76.
Addis Ababa: CFEE
SOLOMON Berhane, 2014 “Indigenous democracy: alternative conflict manage-
ment mechanisms among Tigray people: The experiences of Erob”, Community
Journal of Science & Development 2 (2):101−122
TASEW Tafese, 2016 “Conflict management through African indigenous insti-
tutions: A study of the Anyuaa community”, World Journal of Social Science 3
(1):22−32
TAREKEGN Adebo and HANNAH Tsadik, 2008Making peace in Ethiopia: Five cases of
traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution. Addis Ababa: Peace and Development
Committee
184 Desalegn Amsalu
TESFA Bihonegn, 2009 Ethnic conflict resolution by the Federal Government of Ethiopia:
A study of institutions and mechanisms. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA
Thesis)
TEMESGEN Thomas, 2010 The quest for common ethnic identify and self-governance in
southern regional state within the context of the Ethiopian federal system: The case of
the Gawada-Dhobase (Ale) ethnic group. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA
Thesis)
TEKLE Dideu, 2009 Inter-ethnic conflict management under the Ethiopian federal sys-
tem: A case study of the conflict between Sidama and Guji Oromo groups in Wondogenet
Woreda. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
TOLOSA Mamuye, 2010The role of women-based institution (siiqee) in conflict resolution:
The case of west Arsi Oromo. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
UTHMAN Hassen, 2008 “The role of abegar (divine father) in conflict resolution:
The case of north Wollo Zone”, in: Tarekegn Adebo and Hannah Tsadik (eds.)
Making peace in Ethiopia: Five cases of traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution,
78–100. Addis Ababa: Peace and Development Committee
WODISHAHabtie, 2010 ‘Neema’ – Traditional conflict resolutionmechanisms of the Boro-
Šinaŝha people, northwestern Ethiopia: Challenges and prospects. Addis Ababa: Addis
Ababa University (MA Thesis)
YOHANNIS Brhanu, 1998 Conflict and conflict resolution among the people of Chehara.
Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University (MA Thesis)
Procalamations
Proclamation No. 361/2003 (The Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter
Proclamation),
Directives of Operation of Committee of Peace,No. 001/2002,The Amhara National
Regional State Administration and Security Affairs Office, Bahir Dar, document
in Amharic.
Proclamation No. 188/1999 on Federal Courts of Sharia
III.
Emerging hybridity of legal institutions
and practices

9. Local strategies to maintain cultural integrity
The vernacularization of state law among the Bashada
and Hamar of southern Ethiopia
Susanne Epple
Introduction
The Bashada and Hamar people, like many of their ethnic neighbours in the south-
ern peripheries of the country, have continued to adhere to their customs, beliefs
and lifestyle, and have a reputation for being rather resistant to change and devel-
opment. Being agro-pastoralists, until recently they lived in relative isolation from
the centre. Although encounters between the agro-pastoralists of South Omo Zone
and the government occured also under earlier regimes, intensified and continuous
interaction began only in the mid 1990s, when large-scale investment and develop-
ment projects (such as the creation of sugarcane plantations and sugar factories,
and commercial farming) were implemented.1 Together with a modernized infras-
tructure (asphalt roads, mobile and internet networks, health centres, etc.), and
1 According to government documents, Ethiopia aims to become a middle-income country by
2025. It is focusing on ‘rapid, broad-based and inclusive economic growth with the aim of
eradicating poverty’ (FDRE 2015:2). This is to be achieved through the implementation of
four successive national development plans by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Devel-
opment (MoFED, renamed the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation in 2015). From
2002, the focus has been on the transformation and growth of the rural economy, and par-
ticularly the agricultural sector (FDRE 2002:iii); the development of the private sector and
commercialization of agriculture, industry and urban development (MoFED 2007:1); and the
improvement to both the quantity and quality of social services, especially education, health
and other infrastructural developments. These initiatives have led to several mega develop-
ment projects. In South Omo, these include the construction of the Gibe dams for hydro-
electric power, the construction of sugar and cotton plantations as well as sugar factories
(Yohannes forthcoming). The search for oil, which continued for several years, ultimately
without success (see http://www.oilnewskenya.com/africa-oil-relinquishes-ethiopias-south-
omo-block). In 2017, Jinka University was inaugurated, and there are plans to build a railway
linking Ethiopiawith Kenya in the near future. Throughout all these projects, the government
has aimed to improve the standard of living of the agro-pastoral communities by integrating
them into themainstream national economy. The relocation of Bodi andMursi communities
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an expansion of the educational system (construction of schools and educational
projects), there came also a stricter implementation and enforcement of state law.2
The government’s efforts to integrate the southern communities culturally, eco-
nomically and legally into the Ethiopian nation state have caused a wide range of
local reactions. Many of these have been interpreted as signs of the resistance of
local communities to development, modernity and cultural change. Little recog-
nition has been given to the efforts made by indigenous communities to adapt to
and make sense of the state law in ways that do not force them to completely aban-
don practices and values that lie at the hearts of their cultures. Many dynamics
have remained unnoticed and/or under-appreciated, both with regard to the local
communities who have to deal with the new realities on the ground, and also with
regard to lower-level government officials.
The reorganization of the Ethiopian state into an ethnic-based federal struc-
ture in 1995 came with greater representation of the local communities in local and
zonal administration, as well as in regional and national politics. Cultural diversity
and local practices were officially acknowledged in the new constitution of 1995, and
are celebrated during national, regional and local events. In the 1995 constitution,
Ethiopia explicitly granted every ethno-linguistic community ‘the right to express,
to develop and to promote its culture’ (Art 34:2), recognized customary laws and
allowed their application in civil and family cases (Art 34:5). However, this has been
accompanied by intensified state intrusion, even in the remotest areas, intensive
awareness-raising activities designed to inform the population about national law,
and stricter enforcement of the state law, with the aim of resolving all criminal
matters through state law and eliminating cultural practices that contradict hu-
man rights and gender equality. These moves are part of the more general aim of
promoting development and modernization, which are among the top priorities of
the country.
The implementation of national and international law is leading to conflict and
confrontation inmany places of theworld.Contradictions between local customs or
values and human rights are proving difficult to resolve.What is central to a group’s
identity may not be easily understood from the outside, or may be contradictory to
to small irrigation farms along the Omo River can be seen as part of these efforts (Abbink
2012, Turton 2011).
2 While the number of children attending school has increased in the last two decades, so far
only a few of them have completed higher education. The number of university or college
graduates from Hamar differs from kebele to kebele. The first Bashada student graduated
from university with a BA degree only in 2018. Generally speaking, the first generation of
Hamar graduates (together with graduates from Arbore and Kara with whom they share the
district) now dominates the district administration, while non-local officials are underrepre-
sented.
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the national law. Keeping the balance between integrating culturally diverse com-
munities into a nation state and allowing them to maintain their cultural integrity
is a major challenge. Today, it is internationally recognized that cultural values and
the ways of life of indigenous peoples deserve to be protected – not only for the
romantic reasons of preserving cultural diversity and cultural integrity, but out of
a necessity to ensure the wellbeing of individuals, the survival of communities and,
to some extent, even as a precondition for participation in other cultural contexts
and change (Gilbert 2009, Tierney 1999). Hence, the protection of cultural rights
has been included in the list of human rights, and has entered national constitu-
tions in one way or the other. However, the protection of cultural rights is limited
by the protection of the individual given by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), which has likewise entered into many constitutions.
This paper shows that people’s efforts to maintain control over their values,
beliefs and cultural practices are reflected in many adaptive strategies. To enable
their cultures to survive through slow and partial adaptation, people reinterpret
and use state institutions as they deem necessary and as suits them and their lo-
cal context. Strategies to maintain group identity and integrity range from silent
avoidance and circumvention of state institutions, to creative ways of adapting to
or customizing state law, to open rejection and violent resistance. All are based on
a fundamental wish to stay in control and maintain cultural integrity.
Cultural integrity and the vernacularization of law
Cultural integrity or control over culture
has become one of the key claims of
indigenous peoples in their international
efforts to gain recognition and accommo-
dation of their interests in legal systems
that have, in the past, ignored or excluded
those interests.
(Weatherall 2001:240)
As Karl-Heinz Kohl (this volume) notes, indigenous groups (especially in former
colonies) are still suffering from disregard and neglect. And, on the African con-
tinent, smaller groups are particularly under threat. Many scholars working on
the education of minorities (Tierney 1999, Deyhle 1995), rights over intellectual
(Weatherall 2001) or common property (Amos 2004), cultural self-determination
and land rights (Gilbert 2009) have emphasized that there is a need to protect mi-
norities’ right to determine their own way of life. Maintaining their cultural in-
tegrity, so the argument goes, not only helps ensure the survival of minorities as
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cultural groups, and the well-being of individual members, but also their success-
ful participation in other cultural contexts.3 In the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the need for cultural integrity is also
emphasized:4
States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of and redress for a) any
action, which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities (Art. 8:2a)
The protection of cultural integrity does not mean ‘freezing’ a culture to protect a
kind of ‘historical authenticity of certain cultural practices’. Rather it refers to the
safeguarding of the ‘distinct existence of a multi-dimensional culture’ that is ‘dy-
namic by nature and undergoing self-determined changes’ (Weatherall 2001:225).
This, as Gilbert (2009:13) has expressed, should lead to the formulation of a ‘right
to cultural integrity’, which he defines as a right ‘to subsistence, livelihood, cul-
tural diversity and heritage’, or, as Weatherall (2001:ibid.) puts it, the ‘continued
distinct existence of that culture without unwanted interference’. In short, in pro-
tecting cultural integrity, the emphasis is on the right of people to make decisions
for themselves. This could involve the rejection, but also the (partial) acceptance of
new values and practices, which are accommodated in the local context through a
process of appropriation.
Cultural appropriation5 is most often understood as a dominant group taking
something from a subordinate group. Yet, appropriation also occurs in the opposite
direction, for example, when less powerful groups adopt certain ideas or practices
from a dominant group, and reinterpret and use them to their own advantage.
Cultural appropriation means adopting a cultural product in terms of local mean-
ings and practices. In its broadest sense the term means taking an existing cul-
3 Tierney (1999), for example, argues that enabling students of colour in the US to maintain
their cultural integrity in college (as opposed to ‘committing cultural suicide’) will enable
them not only to develop a sense of self and achieve an ‘embodied and objectified capital’
(Tierney 1999:89), but also to act as social agents and produce the conditions for change and
improvements in opportunity (ibid.:85).
4 The Declaration was signed in September 2007 by 143 members of the UN General Assem-
bly. Fourteen member states, including Nigeria and Kenya, abstained, and four (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) voted against. Thirty-four countries did not
participate in the vote at all. Out of these, fifteen were African states, including Ethiopia (see
Kohl, this volume).
5 While the concept of cultural appropriation was originally developed in the field of intellec-
tual property to refer to processes by which dominant groups take, and often profit from,
the artistic, musical, and knowledge productions of subordinate groups, it actually encom-
passes a very broad and pervasive phenomenon, as cultural influences blend and merge in
constantly layered ways.
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tural form from one social group and replaying it in another with different mean-
ings or practices: perhaps taking the tune and playing it in a different key or at a
different tempo so that it becomes something different, yet still the same (Merry
1998:585).
In the widest sense, this is what happened during the colonial period. As is known
from various publications, the various norms and conflict resolution mechanisms
and institutions on the African continent were greatly influenced by imported law
and the colonial situation. So, what is today called ‘customary law’ is not the same
as the law in use in precolonial times (Snyder 1981, Gordon andMeggitt 1985,Moore
1986).This change to local legal systems occurred not only by force and imposition,
but also through the creative responses of local communities that had to adapt to
the unavoidable. As such, it was to a limited extent led by the African people, who
sought to secure their own interests and agency (Chanock 1985).
This process has continued, albeit in a different form. Today, the transnational
flow of law is exerting a similar pressure to that of colonial law in its time on devel-
oping countries and local communities striving to keep pace with the international
discourse of democracy and development (Merry 2003). In their study on the trans-
lation of global ideas about women’s rights into local contexts, Levitt and Merry
(2009) have shown how ordinary women in different cultural contexts understand
and made sense of them. The vernacularization of the notions of women’s rights,
the authors argue, led to diverse social responses in the respective communities
because, while some of the original formulations of women’s rights were kept, lo-
cal ideological and social attributes were also added. The local women were acting
as bricoleurs (Levitt and Merry 2009:446), e.g. as creators of something new out of
bits and pieces of what was available. This scrutinization and re-interpretation of
external values and laws in their own logic allows local actors to create a sense of
ownership over newly created ‘custom(ary law)’ (Scheele 2009, see also Beyer 2015
and her detailed study on elders’ courts in Kyrgyzstan).
Besides creating a feeling of ownership, accepting and adapting state law into
their own system can also be a way by which communities can present themselves
to the outside world as ‘modern’. As Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1989), for exam-
ple, has reported, theMinankabau developed a legalistic version of their customary
adat system, which they present and refer to when they communicate with state
bureaucrats. By claiming that certain practices (such as land ownership or transfer)
violated one of their customary laws, they could defend their interests against the
dominant state in a convincing way. Had they simply claimed that land ownership
did not exist or was disliked among the Minankabau, they would have appeared as
backward and uncivilized.
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Co-existence of state and local institutions in Bashada and Hamar
The Hamar people are one of the sixteen registered ethnic groups in South Omo
Zone. The Bashada people are officially considered as a subsection of the Hamar,
though they claim to have a slightly different history and identity.6
Most Bashada and Hamar local institutions continue to function today. Like
many of their ethnic neighbours, the Bashada and Hamar do not have any political
leaders or chiefs. Instead, they have ritual authorities who are responsible for the
wellbeing of the people, land and animals. The most powerful ritual functionaries
are the bitta (a ritual leader who blesses the community, animals and land) and the
parko (a ritual expert who blesses the people, cattle and bees).7Though traditionally
not endowed with political power, some of these ritual experts assumed a double
role by adopting additional functions from the government, in the past,8 and,more
recently, by engaging with state politics (see below).
Public decisions are made through consensus by the zarsi, ‘the community of
competent adult men’ (Strecker 1976).9 Depending on the issue to be discussed or
decided,10 the zarsi’s gatherings range from small meetings (assaua) of the men of
6 Hamar Woreda (district) is one of nine districts in South Omo Zone, which is located in the
very south of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR). Three offi-
cially recognized ethnic groups share the thirty-eight kebeles of the district. These include
the Hamar people – the largest in number – who have twenty-eight kebeles, the Arbore peo-
ple who have four, and the Kara people who have three. The Bashada people have their own
kebele in Hamar Woreda. Each of the three small towns in the district (Turmi and Dimeka in
Hamar, and Tabia in Arbore) constitutes also its own kebele. In the 2007 report of the Central
Statistical Agency (CSA) the total population in Hamar district was estimated to be 59,572
(CSA 2008:8). Out of this the Hamar number 46,129, the Kara 1,368, and the Arbore 5,926
(CSA 2008:135).
7 There are two bittas in Hamar, and one in Bashada; each has their own territory. There is a
parko in Bashada, but there has not been one in office in Hamar for some time. Other ritual
offices include the gudili (blesses the fields, earth priest), and the k’ogo (ritual fire maker,
blesses the cattle). Seasonally, these ritual experts perform their rituals and bless the people,
their animals and fields and protect them against disease and misfortune. In return, they
receive gifts or communal work services (see Epple 2010).
8 Nakwa Dal’o, for example, was known not only to be a powerful ritual expert (Bashada parko)
and diviner (moara), but also acted as a spokesman (likamamber, ayo) between the local pop-
ulation and the government.
9 In its widest sense, the term zarsi refers to all inhabitants, i.e. all men, women and children,
of a neighbourhood, a settlement area, a territorial segment, or the whole population of
Bashada, depending on the context in which it is used. Literally, zarsi is a patch of grass that
has interconnected roots, just as the people of the community should ideally be connected
with each other.
10 As the zarsi do not consist of a fixed group of elders, but is composed depending on the scope
and kind of conflict (involving families, neighbours, a whole settlement area or the whole
kebele), the term should not be translated as ‘customary court’.
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one neighbourhood, during which smaller conflicts are resolved or decisions con-
cerning the settlement area are made, to large public meetings (osh), during which
major conflicts are addressed or issues concerning the wider community decided.
As the zarsi have the power to curse, bless, exclude and rehabilitate any members of
the society, they are the most powerful institution of social control at the commu-
nal level. Seniority is important within the zarsi. It is expressed in the sitting order
during meetings, coffee sessions in the house, and public dances. The most senior
men have the right to bless and speak first at public meetings, and deserve the
highest respect., Seniormen are responsible for advising and guiding their juniors,
have the right to give juniors orders and be served by them during meetings and
festivities11, and sanction wrongdoers and criminals. Age-mates also play a signifi-
cant role in controlling and sanctioning men’s behaviour: wrongdoers are advised,
scolded and sanctioned by members of the same age-set or those of the age-set di-
rectly senior to them (see Epple 2010, 2014). Women do not attend the men’s public
meetings. However, as the men usually discuss things at length while sharing food
and coffee at various houses before and after such meetings, women are usually
well informed about what is going on in the community. Conflicts among women
are often resolved by women, who constitute their own women’s zarsi (ma-zarsi).
Certain conflicts between men and women are also addressed by the ma-zarsi.12
Delinquents, both male and female, are locally called d’abbi, a term used for a
wrongdoer whose relationship to the community has been disturbed. As a d’abbi,
one is expected to submit to the zarsi’s judgement and decisions. Depending on
the case, sanctions range from giving advice and scolding to public whipping and
demanding a goat, cow or beer as redress. Individuals who do not submit to the
zarsi can be excluded from community activities or even cursed. To be re-included
or healed from a curse, d’abbi have to approach the zarsi through a go-between
(motal), ask for forgiveness, express the willingness to accept any fine imposed, and
convincingly promise to improve in the future. The overall aim of sanctions is to
‘guide and bless’ the wrongdoer, that is, to bring him or her to the right behaviour
and to re-establish social peace and understanding between conflicting parties (see
Epple 2014). Therefore, any sanctioning usually ends with a blessing and the re-
inclusion of the wrongdoer into the society.
11 In Bashada, the senior–junior relationships as well as those among age-mates are structured
more formally than in Hamar: while in Hamar age-sets are said to have been given up awhile
ago, they continue to exist in Bashada (see Epple 2010).
12 This is the case, for example, when a woman has been insulted or treated disrespectfully
by a man. In such a case, the ma-zarsi, i.e. the women of the neighborhood, may refuse to
participate in rites of passage and thereby block the ritual’s continuation until thewrongdoer
has asked for forgiveness and given them compensation (see Epple 2010:51–52, 2018).
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State institutions in Bashada and Hamar
The south of Ethiopia was included into the Ethiopian Empire at the end of the
nineteenth century under Emperor Menelik II, and the people living there have
been administered and dominated by the highland Ethiopian centre since then.
It was only with the downfall of the socialist Derg regime in 1991, that the people
were given the right to self-administration. Under previous regimes, both admin-
istrative personnel and legal practitioners belonged to ethnic groups from highland
Ethiopia, and were either sent from the centre to the regions or were descendants
of earlier migrants to the area.13 Over the last decades, people from local commu-
nities have increasingly replaced these highland officials, and since the end of the
Derg regime (1974–1991), all Hamar district administrators have been from Hamar,
Banna, Bashada or Kara.14 Because many more locals have undergone formal edu-
cation with the intent of achieving ethnic self-administration since the introduc-
tion of ‘ethnic federalism’ in 1995, today most heads of the district sub-offices and
the police, many of the legal practitioners at the woreda court and some of the staff
at the police office are from Hamar, Bashada, Arbore or Kara.
Today, the small town of Dimeka is the administrative capital of Hamar
Woreda, and the seat of the district administration and of various government
offices, including the Justice Office, the Women and Children’s Affairs Office, the
Culture and Tourism Office, the Education Office, the Health Office and others.
The district court is also located in Dimeka. In 2017, it had three judges and two
prosecutors. The court handles civil and family cases as well as minor criminal
cases, while major criminal cases, and all cases of homicide are sent to the zonal
court at Jinka, the capital of South Omo Zone. The head office of the district
police is also in Dimeka. It has three sub offices in Turmi/Hamar, Dus/Kara, and
Tabia/Arbore. Minor conflict cases are sometimes handled in the police office, and
sometimes sent back from there to be resolved at the village level.
Alongside the government institutions, Dimeka is home to the offices of several
international NGOs.15 These NGOs cooperate with the government in certain areas
of legal concern (such as women and children’s rights), in the improvement of social
services such as education, health, food aid, and in various development activities.
13 There were mostly descended from neftenya (lit.: ‘gunmen’, Amharic), i.e. soldier-settlers as-
signed by Emperor Menelik II to administer the regions in southern Ethiopia after his armies
had conquered them at the end of the nineteenth century. They were rewarded with le-
gal rights to exploit the indigenous population inhabiting large parcels of land (Schaefer
2012:193–194).
14 Among the three administrators of what was by then called Hamar Awraja (province), there
were two from the south of the country: one fromBanna (son of a bitta, educated under Haile
Selassie) and one from Basketto.
15 For example AMREF and Save the Children.
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Customization of government institutions
TheHamar andBashada people’s customary institutions now co-exist with the state
institutions, and the local understanding of state law is influenced by the local peo-
ple’s own values and practices. In the following, examples are given of how the com-
munity reinterprets andmakes use of state law, and how state law is to some extent
customized to the local needs and rationalities, customary structures, institutions,
concepts and values.
Customization of government offices
Each kebele16 has its own spokesman, locally called ayo. Officially, these representa-
tives are called likamenber (Amharic: ‘leader’), the local people pronounce it as lika-
mamber. An ayo represents the interests of his locality during local public meetings
and meetings with the government.17
In his own kebele, the ayo works with a group of assistants (the kebele speaker,
his secretary, a seraskaj/manager),18 several committees (such as the health com-
mittee, the education committee, and the development committee). In addition,
the ayo keeps communication between the government and the local population
alive. He informs and calls elders to meetings organized by the government, both
in town and in the villages, attends government meetings at the zonal or some-
times regional level, and reports back to his people on what the government has to
say. In cases of interethnic conflict, the ayos are also invited to act as a mediator
during peace meetings organized by the government.19
Together with a groups of local men selected as militias, the ayos are also re-
sponsible for security and the application of state law in the communities: they
must report on crimes and hand over wrongdoers to the police, and follow up cases
16 Smallest administrative unit.
17 Strecker (1976:60) translated the term the ayo as ‘in the widest sense a kind of leader, but
more specifically he is a spokesman’. The term ayo derives from the verb aya, ‘to do’, and the
social symbol of an ‘ayo’ in Hamar is his spear ‘ which signifies the right and duty to speak at
a public meeting’ (ibid.).
18 Most ayos are not formally educated and they therefore need educated assistants to help
with formal communication with the government, as, for example, when letters have to be
written or documents signed.
19 The members of these committees are respected (usually non-educated) individuals from
the community who aremade responsible for certain aspects of community life. Members of
the education committee, for example, are there to motivate parents to send their children
to school, to communicate with the teachers when there are problems, and to report to the
government. Theheath committee is there to followuppregnancies and call the ambulance if
necessary, to spread information on hygiene andmodern health care, and to convince people
to participate in vaccination campaigns or meetings on HIV prevention.
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that the court or police have sent back to the villages to be resolved through cus-
tomary mechanisms. Despite his close connection with government officials and
his respected position within the community, the ayo cannot make any decisions
without the consent of the community.
The ayo is chosen by the community on the basis of his reputation, but is of-
ficially appointed by the government. Although the likamamber is a government
office, his appointment has been customized to local beliefs, and the community
thereby has control over it: On the day of his appointment, he is given certain in-
signia, including a jacket, a spear and a cap, together with blessings by the out-
going office holder. The likamamber’s cap has been an important item since Haile
Selassie’s reign, when the first likamambers were installed and received jackets and
caps from government officials.20 Originally simply a sign of recognition, the caps
were locally bestowed with magic and only likamamberswere allowed to wear them.
Even today, a likamamber’s cap (together with a spear and a whipping wand)21 can
only be formally handed over to a successor on the likamamber’s death or voluntary
resignation, as it is believed that a likamamber is protected by his cap’s magic. Peo-
ple claim that if taken without the consent of the previous owner, the cap would
kill the new spokesman. Many of the government officials in Hamar Woreda are
originally from Hamar or Bashada. They know about the strong belief in the cap’s
magic (and some of them share the belief), and they know that they cannot im-
pose an unacceptable person on the community. As the former representative of
the Hamar in the Ethiopian national parliament explained,
It is like a monarchy (…). Someone might say, ‘I will be an ayo! I want to have the
cap!’ But if the cap is given to him against the acting ayo’s will, that person will
die! (…) Therefore, even if a new likamamber is appointed by the government,
that person will not accept if the acting likamamber does not want to hand over
the office to him. (Interview, 10 November 2016)
Similarly, candidates for the militia are recruited by the community on the basis
of their reputation for trustworthiness and self-control. As for the office of the
ayo, militiamen do not need to be formally educated. They are officially appointed
during a public meeting, and given a uniform and a gun by the government as a
sign of their position. The elders and the ayo bless them and thereby confirm their
acceptance. If the elders and ayo reject a candidate, they withhold their blessing.
20 While the office of the likamamber was officially abandoned under the Derg regime
(1974–1991), it continued to be active in Hamar Woreda. Under the Derg regime, the lika-
mambers were also given pants, jackets and other clothes, so that wearing a cap has lost its
symbolic weight and nowadays anyone can wear one. The belief in the cap’s magic, however,
has persisted until today.
21 Local insignia used for blessing and cursing during public meetings.
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Both, the likamamber and the militia are government offices that have been
to some extent customized to the local context. Just as the magic of the ayo’s caps
ensures that the local population retains ultimate control over who represents them
before the government, the elders’ blessing represents control over who can join
the militia. Government officials have to respect the choices and the ritualization
of these offices if they want to secure the cooperation of the local communities.
Prison and imprisonment re-interpreted
Conflict resolution in Bashada and Hamar, as indicated above, focuses on the
restoration of social relations rather than on punishment. The common sanctions
of scolding, whipping, fines, exclusion or cursing by age-mates and/or zarsi are
meant to intimidate wrongdoers and are, along with the giving of advice, con-
sidered as elements of a learning process that will keep individuals ‘on the right
and straight track’.22 Once a wrongdoer shows repentance, he is blessed by the
elders or his age-mates and thereby fully rehabilitated and re-included into the
community.
The state’s imprisonment of wrongdoers emphasizes retribution and is, as
such, alien to the local customs. People refer to prison as daxe (lit.: ‘a place to tie
up’). Until recently, to many in Bashada and Hamar, prison was a much-feared
place, and the government an uncontrollable external power. Officials belonged to
different ethnic groups and looked down upon the local communities, and many
people in Bashada recall how, under previous regimes, prisoners were beaten up
and sent to far-away places, where relatives could never visit and prisoners were
not sure if and when they would return home. 23
This situation has changed, as has the image of prison and imprisonment.
Nowadays, most criminals are taken to Jinka prison (about 100 km north of
Dimeka), which has become easy to reach with public transport in the last 10–15
years. Living conditions are much better than in the past and relatives can come
to visit.
Although local communities still hide certain criminal cases from the police
(see below), the pressure from government institutions to handle criminal cases in
state courts has made prison to some extent inevitable. The Bashada and Hamar
community has made efforts to reinterpret and customize the idea of prison and
imprisonment so that it does not contradict and disturb local handling of conflicts,
and in certain contexts even complements it.This has led to situation where, on the
22 See Epple 2012b on the meaning of whipping as ‘guidance and blessing’.
23 People were sent to prison in Arbaminch (about 300 km from Hamar) and further away, and
public transport was not available.
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one hand, prison is talked about as something positive, as a place to learn and ma-
ture, and on the other hand it is used as a last resort, a place where uncontrollable
individuals that the community does not want to deal with are sent.
Prison as a place of learning and maturing
The image of prison as an institution of timirte (Amharic: ‘learning/education’)
emerged in the last couple of decades under the influence of the rhetoric used
by the courts during awareness-raising campaigns on modern state law and
sanctioning. However, it does relate to some practical realities and also to local
ideas about sanctioning of wrongdoers.
First, Jinka prison has educational facilities where many prisoners attend
school. Almost all learn to speak Amharic, read and write during their time in
prison, and some receive vocational training in handcrafts or even attend the
Jinka Industrial College.24 For this reason, many people in Hamar joke that going
to Jinka prison is comparable to securing a scholarship. Second, with regard to
prison being a place where people mature, being imprisoned is intimidating and
scary, and imprisonment leaves an imprint on those who are away from home
for a long time. That means that the expectation is that many become better
people after their return. Unlike in many western societies, there is no permanent
stigma attached to a wrongdoer once he has admitted his mistake, accepted
the sanction and ritually been re-included into society: any wrongdoing (even
homicide) is forgiven and forgotten, at least socially if not emotionally, with the
blessing given at the end of a reconciliation ritual. People who show remorse serve
as living examples to the community. Thus, people returning from prison are also
often fully integrated into society and live respected lives. However, there is an
expectation that returnees will talk about their experiences in prison as a way to
help keep others from making similar mistakes. Individuals who do so are locally
appreciated, while those who return and play down the suffering they experience
in prison are considered arrogant and those who do wrong repeatedly and never
improve are despised.
24 Jinka prison was founded in 1950 (Ethiopian Calendar). In 2016, it had 1,721 prisoners, most of
whomweremen (only 82werewomen). Among the prison facilities are a kindergarten for the
children anda school that runs from1st to 10th grade. As theheadof theprison toldme, almost
all prisoners join the adult schooling programme. Some of the 10th grade graduates attend a
college in Jinka. Others are interested in the woodwork and basketry workshops, which are
part of the prisoners’ cooperative. The cooperative also runs a shop and a cafeteria in the
prison. With the income, the cooperative has recently purchased three vehicles (one four-
wheel drive, one minibus, one large bus), which are used to take prisoners to court, college
or the hospital (from fieldnotes after visiting Jinka prison, 14 November 2016). A new prison,
which was under construction in 2016, has recently opened a few kilometres outside of Jinka.
It occupies a large space and several modern buildings.
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Prison as a last resort for obstinate wrongdoers
Many informants in Bashada andHamar seemed to resent the fact that some young
people are becoming disrespectful when it comes to listening to the elders. While
this seems a common complaint among the senior generation worldwide, the pro-
hibition of certain cultural practices in Ethiopia is believed to have contributed
to the phenomenon. The traditional, rather authoritative socialization, which in-
cluded physical punishment of children, assured a general respect towards senior
people and their orders among them, but recent awareness-raising programmes
have meant that whipping within the family has decreased, and whipping as a
means of sanctioning wrongdoers has become less common. Many thus complain
that the zarsi’s authority has also been diminished, and that local mechanisms for
controlling the youth and sanctioning wrongdoers sustainably have become inef-
fective. Consequently, sending wrongdoers to prison as a last resort has become
acceptable,25 as Shada, a young educated man from Bashada, explained:
Nowadays, when the zarsi has exhausted its entire means [to deal with a wrong-
doer], they call the police. (…) Maybe first the elders thought they could man-
age him, but if someone never stops and never listens to them, he is given to
the police. They say, ‘Let him get their kind of timirte (education) and see!’ (21st
September 2016)
A wrongdoer’s refusal to give in to the zarsi is seen as a threat to the whole commu-
nity, because it might lead to dangerous and harmful behaviour and community
disruption. Imprisonment is therefore sometimes used as an additional threat or
a way to get rid of an unrepentant individual.
While communities generally still prefer to handle conflicts locally, in urban
contexts it has become more common to involve the police. On market days in
town, the consumption of alcohol often leads to quarrels and physical encounters.
While friends and age-mates prevent conflicts from escalating in the face-to-face
context of rural life, in the towns, insults are easily taken seriously and end up in
fights when people who do not know each other drink together. In the countryside,
the re-establishment of friendship among age-mates after such quarrels is very
important; in town, it has become important to provide financial recompense for
damaged property or injuries incurred, and re-establishing a good relationship is
not a priority.
25 I heard this complaint not only in Bashada and Hamar, but also by elders from other ethnic
groups during a conference at the South Omo Research Center in 2017. During this confer-
ence, elder from almost all groups in South Omo participated. In discussions with govern-
ment officials, the elders from the lowland pastoralist groups, especially, from Nyangatom,
Arbore, Dassanech, Kara, Hamar and Bashada blamed the prohibition of whipping delin-
quents for the many wrongdoing of young men in the area.
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Strategic interaction with state institutions
The Bashada and Hamar have developed certain strategies for dealing with govern-
ment institutions and representatives. These strategic interactions include ‘shop-
ping’ among state legal forums, limiting and controlling individuals’ access to state
institutions, delaying the apprehension of delinquents, negotiating and bargain-
ing with officials, avoidance and hiding, pretending cooperation, and other more
open forms of resistance. These strategies should not automatically be considered
as opposition, but rather as variations of efforts to stay in control.
‘Forum shopping’ at government institutions
As elaborated above, the police and the courts are sometimes addressed in cases
where local institutions have failed to sustainably improve a wrongdoer’s be-
haviour. They are also increasingly being used to obtain financial compensation in
cases of physical injury, especially in cases involving incidents in town. These are
the locally acceptable contexts for making use of state law. For most other cases,
it is preferred that they are handled locally or, at least, that the zarsi discuss such
cases before handing them over to the police through the militia and ayo. The
local communities strongly disapprove of, and will sanction, direct access to state
institutions.
Limiting direct access to police and state court
While in principle everyone can choose which of the available legal forums they
want to handle a case – the police, state court, government office or local system
– in practice individuals are not that free to make the choice. Locally, it is con-
sidered inappropriate and disloyal to take a case outside the community, and it
is expected that any issue should be taken to the zarsi first and then, if need be,
through the militia or the likamamber to a government institution. Anyone who ad-
dresses the police or court directly risks being locally sanctioned and fined by the
elders.Women who directly report abuse or mistreatment by their husbands to the
police are commonly sanctioned by the other women in the neighbourhood.
A former court officer in Dimeka Woreda court confirmed that very few indi-
viduals address the police directly. Those who did, she said, were mostly individ-
uals who were sure that their case would not be listened to locally because local
customs were contradictory to their personal interests.26 Such cases sometimes
involve women who have decided to leave their husbands and the community and
have moved to town. In most instances, they involve adolescent girls, who use the
26 Interview on 12 November 2016.
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protection offered by the state to escape arranged or forced marriages. Claiming
they want to gain a formal education, the girls enter the police stations fromwhere,
with the support of the Women and Children’s Affairs Office, they are usually sent
to school hostels. The government’s protection of runaway girls has caused a lot of
resistance among the Bashada, Banna, Hamar and Kara (see Epple 2012a, Masuda
n.y., Maurus 2016, Niebling 2010, Yohannes this volume), especially because some
of the girls involved have already been betrothed, and bride wealth been given. Par-
ents are also concerned about the inadequate supervision of the girls in the town
hostels, as unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted disease are not uncom-
mon. Moreover, many of the girls, especially those who were already adolescents
when they arrived, drop out of school after a few years; they do not usually return
home, but stay in town, working in bars or restaurants.
Delaying the handover of criminals
In certain contexts, the local people delay the handover of perpetrators to the police
in order to make time to make peace and perform reconciliatory rituals between
the conflicting parties.
As amongmany other Ethiopian groups, intra-ethnic homicide in Bashada and
Hamar is considered harmful to the victim, the perpetrator and their families: it
affects the relationship between the families of killer and victim not only emotion-
ally, but also metaphysically. It is believed that if members of the two families eat
or drink together before peace has been re-established and ritually sealed, disease
and a quick death will follow for anyone who consumed anything that was pro-
duced by the other party. If a killer is convicted by the court and goes to prison
before reconciliation rituals can be held, members of the two families remain at
risk for many years. As even distant relatives are said to die if they eat food pro-
vided by the other family, even unknowingly,27 the performance of a reconciliation
ritual is imperative. Therefore, the community usually holds back on handing over
a killer to the police by pretending that they cannot find them.
When the police or the court hears of a serious crime in the villages, strong
efforts are initially made to get hold of the perpetrator. However, as the Bashada
and Hamar territory is a large and bushy area where people are armed with guns,
the police cannot easily get hold of a criminal if the local community does not co-
operate. Therefore, the police usually choose to follow up a case only occasionally.
27 During my stay in 2017, I was told about a herding boy who unknowingly drank milk from a
cowbelonging to a familywithwhomhis own family had notmade peace. The alleged reason
for his death came out during a consultation with the sandal oracle. After this sad event, the
reconciliation, which had been delayed for several decades as the two families lived far apart,
was quickly enforced.
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Furthermore, many government officials are now native to the area and know the
local customs. Consequently, many people in Bashada are convinced that the po-
lice tolerate delayed handovers in order to give the community a chance to settle
the case locally before formal law is enforced, as a young married Bashada man
explained:
The woreda administrator [originally from Bashada/Banna] and those working
with him know our tradition. When people say, ‘The culprit did not come to us,
we have not heard anything, the guy did not come!’, he knows that people are
doing their rituals. (…) When everything has been finished, they will say to the
government, ‘Now we have heard about it, people came to us.’ Then they say to
the culprit, ‘Now you have to go, everything is finished, go!’ and send him. It is
the gal (non-Hamar), who do not know…. (Interview, 21 November 2016)
What he describes seems to be a kind of silent agreement between the govern-
ment and the locals, and so it is difficult to get a statement on the issue from le-
gal practitioners, who officially must prosecute any case of homicide immediately.
Many confirmed, however, that getting hold of and prosecuting anyone in the bush
against the will of the community was impossible.
Negotiations with government officials on the application of state law
People in Bashada know that there is room for negotiation even after a case has
been handed over to the police or court. This applies in less serious cases, such as
quarrels, insults, family issues and minor criminal cases, when a case can officialy
be returned to the local community for resolution with the agreement of all parties
involved (following article 34(5) of the Constitution). The initiative for negotiation
can come from the local people’s side, butmay also come from the government side.
Sometimes, negotiations also take place in more serious contexts, when it seems
more promising to resolve cases outside the courtroom. such as when adolescent
girls run away from home to escape an unwanted marriage. Instead of punishing
the families who may have forced a girl into marriage, other offices, such as the
Women and Children’s Affairs Office get involved inmediating between the parties.
Social background of a perpetrator may also be taken into accunt. When a perpe-
trator comes from a poor background or has very few relatives, elders sometimes
approach the court and plead for a fine for the wrongdoer rather than imprison-
ment, arguing that his family would suffer without him. As the former president
of Hamar Woreda court explained, judges may use the legal room available in the
law and decide on a fine or communal work instead of imprisonment in such con-
texts. They understand that the wife and children of a man who has no brothers to
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support his family during his absence would not be able to sustain themselves.28
Generally, however, legal practitioners want to be seen to be loyal to state law. One
of the prosecutors29 at Hamar Woreda court emphasized,
Wrongdoing is wrongdoing. The law treats all: whether someone steals a needle
or a cow, both is theft and it is treated here. (…) The provision we have in the
law is that when small problems, like insult or so, can be sent back and solved
locally. But theft and murder, these are treated only in court. (…) If there is a
theft, somewhere in the bush, and we don’t hear about it, it might be solved
there, that is fine. But when we hear about it, we have to follow up. (Interview
28 March 2017)
Keeping silent, avoiding and hiding
In the last couple of decades, representatives of the Bashada and Hamar people
have been increasingly invited to meetings in town organized by NGOs or gov-
ernment offices to inform the population on issues such as health, education and
development, but also gender equality, HTPs and state law in general. At the same
time, government officials, NGO representatives, health officers, agricultural ex-
tension workers have been visiting the villages with the same agenda. In the early
years of this education programme, certain individuals were appointed by the lo-
cal government as members of committees (such as health committee, education
committee) and taken to meetings in different parts of southern Ethiopia, where
they met with members of other ethnic groups. Today, some of them remember
that they enjoyed the free travel, the chance to see other places and other people,
and the per diems and other incentives.
While such journeys have become less common, meetings in the villages or lo-
cal towns (Dimeka and Turmi) have become so frequent that people complain they
are a hindrance to their daily duties. While the likamambers and the members of
their committees are expected to attend these village and townmeetings, for others
participation is voluntary. Nevertheless, meetings often start with the organizers
complaining about low attendance, little change or improvement, and low moti-
vation. Though participants are encouraged to express their views, opinions and
complaints, most attendants keep silent when they disagree with what has been
said, or when they are scolded for having been late or absent, or for not fulfilling
28 This could include working for the district administration for some months in construction,
watering plants, cleaning offices and the like (interview 24 June 2017).
29 Originally from Kara.
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what they promised to do during an earlier meeting.30 Instead of airing their views
during the meetings, as I observed, they discuss them when walking home.
The silence of participants during meetings is a common sign of withdrawal
from a conversation that, from a local perspective, has taken an inappropriate turn;
in this case, when the tone of government officials is perceived as paternalistic,
dominant or arrogant. When discussions are held face to face, they are often quite
lively and direct.The reasons for people’s silence is common knowledge, as the head
of the Education Office in Hamar Woreda, himself from Hamar, explained:
When we explain things slowly, people listen. Especially, when they do not like
the work of the government, we explain things again slowly… [means here also:
‘we repeat things several times with patience’]. If you tell them the hard way,
people stay silent. That means that they have not accepted it, they don’t speak it
out loud. (interview 28 March 2017)
Government officials meet this passive behaviour with patience and continuous
and repeated effort in the hope that their message will be accepted in time.
Hiding crimes
Minor offences, such as insult, physical injury or theft are often not reported to the
police; if they are, they are sometimes sent back to be resolved locally. Serious of-
fences such as forced marriage and abduction are not considered locally as crimes,
but rather as part of local custom. Therefore, such cases are usually kept with the
community, and the zarsi prevent victims reporting to the police, arguing that it is
better to handle such things locally.
Fathers commonly complain when their daughters are forced into marriage or
abducted. Relatives and elders usually calm such a father down. They remind him
of the reciprocity between generations: though it might be painful now to let the
daughter go, he himself may have abducted his own wife, and his own son might
do so in the future. One Bashada elder recounted how a father is stopped from
going to the police:
‘It is our tradition. Yih, tomorrow you might also abduct a girl! Today, if you send
this guy (the abductor) to prison, tomorrow, will you go to prison too then? What
if tomorrow you will go to prison? What if your son is going to prison? Who would
tomorrow talk in favour of you or your son? Don’t do it!!’ This is how the elders
30 The health officers, for example, have been urging the community to build pit latrines in their
settlement areas. Many Bashada and Hamar people feel disgusted by the latrines in towns,
which are usually very dirty and smelly. They prefer to use the bush where there is no smell
and any remains usually disappear by themselves after a few days.
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talk and stop him from going to the police!’ (…) [Then he will respond] ‘Eh, if this
is what the zarsi is saying, it is good. I will not go.’ (25 January 2017)
Only when a girl decides to seek protection in town does abduction and forced
marriage become a matter of law, most cases remain hidden.31 This shows that
with regard to marriage, custom is locally rated higher than state law.
Faking cooperation
The highest priority in combatting harmful traditional practices (HTPs) in Bashada
and Hamar is to eliminate infanticide, the ritual whipping of girls and women dur-
ing male initiation, and forced and early marriage and abduction. As many initia-
tives have proved unsuccessful, more recently, the bittas (ritual leaders) have been
asked by the government to get involved with the hope that through the perfor-
mance of a ritual of abandonment these practices could be given up.
After several meetings and lengthy discussions between government and lo-
cal elders, the Hamar and Bashada bittas were convinced, albeit under pressure, to
ritually curse and abandon whipping, abduction and infanticide. However, when
these rituals were performed – in the presence of government officials and local
elders – certain elements were changed so that the rituals were in fact non-bind-
ing.32 While the situation was clear to the local participants, it was not to most
of the officials who learned only later that the rituals had been incomplete and
therefore ineffective.
Resistance through magic, curses, verbal and physical violence
The Bashada and Hamar also use magic and curses against individuals to protect
their interests. Cursing is commonly used to sanction those who do not listen and
submit to the zarsi. Locally, persistent wrongdoers, those who act disloyally or have
angered senior relatives can be targets of curses, which affect the health and some-
times even the lives of the cursed through disease or accidents.The community has
turned cursing on government officials in the past, as the following stories show.
In the early 1990s the first administrator of Bashada and Hamar was chosen
from the local communities. He was known as someone who took state law very
seriously, employed very strict measures whenever the law was broken, and ig-
nored the needs and interests of his people. The Bashada vividly remember that
this particular administrator, tasked with protecting the wildlife there, asked them
and the Hamar to remove their cattle from Mago Park. As they had taken their
31 See also Epple (forthcoming) on details about forcedmarriage and abduction in Bashada and
Hamar.
32 See Epple (this volume) for details on the handling of infanticide in Bashada and Hamar.
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animals to the park to graze during a drought, the people refused to comply with
the request for fear their animals would starve. The administrator then loaded the
cows and calves onto trucks and moved them elsewhere. He also insulted the el-
ders with whom he had discussed his request, and ordered that some of the small
houses and cattle enclosures built by the herders be burnt down. This behaviour
angered the community so much that they cursed him. As a result, people say, he
turned crazy, lost his job and never recovered. Today, he lives in Dimeka, his mind
still broken.33
His successor, also a Hamar, was also a strict supporter of government inter-
ests. He strongly supported the government’s wish to get girls into education, and
willingly accepted all runaway girls who came to town to go to school. At that time,
many parents were set against their daughters being educated, and some even
withdrew them from the hostels by force (see Masuda n.d.). People felt betrayed
when the administrator helped girls to escape to Jinka without consulting their
parents or any elders.34 While he was on a visit to southern Hamar, an edi arti (ma-
gician) offered him a goat and fresh milk in a traditional container as a gift, as is
common for honoured guests. Both milk and goat were bestowed with magic, and
many people recount how the administrator became very sick when he ate themeat
and drank the milk. He remained half paralyzed, unable to walk or talk properly.
When after some years, he asked the elders for forgiveness, they performed a ritual
for him and his health slightly improved. Later, however, he was said to have acted
against the interests of the Hamar again, so the curse was renewed and he died.
All subsequent local administrators and other officials have heard about these
curses and all educated Hamar – including those who have converted to Christian-
ity – I talked to consider the magic and curses of Hamar elders as powerful and
effective.
Open confrontation: Physical violence and revitalization of HTPs
Some court officials reported that they experienced verbal threats and intimida-
tions by individuals who felt that the court had treated them unfairly. One of the
administrators (in power from 2010 to 2014) who had gained a reputation for being
rough and very disrespectful was in fact beaten so severely he almost died.This hap-
pened during a time of extreme tension between the Hamar and the government
that ultimately lead to a violent and open conflict erupting in some Hamar kebeles
and in was a reaction to continuous pressure from government officials on the local
33 From a scientific perspective he probably had a stroke, which may have damaged his brain.
34 During my research in the late 1990s one of the popular songs to which the youth danced in
the night was about the first Bashada girl who ran away and escaped secretly by Dagne’s car,
defying the will of the elders.
Local strategies to maintain cultural integrity 207
communities. As Yohannes has shown (this volume), the main underlying reasons
for the violence were the continuous demands to send more children (especially
girls) to school, the prohibition on hunting wild game and the legal prosecution of
hunters, and the efforts to end certain cultural practices labelled as harmful. The
communities’ usual strategies – of avoidance, partial acceptance and pretending to
cooperate – had failed to stave off the pressure, so the situation escalated at the
end of 2014: the Hamar physically attacked the district administrator, police and
other government representatives, destroyed schools and health posts and thereby
clearly demonstrated their rejection of government intervention. As a strong sign
of their position, they even revived one of the HTPs that had been most strongly
addressed by the government: the abortion or postnatal killing of allegedly impure
children. Several allegedly impure children, who had grown up and were attending
school, were killed (see Epple this volume).
Summary and conclusion
Local communities use a variety of strategies by to cope with changes – here in the
form of the implementation of state law – offered by or imposed on them by the
state. As the example of the Bashada and Hamar people has shown, these strate-
gies range from customizing institutions and official positions and avoiding state
institutions, to hiding crimes, pretending cooperation, trying to influence court
decisions and – as a last resort – openly resisting.
In HamarWoreda, both customary and state legal institutions are available and,
in theory, individuals can freely decide which legal forum they want to address
(except in criminal cases, which have to be dealt with by the state). In practice,
individuals are not always free to choose, and the law is not always followed so
clearly. Instead, the communities makemany efforts to stay in control and preserve
their cultural integrity.
First, individuals are not free to report crime to the police because they are
expected to first address the elders, the ayo (spokesman) or the militia. These local
representatives then discuss a case before deciding whether to report it to officials.
Individuals who go directly to the police risk being considered disloyal to the com-
munity and face local sanctions. Usually, only individuals who are determined not
to submit to cultural expectations – such as girls who want to escape an unwanted
marriage – take that risk.
Second, certain government institutions have been customized and to some
extent brought under local control. These include the office of the ayo/likamamber
(the local representatives of each kebele) and the local militia. While the govern-
ment created these positions to extend its control into the communities, they are
indirectly controlled by the local communities through the ritualized installation
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of the office holders. To reach the communities more effectively, the government
is also making use of local practices. For example, meetings between government
officials and local elders begin and end with the elders’ blessings. Additionally, the
ritual leaders’ influence is used to give more weight to decisions reached during
such meetings, and ‘harmful traditional practices’ are not only combatted through
awareness-raising and legal prosecution, but also by asking the ritual leaders to
ritually ban them.
Third, it can be observed that while, in principle, individuals can ‘shop’, i.e.
choose between legal forums, the communities selectively ‘shop’ elements of state
law and institutions that are suitable to them, and strategically reinterpret, avoid,
manipulate or reject and resist others that contradict local values. For example, al-
though imprisonment is alien to the local culture, which favours reconciliation over
punishment, it is nowadays used by the communities as a threat or to get rid of
wrongdoers who can no longer be handled by traditional mechanisms. When the
police hear of a crime and do get hold of the perpetrator, the community rhetori-
cally changes the meaning of imprisonment. Rather than being a place of suffering
far away from home, prison is reimagined as a place of learning andmaturing (with
actual offers of schooling and vocational training) from which wrongdoers return
as better people.This image was promoted by the government and has been locally
picked up, but it is only evoked when someone is convicted and imprisoned. In in-
dividual cases, elders try to influence court decisions with the intention of having
imprisonment changed to a fine by reporting to the prosecutors or judges on fam-
ily background, emphasizing that their family would suffer greatly if the person
goes to prison. When communication fails and/or government pressure is high,
people tend to pretend or fake their cooperation: when the elders or the militia are
asked to hand over a criminal, they often claim they cannot get hold of him.When
ritual leaders are pressurized into performing rituals to abandon certain cultural
practices, they may do it wrongly, so that the ritual looks real to outsiders, but
is locally ineffective. Open resistance and violence is the last resort to which peo-
ple turn when the pressure gets too much, communication between government
and communities is imbalanced and unsuccessful, and cultural key values are felt
to be severely under threat. As the recent conflict in Hamar Woreda shows, peo-
ple will not only defend themselves with weapons, but will also attack innocent
government employees (such as teachers or nurses), and revitalize prohibited and
formerly abandoned practices (such as infanticide) as an additional provocation.
Many of the local government officials are now native to the area and have a
good knowledge of local customs and values. Having been through a modern ed-
ucation system, these officials may not share all the views of the local population,
but most of them do have a good understanding of local needs related to the lo-
cal culture and values. Therefore, many indirectly support the vernacularization of
state law and institutions, and accept that people avoid or circumvent state law
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sometimes. The delayed handover of perpetrators in cases of homicide, for exam-
ple, which gives communities time to perform reconciliation rituals, is informally
tolerated, and pragmatic given that the vastness of the territorymakes it practically
impossible to get hold of any perpetrator without the cooperation of the commu-
nity. When communicating with local elders, government officials – who are often
much younger – display the expected respect. Most of them marry a local wife to
achieve local acceptance, and they often take the threat of being cursed seriously.
They also place great emphasis on information and awareness-raising about the
state law, human rights and gender equality, and tolerate violations of state law
in the hope that a gentler approach will slowly bring about cultural change. And
indeed, it appears that the will to cooperate is much higher when people feel that
the cultural integrity of their community is not violated.
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10. Legal pluralism and Protestant Christianity
From fine to forgiveness in an Aari community
Julian Sommerschuh
Introduction
For several years, the topic of legal pluralism in Ethiopia has been the subject of
lively scholarly debate (e.g. Donovan and Getachew 2003, Pankhurst and Getachew
2008, Baker 2013, Girmachew 2015). In this chapter, I would like to contribute to
this debate by offering a new perspective. My suggestion is that, at least in some
parts of the country, there is a further actor in the legal arena that has hitherto
been overlooked: Protestantism.
Legal pluralism is commonly defined as ‘a situation in which two or more legal
systems coexist in the same social field’ (Merry 1988:870); with ‘legal system’ mean-
ing both ‘the system of courts and judges supported by the state as well as non legal
forms of normative ordering’ (Merry 1988:870, cf. Griffith 1986, Benda-Beckmann
2002, Berman 2009). In the Ethiopian case, interest in legal pluralism followed in
the wake of the 1995 constitution, which provided ‘a clear recognition of the juris-
diction of customary and religious laws and courts in family and personal matters’
(Pankhurst andGetachew 2008b:6). So far, research has concentrated on examining
the customary norms and legal procedures of the different ethno-cultural groups
in Ethiopia, both as such and in their relation to the formal, state-organized legal
system. In addition, some attention has been paid to Islamic jurisdiction, notably
in the form of Sharia courts (Mohammed 2011, Berihun 2013, Girmachew 2018).
Protestantism, by contrast, has not yet received any attention. However, there
are at least two reasons to think that Protestantism ought to be part of the debate.
First, the number of Protestants in Ethiopia has increased massively over the past
few decades, rising from 5.5 per cent in 1984 to 18.6 per cent (or 14 million people)
in 2007. The majority of believers live in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples Region (SNNPR), where 55.5 per cent of the population (or 8.4 million peo-
ple) are Protestant; followed by Oromia (4.8 million or 17.7 per cent). Indeed, with
Ethiopia having ‘one of the fastest growing evangelical churches in the world’ (An-
derson 2004:126), numbers are bound to increase even further. Second, Protestant
Christianity, like Islam or Judaism, offers not only a set of substantive rules and
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norms, but also stipulates procedures through which believers should deal with
conflicts.
Taken together, these points suggest the importance of including Protestantism
in the study of legal pluralism in Ethiopia. In this chapter, I take a first step in this
direction, offering an ethnographic case study of legal pluralism in a southwest
Ethiopian community, with a particular focus on the role of Protestantism. I show
that inmy field site, the Protestant church offers an alternative approach to dispute
resolution to that of the state, and that, in fact, the Protestant approach, which
privileges forgiveness over retribution, is increasingly informing the functioning
of local formal judicial institutions.
The chapter is based on twenty-two months of fieldwork conducted between
2014 and 2017 in a rural southwest Ethiopian community called Dell. Dell is a kebele
of SNNPR’s South Aari woreda (district), located at about four hours walk into the
mountains north of Jinka, the zonal capital. The roughly 4,000 inhabitants of Dell
are ethnic Aari and speak Aaraf (on Aari see Jensen 1959, Naty 1992, Gebre 1995).
People are subsistence agriculturalists and live in dispersed homesteads. Since 2010
a small village has emerged in the western part of Dell, next to the kebele’s admin-
istrative buildings; it has been accessible by a 40-minute motorbike ride from the
woreda capital at Gob (also known as Gazer) since 2014.
At the time of my fieldwork, about 60 per cent of the population in Dell were
Protestants and 40 per cent were traditional believers. Conversion to Protestantism
began in the late 1980s, accelerated in the early 2000s and continues today. The
vast majority of Protestants in Dell belong to one of the three local branches of
Ethiopia’s largest evangelical church, Kale Heywet. In recent years, two small Pen-
tecostal churches have also emerged, although these do not differ in terms of dis-
pute resolution and will therefore not be treated separately. The 40 per cent of
the population that have not converted are locally referred to as alem, Amharic for
‘world’.1 The term was originally introduced by the Protestants to signify ‘non-be-
liever’, and has over time been adopted as self-designation by the non-Protestants.
It is perhaps best translated as ‘traditionalist’, since the people who call themselves
alem self-consciously follow what they consider to be ‘tradition’ (karta) or ‘the ways
of the ancestors’.
Both traditionalists and Protestants have their own modes of dispute resolu-
tion. These two approaches and their respective institutions coexist with the judi-
cial institutions of the state. Formal courts have existed in Dell since the admin-
istrative unit of the kebele was first established by the Derg in 1975. While people
used the formal courts from the beginning, their importance has clearly increased
1 The Aaraf spoken by people in Dell features many Amharic loanwords. In this chapter, both
Aaraf and Amharic terms appear in italics; but when using an Amharic word for the first time,
I indicate this in brackets: (Amh.).
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over time. Today, when faced with a conflict, every person in Dell has to decide be-
tween two ways of addressing it. The traditionalists have to choose between what,
following Pankhurst and Getachew (2008a: viii), I will call the ‘customary mode
of dispute resolution’ on one hand, and formal litigation on the other. The Protes-
tants, in turn, have to choose between the Protestant mode of dispute resolution
and formal litigation.
In what follows, I will discuss customary, formal and Protestant ways of dealing
with conflicts. The largest part of the chapter deals with the Protestant way, since
the chapter’s main aim is to make a case for taking Protestantism into account as a
hitherto overlooked player in Ethiopian legal pluralism. However, some knowledge
of both the customary and the formal approach is required in order to understand
the specificity of the Protestant approach to conflicts. My description of these ap-
proaches will be rather brief both because of the demands of limited space and
because it seems justified since customary and formal legal institutions in Dell do
not – in their broad logics – strongly differ from their counterparts elsewhere in
Ethiopia, which have already been described quite extensively in the literature.
Legal forums in Dell
Customary dispute resolution
To understand the customary mode of dispute resolution, some knowledge of tra-
ditional social organization is required. Dell forms part of Baaka, one of nine Aari
kingdoms. While Baaka lost its political independence with incorporation into the
Ethiopian empire in the early twentieth century, it has retained its ritual signifi-
cance. Baaka is headed by a hereditary ritual king (babi), who is assisted by a group
of hereditary ritual specialists (godmi) in guaranteeing the fertility and well-being
of the land and its people.There are two exogamousmoieties, each of which is com-
posed of numerous patrilineages; and each lineage is headed by a so-called toidi,
who carries out rituals on behalf of his junior kin. Relations between seniors and
juniors are strictly hierarchical; and those higher up in the hierarchy are thought
to be able to bless or curse those further down.The hierarchy characteristic of tra-
ditional social organization also plays an important role in the customary mode of
dispute resolution.
This customary mode of dispute resolution is called k’esh. K’esh refers to a
process aimed at finding an agreement between conflicting parties and restoring
peaceful relations among them. It is therefore best translated as ‘reconciliation’.
K’esh is done for conflicts of every magnitude, ranging from minor quarrels be-
tween spouses to land or property disputes to adultery and homicide. The men –
and it is only men – charged with leading the negotiations are referred to as galta
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(elders) and are selected depending on the nature of the case. Conflicts between
members of the same household or lineage are commonly dealt with by their
lineage head, who may sometimes also call elders from related lineages considered
as ritual helpers (geta). In case of conflict between people of different lineages,
respected men unrelated to either of the opponents are usually chosen as galta.
In more serious cases, such as adultery or where there has been bloodshed, cases
are taken to the zia, the local representative of the ritual king, who will call upon
other high-ranking elders to assist him with arbitrating. The most severe cases,
especially homicide, may also see the involvement of a high-ranking godmi (ritual
specialist).
In every case, the galta begin by hearing the two sides and then make further
inquiries, sometimes among witnesses.The aim here is to gain a clear understand-
ing of the offence (dax’ilsi) that has been committed. Sometimes, a perpetrator will
openly and from the outset acknowledge (buts) his or her wrongdoing; in other
cases such an acknowledgement is only obtained in the course of the hearing and
under pressure from the elders. In all cases, an admission of guilt is necessary for
k’esh to be possible;2 only once it has been obtained does the work of reconciliation
proper begin.
Here, it is useful to distinguish four techniques or practices through which
the imbalance created by the offence is redressed: humiliation, compensation, pu-
rification and commensality. Each of these practices features in every instance of
k’esh, taking on a more or less elaborate form depending on the magnitude of the
conflict.
(1)The first key element of reconciliation is the humiliation of the offender; with
‘humiliation’ defined as ‘rendering humble’ (rather than ‘shaming’ or ‘disgracing’).
This needs to be understood against the background that people in Dell framemost
transgressions in terms of disrespect – of one person ‘belittling’ (toksi) another by
treating them as ‘smaller’ than they can rightfully expect to be treated. During k’esh
this belittlement is redressed by way of inversion: the offender humbles himself
before the victim by displaying signs of inferiority – being submissive, displaying
fear (bashi), addressing the other with honorific titles, clutching the other’s knee,
putting grass on his own head etc.The victim, in turn, will participate in the humil-
iation of the offender by acting for a while as if unwilling to agree to a settlement.
This forces the offender to beg (miks) more strongly by displaying even clearer signs
of humility.
2 Where a defendant continues to deny the charge, the plaintiff can either take the case to the
formal system or, remaining within the customary system, take the case to a godmi living on
the eastern boundary of Dell. The godmi is able to bring out the truth by way of letting the
disputants testify beforemaking themdrink water which is thought tomake ill or kill anyone
who has testified falsely.
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(2) Compensation is the second key principle of k’esh. The plaintiff commonly
requests a certain amount of compensation, but ultimately the elders decide the
amount to be given. Compensation can range from a small sum of money or a litre
of alcohol, to a sheep or several heads of cattle (or an equivalent sum of money). It
is important to note that, while victims often do take compensation, they may also
refuse it for the sake of social harmony. In one homicide case, for instance, the kin
of the victim refused to take the virgin girl and ten heads of cattle that had been
agreed as compensation. They argued that the two lineages had previously inter-
married and that to normalize their affinal relations it would be better to be mag-
nanimous and not take what was rightfully theirs. Similarly, there are instances –
such as stray livestock damaging crops – where compensation is agreed but both
sides work with the tacit understanding that it will not really be paid.
(3) Most conflicts and transgressions are thought to produce either pollution
or a sort of heat in the disputants’ stomach (norti, the locus of feelings), which
will lead to harm if unremedied by purification. Purification can take numerous
forms, ranging from small acts, such as a lineage head throwing grass into the
granaries of a household where spouses have quarrelled over the distribution of
grain, to large rituals, such as two lineages washing their hands in the blood of
a bisected sheep to overcome enmity after homicide. But the most basic form of
purification, used in almost every reconciliation, is the drinking of purifying water
which washes away the pollution or heat and brings ‘coolness’ (shimma), and which,
together with the pronunciation of ‘forgiveness’ (negane), marks the penultimate
step in the reconciliation process.
(4) The final step is commensality between the disputants and the elders. Drink
and food need to be provided by the offender, who thus incurs expenses even when
the victim does not take compensation. In a very immediate way, commensality
marks the end of hostility, since the parties in dispute refrain from eating together
until reconciliation has been achieved – not least because eating together before
reconciliation is thought to entail illness or even death.
Formal litigation
If k’esh denotes customary dispute resolution, kisi (Amharic ‘lawsuit’) is the term
people in Dell use for the process of dealing with disputes through state institu-
tions. Contrary to k’esh, which is about reconciliation, kisi is locally understood as
beingmore antagonistic.Why this is the case and why people file lawsuits nonethe-
less is one of the questions addressed in this section.
There are two levels at which people can sue others in Dell: the level of the
‘cell’ (local people use the English term) and that of the kebele. Dell kebele is subdi-
vided into sixteen so-called cells, each of which groups together between thirty-
five and fifty households from one neighbourhood. The cells were first formed in
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2006. Officially, they are party organizations of the EPRDF, Ethiopia’s ruling po-
litical coalition. In practice, however, people consider the cells as part of the state
apparatus – they belong to the realm of the mengist (Amharic ‘government’) no less
than the kebele or the woreda.3 As well as carrying out public works, the different
cells assemble on one morning each week at their respective meeting grounds. At
these meetings, court hearings take place, with the cell’s three leaders acting as
judges (danya [Amharic]). Issues commonly dealt with include domestic conflicts,
petty theft, unreturned loans and disturbances. Usually cases concern members of
the same cell, although it is possible to sue outsiders by going to their cell. Cases
that remain unresolved in the cell or that fall outside its jurisdiction are referred
to the kebele.
The kebele has two courts and one komitee (committee) for dealing with legal
issues, all of which operate on Wednesdays and Fridays: the meret komitee (Amh.)
for land disputes; the mahberawi firdebet (Amh.) or Social Court for property and
monetary claims; and the wana firdebet (Amh.) or Main Court. The first two refer
more serious cases to the Main Court, which also deals with matters like adultery,
divorce and fights involving bloodshed. The Main Court, whose judges are the five
main kebele leaders, is the highest court at the kebele level and it alone is able to refer
cases upward to the woreda. No matter at which level litigation takes place, there
are three possible outcomes: (i) the respective court passes its own judgement; (ii)
the court asks people to deal with the case through k’esh and then notify it about
the agreement reached; (iii) if neither of these works – for example, because one
party does not consent to doing k’esh – the case can be referred to the next highest
level.
Judgements are usually passed in those cases where the evidence is clear and
where the damage done can be easily assessed. For instance, in one case, where a
man had beaten up his wife, the cell ruled that he had to give her themoney she had
spent on going to hospital, and pay a fine to the cell. In another case, the judges of
the Social Court ruled that a defaulting debtor had to repay his loan with interest.
In a third case, where one man had sued another for injuring him with a stone
while they carried out public works together, the Main Court found the accused
not guilty, arguing that he had not hurt the other with intent.
In many cases, however, disputants are asked to solve their conflict by way of
k’esh.There are two main reasons for this. First, cell and kebele courts lack the ca-
pacity to deal with every case presented to them; and asking people to do k’esh is
a way of reducing caseload. Second, having no legal training whatsoever, cell and
kebele judges are aware that they lack detailed knowledge of state law and therefore,
in some cases, might not make adequate or legally binding judgements.
3 For similar observations from elsewhere in Ethiopia see Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003:41.
Legal pluralism and Protestant Christianity 219
In one case, for instance, an unmarried woman who had become pregnant by a
married man sued him for alimony. Her original demand had been that he marries
her, but the Main Court judge told her that the law did not permit a man to take a
second wife and that a monthly support should be paid instead. He went on to say
that the kebele court was unable to decide the amount of alimony to be paid, and
that the woman would have to go to the woreda court to get a decision. Pointing
to the costs of this, the judge proposed k’esh as an alternative. For this, both sides
selected elders, and negotiations took place outside the court building. After an
hour, the disputants reported back to the judge that it had been agreed that the
man would pay 50 Birr and 3 tassa (c. 2.5 kg) of grain each month. This agreement
was written down by the judge, who also included a clause stipulating that the
man would have to pay a 500 Birr fine to the kebele should he fail to stick to the
agreement. The document was signed by thumbprint by both parties. Finally, the
judge decreed that the man had to immediately pay a 150 Birr fine (zera [Amh.])
to the kebele for having failed to support the woman as had been agreed between
them orally at the time of the child’s birth.
As this example shows, people who sue others in court often end up being asked
to deal with their conflict through out-of-court negotiations. These out-of-court
negotiations are – like the customary mode of dispute resolution – referred to as
k’esh. Contrary to customary k’esh, however, this latter kind of k’esh does little to
diminish the antagonism between the disputants. This is for two reasons. Firstly,
k’esh done on the recommendation of a judge commonly only deals with questions
of compensation. It does not feature the other three elements of customary k’esh –
humiliation, purification, commensality – and therefore is not as reconciliatory. As
people often put it, this kind of k’esh is ‘done just with themouth’ (gurri afak) and not
‘truly from the stomach’ (dofen norti girank). Secondly, the court is always notified
about the agreement reached, which is written down and commonly includes a
threat of punishment for repeated infringement. Beyond that, virtually every case
ends with the offender having to pay a fine, which varies with the magnitude of the
offence, from 50 Birr forminor cases to 5000 Birr for adultery.4 Fines – often linked
to one-day imprisonment – are the main punishments (k’itat [Amh.]) dealt out by
local courts, and it is the inevitability of these fines that makes taking someone to
court such an antagonistic move.5
4 The courts have a strong institutional interest in imposing fines because fines are the main
source of income for the cells and the kebele. It is also true that, while one part of the fines
is used to finance the operation of these institutions, another part goes to the judges, who –
not receiving any remuneration for their work – take them in lieu of a salary.
5 As one reviewer has pointed out, in many other Ethiopian societies, rituals of reconciliation
and purificationmay be done even after a case has been settled in court. In principle, this also
applies for Dell, in particular for serious crimes like homicide, where it is felt that communal
life would be impossible unless the punishment imposed by the court was complemented
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Given that reconciliation and the restoration of peaceful relations have tradi-
tionally been important values in Dell, why do people sometimes take the antago-
nistic step of suing someone in court? There are several reasons. Firstly, there are
cases where an offender refuses to do k’esh and openly challenges the claimant to
sue him. Secondly, some groups in local society, especially women and craftwork-
ers (mana), feel disadvantaged by the male-dominated customary mode of dispute
resolution.Thirdly, for these groups in particular, but also more generally, it seems
that one can get a higher compensation by going to court than by solving a case
through customary k’esh because one has more bargaining power. A final reason
relates to the fact that customary k’esh does not have any developed notion of pun-
ishment (k’itat), whereas punishment – in the form of fines and short-term im-
prisonment – is central to the formal system. When asked why they had taken
someone to court, several people explained that they hoped that the punishment
would deter the offender from repeating their offence.There also exist cases where
the plaintiff ’s main desire is to see their opponent fined out of a belief that one’s
enemy’s loss is one’s own gain.
The perception locally is that people now use the formal judicial system much
more frequently than in the past; and duringmyfieldwork I heardmany complaints
about the fact that ‘these days’ people even sue their parents, and brothers go to
court. This assessment is not free of romanticism. On closer examination, it turns
out that the purportedly better past also had its cases of litigation among kin. Yet,
it would be wrong to simply dismiss the emic analysis. In a context of progressive
land scarcity and intensified competition for economic ‘growth’ (gabinti), conflicts
touching on money and property in particular have increased, and so have the per-
ceived costs of peaceful reconciliation. It is not least against this background of in-
creased litigation that the Protestant message of unconditional forgiveness needs
to be understood.
Protestant dispute resolution
In Dell, the Protestant mode of dispute resolution is shaped by the key local
Protestant value of forgiveness (negane). Protestants in Dell regularly make use of
a number of Bible passages to promote this value; the most frequently cited one is
Matthew 6:14-15:
If you forgive others the wrongs they have done to you, your Father in heaven
will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive others, then your Father will not
forgive the wrongs you have done.
by reconciliation. Inmany other, less dramatic cases, however, rituals of reconciliation do not
follow settlement in court and latent antagonism thus remains.
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The Protestant logic of forgiveness stands in utmost contrast to the logic of formal
litigation. And while negane is a concept that also plays a role in the customary
mode of dispute resolution, the Protestant and the customary understandings of
the concept differ starkly, as do the respective modes of dispute resolution, as I
show in the following.
This section, then, explores the differences between customary, state and
Protestant ways of dealing with conflicts by taking an in-depth look at the latter.
Additionally, it looks at the personal, institutional and ideological factors that
move people to employ the Protestant mode. As a way into my discussion, let
me offer a case that exemplifies some key characteristics of Protestant dispute
resolution.
One day when passing by his field in the morning, Mathos6 saw two large oxen
belonging to his neighbour Elias. The oxen had broken free from where Elias had
tethered them the previous evening, and had spent the night feeding on Mathos’
ripening maize, causing considerable damage. Mathos dragged the oxen out of
his field and tethered them securely by the wayside. Early the next morning,
Elias went to Mathos house. He was accompanied by two Protestant men, whom
he had asked to act as his galta (elders). One of the galta began with an apol-
ogy for only coming after a whole day had elapsed. He explained that Elias had
gone to town the previous day and had only heard about the troubles when he
returned in the evening. Mathos calmly replied that it wasn’t a problem at all,
and that he had trusted Elias to come. Then, Elias spoke about how very sorry he
was for what had happened, and how much it ‘burnt inside his stomach’ to see
his neighbour’s maize devastated. He also offered to bring Mathos some dried
maize in compensation. At this point, however, Mathos gently interrupted him
by clearing his throat to indicate that he would now speak himself. He began by
asserting that they were all believers in God, and that the Bible demanded that
you ‘not make your brother pay’ (indapsi antam ay kashishka).7 He went on to say
that he didn’t doubt that God would find a way to feed his family, and that he
was willing to forgive Elias freely and without further ado. Thereupon, one of the
elders asked the two to ‘take confession’ (nisah teykate). Rising to his feet, Elias
gave a condensed account of what had happened, stated that he had ‘made his
brother sad’ and asked for God’s and Mathos’s forgiveness. In response, everyone
including Mathos waved their hands over Elias, saying ‘sabi an negane!’ (‘May God
forgive you!’).
6 All personal names are pseudonyms.
7 The term ‘brother’ is part of an idiom of spiritual kinship; in reality Elias and Mathos are
unrelated.
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Then Mathos himself got to his feet, gave a similarly condensed account, noted
that he had become sad on first seeing the damaged crops, and asked God’s for-
giveness for this sadness. Like Elias before him, Mathos then bowed and everyone
waved their hands over him, calling out ‘May God forgive you!’ The reconciliation
was thus officially concluded and, after one of the elders had spoken a prayer,
the elders and Elias left. (Summary of fieldnotes, 2 August 2016)
The case of Mathos and Elias exemplifies a number of characteristics of the Protes-
tant mode of dispute resolution that, in the following, will be drawn out through
a comparison with how a similar case would be handled in the formal or the cus-
tomary mode.
To begin with, Mathos did not take the opportunity to take Elias’ oxen to the
kebele, that is, he decided not to use the formal system.This would have been a way
of punishing Elias, since Elias would have had to pay money to the kebele to ransom
his oxen. Such antagonistic moves are sometimes made by people in Dell, but they
are prohibited to Protestants since they would violate the principle of not making
others pay.
Secondly, it is noteworthy that no assessment of the damage was made, even
though the damage was considerable. In the customary mode, such an assessment
(gemet [Amh.]) is always made, and the elders subsequently state approximately
howmuch grain has been lost.There is usually a tacit understanding that compen-
sation will not really be paid, but people use the assessment for mental accounting,
and might in a future conflict make use of this knowledge. Moreover, verbalizing
how much has been lost helps in the humiliation of the offender, since it increases
the pressure on the latter to submissively beg the injured party (see above).
In Mathos’ case, humiliation is conspicuously absent; and this is a third key
distinctive feature of Protestant dispute resolution.While Elias humbly apologizes
for the damage done by his oxen, Mathos in no way exploits the fact that his prop-
erty was damaged or that Elias only came to apologize one day after the event.
Rather than blustering and being unconciliatory so as to force Elias into acting
submissively, Mathos himself acts in a humble way. Behind this attitude is the lo-
cal Protestant idea that the one who has been damaged or otherwise wronged is as
much in need of forgiveness (and thus of humility) as the offender, because ‘becom-
ing sad’ – for example, about losing crops – is no less sinful than ‘making someone
sad’. Hence, in the end, both Elias and Mathos ask God’s forgiveness.
Finally, it is also characteristic of Protestant k’esh that the offender is not re-
quired to provide drink or food. Rather than engage in commensality, as would be
done in the customary mode, Elias and the elders quickly leave once reconciliation
has been achieved.The eschewal of demands for food and drink is partly motivated
by the notion of ‘not making others pay’, but an idea of divine blessings is also at
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play. Protestants in Dell believe that God rewards people with blessings (anje) if they
forgive freely or freely help others to solve their conflicts. Mathos and the elders
would have lost their entitlement to divine blessings by asking Elias for food, since
their forgiveness and help would no longer have qualified as ‘free’.8
The requirement to forgive freely applies in all cases where damage is caused
involuntarily – no matter how great the damage. For instance, during my time
in the field, one man lost two of his four oxen when they were gored to death by
anotherman’s bull.The enormity of the loss notwithstanding, church leaders urged
the man not to ask compensation and, after some inner struggle, he agreed to this.
At this point it is important to note that, where damage was caused involuntar-
ily, forgiveness is not merely a recommendation. Rather, it is a duty backed up by
a threat of divine punishment (sabite gami) – a threat, which is very real to Protes-
tants in Dell. Protestants frequently cite the case of Angri’s horse to illustrate the
reality of this threat. Some years ago, Angri’s horse died after being kicked by an-
other man’s horse. Angri, despite being Protestant, did what would be done in the
customary mode: he took the other man’s horse as compensation. Soon after, how-
ever, Angri’s hut was destroyed by fire, and a little later he suffered the death of a
child.These troubles were interpreted as divine punishment for having taken com-
pensation. It was only when he returned the horse and asked God’s forgiveness –
or so people in Dell say – that Angri’s luck improved.
Cases where damage was caused involuntarily are distinguished from conflicts
resulting from intentional action. While forgiveness is mandatory in the former
case, it is virtuous but not strictly required in the latter case, as can be seen in the
following case. The case at the same time allows me to introduce a second Protes-
tant setting for dispute resolution: taking a case to the church leaders rather than
gathering elders and going to another person’s house for k’esh.
Every Tuesday evening, the leaders of Dell Kale Heywet church assemble for their
weekly meeting. The evening begins with a service, celebrated in the intimacy of
the leaders’ assembly room. Afterwards, church business is conducted, and then
the leaders turn to dealing with conflicts brought to them by church members.
On one evening in May 2017, two men – Mangi and Ali – turned up and asked
the leaders for help with solving a conflict that had been smouldering for weeks.
 
The twomen had share-cropped together for several years. Using a common type
of share-cropping arrangement (called kotsa), Mangi provided the field and Ali
8 Note also that Protestantism in Dell does not place high value on commensality. Contrary
to what traditionalists assume, local Protestantism does not consider commensality neces-
sary for (re)producing relations. Rather, it is thought that believers are already related in and
through Christ, and that this relatedness is more profound than any relatedness that could
be produced by worldly means like commensality.
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provided seeds and the bulk of the labour, and each year they divided the harvest
equally. Recently, however, Mangi had announced that he would stop working
kotsawith Ali because he needed the field for his own purposes. Ali was unhappy
about this decision and asked Mangi to give him 300 Birr. He reasoned that he
had a right to this money because, when they first negotiated their share-crop-
ping arrangement, Mangi (who at that time was in need of money) had asked Ali
to pay 300 Birr as a sort of entry fee and had promised to pay back the money
once their cooperation ended. Now, however, Mangi refused to return the money
to Ali, arguing that they had worked together for several years, and that Ali (who
had very little land of his own) had greatly benefited from their partnership, so
that the money had effectively already been repaid.
After each side had presented its point of view, one of the church leaders rose to
speak. In a way typical of Protestant dispute resolutions, he began in very general
terms: ‘God’s Holy Word tells us to not fight with each other. So abandon your
fight and live together in peace and love... What is dividing you, are but things
of the flesh – things that will remain behind on earth [i.e. cannot be taken to
Heaven]... God blesses the one who forgives.’ As these exhortations moved nei-
ther of the disputants to give in, another of the leaders then started to gently
urge them to compromise. Both of them had a point, he asserted. Ali was right
to claim back the money if that was what had originally been agreed. But Mangi
was also right to observe that Ali had profited a lot from their cooperation. These
days, he noted, it was not uncommon for field-owners to terminate share-crop-
ping agreements after only a year or two, at a point when the partner had hardly
recovered his original investment in seeds. Mangi, by contrast, had worked faith-
fully with Ali for several years, and so Ali had gained more than he could initially
have hoped for. After the leader had gone on in this way for someminutes, Mangi
– adopting a conciliatory attitude – said that Ali had been a good partner, that
he was grateful for the economic success they had had together, that he did not
want there to be any resentment between them and that he therefore offered to
give Ali 150 Birr. Thanking him for this offer, the church leader turned to Ali and
urged him to content himself with this offer rather than to take the case to the
kebele court to sue for the full 300 Birr. Still somewhat disgruntled, but bowing
to the leader's authority, Ali agreed to this. The two disputants were then asked
to take confession (nisah [Amh.]) and to speak ‘truly from their stomach’ if they
harboured any other ill feelings.
As it turned out, there was another issue. In his nisah, which followed Mangi’s,
Ali recounted how, two or three years ago, the onions had not grown well and
Mangi’s wife had hinted that someone with the ‘evil eye’ (afi) might be respon-
sible for the poor growth. She had said this in a way that made Ali feel that she
suspected him. ‘No one has ever accused me of being aish [person with the evil
eye]’, Ali told the church leaders, ‘but this woman [pointing to Mangi’s wife, who
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had come along to the dispute resolution] is always belittling me because I am
poor.’ After Ali had finished his confession, asking forgiveness for having become
sad about both Mangi and his wife, the latter was asked by a church leader to
take confession herself since she was also implicated in the conflict. She did so,
saying that she had not meant to imply Ali had given the onions the evil eye, that
she was sorry if it had come across that way and that she asked Ali’s forgiveness.
With this apology the confessions ended; and Mangi and Ali, as well as Ali and
Mangi’s wife, were asked to hug each other. With a prayer the case was then laid
to rest, and the church leaders called in the next two disputants. (Summary of
fieldnotes, 23 May 2017)
The conflict between Mangi and Ali differs from that between Mathos and Elias
inasmuch as there is no clear-cut requirement for either of them to freely forgive
the other. As one of the church leaders points out, forgiving would be virtuous and
divinely rewarded; and it is imaginable that more committed believers might have
solved the issue that way, with one paying the 300 Birr or the other abandoning his
claim. But in Mangi and Ali’s case, neither of the two was ready to back down so
the church leaders had to negotiate a compromise between them.
Given their initial unwillingness to give in, one may well ask why they did not
take their conflict to a formal court. Addressing this question allows us to take a
closer look at the factors that move people to solve their conflicts through Protes-
tant rather than through state institutions, and also brings to light further specifics
of the Protestant mode of dispute resolution.
The first, straightforward answer to why Mangi and Ali avoided court is that
the church in Dell prohibits its members from going to court. Given that courts
inevitably impose fines (see above), filing a lawsuit against someone is seen as
equivalent to ‘making him pay’, which is impermissible for a Protestant. As one
church leader put it to me: ‘The Bible tells us to not give our brother to the hyena;
but the government will always make you pay.’ Hence, the church’s prohibition.
Moreover, drawing inspiration from 1 Corinthians 6:1–6, the church holds that be-
lievers suing each other would set a poor example for outsiders. By solving their
conflicts through the church, Protestants can instead impress unbelievers with the
peacefulness of their religion.
Under certain conditions the church will give permission for someone to go to
court.9 But anyone who goes to court without having first asked permission will
9 Among others, this may happen in the case of a conflict between a Protestant and a non-
Protestant, if the latter does not agree that the case can be handled by the church. Note,
however, that non-Protestants do sometimes agree to the church handling a conflict, because
church leaders have a reputation for being excellent at reconciling people. According to my
informants, the only cases that would not be handled by the church, but would directly be
referred to the formal system, are homicide cases.
226 Julian Sommerschuh
be punished with dakri. Literally translatable as ‘tying’ (the same term, indeed, as
the one used for ‘imprisonment’ in the kebele prison), dakri means that a person
is banned from active religious participation (praying out loud, singing in a choir
etc.) for a specified number of months. Should the person die without first having
been ‘untied’ (bul), i.e. absolved, their soul is believed to go to hell.
On top of the church’s threat of disciplinary action, there is the threat of social
disapproval. As I have said above, forgiveness and peacefulness are key values for
Protestants in Dell, and the violation of these values elicits much gossip and dis-
approbation. Therefore, those who care about being considered good Protestants
have to solve their conflicts without recourse to the formal system.
Alongside these negative incentives that deter Protestants from going to court,
there are also positive aspects of the religious mode of dispute resolution that
Protestants in Dell find attractive. To begin with, solving a case through the church
has economic advantages. For both parties it saves a lot of time, since formal law-
suits often drag on for several weeks, with people spending hours waiting in front
of the court house, or being asked by judges to return the followingweek. In church,
by contrast, cases are usually solved in one evening. For the offender – or the one
who is more likely to be found guilty – it is also financially advantageous to settle
the case in church. Although, as we have seen in Mangi’s case, Protestant dispute
resolution may involve compensation payments, these are usually lower than those
agreed in the context of litigation. This is because there is a moral expectation –
embodied by the church leaders – that the claimant compromise at least a little bit.
Thus, in the above case, Ali agreed to content himself with 150 Birr rather than to
demand the full 300 Birr originally requested.
More importantly, the church unlike the formal courts – does not levy any fees
or fines.This, of course, is hugely advantageous to the offender. But the absence of
fees also means cost benefits for the claimant, since filing a lawsuit in the kebele re-
quires paying a fee for ‘opening a dossier’ (dosi potsh) and, in some cases, for sending
a militia (auxiliary policeman) to seize the defendant.10 The church’s refusal to levy
fees and fines is not only a matter of religious principle. Unlike the kebele, which
is financially dependent on collecting fines (see footnote 4), the church is financed
through members’ tithes. Hence, the operational costs of the church’s forum for
dispute resolution – notably the food served to church leaders after a long evening
of arbitration – need not be covered by the disputants. Likewise, the church leaders
have no personal interest in imposing fines, even though they are unpaid volun-
teers. They conceive of their work as a service to God (sabite woni), which will be
rewarded with divine blessings if carried out freely.
10 Note also that costs of litigation increase massively for the claimant should the case be re-
ferred to theworeda: according to people inDell,woreda judges do not consider caseswithout
first having been bribed.
Legal pluralism and Protestant Christianity 227
Aside from the locally perceived cost and time-saving advantages of solving
conflicts through the church, another – even more meaningful – advantage relates
to social harmony. It is true that there is a culture in Dell of exhibiting one’s great-
ness or ‘heaviness’ (detsmi) through self-assertive and feisty behaviour, with litiga-
tion being one means to this end. At the same time, however, many people also
have a genuine interest in maintaining respectful and harmonious relationships
with their surroundings. As was often explained to me, life in a small place like Dell
becomes awkward and unbearable if one has to avoid someone. Thus, the Protes-
tant mode of dispute resolution’s peacefulness and capacity to repair damaged re-
lations makes it attractive. This concern with overcoming hostility and recreating
harmony is readily perceptible in the atmosphere of Protestant k’esh. Both church
leaders and disputants speak softly, often with humbly downcast eyes, and there is
none of the yelling and cursing typical of cell or kebele court hearings. Furthermore,
as Ali’s confession in the case above exemplifies, the Protestant principle that peo-
ple may only ask or grant forgiveness after having confessed all the ill feelings they
harbour toward their opponent, even though these may not directly relate to the
case, can bring to light further conflicts, which then become the subject of recon-
ciliation efforts. In this way, the Protestant mode of dispute resolution is able to
repair social relationships in a very comprehensive way. And this, I would suggest,
is one of the key things people cherish about it.
Protestantism’s impact on the formal system
In the previous section, we encountered the church’s demand that conflicts be
solved through the Protestantmode of dispute resolution, rather than by the formal
judicial system. Not every church member, of course, follows this rule: cases exist
where Protestants have demanded compensationwhere they ought to have forgiven
freely or have gone to court without the church’s permission. Yet, even though they
may sometimes fail, and even though it may not always feel easy, most Protestants
in Dell do genuinely try to forgive or compromise most of the time. With 60 per
cent of the population in Dell currently Protestant, the church is clearly an impor-
tant player in the local legal arena, providing a much-used alternative mode for
dealing with conflicts. However, Protestantism’s impact on legal life in Dell goes
even further. Beyond offering a mere ‘alternative’, there is an observable tendency
for Protestantism to also affect the way in which the local formal system operates.
In short, one could speak of a ‘Protestantization’ or – to use a slightly less awkward
term – ‘Christianization’ of local courts.
To spell out this point, I need to begin by explaining how local state institutions,
including cell and kebele courts are staffed. All people who work in state institutions
in Dell are locals. They do not get a salary, and work is quite time-consuming.
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Consequently, hardly anyone is keen to work in these institutions. However, once
appointed to office,11 one is obliged to do the job. Starting in the early 2000s, when
a Protestant was appointed as kebele chairperson for the first time, the number of
Protestants working in local state institutions has increased rapidly. Indeed, since
around 2013, all kebele staff have been Protestant. At cell level, too, Protestants are
clearly over-represented, although there remain a few cells in which the leaders
are predominantly ‘traditionalist’. The over-representation of Protestants in local
state institutions is due to the understanding – shared by ‘traditionalists’ – that
Protestants are better suited to these kinds of job because they don’t drink alcohol,
do subscribe to ideals like punctuality and industriousness, and are often literate.
The observation that almost all local officials are Protestant raises an important
question. Given that the Protestant mode of dispute resolution is deeply opposed
to the formal approach, how do Protestant cell or kebele staff deal with this contra-
diction? How, that is, do Protestant officials reconcile belonging to a religion that
demands forgiveness with working in judicial institutions that convict and punish
people?
More than an anthropologist’s musing, this is a burning question for at least
some of the local judges. As one of my interlocutors, a middle-aged man by the
name of Simon,who had recently ended his term as judge in the kebeleSocial Court,
told me:
On us Protestants, work in the kebeleweighs very heavily. God says ‘Do not judge!’
(ay berimka), but the government says ‘Beat!12 Fine! Imprison!’ (gika, kashka, dak-
erka) ... After my election, I pleaded with God. I told Him that this work [as judge]
clashed with His Word, and I prayed and prayed that God would relieve me from
my office. I also asked the church leaders to pray on my behalf, and now, finally
[after five years], my prayer has been answered and God has removed me from
this heathen work (aysafte woni). (Interview, 4 March 2017)
Having told me how God had extricated him, Simon went on to talk in more de-
tail about the dilemmas he had faced in his work. One issue was beating suspects
to extort a confession, as Simon explained: ‘The Bible does not give us authority
to beat others. All people have been created by God and one may not beat God's
creatures. So when acting as a judge, I did not permit beatings.’ Oaths were an-
other problematic point. Courts in Dell frequently make disputants or witnesses
testify under oath (tsha’x’a), on the assumption that false testimonies may result
in supernatural punishment, including death. But, as Simon asserted:
11 Appointment is either through the ‘kebele parliament’ (composed of 200 local people) or by
higher-level officials.
12 Note that Ethiopian law does not allow suspects to be beaten. In reality, however, beatings
do happen and thus local people may come to the understanding that beating is an officially
sanctioned practice.
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God says, ‘Don’t make others swear oaths’. I had read that in Matthew’s Gospel.
I was very afraid. You know, these oaths have the power to kill people. But if
someone died after I had made him swear, God would punish me. So I said I
wouldn’t make people swear. Although this may be the way of the government, I
will not follow it. The government rules over the flesh, but as a Protestant I need
to look after my soul. I need to save my soul – I need salvation for myself, do I
not? (Interview, 4 March 2017)
Simon’s account shows two things. First, it reveals how seriously he had reflected
on what it meant to work as a Protestant in state institutions. The problem, as he
sees it, is that by using certain procedures typical of the local formal system (e.g.
requiring people to swear oaths), he may be committing sin. This means nothing
less than to imperil the salvation of his soul. Second, it is clear that Simon had not
only reflected on this problem but had taken practical steps to mitigate against it.
Driven by anxiety over salvation, he decided that he would conduct court business
without recourse to beating or oath-taking. In other words, Simon introduced a
small change to how the Social Court worked in order to make it less opposed to
Protestant values. Of course, the change was not very substantial and may not be
adopted by other judges. Yet, it is noteworthy because it fits into a broader pattern,
composed of similar subtle changes, introduced by other Protestant officials. Some
further examples will help to substantiate this point. The first example concerns a
case that occurred some years prior to my fieldwork. It was related to me by Petrus,
who was vice-chairperson of the kebele at the time of the case.
The kebeleMain Court at that time had repeatedly dealt with amanwho regularly
beat his wife. The man was a drunkard and the beatings always happened when
he was intoxicated. An agreement was signed that he would pay a 200 Birr fine
to the kebele should he repeat his offence. Before long, however, his battered
wife once again appeared before the Main Court. A militia was sent out to seize
the man who admitted to the offence. Petrus, who was presiding over the court
that day, pointed out to the man that he would never stop beating his wife and
paying fines to the kebele if he did not give up alcohol. He then proposed to him
that he should become Protestant (which is locally deemed the best way to stop
drinking); and proposed that he would not have to pay the infringement fine of
200 Birr if he converted. The man agreed to convert on the spot; and it was the
judge Petrus who then went with him through the declaration of faith required
to become a Protestant. Indeed, eager to demonstrate to the new convert the
brotherliness that reigns among believers, Petrus not only did not impose a fine
but actually paid the 20 Birr fee that the man would have had to pay to themilitia
who had gone to fetch him. ‘You are a child of God, now’, Petrus recounted having
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said to the man, ‘so I will pay for you.’ Ever since – and to the satisfaction of his
wife – the man has been a Protestant. (Summary of an interview, 12 July 2017)
This example, like the previous one, shows how a Protestant logic is introduced
into the formal system. Rather than imposing a fine, Petrus dealt with the violent
drunkard by way of forgiveness. Indeed, by making conversion a precondition for
forgiveness, Petrus – from his point of view – not only respected God’s command
to not make others pay but also realized the Protestant value of making converts.
In this example, too, then, personal religious convictions find their way into the
mode of operation of public institutions.
This colouring of public institutions by religion can be seen in the cells too. In
some areas of the kebele –namely in those located at some distance from a church –
the concentration of Protestants is lower than in other areas. Therefore, since cells
bring together people from one area, some cells are – both in terms of members
and leadership – predominantly Protestant while others are predominantly tradi-
tionalist (although no cell is entirely homogeneous). It is commonly understood
among people in Dell that this difference is reflected in the legal life of the respec-
tive cells. As people repeatedly pointed out to me, and as I observedmyself, ‘there is
not a lot of fines’ (kashi beday) in Protestant-majority cells; whereas in traditionalist
cells fines are common. The reason for this is that Protestant cell leaders, when
acting as judges in the cell court, urge disputants to solve their conflicts peacefully
through confession (nisah) and forgiveness, and without payment. By contrast, in
traditionalist cells there is a stronger impulse to impose fines.This is because such
cells lack the Protestant concern with ‘not making others pay’, but also because
they believe that commensality is an important part of dispute resolution. Conse-
quently, it is common in traditionalist cells for parts of the fines imposed on the
offender to go towards hisbint dassken. Roughly translatable as ‘helping people up’,
hisbint dassken means that the offender has to provide food and drink for all cell
members, who will not leave the cell’s meeting ground until they have eaten.
One way in which Protestant logic is introduced into the cell, then, is through
the judges’ personal religious convictions.However, I have also observed cases, such
as the following one, where the church directly influenced proceedings.
OneWednesdaymorning inMarch 2017, the cell, themeeting of which I regularly
attended, dealt with the case of Doba’s dog. Some days before, a sheep belong-
ing to a man called Gizo, had been found dead, torn apart by what was suspected
to have been a dog. Gizo had then set a trap and, a day later, had indeed found a
dog caught in the trap – Doba’s dog. Bigger than any other dog in the area, and
known for its voracity, everyone agreed that this must have been the dog that had
killed Gizo’s sheep. After some discussion, the cell leaders granted Gizo’s claim
for compensation. Doba’s own sheep had recently given birth to twins, and it was
decided that – after raising them for a while – Doba was to give the two lambs
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to Gizo. A couple of weeks later, during another cell meeting, Gizo angrily told
the cell leaders that, according to Doba, one of the lambs had died. However, no
one had seen the carcass, which Doba claimed to have buried quickly, so Gizo
alleged that Doba had secretly sold the lamb. The cell judges once again sided
with Gizo, ordering Doba to pay 300 Birr to Gizo as a substitute for the lamb.
Doba was deeply angered by this decision and exclaimed before the whole cell,
‘Oh, God! How is it that my nephew deceitfully makes me pay?’ (Gizo and Doba
were indeed not only members of the same Protestant church, but Gizo was also
Doba’s sister’s son.) Soon after the meeting at which Doba had to pay 300 Birr,
Gizo fell very ill, and this illness coincided with the sudden death of two of his
sheep. He called the church leaders to pray for his healing. As is normal on such
occasions, the leaders asked him to reflect on possible sins, and Gizo mentioned
the issue with Doba. For the church leaders, Gizo’s illness was a clear case of di-
vine punishment for having sued Doba in the cell rather than having solved the
issue the Protestant way – an offence aggravated by the fact that Doba was Gizo’s
mother’s brother (irki), and thus someone to be treated with special respect. Two
of the church leaders therefore decided that they would personally go to the next
cell meeting to rectify things.
At that meeting, speaking to the assembled cell members, one of the two began
by reminding everyone that while there was, of course, the law of the govern-
ment (mengiste higi [Amh.]) and while God wanted his people to obey that law,
ultimately everyone was subject to God’s law (sabite higi). And God’s law was clear
that believers should not take each other to court. It had thus been a first mistake
for Gizo and Doba to deal with their case through the cell rather than through
the church. The decision of the (Protestant) cell leaders in favour of compensa-
tion was problematic too, since this was the type of case where damage had been
done involuntarily and free forgiveness would have been the right and necessary
response. Even worse, the church leader claimed, was that Gizo had accused his
uncle of lying and had pressed for the 300 Birr. Even if Doba had been lying, didn’t
the Bible say (at 1 Corinthians 6:7) that it is better to be wronged and cheated
than to take a fellow believer to court? To rectify things, the church leader ended,
Gizo should return the money to Doba and renounce his claim to the remaining
lamb. Gizo agreed to this, and there followed the standard Protestant ritual of
confession and forgiveness. (Summary of fieldnotes, March and April 2017)
The church leaders’ intervention in the affairs of the cell is a clear case of the church
exercising direct influence on local judicial state institutions: by making Gizo re-
turn the money and relinquish his claim to the lamb, they effectively overruled the
cell judges’ earlier decision.
By way of closing, I would like to note two conditions that make this ‘Chris-
tianization of the local judiciary’ possible. First, there exists no developed notion of
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‘secularism’ in Dell, that is, no real sense of the division between state and religion.
While people do conceptualize the two as distinct realms, they also assume there
is a clear hierarchy between them, with God ranking above the state. From their
perspective, therefore, there is nothing unusual or critique-worthy in church lead-
ers intervening in state affairs. Second, the particular nature of state institutions
at the grass-roots level permits the kind of religious influence seen here. Unlike
at higher levels of the state, the kebele has very little in the way of clear procedural
rules. To a large extent, the local kebele staffs have to decide how they are going to
run the local state institutions, and this relative absence of strict procedural rules
allows the religious background of the local officials to influence their work.
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated legal pluralism in a southwest Ethiopian community.
It has brought to light three coexistent modes of dealing with conflicts: customary,
formal and Protestant. The customary mode aims at reconciliation, and draws on
the key practices of humiliation of the offender, compensation of the victim, pu-
rification of both disputants, and commensality. Formal litigation is antagonistic
rather than reconciliatory. Though sometimes requiring disputants to find a solu-
tion through out-of-court negotiation, local courts in the end always impose fines
and often sentence offenders to short-term imprisonment. Protestant dispute res-
olution shares with customary dispute resolution a concern with reconciliation and
restoring peaceful relationships, but it also differs in some profound ways: it does
not allow for the humiliation of the offender, but asks humility of the victim, too;
it does not permit compensation claims where damage has been done involuntar-
ily, and requires compromise where conflicts are the result of intentional action;
and it does not require the offender to provide food or drink for commensality. In
positive terms, the key principle of Protestant dispute resolution is forgiveness.
Over the past few decades, 60 per cent of the population of Dell have converted
to Protestantism.This means that an ever greater number of people has started to
use the Protestant rather than the customary mode of dispute resolution. This is
a first reason for considering Protestantism an important player in the legal arena
in Dell. A second reason became visible through a closer inspection of the relation
between the Protestant and the formal system. Protestantism, as I have shown, is
deeply opposed to the antagonistic logic of litigation and the imposition of pun-
ishments. Believers are not only prohibited from going to court (at least, without
having previously obtained the church’s permission), but Protestants working as
judges in the kebele or cell courts also bring to bear Protestant principles on these
institutions. Driven by anxieties over salvation and enabled both by Protestantism’s
moral authority and a relative lack of clear procedural rules, these Protestant offi-
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cials sometimes draw on the logic of forgiveness rather than on that of punishment.
Clearly, this tendency is still in a nascent stage. Yet, it does not seem unlikely that if
the number of Protestants in Dell grows even further, Protestantism’s influence on
the functioning of local formal institutions will also increase. All in all, this shows
that Protestantism in Dell is a legal player to be reckoned with.
Whether or not this is true in other places in Ethiopia could well be the ob-
ject of further inquiry. In advancing the study of legal pluralism in this direction,
the following questions could be of help. What role does Protestantism play in ur-
ban settings, as opposed to rural areas? What differences are there between places
where Protestants are in the majority and where they are in the minority? Can
Protestant influence on state institutions also be observed at higher levels, such as
woreda or zone? To what extent are there differences with regard to legal matters
between different types of Protestants, such as Evangelicals and Pentecostals? And
is forgiveness also a key principle elsewhere, or do other Protestants in Ethiopia
emphasize different principles and parts of the Bible? Considering these and other
questions, I hope, would help broaden what is already a very rich and lively debate
on legal pluralism in Ethiopia.
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11. Kontract: A hybrid form of law among the Sidama
Muradu Abdo
Introduction
Three legal regimes govern the Sidama’s land.These partly support and partly com-
pete with and contradict each other, leading recently to the emergence of new dis-
putes and concerns.
The three legal systems are utuwa (customary land law), state land laws and kon-
tract (a new hybrid form of land law). Utuwa refers to Sidama customary norms and
institutions, under which individual farmers enjoy usufruct rights over agricultural
landwhile the ownership rights reside with the clans. State land laws, including the
1995 Federal Constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE 1995), stipulate that the right to own-
ership of rural and urban land is exclusively vested in the state and in the peoples
of Ethiopia. The statutory land laws further guarantee the rural masses usufruct
rights over agricultural land, and prohibit the sale or exchange of such land. Kon-
tract – the main focus of this chapter – straddles state land laws and utuwa, and
exhibits hybrid characteristics. It is enshrined in written agreements concluded
between an akonatari (transferor) and a tekonatari (transferee) regarding the perma-
nent transfer of agricultural land by the former to the latter. The use of the written
form and attempts to inject validity into it through both authentication and ref-
erence to state law give kontract a semblance of modernity. Yet, kontract is clothed
with components of Sidama customary land tenure: it involves elders as witnesses,
it ends with a fenter (special feast to mark the conclusion of a kontract), it imposes
hefty fines should parties break their promise, and it makes elders responsible for
reconciling the parties should they disagree on the kontract and ostracizing those
who resort to invalidation.
Being a mixture of modernity and tradition, one would expect kontract to be an
interesting case of cooperation and harmonization of state law and customary law.
However, as will be shown in this chapter, in practice kontract often results in land
alienation.
Informal land transfers have been observed in other peri-urban and cash-crop
growing sections of southern Ethiopia and beyond. In parts of the study area where
the value of land is high, they have also become common, whether designated as
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kontract or given another name.The proliferation of kontract has triggered disputes.
For example, a local court administrator estimated that 70 per cent of court cases
in the research site related to land disputes, one-third of which concerned kon-
tract.1Though there are studies on large-scale formal land transfers (Dessalegn 2011,
Makki 2014), only marginal attention has been paid to the widespread micro-land
transfer schemes; and the extent and prevalence of informal land alienations, as
well as their dispossessing consequences for the poor, has been neglected.
This chapter examines the nature of kontract: how it is viewed by various actors,
and its implications for agricultural land alienation, which results in smallholders
losing their livelihoods, and for rural land reform.2 It is arranged as follows: after
giving a brief profile of the Sidama land and people, I will provide some theoretical
and comparative discussions with respect to informal land transfer practices before
moving on to the main part of this contribution. First, I will sketch out the fun-
damentals of Sidama traditional land rights, land rights under the contemporary
formal land laws of Ethiopia, and the concept and practice of kontract as a hybrid
form of land law. Next, I will describe and analyse kontract from the perspective of
Ethiopian lawmakers, the local people and regular courts. Then, I will single out
factors that contribute to or correlate with the emergence and prevalence of kon-
tract in the Sidama area and beyond. Finally I will investigate the existence of power
imbalances between akonatari and tekonatari. In the final section, discussions and
conclusion, I look at the practice of kontract from three perspectives – those of an
economist, a legal positivist, and a legal pluralist – before concluding with a reflec-
tion on kontract and its wider effects, and how these could be addressed through
land reform.
Sidama Zone and people
The Sidama people are speakers of the Cushitic Sidama language. They live in
Sidama Zone, which is located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peo-
1 Interview 14 September 2012.
2 The chapter ismainly based on qualitative data collected through interviews and focus group
discussionswith farmers, elders, policymakers, judges, researchers, public servants and legal
practitioners, as well as observation in the study area for a total of two months, between
September andDecember 2012, in April and June 2013, and inNovember 2015, 2016 and 2017.
It builds on literature, relevant federal and regional constitutional provisions and legislative
frameworks, court cases and comparative experience.
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ples Regional State (SNNPRS) in the south central plateau of Ethiopia, about 265
kilometres south of Addis Ababa.3
Sidama Zone has a total of 6,972.1 square kilometres. According to the 2007
national population census, its population 3 million people in 2006, 90 per cent
of which lived in rural areas, and its annual population growth rate was 2.9 per
cent (CSA 2010). It is one of the most populous areas in southern Ethiopia, with
a density of 451 people per square kilometre (CSA 2010). The Sidama land features
diverse agro-ecologies including semi-arid and arid areas inhabited by pastoralists.
With its beneficial climatic conditions, land fertility, economically valuable land
and cash-crop production, Sidama can be seen as representative of the productive
part of Ethiopia.
The Sidama predominately practise sedentary agriculture. They produce ensete
(false banana), a highly drought-resistant staple food crop, cereals and legumes,
and they also rear livestock. Small farmers in Sidama are also known for growing a
type of organic Coffea Arabica. At present, around 70,000 hectares of good agricul-
tural land is given over to coffee production, the sales of which bolster Ethiopia’s
foreign currency funds, and which formally links the Sidama to the global econ-
omy. The area also supplies animal skins and hides, and khat (a stimulant plant)
for export nationally. The average farmland holding in the area is 0.3 hectare per
household; this is smaller than both the national and regional averages, which are
0.8 ha and 1.01 hectare per family, respectively (SNNPRS Report n.d.). While cities
and towns house only 10 per cent of the population of the Sidama Zone, there is a
high degree of urbanization, as reflected in the urban population growth rate of 5
per cent and in the proliferation of towns (CSA 2010).
The Sidama people were incorporated into greater Ethiopia in the second half
of the nineteenth century.The Sidama territory is divided between nine sub-clans,
each of which controls its own sub-territory. There are various degrees of hostility
and alliance amongst the sub-clans and with neighbouring ethnic groups (Hamer
2002, Aadland 2002).
Land rights and legal pluralism
Legal pluralism and its disempowering effects
There are several commonalities in the literature on legal pluralism. Firstly, legal
pluralism pervades human society.Thus, the state is no longer the exclusive source
3 The SNNPRS is one of the nine regional states recognized by the Constitution. Administra-
tively, the SNNPRS is broken down intomore than a dozen zones and several special districts.
Each zone is divided intoworedas (districts), which in turn are split into kebeles (sub-districts).
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of law since multiple legal orders co-exist in the same social field and same space
at the same time. Secondly, such multiple legal orders may exist at international,
national and local levels (Helfand 2015). Thirdly, legal pluralism appears to regard
social justice as being of ‘prime importance to legal validity’ (Barzilai 2008:402).
Legal pluralism has been addressed by two theoretical approaches: relation-
alism and consequentialism. Relationalism focuses on the nature of plural legal
orders as well as on the competition, conflict and cooperation between them, and
their influence on each another. Consequentialism, which is the focus here, as-
serts that the effect of a plural legal order may be empowering or disempowering,
depending on an actor’s capacity to negotiate. On the one hand, when legal plural-
ism produces empowerment, it offers a greater scope for human agency as there
is negotiability of interests in the course of re/making laws, through the access to
different legal forums, and thus availability of normative and institutional choice
(forum shopping) and the potential for procedural and institutional innovation or
rule adaptation (Meingzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002: 27). This means legal plural-
ism can have an empowering effect provided that ‘communities and households are
able to better adapt themselves to change and retain their entitlements…to negoti-
ate, bargain and reorganize relationships of production and exchange’ (Parthasathy
2002:22). On the other hand, legal pluralism can bring about disempowerment
where there are power imbalances among actors – due to impoverishment, gen-
der and other vulnerabilities – that adversely affect the legitimate interests of the
weak.
Prevalence of informal land transfer practices in other African countries
Land in Africa is governed by pluralistic legal regimes, as evidenced by the infor-
mal land transfer practices that are not uncommon inmany areas of the Continent.
Land alienation practices, for example, in Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Tanza-
nia exhibit some shared features. The practices are prominently observed in peri-
urban and cash-crop growing parts, and are disguised as rent, mortgages, or the
sale of perennial plants and fixtures. Such deals occur in times of financial distress
and use a mix of customary and statutory norms and institutions (Lund 2000).
Government officials recognize the practices through attestation, authentication
and registration. Such recognition is not necessarily compatible with state law and
may, in fact, at times conflict with or undermine age-old customs and legislation
that proscribe land sales (Lund 2000). State recognition of informal land transfers
makes it impossible for a transferee to get their land restituted. Land recovery is
also made unfeasible by economic power imbalances, which tend to tilt in favour
of the buyers: ‘land is often irredeemable as a goat sold on the market place’ (Lund
2000:7–8).These land transfer practices are seen to generate conflicts and disputes,
which arise in the course of attempts to recover land (Shivji 2009).
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Informal land transfer practices in Ethiopia
Informal land deals are prevalent in several parts of Ethiopia. In Oromia National
Regional State (ONRS), for example, small farmers in Western Wollega, Ilubabor
and Jimma have been displaced by urban elites who bought their coffee plants
(Pausewang 2000). This forced policy makers in ONRS to conduct diagnostic re-
search, which revealed that many peasants had become victims of kontract (Gudeta
2009:125). In particular, peasants in coffee and khat-growing areas of ONRS have
been evicted from their land as a result of the sale of the coffee and khat to un-
scrupulous urban bourgeoisie,4 a practice which has caused social problems, ac-
cording to Gudeta Seifu (2009:135):
The sale transactions usually take place when the landholders are in distress and
in dire need of finance to meet their basic needs. The farmers who have already
alienated their holdings are now financially in a precarious position… for they
lost their livelihood. In effect, this has brought devastating …[social] effects.
Land deals under the rubric of kontract are also taking place in other parts of Oro-
mia. The most well known example occurred in Meki, a small town located along
the road from Addis Ababa to Hawassa and close to the Awash River plains, which
makes it suitable for horticulture. The local authorities ascertained in early 2012
that a total of 700 small farmers had lost their land to either individual or com-
mercial farmers with urban origins – who began growing vegetables and fruits –
under kontract, the terms of which sometimes extended to 99 years, violating the
legal limit of 5–15 years for a lease. Some of these commercial farmers rented land
for 1,000 to 1,400 ETB per hectare per season, with advance payments covering
several years (The Ethiopian Reporter, 6 January 2012).
As discussed below, one force driving small farmers to engage in these deals is
the lack of agricultural support systems, such as loans, to enable them to benefit
from their land. Commercial farms are resource intensive – requiring irrigation,
water pumps, fuel, seed selection, fertilizers, shades and labour – and the costs
of these inputs cannot be covered by smallholders. Moreover, as one local official
noted, ‘those who acquire land from smallholder farmers aremuchmore organized
and networked than we expect” (quoted in The Ethiopian Reporter, 6 January 2012).
According to Gudeta (2009:140), it is not possible to stop investors from acquiring
land from small landholders for commercial ends via enforcement of the formal law
alone. As will be considered in later in this chapter, small farmers are selling out
their land to rich people as such farmers do not have the ability to utilize their land.
Some of the purchasers are rewarded for using such land apparently efficiently. For
instance, one investor who had accumulated more than 20 million Birr by growing
4 Interview with judges 29 April 2013.
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vegetables on several hectares of land acquired through kontract, resulting in the
displacement of about fifty households5, was given a prize for being amodel farmer
by both the regional authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture.6
Three kinds of land rights in Sidama
Sidama traditional land rights
The Sidama people recognize two types of land tenure: dannawa (communal land)
and utuwa (private land). The underlying principle behind both dannawa and utuwa
is that land is the common property of a clan (gosa), but that individuals have access
to and can use the land on the basis of clan membership (Markos et al. 2011).
Dannawa is composed of roughly demarcated pasture lands belonging to sub-
clans and forests outside utuwa dedicated to the use of members of the particu-
lar sub-clan, or of several sub-clans in common, for grazing, hunting, beekeeping,
extraction of forest resources (e.g. firewood and wild fruits), social and cultural
sites and market places (Markos et al. 2011). Dannawa can, under exceptional situa-
tions, be distributed to individual members of a sub-clan.This could happen when
a household is facing a shortage of farmland because of changes in demography
or in order to accommodate outsiders. Otherwise no one is allowed to privately
appropriate dannawa. Historically, dannawa was placed under the administrative
and judicial jurisdiction of the highest clan council (songo), who determined the
use rights of this communal land and settled disputes relating to it. Both utuwa
and dannawa could not be subject to alienation. Access to and use of the two land
tenure types has traditionally enabled Sidama households to make an adequate
living (Markos et al. 2011).
Utuwa is themore prominent kind of customary land tenure among the Sidama
(Markos et al. 2011:71). The utuwa is said to have been inherited from a distant an-
cestor who occupied and developed it and then passed it on to his descendants.
As such, today utuwa is privately held agricultural land expected to be passed on
to male descendants, and every male has the customary right to receive a plot of
farmland from his father’s utuwa when he comes of age and gets married. The un-
derlying principle is that land is an inalienable common property of a clan, but
with individual access based essentially on clan membership (Hamer 2002). As a
local youth leader expressed it:
5 InterviewwithDaniel Behailu, researcher from the School of LawHawassa University on land
policy and law, 26 November 2012.
6 Recently renamed the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
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Utuwa means ‘tomb’. It is the ancestors’ burial ground. It is also land, which you
till, you drive your living from, which is passed onto you by your father who
received it from his father, which you have to hand over to your descendants. It is
a taboo to sell land; it is even prohibited to mention the word ‘sale’ in regard to
land. If you dare sell part of your land, you will be cursed by the ancestors’ spirit.
There is a belief that once you sell a part of your plot, you do not stop short of
selling out your entire land, and if you happen to sell your land as a whole, you
are deemed to be a cursed person and as such you must disappear from the area
as you did a shameful thing and are not worthy to be member of your locality.
Sale of one`s ancestral ground makes one a social outcast as he who does that
must leave the village for fear of being burnt by the eyes of ancestors. (Interview,
12 October 2012)
Land alienation to non-clan members occurs rarely. When it does, it is preceded
by collective deliberation and consultation among the clan members of the man
selling the land, and only after close family members and the sub-clan have been
given first refusal on buying the land in question. In addition, the potential buyer
must be welcomed by the seller’s clan.7 The entire process of land alienation is
therefore a collective decision, and is as good as accepting the person who acquires
the land into the sub-clan: by virtue of the transaction, the buyer changes his clan
membership and becomes one of them.
National law and land rights
The 1995 Federal Constitution of Ethiopia tacitly classifies rights over land into two
categories: ownership and subordinate rights (Art. 40), stipulating that ‘the right
to ownership of rural and urban land is … exclusively vested in the state and in the
peoples of Ethiopia’ (Art. 40[3]). Subordinate rights over land,whichmay be termed
as usufruct rights, have several dimensions and have been further elaborated in the
Constitution and state land legislation.
First, the Constitution bestows usufruct rights over agricultural land to all
Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists without payment (Art. 40 [4 & 5]).These rights
have been extended by offering agricultural land for an indefinite period of time
to ‘any citizen of the country … who wants to engage in agriculture for a living’
and who has no other adequate means of earning a livelihood.8 Second, usufruct
rights accorded to peasants are not given to the head of a farming family or any
particular member therein; the right is bestowed on the farming family as a unit
7 Interview with a local elder, 12 October 2012, and with a legal practitioner, 8 June 2013.
8 The Federal Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No. 456, 2005 (hereinafter
Proclamation No 456, 2005), Art. 5; The Rural Lands Proclamation No. 31, 1975 (hereinafter
Proc. No 31, 1975), Art. 4.
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and as a going concern.9 It remains the right of the current and future members
of such families considered collectively and inter-generationally so long as one of
them continues farming. Hence, it is a right given to the living and the yet to be
born members of such rural households.10 The main legal implication for the joint
nature of usufruct rights is that no member of a household, in particular the head,
can validly transfer the rights without the free consent of all the other members.11
Finally, the Constitution enshrines the principle of non-eviction of peasants and
herders from their land.12 One of the top priorities of the Ethiopian Government is
‘to protect the rural poor from the risk of losing their land’ (De Schutter 2011:532).
The constitutional commitment to protect peasants from eviction from their land
refers to the state itself as well as to non-state forces, such as investors or commu-
nity authorities. Article 40(3) also protects peasants from their own folly by ruling
out any meaningful transfer of land rights through the formal market channels,
stating that: ‘Land…shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange’.
Peasants are only allowed to rent out part of their land, for a short period of time,
with the consent of concerned family members and the prior approval of local
authorities.13 These restrictions on the marketability of land usufruct rights are
linked with the overriding essence of the existing rural land law of Ethiopia, which
views land as a subsistence asset for peasants and pastoralists.14
Concept and practice of kontract: a hybrid form of law
The etymology of the term ‘kontract’15 is obscure. It seems that it originated in
the English term ‘contract’, which is pronounced in Amharic as ‘’ (kontract) and in
Sidama language it as ‘kontracta’. The Sidama people’s inclination to use the term
kontract instead of kontracta lies in the fact that Amharic, as the lingua franca of
Ethiopia, is widely spoken there. It is also used interchangeably with the Amharic
translation of the English term ‘contract’, which is (wule). There is, however, a fun-
damental difference between the two terms. While the term ‘wule’ does not nec-
essarily imply the existence of a definite term in a given agreement, the notion
of kontract suggests the existence of a fixed period in a transaction. The practice
9 Proc No. 31, 1975, Article 4; Proc No 456, 2005, Art 8(2).
10 The Federal Constitution, 1995, Art. 40 (7); Proc No. 456, 2005, Art 2 (4).
11 Proc No 456, 2005, Art. 8.
12 The Federal Constitution, Art. 40 (6); and Art. 40 (4&5).
13 Proc No 456, 2005, Art. 8.
14 Rural Development Policies and Strategies of Ethiopia (Ministry of Information 2001)
15 Nomenclature-wise, local people use the words ‘kontract’ and ‘kontrata’ as synonyms to de-
scribe the practice. However, during my fieldwork for this chapter, I realized that the inhab-
itants use the former much more frequently than the latter both in their day-to-day conver-
sations and in written documents relating to these transactions, so I have chosen to follow
their example here.
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among the Sidama people shows that by kontract they mean a written agreement
concerning a plot of agricultural land, concluded between akonatari (transferor) and
tekonatari (transferee) with a view to permanently transferring the land from the
former to the latter. In short, it is a sale agreement.
Kontract is a Janus-faced transaction. On the one hand, parties to a kontract in-
corporate into it elements of the modern notion of ‘contract’. For example, they
reduce kontract to a written statement, affix their signatures to it, have it attested
by witnesses and even sometimes have it authenticated by relevant government
offices. In addition, kontract is clothed with modernity by the inclusion, in cross-
references, of some of the provisions of the Country’s Civil Code. On the other
hand, kontract embodies components of the Sidama customary land tenure. For
instance, in most cases elders help the parties reach an agreement and serve as
witnesses. Other elements of Sidama custom which are made part of kontract in-
clude the organization of a feast (fenter) to mark the conclusion of the agreement16,
the indication of hefty fines (monetary and customary visitations) should a party
break their word, and the elders’ obligation to reconcile the parties in the event of
a dispute or to ostracize or even curse anyone who breaks the kontract.
It should nevertheless be noted that parties to a kontract never openly call it a
land sale agreement; instead they disguise the transaction as a sale of coffee or khat
bushes, fruit trees or other types of immovable property. This implies the eventual
restitution of the land related to the transaction and suggests that kontract is a
land rental agreement, a temporary transfer of land use rights. As such, it would
seem to lead to a landlord – tenant relationship.However, in reality, this immovable
property rarely exists on the transferred land and kontract does not relate to the sale
of property on the land but simply involves the transfer of a piece of bare farmland.
If some crops, fruit trees, ground works or huts on the land are transferred with
the land, this is merely incidental. As one community leader/farmer expressed it,
kontract ‘is a twisted form of an ordinary land rental transaction’.17
During imperial times, such land deals were not disguised, but were openly
labelled ‘kontract for the sale of farmland’ as land sales were legal. The change in
nomenclature began to occur in the mid 1990s, when the parties involved and the
land deal facilitators, such as agricultural extension workers and lawyers, realized
that the law prohibited land sales. From then on, the term ‘sale’ was avoided; it was
replaced by terms such as sharecropping, kontract and rental, used to pretend that
only immovable property on the land or land use rights were being transferred.18
16 A fentermay consist in having some local drinks or just paying somemoney to the elders who
helped themmake the deal and ultimately served as witnesses.
17 Interview, 18 September 2012.
18 Interview with a local farmer, 22 December 2012.
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Therefore, kontract embodies a rejection of a fundamental common tenet of
both the present state land tenure and Sidama custom: the inalienability of land.
Moreover, as will be shown below, kontract is a blend of state land tenure and
Sidama customary land tenure.
Different views on kontract
Kontract and formal law
As mentioned above, under the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia and as reiterated in
various subordinate laws, land cannot be subject to sale or any other means of
exchange, and any practice or decision that authorizes transfer of ownership over
rural land is of no effect. Specifically, it is unlawful for an informal land seller to
assume an obligation to deliver ownership or even usufruct over rural land to a land
buyer. Similarly, it is illegal for a purchaser to assume an obligation to pay for the
transfer of ownership or usufruct in regard to rural land. So, from the standpoint
of the formal land law, land alienation deals – regardless of their age – should
be struck down for transgressing the supreme law of the land. A joint reading of
Article 1845 and Article 1810(1) of the Civil Code sends the message that contracts
tainted with unlawful objects are not subject to prescription. This is because the
phrase ‘Unless otherwise provided by law…’ in Article 1854 suggests so. Thus, any
deal relating to land sale remains invalid under the state law.
Local views on kontract
Many land deals are made with kontract, even though the local people are well aware
of its risks and disadvantages.
A model farmer and community leader residing in Sidama Zone compared kon-
tract deals with ‘a black market for the sale of a farmland’, stating that he had never
seen such land being restituted to the landholder.19 During a focus group discus-
sion, a land administration expert described the situation as follows:
They sell the land, claiming that the land is rented out for any period between 40
and 99 years or even for life. According to the law in force, the maximum period
for which a peasant can rent out their land is 25 years when dealing with an
investor, 10 years when the deal is between peasants. They do it between those
who trust each other. It is a deal based on trust. We cannot do anything about
informal land deals. The seller is not benefiting out of it. It is a puzzle for us. The
19 Interview, 14 September 2012.
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peasant is selling land by using the language of state land law, which permits land
rentals, but for completely different purpose. (Interview, 14 September 2012)
As indicated by a focus group discussion with female-headed households, an
akonatari – often a household head – enters into a land deal with the tekonatari
without securing the consent of his family members, contrary to what is required
by state land laws.20 In addition, the kontract is not submitted to the relevant
authorities for registration and approval in the initial stage because they might
hamper the transfer process, even though they might know about the transaction
informally and even cooperate. As several different informants – farmers, officials
and the police – told me, land-related corruption has become common. Stein
Holden (2012:10), who has undertaken research in the Sidama area, observed:
… the courts favour the wealthy who can afford to pay for decisions in their favour.
If people do not pay, the cases may take a very long time… cases [land related]
are decided through mobile phones, meaning that the wealthy and influential
have mobile phones and communicate easily with the court judges while the
poor have to travel and wait for long time for their cases to be handled and for
communicating their situation. Decisions may also be based on family ties.
The tekonatari is often a member of the rural elite or a trader with urban roots
deemed to be a ‘model farmer’ by national and local politicians.21 They are people
capable of paying for the land and investing in it; they may invoke tradition to
shame an akonatari that demands the return of the land; and they can litigate all the
way from the sub-district land administration committee right up to the Federal
Supreme Court. The tekonatarimakes use of a mixture of elements of state law and
of Sidama traditional land tenure rules and processes to make his land deal secure,
then uses his influence and connections to register the land subject to the kontract
in his name.22
As one judge told me, most cases (80 per cent) dealt with in the district courts
are rural land disputes, out of which 30 per cent relate to kontract.23 As I was told
by several lawyers and judges,24 practising lawyers play an important role in the
legalization process of kontract – they draft kontracts, have them authenticated and
defend them in court – despite the fact that they are fully aware of the nature and
negative consequences of kontract.25
20 Focus group discussion with local farmers, 16 September 2012.
21 Interview with a Sidama elder, 18 September 2012.
22 Interviews with local farmers, 14 and 18 September 2012.
23 Interview, 17 September 2012.
24 Interview, 14 September 2012.
25 Ambreena Manji (2012:467) describes lawyers playing a similar role in Kenya, facilitating
small-scale land grabs: ‘the legal profession, far from upholding the rule of law, has played
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The increasing use of kontract is, in part, the result of changes to koota, a share-
cropping arrangement used to match land with labour and/or other inputs. Koota
has served as a social safety net for those who have land but are unable to work it for
various reasons, including ill health, old age, absence from the land while working
elsewhere, or destitution. Land left in the care of widows may also be left untended
as cultural barriers prevent widows working on the land. In such cases, sharecrop-
ping arrangements – usually lasting for one or two seasons – traditionally came
into play. Under this arrangement, the net profits from the harvest would go to
the landholder. These could range from a quarter to three-quarters of the harvest
after the deduction of expenses, depending on the nature and size of the contri-
bution of the landholders and sharecroppers. Recently, koota has become a kind of
precursor to kontract. Sharecroppers usually grow permanent crops such as cof-
fee, khat and sugar cane and would, therefore, prefer to keep the land. To achieve
this, having first become a sharecropper, a potential tekonatari extends loan after
loan to the landholder until they are heavily indebted. This gives the sharecropper
a bargaining chip with which to pressurize the landholder to enter into kontract.26
Kontract in the courts
When disputes emanating from kontract reach the regular courts, they are chal-
lenged, as the courts must handle such disputes in the context of opposing consti-
tutional provisions, subsidiary land laws and Sidama custom.
Pre-empting court litigation
A tekonatari who foresees and endeavours to pre-empt court litigation by the
akonatari will use elements of customary and state law selectively. To this end,
as mentioned above, the kontract is made in writing with the attestation of three
to seven elders. The written kontract indicates, inter alia, that hefty fines will be
levied on any party who opts to invalidate the kontract, stating therein that part of
the fine will go to the state treasury and part to the elders. Coupled with this is
the obligation on the part of the akonatari to repay the entire sale price should he
demand restitution.
Should an akonatari move to attack a deal, among the sanctions based on cus-
tomary law that can be read into the kontract is ostracism; this means that the
akonatari is cut off from his vital day-to-day social relations. As one informant put
a central role in (…) using its professional skills and networks to accumulate personal wealth
for itself and others’.
26 As explained to in interviews with a local farmer, 12 September 2012 and with a Sidama
farmer, 14 September 2012.
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it: ‘A person who is excluded from society in this way is regarded as a dead per-
son.’ John Hamer (1998:151), who studied the Sidama extensively, expressed it this
way: ‘To seek to escape normative pressure is to invite social isolation and ulti-
mately destruction by the Creator.’ Elders, who are indicated as witnesses in the
kontract will, therefore, try to dissuade the akonatari from seeking to invalidate the
deal, threatening him with exclusion from society, customary visitations, and ul-
timately cursing – the most feared sanction.27 If the akonatari yields to the elders’
demands, he is compelled to abandon his intention to file a lawsuit, or withdraw
it if he has already filed it, and reconcile with the buyer. Even in this scenario, he
may be ordered to pay a fine, usually slaughtering an animal to mark the end of the
reconciliation. The heavy fine indicated in the kontract might be reduced or waived
altogether depending on the circumstances of the case.
All these tactics, especially the use of traditional sanctions, tip such lands deals
in favour of the tekonatari, and run counter to the fundamental tenets of utuwa, as
well as state land laws. To suit the interests of elites it seems that new practices are
being grafted onto traditional elements.28
Overcoming pre-emptory measures
Some akonatari refuse to be cowed by tradition, and show signs of breaking away
from it. For example, some use a family member who did not sign the kontract to
complain to the court that the kontract is invalid as it was done without their con-
sent.29 Finding a family member who was not part of a kontract is not a problem be-
cause land transfers in the locality are mostly done unilaterally by the family heads,
as permitted by Sidama patriarchy. When the prompted family member goes to
court to seek the invalidation of the kontract, the instigator (i.e. the akonatari) plays
the role of Good Samaritan, pretending to dissuade their relative from dragging
the tekonatari into court.30 In some cases, the person seeking to battle it out in the
court genuinely opposes the akonatari’s unilateral act; either way kontract cases end
up in the regular courts.
27 InterviewwithDaniel Behailu, researcher from the School of LawHawassa University on land
policy and law, 22 December 2012; see also Seyoum (2006:96).
28 My fieldwork reveals that the Sidama categorize their elders into two: ‘people’s elders’ and
‘government elders’. The former are conservative, authentic, fear the sceptre of the spirit of
ancestors, incorrupt, faithful to custom and rarely involved in kontract. When kontract cases
are submitted to them, they tend to decide in favour of the akonatari, invoking utuwa.Govern-
ment elders act to the contrary. In particular, they offer services related to dispute resolution
formoney, are regarded as corrupt and facilitate kontractmuchmore frequently and in favour
of the tekonatari. This taxonomy warrants a separate study.
29 Interview with a lawyer, 22 December 2012.
30 Interview with a judge, 14 September 2012, and interview with Daniel Behailu, researcher
from the School of Law Hawassa University on land policy and law, 8 June 2013.
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Invalidating kontract
The akonatari invokes the concept of contract invalidation on the grounds that the
land deal was unlawful, claiming that the agreementwas underpinned by a promise
to deliver land ownership or land use rights contrary to the law of the land. The
pleading is based on cumulative reading of the constitutional provisions, which
ban land alienation, and Article 1808(2) of the Civil Code, which provides that
A contract whose object is unlawful…may be invalidated at the request of any
contracting party or interested third party (because) obligations to convey rights on
things, if the latter are not in commercio, that is, are made non-transferable (non-
conveyable) by law, the obligation is clearly unlawful (Krzeczunowic 1983:64–65).
Before September 2011, the decisions of the state courts (i.e. district and zonal
courts) in the Sidama area on such kontract cases lacked uniformity, varying from
court to court, from judge to judge in the same court, and even from case to case
heard by the same judge. As an SNNPRS Supreme Court judge explained, in some
cases, the kontract was invalidated and the tekonatari ordered to return the land. In
others, judgments went in favour of the tekonatari, who retained the land. While
in others, judges applied a ten-year period of limitation relating to contracts in
general embodied in Article 1845 of the Civil Code, which provided that ‘actions
for the invalidation of a contract shall be barred if not brought within ten years’.
This meant that, if ten years had lapsed from of the effective date of the kontract,
the akonatari’s claim would be rejected; if less than ten years had elapsed, then the
tekonatari was required to restitute the land. This variation in the handling of kon-
tract cases was widely witnessed in state courts in the Sidama Zone, and the lack of
uniformity in the decisions of regular courts on thematter also prevailed elsewhere
in the SNNPRS, where areas given over to cash crops frequently witnessed – and
continue to see – deals made under the rubric of kontract.31
In September 2011, concernedwith the inconsistencies around how kontract dis-
putes were being handled, the SNNPR Supreme Court adopted a uniform position
on the disposition of kontract cases through a Circular, which was approved by a
forum that brought together all the court presidents in the region. The Circular
stated that kontract should be treated like any other ordinary agreement and, as
such, those legal rules governing contracts in general should apply to these deals
as well. According to the Circular, one of these stipulations was the aforementioned
Article 1845 of the Civil Code. The Circular also assumed that the intention of the
parties at the time of the conclusion of a kontract was clearly to transfer ownership
over land: there was no intention on the part of the parties to restitute the land at a
certain point in the future. Under the Circular, land subject to kontractwas assumed
to have gone out of the hands of the akonatari forever. Based on this assumption,
31 Interview with SNNPRS Supreme Court judge, 25 September 2012.
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the Circular divided kontract agreements into two types: those for which ten years
or more had elapsed between the date of conclusion and that of filing for invalida-
tion; and those for which less than ten years had elapsed. The former were to be
barred from the courts by the period of limitation; the latter were to be be struck
down, leading to the restitution of the disputed land to the akonatari.
The standard justification for the application of the period of limitation is that
it is difficult to find evidence for deals that are over ten years old, much having
been destroyed or witnesses having died.32 Providing certainty around investment
activities and discouraging people from sleeping on their rights for an intolerable
amount of time are further cited as justifications for the ten-year limitation. How-
ever, the underlying reason for the courts not to evict a tekonatari is that they are
regarded as ‘land improvers’. As one judge observed:
Declaring kontract illegal and consequent land restitution amount to evicting
the developer. We judges have to consider the prevailing interest in the society,
which is not to restitute the land to the seller. (Interview, 21 September 2012)
A woreda (district) court judge also told me:
We currently decide in favour of the ‘developer’, the one who is currently work-
ing on the land. (…). There is a need to prevent a socio-economic crisis, as such
transactions are rife. People genuinely thought that the transactions they have
undertaken are legitimate and hence have been using the land for a longer period
of time. (Interview, 17 September 2012)
In 2015, the SNNPRS Supreme Court turned round and annulled the conditional
recognition of kontract, deciding that all kontracts are illegal and therefore invalid
and that the passage of time should not save a kontract from invalidation, so all
land subject to kontract must be restituted to the akonatari.33 However, the Federal
Supreme Court Cassation Division, whose decisions are binding at all levels of fed-
eral and regional courts34, has taken two positions with regard to the practice of
kontract: the first is the invalidation of agreements that expressly transfer land35;
32 SNNPRS Supreme Court Cassation Division Case, File No. 36888, October 2010.
33 SNNPRS Supreme Court Cassation Division File No. 64745, May 16, 2015.
34 Federal Courts Proclamation Amendment Proc. No 454, 2005, Art. 2(1).
35 This is reflected in the decision to nullify a farmland sale agreement thatwas explicitly desig-
nated as such. In this case, the court also decided that a period of limitation was inapplicable
(Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No, 110549, February 2016). The position was further
applied in the court’s decision to invalidate a land mortgage agreement given in the form
of security for a loan (Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No 79394, September, 2012). The
court has also applied the same approach by invalidating an agreement to transfer rural land
in consideration of settlement of a debt (Federal Supreme Court Cassation File No 49200,
November, 2010).
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the second is to turn down petitions seeking the invalidation of disguised land
sales. This means that a kontract whose true character is concealed – as commonly
happens through the deliberate avoidance of any explicit reference to sale of land
– escapes court nullification and is thus saved.
The story of kontract in the courts does not end here, however, because some kon-
tract cases have landed in the House of Federation, which is entrusted to adjudicate
constitutional disputes. The House of Federation has repeatedly struck down land
sales of any kind – be they direct or indirect – based on their violation of the Con-
stitution, and has required land restitution.36 The House of Federation invariably
invokes the constitutional principle of small farmers’ immunity from eviction as a
key justification. On the same grounds, it has nullified sale and mortgage agree-
ments concerning land, and attacked rental agreements that purport to transfer
agricultural land for an indefinite duration or for a period that exceeds the limit
set by the law.37
Kontract and the local government administration
Apart from the courts, as one land administration expert indicated, other local state
actors also have a role to play in the practice of contract, in particular by giving legal
cover to such land alienation deals.38 The entire local government administration
may be implicated in supporting kontract, and agricultural development agents,
land administration and use committees and trade and industry offices contribute
conspicuously.
Firstly, agricultural development agents working for the local government ad-
ministration use their knowledge of the financial vulnerability of peasants to bro-
ker land deals when potential tekonatari ask them to ‘find land’ for them.39 Secondly,
members of the local land administration committee ‘write support letters’ to the
local agriculture office, asking for a land certificate to be issued in the name of the
tekonatari. The committee members extort money from the tekonatari transferor,
threatening him by saying: ‘Land sale is illegal. The kontract is unlawful. It is even
against the Federal Constitution.The committee is going to issue a land certificate
in the name of the akonatari, not in your name!’40 With this message they commu-
nicate to the tekonatari that he should give a ‘good sum of money’ to the committee
members, who will then issue a land certificate in his name. Based on the ‘support
36 Decisions of the House of Federation rendered on 26 June 2015 and 12 March 2016.
37 Decisions of the House of Federation rendered on 12 March 2016.
38 Interview with a land administration expert, 21 September 2012).
39 Interviews with Yidnekachew Ayele, Director of Legal Aid Clinics at the School of Law,
Hawassa University, and researcher on family law and land rights, 12 October 2012; and with
a lawyer, 8 June 2013.
40 Interview with a land administration expert, 12 October 2012.
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letter’, the agriculture office ‘(…) puts a signature on an already printed certificate
and awards the certificate to the tekonatari’.41 Thirdly, the agriculture office often
also plays a role in overvaluing the property on a plot of land that the courts have
ordered to be restituted, thus rendering restitution ineffective as most peasants
are unable to pay the required compensation.42 Fourthly, some land tekonatari use
their kontract to obtain an agricultural investment license and investment incen-
tives from the local trade and industry office. One expert working in the local trade
and industry office told me:
… some agricultural investors get land for their investment through the device
of kontract. When such investors bring documents such as a kontract proving
that they have secured land, we provide them with the required license and in-
vestment incentives, including loans, for which they are eligible. (Interview, 24
September 2012)
The treatment of the tekonatari as an agricultural investor eligible for investment
incentives opens a door for him to collateralize the land subject to kontract – as
currently happenswith land acquired for coffee-processing purposes.Government-
ownedmicro-finance institutions also take land acquired via kontract as security for
loans.43
Factors driving small farmers into kontract
Several factors contribute to the prevalence of kontract among the Sidama. Among
them are the historical experience of land alienation in the area, demographic pres-
sure and a lack of significant out-migration from the rural population, whose con-
sequent increase in the value of land might have contributed to the revival of land
deals such as those considered here. The akonatari are also often driven into kon-
tract by a lack of money to cover expenses such as those for customary weddings,
medical treatment, education or old age (see Berhutesfa 1999). However, two fac-
tors stand out from the others as contributors to the rise of kontract: the lack of
agricultural support schemes and the provisions of state land laws.
The unavailability of agricultural support to peasants in the area is not with-
out historical antecedents. During the Empire (prior to 1974), agricultural sup-
port schemes were directed at commercial coffee farmers. The pursuit of social-
ist modernity during the Derg period (1974–1991) skewed resource allocation to-
wards producers’ cooperatives and state farms, which led to the small farmers be-
41 Interview with a local public servant, 8 June 2013.
42 Interview with a lawyer, 14 September 2012.
43 Interview with a public servant, 25 September 2012.
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ing given little agricultural support. This bias has been continued since 1991, as
Ethiopia has adopted and implemented an agricultural policy founded on mar-
ket principles that, thus, focuses on peasant production for the market. For the
Sidama smallholders, this post-1991 liberalization has meant a lack of any mean-
ingful agricultural complementary support – such as loans and access to affordable
fertilizers or quality government extension advisors – escalating input prices and
market volatility, all of which have contributed to an inability to get fair prices for
their produce and, consequently, to the emergence of kontract. The akonatari alien-
ates his land because he is unable to work the land because, at present, there are
no agricultural support schemes open to him.
For example, peasants are expected to purchase fertilizers and seeds from the
market on a cash basis. Some time ago, the government authorities in the Sidama
area briefly introduced a programme by which peasants with land could get a 50
per cent short-term loan for the purchase of fertilizers through local government
bureaucracy. However, the arrangement was abused by local officials, local militia
men, elders on the government payroll, unemployed youth and other people with
political affiliations, who purchased more fertilizer than they were able to use and
sold them back to the market, having recognized that there was no effective mech-
anism for enforcing the repayment of the fertilizer loans. One farmer recounted:
I went to the chairman of my neighbourhood to find out that his house had been
converted into a fertilizer store… He took fertilizers in the name of dead residents,
those who left the area, children and the elderly with the intent to sell it out to
retailers… (Interview, 26 September 2012)
Such corrupt practices resulted in poor collection of fertilizer debts (SNNPR Re-
port 2011), and the scheme was discontinued, leaving small farmers to purchase
fertilizers at market price.44
There are also problems with the government’s agricultural extension service,
whereby farmers who are able to purchase agricultural inputs get free advice from
government deployed agricultural extension workers. At present, there is at least
one government agricultural extension worker stationed in each neighbourhood in
Sidama Zone.They are supposed to counsel peasants on how to till land vulnerable
to erosion, how to use fertilizers and seeds, conserve land, avoid wastage during
harvest and generally employ modern techniques to raise agricultural productivity.
However, many peasants have questioned the relevance of the advice given to them
by the often young, inexperienced extension agents, especially given the complex-
ity of the local agro-ecology. Some are, at best, contemptuous about the quality
of services given by these workers, which also include land certification, census,
political agitation and work as election facilitators. As one peasant told me:
44 Interview with a local administrator, 19 September 2012.
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The governmentʼs extension program is to be valued more for creating job op-
portunity for the youth than for the quality of agricultural services to be gained
from it. (26 September 2012)
All in all, informants claim that giving them a piece of land without the ability to
use it themselves drives them to engage in kontract,which has the effect of reducing
the size of their landholding or rendering them landless.45
The second overarching factor contributing to the rise of kontract is a set of legal
rules that implies the possibility that the government authorities can confiscate
land that they believe to be improperly cultivated or that has been left uncultivated
for a certain period of time. This rule, which is part of the rural land laws of five
major regional states, arises from the duty of the peasant to continuously till his
land or risk government dispossession: ‘A holder of rural land shall be obliged to
properly use and protect his land.When the land gets damaged the user of the land
shall lose his use right.’46 This general provision is amplified by a regulation, which
provides that:
An individual loses land use right when he fails to implement soil conservation
techniques, and leave the soil to erode, when he does not plant trees suitable
to the environment, and the concerned official ascertains such failure with evi-
dence. … The landholder shall be evicted by the concerned legal body after noti-
fying the land holder as well as a higher body... Any rural land user who is evicted
from his possession is obliged to return the land use right certificate within in a
month after the decision.47
In practice, this means that no rural land usermay negligently let his land lay fallow
for more than two consecutive years. After the kebele administration ascertains that
the land has not been ploughed, it gives an oral warning to the land user in the
presence of the kebele land administration and use committee and local elders. If the
land is not ploughed within six months of this warning, the kebele administration
gives a written warning to the land user within amonth. If the land is still not tilled
even after this written warning, he loses his usufruct rights.48
These stipulations give unchecked discretion to local administrators to evict
peasants for misuse use of the land or failure to use the land for two consecu-
tive years. When these provisions are seen in the context of the Sidama area’s
45 Focus group discussions with local farmers, 21 September 2012 and 12 October 2012; and in-
terview with Yidnekachew Ayele, Director of Legal Aid Clinics at the School of Law, Hawassa
University, and researcher on family law and land rights, 10 December 2012.
46 SNNPRS Rural Land Administration and Use Proc. No 110, 2007, Art. 10 (1).
47 SNNPRS Rural Land Administration and Use Reg. No. 66, 2007, Art. 13 (4, a, c and d).
48 SNNPRSRural LandAdministration andUse Reg.No. 66, 2007, Art. 13 (5); SNNPRSRural Land
Administration and Use Proc No 53, 2003, Art. 9 (6) & 7).
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longstanding association with the state in relation to land, people are quite le-
gitimately suspicious, even though there is no evidence that the authorities have
actually invoked these provisions. In summary, the above accounts show that the
ability of small farmer to use their land has been incrementally diminished by sev-
eral decades of government inaction concerning agricultural support services and
the introduction of land laws that increase the insecurity of tenure.
Winners and losers under kontract
There is a distinct imbalance in the economic positions of the akonatari and
tekonatari. In most cases the tekonatari has urban roots and his livelihood does
not depend on farming but comes rather from non-agricultural sources, often he
is either a model farmer or trader or local public servant. He makes permanent
improvements on the land acquired immediately, to foreclose any possibility of
land recovery in the event of litigation. He further possesses the capacity to cover
the costs associated with land certification and successfully defend himself from
land recovery suits. He also has the ability to invoke Sidama tradition to foreclose
any land restitution claim. Kontract cases entertained by the House of Federation,
on the other hand, reveal the weak financial status of the akonatari. In one case, an
akonatari mortgaged her land to cover the expenses for searching for her lost chil-
dren; the mortgage led eventually to sale. In another case, a litigant mortgaged her
land to provide money for food, and ended up selling her farmland.49 Moreover, a
review of the decisions of the federal and regional supreme courts with regard to
kontract reveals that many akonatari, being indigent, are only able to pursue their
cases in the courts with the support of free legal aid.
The relative weakness of the akonatari is also manifested in the likelihood that
his land will be restituted even after a decision is made in his favour by the federal
and regional supreme courts or House of Federation.The current position taken by
the federal and regional supreme courts, including that of the House of Federation,
indicates that land will be restituted. However, in practice, the land is often not re-
covered by the akonatari because immediately after securing a decision invalidating
the kontract, the tekonatari may file another suit demanding compensation for the
property on the land on the basis of Article 1815 of the Civil Code, which states:
‘Where a contract is invalidated…the parties shall as far as possible be reinstated in
the position which would have existed, had the contract not been made.’ Such suits
are routinely accompanied by a stay of execution order aimed at retaining posses-
sion of the land in the hands of the tekonatari until the litigation on compensation is
finally settled. The second round litigation is long and protracted. The court order,
49 Decisions of the House of Federation rendered on 26 June 2015 and 12 March 2016.
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which delays the execution of land restitution to the akonatari, allows the tekonatari
to continue investing in the land and, in the end, to use the experts from the local
agricultural office to secure an overvaluation of the property.50 Property overvalu-
ation is often exacerbated by corruption, the lack of a national property valuation
formula and experts. Even if property appraisement is carried out properly, it is
difficult for the akonatari to pay compensation to the tekonatari, because the latter
has usually made significant improvements to the land since the conclusion of the
kontract, with a view to ‘buying tenure security’ and hence forestalling any future
possibility of land restitution. Under such circumstances, it is virtually impossible
for an akonatari to actually get their land back.
Peasants who transfer their landholding as a whole via the kontract scheme tend
to lose their farming skills, first during periods of koota (sharecropping arrange-
ments) and then during the long period of kontract.51 And the increasing trend for
commercially driven kontract transactions is one of the reasons for a noticeable shift
away from production of food crops to the production of cash crops – particularly
coffee, khat and sugarcane. The revival of kontract, together with the lack of seed
and fertilizer subsidies for poor farmers, has contributed to food insecurity in the
study area. As one local farmer put it:
We used to produce pretty much most of what we ate on our own farms in the
old days; now we buy food items from the markets at higher prices, like those
who live in towns. Those who purchase land through kontract grow cash crops,
mainly sugar cane, khat and eucalyptus trees, all destined primarily for urban
people. (Interview, 23 September 2012)
Thus, evidence suggests that rural households in the area are experiencing food
insecurity in which land alienation through kontract plays a part, even if the degree
of its contribution in this regard requires further empirical investigation.
Discussion, conclusion and suggestions
Analytical perspectives from economics, legal positivism, and legal pluralism
Kontract may be seen through the lenses of economists, lawyers, or legal plural-
ists. Economists view kontract as a simple land rental agreement, with land to be
restituted on a specific agreed upon date.More broadly, the economists also regard
kontract as a free juridical expression of the peasants’ demand for restrictions on
50 Interviews with a judge and a practising lawyer, 24 September 2012.
51 Interview with an elder, 14 September 2012 and interview with a local public servant, 18
September 2012.
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the transferability of land use rights imposed by the state law to be lifted (Tesfaye
2004, McClung 2012). To such economists, a degree of differentiation in the size of
landholdings is necessary in rural Ethiopia, where toomuch equality in land alloca-
tion prevails, to enhance the productivity of the land. For them, kontract is a useful
tool in replacing the miniscule and uneconomical farm plots (also called starving
plots) common in rural Ethiopia with relatively larger farmlands, since it transfers
land from those who cannot use it to those who can.Thesemedium and large farms
improve agricultural productivity, which in turn leads to economic development,
with its supposed trickledown effect on the poor (Deininger et al. 2008).Thus, they
argue, policy should let these ‘people-driven land rental practices’ evolve and be
prudently governed by land laws and institutions. State courts should nurture, not
nullify, grassroots practices concerning land transactions.
The economic efficiency oriented view outlined above can be attributed to in-
ternational organisations such as the World Bank and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). A study conducted by the World Bank has
argued that:
Most farmers would rather rent their land during stressful periods comparedwith
any other alternative, such as selling it. In other words, in addition to all the other
benefits of rental markets suggested in the literature, the availability of formal
land rental markets will serve as a caution to enable farmers to withstand un-
favourable circumstances by temporarily renting their land rather than selling it.
Small farmers are driven into informal land deals by state land laws that impose
restrictions on land use rights of small farmers; remove the restrictions to make
them beneficial for the poor (Haddis 2013:9).
It has also been claimed that ‘unofficial transaction may negatively affect women
and other vulnerable people because it does not provide effective legal backing
when local land grabbers snatch their holdings’ (Haddis 2013:10). Thus, the solu-
tion is to liberalize land markets, among others, to solve the problem of shortage
of land and capital, to encourage the movement of people towards off-farm activ-
ities, and to increase land tenure security. Research done under the auspices of
USAID presents kontract as an ordinary ‘land rental’, that is, as, a contractual ar-
rangement for a defined duration with land restitution in the end (Gizachew and
Solomon 2011:7, McClung 2012). The same research classifies land transactions in
Sidama area simply as land rental and sharecropping arrangements, discounting
out kontract in the sense understood here (Gizachew and Solomon 2011, McClung
2012).
Lawyers with a legal positivist orientation (i.e., those who assume that the state
is the exclusive source of law) would see kontract in terms of a violation of state
land law. Under kontract, the intention of the parties is to transfer land rights over
rural land permanently in favour of the tekonatari.The legal positivist approach is in
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line with the stance taken by the House of Federation, as well as with the position
adopted by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division and the latest judgments
of the SNNRS Supreme Court. To positivist lawyers, the prevalence of kontract is
due to a lack of clarity, the existence of loopholes in the state land laws, their weak
enforcement, and an absence of clear sanctions against those who enter into land
sales. As kontract is a legal problem, therefore, they recommend the introduction of
additional laws that are specific, complete, clear, effectively communicated to the
right people and properly enforced upon transgression.
Legal pluralists, on the other hand, view kontract as constituting a third layer
of the land tenure regime, lying somewhere between utuwa and state land law. Un-
like for the legal positivists, the accent here is not on mere legality or economic
efficiency, but rather on the recognition of a different set of land norms and insti-
tutions, including kontract, whose validity and legitimacy emanates from the grass-
roots, that is, the local people.
However kontract is viewed, one point is clear: the prevalence of kontract in rural
Sidama is weakening the professed protective purpose of the current land policy
of Ethiopia, which is meant to ensure that land remains in the hands of peasants
as a survival asset. Allan Hoben (2000:30) has observed:
The present tenure system with state ownership of land…could not prevent land
sales and mortgaging but made them take place where the sellers are at a disad-
vantage, could not prevent land transfer from rural communities to commercial
farmers and urban dwellers… could not slow rural–urban migration...
Summary and conclusion
Kontract is a practice of disguised permanent transfer of farmland encapsulated in
an agreement concluded between akonatari (transferor) and tekonatari (transferee).
It is a hybrid of state law and Sidama customary law, for it takes elements from
both. At the same time, it is opposed to both. Kontract conflicts with the Constitu-
tion’s clearly stated tenet that agricultural land held by the rural masses is a survival
asset and is ex-commercium. And it is inconsistent with time-honoured egalitarian,
though not inclusive, principles embodied in Sidama custom.
Despite this, kontract has gained some kind of legitimacy from the state ap-
paratus. The position of the federal and regional highest courts towards kontract
has been contradictory and lacks uniformity: where the courts repudiate kontract,
their decisions are not effective because of power imbalances; and from the point
of view of the akonatari, court decisions in this regard are not worth the paper they
are written on. Legitimacy is also given to kontract by land administration agen-
cies, which accept the tekonatari’s annual land use fee and register land subject to
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kontract in the tekonatari’s name. Hence, to some degree, kontract is a state-sanc-
tioned land deal, which allows those with financial clout to undertake what might
be called small-scale land grabs.
The subtext in the practice of kontract favours those deemed ‘improvers’ of the
land, and has adverse consequences for economically vulnerable sellers. Thus, the
diagnosis of kontract undertaken here suggests that the egalitarian principle behind
Ethiopia’s land policy is being undermined.This indicates the need for a rural land
reform,which should have twin pillars: it should grant the poor access to both agri-
cultural land and to meaningful agricultural support. Such a land reform should
be augmented by a system of good land administration that, among other things,
includes a mechanism for minimizing or eliminating land-related corruption. The
implication of all this is that the debate surrounding negotiated legal pluralism
should consider critically its outcome, which is rooted in a significant power im-
balance, instead of merely valorising it as a potent tool for providing flexibility and
human agency. In other words, there should be critical scrutiny of who is negoti-
ating with whom, under what circumstances and with what impact.
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12. Legal pluralism and emerging legal hybridity
Interactions between the customary, state and
religious law among the Siltie of southern Ethiopia
Kairedin Tezera
Introduction
Examining the versatile relationship between the customary, state and Sharia legal
systems, and focusing on Siltie people in southern Ethiopia, this paper provides
an anthropological understanding of the legal dynamics of state–society relations.
Based on the experiences of dispute settlers and disputants, the paper investigates
how the three legal systems interact in the area, and explores why and how dis-
putants show a preference for one form of conflict resolution over another. It also
looks into how dispute settlers use dispute settlement forums not only to end con-
flicts, but also to protect the custom and the language of the people and preserve
and promote Siltie identity.1
The situation in Siltie is especially interesting because of the great complexity
of legal institutions.The Siltie legal landscape consists of three normative systems:
the state law, the customary law and the religious (Sharia) law. The complexity of
the legal sphere is also observable in the intra-plural nature of these three legal
systems. The religious legal system, for example, is comprised of Sharia courts,
courts of localmashayik or waliye,2 courts of local sheiks such as Abdul Qadir Jailani
and Sheik Hussein of Bale, and the Salafi Social Committee, which was set up by
Siltie-educated Muslim youth in the 1990s (Zerihun 2013:141).
1 This paper is the result of the research done for my PhD, which was conducted between Au-
gust 2014 and March 2017. It was funded by the Bayreuth International Graduate School
of African Study (BIGSAS) at Bayreuth University in Germany. I conducted several months
of ethnographic fieldwork and mostly used qualitative methods, but also included some
archival sources to substantiate the empirical data. Being from Siltie Zone myself, I was able
to use my native language skills and prior knowledge of the local culture of Siltie to easily
integrate with the local community.
2 A waliye or a mashayik is a human religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized as
honourable Islamic symbols by the majority Muslims. It is usually represented by a tomb,
and in some cases by a mosque, and is associated with a shrine.
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While customary law has the longest history in the area, state law was intro-
duced in the late-nineteenth century and Sharia law has been used since the 1950s.
Since 1995, all three legal systems have been recognized and have a constitutional
right to function and offer their services to the public, and parties in a conflict can
choose which legal forum they want to hear their case. However, the customary
and Sharia courts are constitutionally mandated to deliver legal services only in
civil and family cases. Yet, the findings of this study show that customary courts
deal with all forms of conflict – including those that are the preserve of state law
– at the grassroots level in the study area. They also show that the relationship
between the different institutions is both cooperative and competitive since the
courts exchange some cases while contend also over the others when they handle
some cases like murder cases. Additionally, not only do the clients to the courts
choose the forum that seems to best represent their interests, but some of the le-
gal practitioners from the various courts also pursue their personal interests when
dealing with conflicting parties.While state legal actors, often rely on non-state ac-
tors in dispute cases that the state legal system cannot adjudicate. In addition, the
interactions of the legal systems reveal contradictory perspectives and crossings
into territories claimed by the other. Religious dispute settlers, for instance, bor-
row ideas and legal norms from the state and customary legal systems whenever
they handle dispute cases. In turn, customary legal actors use Islamic legal pre-
cepts and at times state legal norms to settle disputes.This hints at the porousness
of the boundaries between the various legal systems.
The empirical data presented here further indicates that some dispute cases
do not remain in one court, as disputants often take their cases from one legal
system to another. Marital disputes in particular are often moved between state
and customary courts, and some disputes are moved from one customary court to
another, all of which indicates that ‘forum shopping’ exists not only between the
various legal systems but also within the same legal system. This is partly because
many state and Sharia court judges favour the customary courts for their efficiency
in handling legal cases, and this has greatly increased their legitimacy in the area
and has affected disputants’ choice of forum.
Islam plays a key role in Siltie and has been important in the construction of the
Siltie people’s identity (Markakis 1998:130–33). Islam also plays an important role
in the area of dispute settlement and as a control mechanism that regulates social
and moral aberrations among the Siltie and their neighbours. The Sharia courts,
which have been in place since the1950s, thus play a paramount role as faith-based
dispute settlement institutions, though nowadays some of the younger Muslims
accuse the qadis (Sharia court judges) of being acquiescent to the state agenda.
My findings indicate that, despite the fact that the constitution of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (henceforth FDRE) recognizes both customary
and religious institutions of dispute settlement (FDRE 1995 Articles 34(5) and 78(5)),
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the customary legal system delivers justice to the grassroots level more frequently
than other tribunals, and that Sharia courts cannot do so to the same extent due to a
number of internal and external factors.These factors include not only competition
with the other legal systems, but also the plurality within the Islamic legal system
itself, as represented by the Salafi Social Committees that have developed since the
1990s and the local Sufi shrines.
There is also a kind of competition between individual actors within these sys-
tems. I found that elders and religious figures (sheiks and imams) use their medi-
ation services not only to settle conflicts, but also to acquire and consolidate their
power and influence in the area. The competition between legal actors is acceler-
ated by a shortage of trained manpower in both the state and Sharia courts that
negatively affects the courts’ ability to deliver justice to the community. There are
reportedly only thirty state judges and seven qadis serving about one million Siltie
people. This has the effect of rendering these courts irrelevant in the eyes of many
local people, who often question their legitimacy and jurisdiction. This is also ev-
idenced by the high number of people who prefer to take their cases through the
local religious and customarymodes of dispute settlement rather than to the Sharia
and state courts.
Yet, there exists also cooperation between the legal systems. For instance, the
customary courts’ handling of a large number of civil cases helps the state courts
reduce their caseload. Elders likewise seek the assistance of state court judges in
certain contexts, such as when they handle cases of domestic violence. Neverthe-
less, since the customary legal system has normative proximity to the community,
it enjoys a wider legitimacy and hence resolves disputes in restorative ways.
Finally, the fact that dispute settlers from the three courts borrow norms and
legal concepts from each other to handle dispute cases in their respective courts
points to the emergence of hybridized legal practices in the area.
The Siltie Zone and people
Geo-political setting, social and political organization
Siltie Zone is located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Regional
State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia. The Siltie people mainly live in the Siltie Zone,3
although quite a large number of them are also found in various urban centres
in the country. Although historical documents clearly indicate that the Siltie are
a separate ethnic group (e.g. Markakis 1998, Braukämper 2002, Abdulfeta 2002,
Kairedin 2012), the Siltie were incorporated into the administrative zones of
3 Zone is the second administrative division after Regional State in the contemporary federal
structure of Ethiopia.
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Hadiyya, Gurage, and the then Hallaba Kambata in the early 1990s. In the early days
of the post-Mengistu regime, they felt neglected both economically and politically.
The urban youth and entrepreneurs, as well as rural self-help organizations,
initiated an ethnic identity movement called ‘The Siltie Movement’ that lasted
for ten years (1991–2001). Its aim was to define Siltie ethnicity and to develop
the socio-economic conditions of the society. According to Bustorf (2011:457),
the Siltie activists’ first important political goal was ‘to assert their ethnic unity
and to realize equality with neighbouring ethnic groups by acquiring their own
administrative zone’.
Their political struggle resulted in a referendum on1 April 2001, when they re-
gained the ethnic and administrative independence that they had lost following the
incorporation of Siltie land by the forces of Emperor Menelik II in 1889 (Bustorf
2011:457–458). Based on the 2007 national population census, the total population
of the Siltie was projected to be more than one million in 2017 (CSA 2008). Agri-
culture is the mainstay of the local economy. Muslims make up 97.6 per cent of the
population, while 2.03 per cent belong to various Christian denominations (Siltie
Zone Finance Abstract 2016). Some works (e.g. Abdulfeta 2002, Braukämper 2001,
Kairedin 2013, 2017, 2018) indicate that the Siltie were one of the societies that came
into contact with Islam very early, probably as early as the ninth century.There has
been some erosion of cultural norms and practices due to the influence of reformist
strains of Islam imported from the Gulf region over the last 25 years. However, the
Siltie have maintained their customs, local beliefs and values, including the faith-
based and customary modes of dispute settlement.
Siltie society is internally differentiated and consists of several stratified
descent-based subgroups. These include the dominant majority of farmers and
traders (woleba) and the marginalized craft workers (awneya), including black-
smiths, tanners and potters. People also differentiate between believers in Islam
and non-believers. Believers are further differentiated into higher and lower
classes. High-class individuals are called sharafic and belong to a group of people
who trace their genealogy to the Hashemite and the Prophet Mohammed’s family
and who migrated to the Siltie area in three different exoduses after the ninth
century. Low-class individuals are called yeafer seb, are of non-sharafic descent and
are believed to be native to the area, having lived there long before the coming
of the new settlers led by the legendary Siltie father Hajji Aliye from eastern
Ethiopia during the sixteenth century. Finally, believers distinguish between Siltie
highlanders (ansewa) and lowlanders (qalla).
Craft workers have no right to own land or local titles. They are socially
marginalized, not allowed to intermarry with farmers and traders, and cannot
be chosen to serve as dispute settlers. They are also treated differently in the
elders’ councils. For this reason, as my informants indicated, members of minority
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groups prefer the state legal system over the customary courts, since the latter are
said to favour members of the dominant majorities.4
Recently, another form of social stratification has emerged. Due to the expan-
sion of development and education in the area, Siltie are now categorized as urban
or rural, as well as elite or ordinary people. Resulting from the recent economic
progress in the area, one can also see a middle class emerging in the space between
lower and upper class Silties. Furthermore, there is gender segregation in the social
life of the Siltie. Women are predominantly housewives who control their house-
hold’s economy, while men work in the fields as farmers or as traders. However, in
urban centres, Siltie women have begun to participate in new activities, including
business. Rural women prefer customary courts for handling marital disputes than
urban ones who mostly resort to State courts. But due to the patrilineal nature of
the customary courts, rural women prefer property cases to be handled by the state
courts.This is because the state courts take cases involving women seriously as part
of the government’s commitment to redressing the general imbalances in society.
In the urban areas, more-educated women prefer both the Sharia and state courts,
rather than customary courts, to handle property disputes.
Legal pluralism and hybridity
Some conceptual notes
Conflict transformation, conflict management, and conflict resolution have been
distinguished in the existing literature. Appleby (2012:212) defines conflict transfor-
mation as the transformation from violent to non-violent means of dispute settle-
ment, while conflict management entails the prevention of conflict from becoming
violent or expanding to other areas. Conflict resolution refers to the removal, as far
as is possible, of the inequalities between disputants through the use of mediation,
negotiation, advocacy and testimony.
In complex industrial societies, the formal law is usually retributive and consis-
tently employed, indicating the social distance between members of the societies
(Lewellen 2003). In ‘traditional’ societies, restorative justice – that is, the concili-
ation between conflicting parties – is the main purpose. For this, techniques that
involve mediation, conciliation or even forgiveness are commonly used to handle
4 The reason behind this is that the craft workers are said to have ‘impure blood’ (deme keleb).
If a craftworker kills a farmer, the victim’s family will not prosecute him/her in the customary
court, because at the end of the dispute settlement the families of the perpetrator and the
victim have to forge a new form of kinship. To avoid this social tie, the families of such victims
usually deliberately drop the case.
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disputes. The modalities by which disputes can be settled are divided into violent
and peaceful. Violent modes include duel or combat, self-help and warfare, while
peaceful modes include avoidance, negotiation, mediation and adjudication (Gul-
liver 1979:11).
With the growing interconnectivity of the world, contemporary conflict res-
olution entails the involvement of different legal systems even in remote areas.
This challenges the hitherto alleged monopoly of the state legal system as a
dominant dispute resolution mechanism (F. von Benda-Beckmann and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2006:9) and leads us to definitions of legal pluralism. Authors
have attempted to define pluralistic socio-legal structures at least since the 1930s.
However, due to its cross-disciplinary nature, scholars have struggled to come up
with a universally agreed definition of legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986:9, Tamanaha
2008:376, Twinning 2010:11). In an attempt to resolve the intellectual battle over
the concept of legal pluralism, Tamanaha (2008:396) introduced what he calls a
‘simple approach’, stating that, ‘legal pluralism exists whenever social actors iden-
tify more than one source of “law” within a social arena’. He further defines legal
pluralism as multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law that
may make competing claims to authority (Tamanaha 2008:375). Taking ideas from
Moore’s ‘semi-autonomous social field’, Griffiths (1986:38) asserts that, since ‘law
is present in every semi-autonomous social field, and since every society contains
many such fields, legal pluralism is a universal feature of the social organization’.
In this way, legal pluralism challenges the assumed state monopoly of making,
administering, imposing and sanctioning the law. If one closely inspects the
various definitions of legal pluralism, one notes that they imply that law covers a
continuum from the state law to the informal social controls mechanisms of the
customary legal spheres (Moore 1978, Woodman 1998, F. von Benda-Beckmann
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2006, Twinning 2010).
A number of authors (for example, Santos de Sousa 2006, F. von Benda-
Beckmann and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2006) point to the fact that law is
increasingly becoming hybridized. This hybridization, or mutual influencing
among coexisting legal systems, is not a recent phenomenon. It could be observed
during the colonization period (Tamanaha 2008:384), where the customary law
and the colonizers’ law influenced each other in various ways, with each exchang-
ing or recognizing the other’s norms. Nevertheless, the increasing economic and
social pressures that have accompanied globalization and that surpass national
boundaries (Santos de Sousa 2006, Tamanaha 2008:386) have further accelerated
the porosity of legal systems’ boundaries. This has led to the coming of what
Griffiths (1998:134) calls ‘cross-fertilization’, a process whereby rules in one system
are shaped by those of another, and are also shaping those of the other. Legal
hybridism underpins the existence of multidirectional interactions rather than
hierarchical relationships among legal systems, whereby an actor from the state
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legal system, for instance, borrows legal ideas from religious or customary legal
systems and vice versa, as is witnessed among the Siltie people. The form of legal
hybridism that is currently emerging indicates that each legal system influences
the practices of the others whenever legal practitioners handle dispute cases. In
this regard, we can see the birth of a ‘hybrid legal system’ among the Siltie in which
each legal system incorporates elements of the other two, yet still stands by itself.
Ethiopias experiences of legal pluralism
Ethiopia’s historical and political milieu is particularly rich, for the country is one
of the oldest independent political entities in the world, having existed as such for
more than two thousand years (Bahru 2000, Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:2). It
is a legally plural state not only because it hosts different ethnic groups that have
various coexisting normative orders, but also because the country has embraced
constitutionally sanctioned federal and state laws that co-exist with other norma-
tive orders – including customary and religious ones – that have been formally
recognized since 1995.
The current legal system reflects Ethiopia’s history and politics, including the
various doctrines – be they religious or ideological institutions the country has
passed through since at least the nineteenth century.Many studies indicate that the
customary legal systems serve as alternative institutions of dispute resolution in
Ethiopia, where the state legal system is failing to fully provide the judiciary needs
of the nation (see for example Meron 2010). Pankhurst and Getachew (2008:2) go
further, saying that the various customary systems are the dominant legal systems
delivering justice at the grassroots level in the country. Even though the religious
and customary legal systems have long existed in Ethiopia, it was only in 1995 that
the country officially embraced legal pluralism, in its Constitution. In the Consti-
tution, Article 34 – entitled ‘legal pluralism’ – and Article 78(5) specifically contem-
plate the linkages between statutory courts, religious courts, and non-state dispute
resolution forums. Article 34(5), for example, stipulates that the Constitution ‘shall
not preclude adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws in ac-
cordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the
disputes.’ Article 78(5) underlines that ‘pursuant to sub-article 5 of Article 34, the
House of People’s Representatives and state councils can set or give official recog-
nition to religious and customary courts.’ Article 78(5) goes on to say that ‘religious
and customary courts that had state recognition and functioned before the adop-
tion of the Constitution shall be organized on the basis of recognition accorded to
them by this Constitution.’ Following the national constitution, regional constitu-
tions have also provided room for religious and customary laws to operate in their
communities.
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Following the arguments of Griffith (1986), Ethiopia could be understood as
having ‘weak legal pluralism’ (Griffith 1986:6), since the state legal system accords
supreme status to the Constitution, as seen in Article 9(1) of the 1995 Constitution:
‘The Constitution is a supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or
decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this Constitution
shall be of no effect.’ Indirectly, however, it empowers the state law to validate the
activities of other laws and legal forums. In this regard, although the government
recognizes the customary and the Sharia courts, they are given a limited mandate
(e.g. to handle family and civil matters) so long as both parties give their consents.
Yet, the courts do not have ameans by which to enforce their decisions.However, as
will be shown in this chapter, even though the greatest power lies with the state law,
when it comes to daily practices, the different legal systems have been influencing
each other.
The Siltie legal world
A descriptive analysis of three legal systems
The state legal system
The late-nineteenth century marked a turning point in the modern history of
Ethiopia as much of today’s South was then incorporated into the Ethiopian
empire under Emperor Menelik II, ushering in the beginnings of the modern
Ethiopian state. At the same time, the foundations for legal pluralism in the coun-
try were laid. It was then that the state introduced its legal system in Siltie and
many other places as a way of strengthening its grip on power and building state
processes (Bustorf 2011:468). Since then, new forms of land tenure, the modern
centralized state bureaucracy, a new judiciary system and economic order have
grown up.
Most of my respondents indicated that, during both the Imperial (1931–1974)
and the Derg regimes (1974–1991), the capacity of the state judiciary systems to de-
liver justice to the Siltie community was limited to the urban areas of neighbouring
ethnic groups. This was because the Siltie area was broken up into adjacent areas
following its fierce resistance to Menelik’s expansion that led the area not to have
an administrative centre of its own.This situation continued during the early days
of the EPRDF regime: between 1991–2001 there were, for instance, only three state
courts of first instance with a small number of trained judges in Silti, Dalocha and
Lanfuro Woredas. This forced many people to travel long distances to get justice
since there were not state justice offices in Siltie-settled areas.
After the establishment of Siltie Zone in 2001, the Siltie people set up nine first
instance courts plus a High Court in Worabe town. There are now also more than
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Figure 1: Meeting of clan courts in Lanfuro Woreda, Edeneba Kebele to handle both murder
and civil cases (Kairedin 2015 )
150 social courts in 181 kebeles.Most of the social courts were established by the state
after 2001, with the intention that they would handleminor cases, for example, civil
cases up to 500 ETB. However, their roles and functions have declined because of
various legal reforms made in response to competition from customary courts in
the country. The state system also exhibits some intra-plurality, as customs and
revenue sections and the Good Governance and Appeal Office are also involved in
dispute resolution processes.
According to the president5 of Siltie Zone High Court, there are only thirty
judges working in ten courts, including the High Court, in the whole zone. This
clearly shows that the state court still cannot effectively serve the more than one
million Siltie people. Appointment to the position of president in the state courts’
is a political decision since it is the zone officials who propose candidates and the
Regional Council that approves them. State court judges are trained lawyers. The
5 Interview with Akmel Ahmedin, Siltie Zone High Court President on 7 April 2015 in Worabe
town.
272 Kairedin Tezera
dearth of qualified judges in the study area seems to be one of the factors con-
tributing to the decline in demand for the state courts in the area,6 alongside the
problem of accessibility, the normative distance and the perception of state judges
as more corrupt than those of customary and Sharia courts.
The religious legal system: Plurality of intra-faith institutions and modes
of dispute settlement
Local religious institutions also have a bearing on dispute settlement processes. In
the following section, I will look into the plurality of intra-faith-based institutions
of dispute settlement and how they interact and compete with each other over
dispute cases.
According to my key informants,7 the first Sharia court was set up in the 1950s.
During the Imperial period, the Siltie people were categorized under Haikochina
Butajira, ChebonaGurage andKembata andHadiyya Awrajas.8With noworeda-level
administration, the awraja (Provincial) qadis appointed one or two qadis within a
given area of a balabat (landlord). Informants mentioned that the qadis were very
respected by the society, as they were considered to be fair and committed to serv-
ing the community. During the Derg regime, the Siltie were categorized under
the southern Shoa administrative structure and had access to the Dalocha-Lanfuro
Awraja Sharia Court, which persisted until the demise of the Derg in 1991. The Is-
lamic Affairs Council and the Sharia courts had been set up in Dalocha and Lanfuro
areas, while the majority of the Siltie were living in Gurage Zone from 1991 to 2001.
It was after the establishment of Siltie Zone in 2001, that the Siltie established an
independent Islamic Council and their own Sharia courts. The Siltie High Sharia
Court handles cases not only from the six first instance Sharia courts in the zone,
but also from those in the neighbouring Hadiyya and Gurage zones.The proximity
of the areas as well as the cost-effectiveness of servicing several zones are the main
factors behind this development.
6 Baker (2013:202) indicates that political interference in the judiciary system in Ethiopia is
meant to bring local development. The lack of enough qualified human resources in the state
legal system and a low retention rate is a result of low salaries in the state system driving
many judges leaving to join the private sector as legal representatives. This is less observable
at lower administrative tiers, e.g. regional and zonal levels.
7 These were Kaire Sule, an important informant who has a deep knowledge about Siltie cul-
ture and history, and Shifa Seid, who worked in the Islamic Affairs offices including as Sec-
retary of Siltie’s Islamic Affairs and Sharia courts at different levels between 1970s to early
1990s in Lanfuro and Dalocha Woredas.
8 Awraja was the third administrative tier below the province/region during the Imperial
(1931–1974) and the Socialist Derg (1974–1991) regimes.
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The Sharia Courts handle issues such as marriage contracts (nikah), inheritance
and divorce cases.They also examine civil cases up to 5000 ETB (approximately 350
USD in 2018), wills (wesiya), gifts (hadiya), endowments (waqf ) and family Main-
tenance cases. My research has shown that the Siltie Sharia courts are very much
occupied with marriage contracts as well as divorce and inheritance cases. Accord-
ing to several interviewed qadis,9 the number of cases referred to Sharia courts
has decreased since the introduction of the Revised Southern Family Law in 2008,
which prohibits courts from handling inheritance cases
According to my informants, the Sharia courts have rather little legitimacy
in the community, as their establishment is attributed to the political agenda of
the state rather than to a true commitment to Sharia law. Besides, like customary
courts, Sharia courts do not have the power to enforce their decisions, but depend
on the agreement of the involved parties to any proposed resolution to their cases.
The local community also mentioned the fact that young Salafis consider the qadis
as ignorant of Islamic knowledge (jahil) and as more loyal to the political interests
of the state than to Islamic values.
Some of the qadis I talked to during my research also expressed frustration that
they were not practising the Sharia in its true spirit. Besides which, even the lim-
ited rights granted to the Sharia court could not be fully implemented due to a
meagre budget, which is not even enough to cover purchases of basic office equip-
ment, such as computers or copy machines.The qadis interpreted the small budget
allocation as a manifestation of the government’s lack of regard for Sharia law.
The president of the Siltie Sharia High Court10, on the other hand, argued that
many Muslims lacked of awareness about the Sharia courts for dispute settlement.
As one qadi confirmed, many do not know the extent to which the Hanafi School
of teaching gives an equal share of property to husband and wife upon divorce. He
argued that if Muslims better understood the Hanafi School’s teaching on gender
equality,moreMuslims would go to the Sharia court.This provides an indication of
intra-faith competition among Muslims, since the qadi in this case was a follower
of the Hanafi School, which is less dominant among the Siltie, who mainly follow
Shafie teachings.
While most of the qadis I interviewed complained about the lack of state sup-
port – both financial and constitutional – for Sharia law, some appreciated the
financial support of the government that allowed them to hire qadis in different
Siltie woredas and provide training for them.
9 InterviewwithHajji Siraj, SiltiWereda Qadi andHajji Shemsu, DalochaWeredaQadi in April
2016.
10 Interview with Hajji Mifta Seid, President of Siltie Zone Sharia High Court on 18 July 2017.
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Local religious dispute resolutions
Dispute settlement entails not only the material interests of disputants, but also
reintegration and the restoration of relationships. Faiths play a pivotal role in
achieving these goals by connecting disputants under one identity as well as
promising them rewards such as eternal peace in the hereafter, in addition to the
internal and external peace they can get in the social world. Moreover, religious
actors can also admonish disputants if they reject a peace proposal, threatening
them with not only divine punishment but also failure in the social world. In
Siltie, local religious actors play an important role as dispute settlers, and religious
centres like mosques are centres of dispute settlement. Zerihun (2013:139) notes
that there are three forms of local holy man (waliye)-based institutions of dispute
settlements among the Siltie: mawlid, liqa, and warrie.11 Mawlid is categorized into
two: the Prophet Mohammed’s mawlid (mawlid-un-nabi) and mashayik’s mawlid
(mawlid al-mashayik). Veneration of waliyes12 has a central place in the religious as
well as communal lives of the Siltie (Kairedin 2012:180).
The Siltie revere the local religious leaders (mashayik) because of the role they
played in bringing about the social order and in expanding Islam in the area. The
religious leaders are called among the Siltie as sheiks. Those religious leaders who
play an important role for expansion of Islam and are also involved in dispute settle-
ment are known asmashayik.Themost celebrated Sufi shrines are Alkeso, Dangeye,
and Hajji Aliye mosques.The local community attend the sheiks’ mosques daily for
prayer, to strengthen social solidarity and to resolve disputes among themselves
and the neighbouring ethnic groups. The mosques are used to resolving inter-
faith, inter-ethnic and minor disputes, which do not involve blood cases. How-
ever, some informants13 told me that said that these local religious forums do not
handle dispute cases directly but instead indirectly play a role in peace-building as
faith leaders advise their followers to give priority to forgiveness and peace rather
than retaliation.14
Since the 1990s, there has been another religious institution for dispute set-
tlement – the Salafi Social Committee. Some Siltie youth formed these forums
to consider disputes within their own socio-religious groups. The formation of
11 Warrie, liqa and mawlid are local people’s gatherings to revere the waliyes (religious figure)
and handle dispute cases in the study area.
12 Awaliye or amashayik refers to a human religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized
as honourable Islamic symbols by the majority Muslims. It is usually represented by a tomb,
and in some cases by a mosque, and is associated with a shrine.
13 Interview with Sheik Mohammed, Ato Bahredin and Ato Usman on 23 February 2016 in Wer-
abe.
14 The local community also resorts to the religious centres during natural calamities like
drought and earthquakes, believing that these disasters can be averted by the intercession
of the waliyes, whose prayers (du'aa)may be accepted by the Almighty.
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the Committee seems to have emanated from a rejection of the customary courts
and Sufi-oriented social gatherings on one hand, and the perceived failure of the
Sharia courts to deliver justice according to Sharia law on the other. The Salafi
Social Committee informally considers marriage contracts, disputes between hus-
band and wife, and supports the needy. The group does not have a fixed structure,
but gathers whenever the need arises. It is led by young university graduates and
civil servants and is widely preferred by youths in the emerging Siltie elite. Siltie
elders and old religious scholars, however, state that the youths’ form of dispute
settlement should be viewed in the context of the struggle between Sufi-oriented
teaching and the more textual and puritanical Islamic teachings that have been in-
troduced in the area since 1980s. The competition or clash between the young and
old indicates the existence of a generation conflict between the classic Sheiks and
the younger generation in the area.
The customary legal system
The Siltie customary legal system is rooted in Siltie ada or culture. It is influenced
by some Islamic values. It employs local values and beliefs – namely, berche, tur
and fero – as enforcing mechanisms. Berche, tur, and fero are local notions of the
right to justice and, if one refuses to fairly treat others – including animals – it
is believed that berche, tur and fero can bring bad repercussions in later life. It is
believed that berche is inherited, so if someone cannot address a grievance or tries
to hide a crime – even if it was committed by someone else – the repercussions will
affect up to seven generations of that person’s family. Being highly embedded in
local values and norms, the customary legal system enjoys a wide legitimacy among
the community.
Both, the political and social organization of the Siltie are characterized by plu-
rality.The Siltie people are subdivided into several exogamous patrilineal clans, and
the highly respected clan leaders have both social and political power at the local
level. Despite the fact that the Siltie are a patriarchal society, they also value the
female lineage: while the father’s lineage (abotgae) is superior to the mother’s lin-
eage (ummegae) in various aspects, women’s role and involvement can be observed
in dispute settlement sessions, where people recognize female descent.
The Siltie call their local mode of governance yesiltie serra. Yesiltie serra has two
forms of administrative structures: lineage and territorial based systems. Siltie el-
ders work at various levels of the yesiltie serra as local leaders and mediators. Gote,15
the smallest customary local administration level comparable to the state’s admin-
istration level is known as yeburda baliqe shengo (hamlet elders assembly). At the next
level, we find yeazegag baliqe shengo (village assembly), followed by yemewta baliqe
15 Gote is the smallest state administrative level below kebele; it consists of less than 500 people.
276 Kairedin Tezera
(supra-village assembly). Yebad baliqe shengo/chale (local chiefs’ assembly) functions
at the apex of the Siltie territorial level.
The customary courts consist of the elders’ court, the clan court and the raga
(local legal expert) court. The elders’ court mainly deals with marital cases and lo-
cal boundary disputes, while the clan court handles inter-clan disputes and crime
cases committed by members of the clans.The raga court resolves mainly homicide
cases. Despite the allocation of responsibilities among the courts, actors in the cus-
tomary courts converge to handle dispute cases and to avoid communal disputes.
In addition, all homicide cases resort to the raga courts for final resolution since it
is believed that the ragas’ decisions are binding. But the customary courts may also
contest the authority of another customary court to resolve some cases involving
many actors, such as murder cases.
Local assemblies comprise the offices of the local leadership and the custom-
ary courts. According to key informants,16 local actors such as the mesaki (family
head), murra (representative of many interrelated households), moro (head of sub
clan), and gerad (leader of a clan) exercise local political power, while themaga, raga
and ferezagegne (local cassation court judges) are local legal actors working in the
customary courts. As one clan leader17 explained, the traditional elder assemblies
oversee the cases in their respective localities. However, their organization is based
on clan groups and not on territory.18These assemblies come together once or twice
a year to discuss issues of common concern, such as how to keep the norms and
values of yesiltie serra alive. They also hand over criminal suspects who have tried
to avoid punishment by moving to another locality to their respective clan leaders.
As I observed during my research, local dispute settlers handle all kinds of dispute
cases including homicide.
Informants stated that one could become a raga (local legal expert) on the basis
of one’s maturity,marital status (married), knowledge of handling issues and social
acceptability. The position is also often passed from father to son. The value and
belief systems of the people serve as powerful enforcing modes for the decisions of
elders. In addition to their role in ending disputes, such local dispute settlement
sessions are stages for strengthening Siltie identity and channels for exchanging
information about local developments.
16 This relies on FGD that was conducted with eight informants, namely Hajji Hussein Hassan,
Hajji Hussein Bussera, Sheik Yusuf, Hajji Mifta, Gerad Kedir, Kaire Sule, and Hamid Azma
Hassan inMay 2016 at the annual SiltieHistory, Culture and Language Symposium inWerabe.
17 Interview with Girazmach Hussein Bussera on 3 April 2016 in Dalocha Woreda. He is the
leader of the Chiro-Dilapa clan in Dalocha and HulbaregWoredas, and is at the same time a
customary dispute settler.
18 These are Yechiro Dilapa Serra, Yemelga Serra, YeSumm Silti Serra and YeAlicho Serra. These are
the names of the clan councils, which are named after the communities they represent.
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Although revived since 1990s, the customary justice system is currently in de-
cline because of the competition it faces from the two other legal systems. First,
the Islamic justice system promoted by the youth has labelled the customary justice
system as an ‘unwanted innovation’ (bida’a) and an adulteration of the principles of
Islamic justice. Second, it faces strong pressure from the state legal system and
the government in general, which fears the creation of space for a ‘state within a
state’ that might instigate a kind of power struggle between traditional authorities
and local government officials. Due to the growing monetization of the customary
courts in the area, some elders are also blamed for an increase in the prevalence of
bribery.
Interactions of the various legal systems: Duality of cooperation and
contestation
As has been indicated above, the interaction between the three legal systems is
characterized by both cooperation and contestation. On the other hand, the fact
that the three courts borrow local norms and legal concepts from each other indi-
cates the emergence of a hybridized legal practice in the area, and possibly beyond.
In this section, I discuss this issue in some detail. The judges of the customary
justice system, for instance, operate pragmatically, borrowing from or referring to
legal norms from other legal systems, in particular from the Islamic justice system.
While the local politico-legal system of the Siltie has continued to operate side
by side with the new regimes, the state system has also brought changes in the
application of the customary law. In the case of homicide, for example, previously,
a person who committed homicide was thrown into a big gully by his relatives to
end the feud and avert revenge. Since the late-nineteenth century, the customary
practice of ‘killing themurderer’ –which is believed to have been taken from Sharia
law –was replaced by the payment of blood money (gumma) to the victim’s family.19
Some informants said that the Siltie practised gumma even earlier, giving compen-
sation in kind (such as cattle) rather than money to the victim’s family. Hajji Kemal
Barsebo, a 62-year-old elder and customary court dispute settler gave this account
of his experiences in the area:
We have asserted the right to self-administration, albeit late, in federalist
Ethiopia. We paid every price to get recognized by the central government. As an
independent ethnic group, we have our ways to settle disputes (e.g. yesiltie serra).
We have employed the system for long to resolve disputes, including murder
19 Some informants stated that compensation payments were also common before Siltie was
incorporated into Ethiopia, especially in cases of intentional murder. While such compensa-
tion was given in kind (e.g. in the form of cattle) before the late-nineteenth century, today is
given in cash.
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cases. We also know that the government has set up its judiciary systems at the
grassroots level. Alhamduli-Allah our Din (Islam) also acknowledges our role as
elders to use our culture. It even recognizes berche (lit.: ‘fairness’).
Ironically, the public prosecutors do not drop the dispute the cases we are
handling and thereby affect our credibility as elders in the community. In fact,
we do cooperate with the state legal system in those cases for which the police
could not easily find evidence. The state has got prisons, yet we have got berche,
which can keep inflicting harms on up to seven generations of the disputing
parties as well as on the dispute settlers if not well addressed. Where is article
39 of the FDRE constitution? Why does the state not allow us to fully involve our
elders in resolving disputes like our neighbouring ethnic groups? (Interview, 27
August 2014, Silti Woreda)
Barsebo recounts the cooperation he witnessed among different legal systems on
the one hand, and the competition that characterized the interactions of legal ac-
tors on the other.
The various mechanisms that the state has developed since the 1990s indicate
that the government has tried to expand the state judiciary system in the coun-
try. Yet the system seems to have remained ineffective. In this regard, the consol-
idation of state power and its legal system has two severe consequences for legal
pluralism: it prevents religious and customary laws having an equal status as state
laws; it changes the role of law from enforcing social norms, which is the typical
characteristic of the religious and customary courts, to achieving the political and
economic objectives of government (Tamanaha 2008).With the challenges the state
legal system faces at the grassroots level, pluralism is at a crossroads in Siltie.
Summary and conclusion
The paper has shown that in Siltie today, the customary law and courts, the state
(formal) legal system and Islamic institutions and courts operate side by side.While
the customary and the religious legal systems have faced challenges from the state
since the late-nineteenth century, they have survived because of the people’s strong
attachment to local values and norms on one hand and the agency of actors who
have used their social legitimacy to deliver justice to the community on the other.
Moreover, the state institutions’ inability to provide sufficient and satisfactory ser-
vices to all Siltie, as well as the community’s lack of trust of the state, and partly of
Sharia courts, have also contributed to the continued existence of the customary
legal systems.
The study has also demonstrated that all three legal systems are marked by
intra-plurality. The legal plurality of the customary justice system, for instance, is
characterized by the various territorial or lineage-based institutions of dispute set-
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tlement. The Islamic legal institutions in the community use not only the Sharia
court but also other institutions of dispute settlement, such as the Social Commit-
tee created by members of the Islamic reform movement (the Salafis). Its plurality
also emanates from the plurality of Islamic jurisprudence itself, which is based on
four legal schools that differ on various issues, particularly on the gender dimen-
sion of property rights: while most of the Islamic legal schools have a male bias,
the Hanafi School stipulates equal shares of property between husband and wife
upon divorce.There is also plurality within the state legal system,manifested in the
existence of various laws and institutions such as municipality laws, custom law,
and the Good Governance and Appeal Office, which is in charge of hearing cases
that are handled by the state courts.
The paper has also revealed that the formal legal system, the Islamic institutions
and the customary institutions interact in such a way that they complement one
another and cooperate with each other in many instances. In this regard, the state
courts rely on customary courts to solve cases that the formal courts cannot adjudi-
cate due to a lack of evidence, which the customary courts can more easily obtain.
The customary courts employ local means of investigation involving ritual oaths to
find evidence of crimes with no witnesses. Customary courts also promote resti-
tutive approaches to disputes as opposed to the retributive approach of the state
courts and formal law, which are culturally disconnected from the communities
where the disputes are processed. While the legal systems cooperate in particular
in handling marital cases, there is competition and conflict in other areas, notably
over homicide cases.
The study has revealed that the different realms of state, customary and reli-
gious law not only interact but also adopt elements from each other, which points
to the emergence of hybridized legal practices in the area and even possibly be-
yond. State court judges, for example, use local notions of justice, such as berche,
when they handle marital disputes, while customary court judges refer to and pro-
mote gender equality when they handle family cases, which is contradictory to the
dominant patriarchal relations prevailing in Siltie.
To conclude, one can state that the interactions between the various legal tradi-
tions in the area are characterized not only by cooperation but also by competition.
And that we are seeing the emergence of the hybridization of legal practices in the
contemporary world that is challenging the prevailing definitions of legal pluralism
as the coexistence of more than one legal system in a given social setting.
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13. A matter perspective: Of transfers, switching, and
cross-cutting legal procedures




Thediscussion about legal pluralism is often framed by the state’s perspective. From
this point of view, the state is in the centre and has to deal with the ‘problem’ of
other legal systems, often subsumed under the generalizing term ‘customary law’
(e.g. Donovan and Getachew 2003:505), acting in ‘its realm’ (Griffiths 1986:1–7). Yet,
these non-state legal systems often preceded state law historically, and may rep-
resent locally the legitimate heir of a legal tradition that used to be termed not
‘customary law’ but simply ‘the law’.1 Looking from the perspective of a local el-
der, senior lineage representative or individual affected by an on-going case rather
than that of the court judge, advocate or government agent, state law may not be
the primary focus or obvious choice for appeals; rather it represents one of several
options or procedural variants ‘out there’ in an arena comprising both diverse re-
gional institutions and authorities created by strangers (see Larcom 2013:205). So,
when it comes to conceptions of the legal spheres, we always need to ask through
whose eyes are they being perceived.
Such an understanding also implies that state law cannot be taken to be the sole
reference point for defining legal pluralism. In fact, legal pluralism is more than
a binary situation of ‘state versus custom’ since there is rarely just one ‘custom’ at
work, particularly in inter-ethnic settings and in settings comprising different re-
ligious traditions (see Pankhurst and Getachew 2008). Instead, there is a complex
1 Although the ‘making of’ customary law by colonial forces has often been stressed (Snyder
1981:49, Tamanaha 2008:384), clearly not all of these legal traditions were invented by the
state (K. von Benda-Beckmann and Turner 2018:261). Various local legal systems, including
several orally transmitted law corpora, preceded and prevailed the coming of the nation
state, even if in partially altered form.
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arena comprising different institutions that may compete or cooperate, closely in-
teract or (officially) ignore each other. Seen in this light, state institutions and their
affiliates constitute just one out of several ‘players in the game’, albeit often power-
ful ones.This raises the question of whatmethodology should be used in describing
and analysing instances where actors navigate through a plurality of legal options.
From an anthropological perspective, there are several ways of looking at le-
gal processes. The actor-oriented approach, which focuses mainly on disputants
(as well as other involved parties) and their diverging goals and interests, has long
been a leading paradigm in anthropology (K. von Benda-Beckmann and Turner
2018:260). However, the approach has been challenged by recent global develop-
ments that have driven an increasing focus on state law and ‘official’ standards.
To take the state’s perspective often means to look through the ‘institutional
eye’: to look at corporate bodies and institutions, and their rules and staffing.
Particularly in heterogeneous settings, one might find the emergence of networks,
the involvement of hierarchies, and the interplay of competition and cooperation
between different institutional bodies. In such settings, often called ‘polycen-
tric’, ‘problems of sovereignty (or sovereignties)’ are frequently involved (Lange
1995:113). A particular case’s cross-cutting of institutional boundaries appears to
be an anomaly when seen from the standpoint of institutions that make exclu-
sive claims on decision-making. Cross-cutting cases must then be described in
terms of ‘transfer’ or ‘switching’ that require explanation as well as legitimate
justification. However, another scenario emerges when tracing such cases with
a ‘processual view’. This involves following a case along its path, through its ups
and downs and sideways turns. Thus, one may find some cases remaining, by
and large, within one dominant institutional setting, while others pass through
different instances or are dealt with by different institutions over a period of time.
Actors make choices and switch the settings, appealing to different authorities in
order to change the outcome of their cases. From an institutional, ‘one-case-one-
justice’ standpoint, this is often branded ‘forum-shopping’, and is likely to be ac-
companied by a negative evaluation, since affected parties are seen as taking too
active a role in shaping the outcome of their case – even though some authorities
do the same (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). From a processual perspective, and
in realist terms, however, this could be taken as no more or less than a legal and
social reality.
The ‘procedural’ perspective provides another approach, and combines charac-
teristics of both the ‘institutional eye’ and ‘processual view’: while some cases may
be treated in formal ways that remain in the framework of a particular institutional
setting, like the state court or a church council, other forms of conflict settlement,
like mediations by elders, may regularly cross-cut different institutional settings,
and even make this ‘crossing’ a standard procedure, without participants losing
sight of their different personal and institutional backgrounds (Nicolas 2011:63–67).
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In the following, it is argued that, depending on which perspective is chosen
and which methodology is taken as a base, different conclusions on the analytical
and theoretical level may follow from the empirical description of cases. The chap-
ter draws on research on the different legal institutions and procedures that are
commonly in use among the Oromo and the Amhara living in East Shewa Zone of
Oromiyaa region, central Ethiopia.2
A history of change: Legal frameworks and pluralist settings
The rural areas of East Shewa Zone of central Ethiopia are inhabited mainly by
Tuulama-Oromo and members of the Amhara ethnic group. The historical sources
for the area mostly describe changes in the power relations between the two
groups, among which processes of integration and exchange seem to have been
strong. The period of Oromo predominance can be associated with the rule of
gadaa, an age- and generation system introduced into the area in the sixteenth
century by northward-migrating Boorana-Oromo (Bahrey 1954 [1593]:116–125; Mo-
hammed 1990:18–27). Amharic rule, on the other hand, is marked by the exercise
of power through the Shewan kings, who – after a period of ‘insular’ existence
in settlement clusters surrounded by Oromo territory – expanded their domains
outward from the Manz area in northern Shewa from the beginning of the eigh-
teenth century (Asfa-Wossen 1980:23–35). Through successive military campaigns,
they gained control of the area discussed here in the nineteenth century (Ege
1996:192–220).
The Imperial era in Ethiopia lasted until the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie
(1930–1974, interrupted by the Italian occupation of 1936–1941) and was violently
ended by the socialist Derg (1974–1991).3 When the EPRDF government took power
in Ethiopia in 1991, it divided the country into ethnic regions and East Shewa be-
came part of Oromiyaa region.
Under Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913), the Tuulama-Oromo of Shewa were
converted to Christianity (Aṣma 1987 [1901–13]:688–695). Today, the majority of the
2 This paper is based on 25 months of fieldwork conducted between 1995 and 2002, which led
to the publication of a dissertation onmediation byOromoandAmhara elders (Nicolas 2011),
as well as to 8 months further fieldwork between 2003 and 2017. The case examples quoted
here stem from the village of Qaallittii in the Adaʾa Liiban district, where I lived for some
time. Most of the interviews refer to a time period stretching back to 1999, but I would hold
that their characteristics are still significant. I would like to thank Felekke Zewde for his help
in translating from Amharic to English during interviews with Amhara elders. I conducted
most of the other interviews in the Oromo language.
3 Amh. därg (‘committee’).
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rural population are Orthodox Christians. Oromo religious prayer and ritual prac-
tices co-exist alongside Orthodox Christianity. The religious framework is supple-
mented by the widespread practice of spirit possession in the wider region.
Local ways and cross-cuts: Mediation by elders
In East Shewan rural society, where ethnic ‘borders’ are regularly crossed by in-
termarriage between Oromo and Amhara, and by the fact that the two groups live
in joint settlements, old men possess a high status. They settle conflicts and ar-
range marriages for the members of the junior generations in a procedure called
jaarsummaa in Oromo, and shimgilinna in Amharic. They deal not only with cases
that one might assume to be too ‘unimportant’ for state courts or other juridical
institutions, such as personal insults and intra-familial disputes, but also with ag-
gravated cases, like physical injury and homicide, and cases that may affect the
wider group or that have inter-ethnic dimensions. Special procedures and rituals
are used to bring about reconciliation between conflicting parties, many of which
are families clashing over cases involving insults, brawls, disputes about property,
bride abduction or killing. The prescribed procedures differ according to the type
of case, and are suited to the gravity and possible consequences of the incident in-
volved. The rituals and courses of action already hold appeasing potential in their
form and language (Nicolas 2011). For instance, in serious cases involving quarrels
and bloodshed, throughout the mediation process, time is set aside to allow the
quarrelling parties to calm down. The procedure also stipulates that go-betweens
contact the victim’s family and enter into negotiations with its elders. This helps
avoid acts of revenge and an immediate face-to-face confrontation between the
families involved in the conflict. The aim of mediation is not primarily to punish
guilty persons but to reconcile the families or groups involved.
A shared complex: Elders and ethnicities
The need to solve conflicts between members of different ethnic groups led to
the emergence of a shared institution of conflict resolution among Oromo and
Amhara elders.4 Amhara individuals who are adopted by Oromo families obtain
the right to be integrated into the dia-paying and reconciliation system, which
4 The development of a joint institution of reconciliation was facilitated by the fact that both
groups already shared some basic characteristics. Both Oromo and Amhara relied on rec-
onciliation by elders. In Amhara, as in Oromo settings, elders have arranged marriages and
been responsible for decision-making in particular community affairs. Evidence of such set-
tlements and arrangements can be found, for instance, inMessing (1957) and Reminick (1973)
for the Amhara, and in Abas (1982) and Abdurahman (1991) for the Oromo.
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shields them from possible Oromo enmities. Vice-versa, Oromo who get into trou-
ble with Amhara and are then threatened with revenge are in need of a mechanism
of peace-making that is acceptable to their persecutors.
It is open to question whether Amhara elders in earlier times reconciled cases
involving blood-fee payments in their communities. However, today members of
both groups share the view that Amhara traditionally do ‘not know’ blood-fee pay-
ments, making them very difficult reconciliation partners who tend to turn to re-
venge or state prosecution if they are victims, while Oromo do ‘know’ it and there-
fore more easily yield to appeals for peace.5 In cases where an Amhara has killed an
Oromo, it is likely that the Amhara would fall back on the Oromo way of paying the
blood-fee in order to calm down his Oromo pursuers. Amhara, in such instances,
often trust their case to exclusively Oromo elders, who are of better help under
these conditions.
Which procedural norm is followed, the Oromo or the Amhara ‘way’, and which
law is applied depends not least on the individual composition of the group of el-
ders in a given case, and on the ethnic, religious and biographical background of the
parties involved. Indeed, although each case is arranged and prepared according
to a common ‘recipe’, slight modifications are always made according to the indi-
vidual needs of the people involved, and the ethnic background of the participants
is one factor that affects any changes.
Higher-level standards: Oromo law and jurisprudence
Since the change of government in 1991, which put an end to the socialist era and
introduced an ethnic-federal system in Ethiopia, there has been a resurgence of the
gadaa generation system throughout the wider Oromo region. Every eight years,
just before a new generation class takes power in the country, the ruling ‘fathers of
the land’ (the gadaa) hold large regional meetings (Nicolas 2006, Alemayehu 2009;
cf. Blackhurst 1978). The members of the ruling class then gather near the tree of
Odaa Nabee, which serves as the regional assembly place for the Tuulama-Oromo,
as well as at other open air locations, such as the places where laws are proclaimed
(caffee). During these meetings the gadaa carry out rituals, decide on matters of
public concern, and deal with disputes, particularly cases of homicide. The gadaa
leaders invite legal experts from previous generations to come and recite for them
the laws of the country at these meetings (Huntingford 1955:47, Nicolas 2006:172).
The Oromo law (seera) is not written in books but is preserved and orally trans-
mitted by a relatively small number of legal experts (sing. abbaa seeraa). Usually
5 It is probable that the Amhara practised, at least in part, blood-fee payments. See Ibrahim
(1990) and Kassa (1967).
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two, but sometimes three, of them perform the ritualized proclamation of the laws
of the country together. Depending on the way in which the experts memorize it,
the body of law consists of about thirty sections, each with four to eight or more
subsections. The recitation is performed in a question–answer form. Paragraph
by paragraph, the law experts list what is respected and sanctified in Oromo so-
ciety (Haberland 1963:226, 476–481, Nicolas 2010:592). The paragraphs list lineage
seniorities, name sacred waters, trees and mountains, legitimate different kinds
of marriages, recite rules for atonement and compensation for killings, injuries,
insults and theft, and clarify the legal status of animals and property.The listeners,
male adults who aremembers of the currently ruling generation class, are expected
to memorize the content of the laws.They will need this knowledge in their subse-
quent stages of life, when they perform their duties as elders,mediators and judges
in their various home areas.
Each of the five gadaa classes has a number of hereditary families in which
titles and offices are handed down from father to eldest son. Thus, the offices
of the ‘fathers of the sceptre’ (abbaa bokkuu), attached to senior positions in the
Oromo lineage system and responsible for decision-making, as well as the most
senior ‘judges’ (hayyuu) at their head, are repeated in all five gadaa classes (Nicolas
2006:170). They usually belong to the most respected families in their areas.
The mediation by Oromo elders does not represent an alternative to formal
Oromo law, but is itself a part of the legally prescribed procedure. In cases of serious
injury or murder, an expert and judge (caffee taa’icha) is usually called in during
the protracted negotiations. In accordance with the law, he must determine the
amount of compensation to be paid and give instructions for the reconciliation
rituals. A caffee taa’icha (literally, ‘[he] who was at [the place of] the law gathering’)
has successfully passed the stage of gadaa, and has thus heard the proclamation of
the Oromo law several times.
The Oromo ‘law’ (seera), however, does not cover the full spectrum of disputes
and problems that people experience. Particularly in multi-ethnic and predomi-
nantly Orthodox Christian settings, where different legal conceptions are present,
‘custom’ (aadaa) and situationally accommodated practice provide more flexibility
for individual decision-making.
Religious interventions, institutional diversity and plurality of law
For centuries, Amhara law was a codified state law, confirmed and protected by
the Shewan rulers, and written down in a book called the ‘law of the kings’ (fetha
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nagast).6 This law contained a number of draconian measures against wrongdoers,
such as flogging, the amputation of a hand for theft, and the death penalty for
killing. We can only speculate on whether these measures were actually and regu-
larly applied among the Amhara population of Shewa, or whether many cases were
instead settled with the help of local elders.7 However, we know that the fetha na-
gast also included some articles on theft and (unintended) homicide that resemble
regulations about compensation and reconciliation rather than punishment.8
Orthodox priests continue to refer frequently to this ancient law of the kings,
even though it has been replaced by modern state law. Priests are also regularly
involved in the mediation procedures of local Oromo elders, albeit only through the
frequent participation of individual priests in local mediations rather than through
any official institutional Church involvement.
Cooperation among elders, priests and Oromo lineage seniors is a regular fea-
ture in East Shewan conflict settlement, yet there seems to be a ranking in the right
to make decisions. Priests might take a leading role in advising councils of devout
Oromo and Amhara elders, but their role often diminishes when a group of tra-
dition-oriented Oromo elders gathers to discuss a case. Particularly when a caffee
taa’icha is present, the seera, not the fetha nagast, forms the basis of decision-mak-
ing. In such circumstances, priests often have to relinquish their preference for the
old law of the kings, which is much closer to Church teachings, and accept that the
case will be settled according to Oromo law. The priests’ readiness to handle such
cases ‘according to the local culture’ (ye-akkababi bahil), as they term it, reflects the
demographic givens and specific power configurations of the region they live in.
Church procedures
In general, the Church itself has no independent mediation procedures that might
supersede the proceedings of elders.The Church’s particular type of religious mar-
riage, defined as being indissoluble, is confined to a few, rather rare, instances;
and the institution where parishioners and priests carrying the cross and wearing
6 According to Messing (1957:309), this law code was ‘a blend of Canons of the Coptic church
councils, the Justinian Code and the Bible’. Compiled in Egypt, the code was later introduced
to Abyssinia, and superimposed by kings and clerics on the older Amhara ‘customary law’.
According to Ibrahim (1990:29), the code was written in the early fourteenth century by the
Coptic Egyptian writer Ibu al-Assal. However, authors disagree about the time of its introduc-
tion to Ethiopia. The work was translated from Arabic into Ge’ez and Amharic, and copies in
these languages can still be purchased in clerical bookstores in Ethiopia.
7 On this issue, see Kassa (1967) and Ibrahim (1990). The same issue has been discussed with
reference to Oromo law (see Dinsa 1975:86 and Bassi 1992).
8 For the different regulations mentioned here, see Fetha Nagast, Art. 24, no. 826–963; Art. 47,
no. 1655–1717 and Art. 49, no. 1759–1770.
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festive clothing gather to pray together, is almost exclusively done for the reconcil-
iation of man with God. It might complement the reconciliation between perpe-
trator and victim (or their families) provided by the elders’ procedure but it is not
a substitute.
The Church, however, does offer some alternative to the elders’ proceedings.
Instead of following the Oromo peace-making rituals of promise-making in the
victim’s compound or at a gorge, participants may choose to perform their vows in
the Orthodox way, within the church compound. Likewise, in some places, gather-
ings for collective pleading to God in the open air is not bound to the occurrence of
exceptional, heaven-caused catastrophes such as droughts or famines, but is orga-
nized at more or less regular intervals to beg God for forgiveness for the sins of the
parishioners accumulated in the interim.At these occasions, reconciliations among
people may be carried out by priests and pious elders at the church compound, by
way of a piece-by-piece handling of the many cases to be dealt with on a single day.
Though this parochial form of reconciliation is usually preceded by traditional me-
diation through local elders, it is nevertheless evident that a Church reconciliation
provides a possible alternative to the elders’ procedures. Some parishes have also
launched an independent platform for reconciliations by Church elders, founding
a council of ‘assembly delegates’ (mele’ata guba’e) consisting of twenty elders chosen
from the surroundings, who make the decisions. Their appointment, however, is
highly selective and based on their devotion to the Christian Orthodox Church.The
council’s proceedings are guided by Church teachings, and are not under the direc-
tion of the traditional laws and practices of Oromo title-holders. Since this institu-
tion is still somewhat rare in the area, it does not influence customary mediation
procedures on a large scale. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly constitutes a potential
alternative to which people who are dissatisfied with other elders’ ways can turn.
Courts of spirit followers
Similar courts are run by some influential spirit mediums at their temple com-
pounds. A particular cult’s leader, who acts as the spirit’s medium, will carefully
select loyal and devout followers to act as the ‘elders of God’ (sing. jaarsa Waaqaa)
and hold these councils.These elders number three ormore. Spirit cults, even with-
out such councils of elders, offer mechanisms of conflict resolution and reconcil-
iation to their members. For instance, reconciliations are regularly carried out at
holidays or during the regular possession rituals held at the spirit’s temple door.
Via his medium, the spirit orders certain participants to end their quarrels; recon-
ciliation is then sealed using grass and through the ritual performance of spitting
and mutual hand-kissing of the former adversaries. A spirit medium described to
me the reconciliation procedures at a spirit’s temple in the following way:
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If, for instance, a thief has stolen money from me, I go to [the temple of] the
oogliya (spirit), [and complain to him]: ‘Someone has stolen from me. I want my
money back.’ The thief then gets sick.9 He goes elsewhere to another oogliya
and asks him why he fell sick. That oogliya answers: ‘You have stolen money from
someone. Give the money back to him!’ The thief now goes to [the temple of] the
first spirit medium, in the area where the person that was stolen from lives [and
begs]: ‘I have stolen from him, please reconcile us!’ The qaalluu (spirit medium)
now sends someone to the person that was stolen from, and has him come for rec-
onciliation [at the temple]. The oogliya (spirit) then speaks to both, and the thief
gives the money back. The money is swathed in some grass, and some money,
1–3 Birr, lay upon it. The person that was stolen from now spits three times on it,
as well as three times towards the sky. Thereby, the [curse] ends and the sickness
of the thief goes away. The thief and the person he stole from kiss each other’s
hands. This shows that peace has been made again.10
In general, only followers of the spirit cult involved attend the reconciliation pro-
ceedings. Since only small and a fewmedium-size cults have spread in the area, and
are often competing with each other, not all the inhabitants are integrated into the
same network of worship. Consequently, spirit mediations do not have the capacity
to replace the elders’ well-established procedures.Mediating elders, however, often
have to pay a visit to the spirits’ temples in cases of marriage, bride abduction or
cursing.They may also occasionally ask a spirit medium to join mediation in order
to gain support for their peace-making efforts.
The mediatory principles of spirit mediums and mediating elders are not un-
like each other. Both exercise rituals for the good of the wider community and both
share an explicit ideology of peace in their prayers and advice. It is true that some
spirit mediums see their own reconciliations as the only ‘true’ ones, since a spirit is
said to know everything, and reconciliations made before him have to be commit-
ted full-heartedly. From this point of view, elders’ reconciliations are just made for
the sake of the maintenance of order and do not come ‘from the stomach’ (that is,
from the heart).11 Inversely, not every elder might be a follower of a given spirit’s
cult, so that only elders who have no objections or are believers themselves are cho-
sen for the task of visiting the spirits’ temples. However, as a rule, spirit mediums
and elders cooperate well with one another: spirit mediums often recommend that
9 The sickness is induced by the spirit as a punishment. The term oogliya derives from Arabic
ʿawliya, the plural form of ‘saint’ or ‘guardian’. Many people in the area also use the term
ayyaana. Both terms refer to spirits that speak to people and give them advice through the
mouths of their human mediums, the qaalluu.
10 Interview Buzunesh Kormee, Qaallittii,13 October 1999.
11 Words of a spirit medium. Interview Buzunesh Kormee, Qaallittii, 1999.
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their followers have their case settled by the local elders; and elders pay tribute to
the spiritual authorities of their surroundings.
Shared know-how: Burial associations, NGOs and new/old clan assemblies
New ‘intermediate forms’ of legal activity between different social and legal insti-
tutions also exist. Among them is the ‘clan assembly’ founded in 1992 by the sub-
lineage of Illuu, near the village of Hiddii in Adaʾa, which has been given the task
of teaching traditional Oromo law, of settling conflicts among the people of the
surrounding area, of calling troublemakers to order, and of securing the locality’s
growth and prosperity. Moreover, it is involved in the collection of money from
its members, which is used for blood-fee payments in cases of homicide (Nicolas
2007:486).
The assembly – called in Oromo walygayii gosaa (assembly of the clan) – is not
just based on old clan and lineage ties, as its name would imply. Rather it has
adopted the organizational structure of the iddir, a form of burial association com-
monly found in the area among both Oromo and Amhara.12 At the same time, the
assembly pursues a policy of monetary investment that closely resembles the ac-
tivities of local NGOs. A special sub-committee of the assembly is responsible for
buying and selling grain at the local markets in order tomake profit from the trans-
action. In the case of thewalygayii gosaa, legal activity is thus closely tied to capital-
raising entrepreneurship.
Legal governance and state administrative units
State law claims precedence over all these forms of legal aggregates and proce-
dures. Today’s state law, referred to in Oromo as seera mootummaa and in Amharic
as hegg, was mainly designed on aWestern model. It was finally enacted by the last
Ethiopian emperor in 1957, following a juridical reform of the first Ethiopian penal
code, which had already officially replaced the ‘law of the kings’ (the fetha nagast) in
1930.13 The penal code of 1957 largely remains in force today; it deals, among other
things, with theft, beating and injury, abduction, robbery and killing, and gives as
punishment – depending on the gravity of the offence – a fine, arrest, or ‘rigorous’
incarceration up to life-long imprisonment. In severe cases, the death penalty can
also be applied. In cases of assault, beating and injury, the law further provides for
compensation to the victim’s side.14
12 The institution actuallymight be of Soddo ‘Gurage’ origin, having spread fromurban contexts
to the countryside (Pankhurst 2002:6, 8).
13 See Ibrahim (1990:29) and Aberra (2000:195).
14 For these regulations, see the Penal Code of 1957, of the Empire of Ethiopia.
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Peasant associations
On the village level, state law is representedmainly by local militias and the work of
village administrators. Peasants associations (PA) have administered the land since
the time of the socialist land reform of 1975. Although, following the overthrow of
the socialist government in 1991, profound changes have been made at the level of
local politics, every peasant who wants to plough land still has to be a member of
a peasant association and is subject to its local jurisdiction.
Within the wider administrative setting, all districts are subdivided into
smaller administrative units called ganda (the Oromo equivalent to Amharic ke-
bele), consisting of between one and three villages or settlement concentrations
situated near each other. This administrative division is basically congruent with
the division of the land into peasant associations (waldaa qottoota)15 and, in fact, the
village administration (bulchiinsa gandaa) and the peasant association’s leadership
are mostly one and the same body (Nicolas 2011:50, 291).The village administration
consists of a chairman, a secretary, an overseer and four more members, all of
whom receive no salary and must fulfil their duties in addition to their usual
work. The whole village administration usually only comes together if there is
a particular problem or need to address. Otherwise, it is considered enough if
the secretary and two members meet once a week. As for the militia, a specified
number of men keep a weapon at their homes and only gather if they are called
together.
The leadership of a village can at any time call together the PA assembly to
announce or discuss issues of concern. However, it is at the monthly meetings of
the burial associations (iddir) where one can actually find most household-heads
gathered. Each village has at least one or two iddir, and every household-head is
a member of one. Iddir meetings are therefore where most issues of concern in
the village are discussed, and are the most important platform for public life in
the village.16 Themonthly iddirmeetings may also deal with problems and conflict;
otherwise, these cases are dealt with by a village tribunal.
The village tribunal
The village committee (koree) responsible for settling disputes consists of three peo-
ple: a chairman, a secretary and a further member without specific designation.
They work closely together with the leadership of the local peasant association, and
15 Also: waldaa qoteebulaa. Amh. ye-gabarewoch mahber, or in short form, gabare mahber.
16 Other forms of voluntary associations are the Church mahber, the local saving associations
known as eqqub, as well as temporary working groups called daboo, in which people rotation-
ally work in each other’s fields.
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actually constitute part of the PA’s administration, having been elected though the
same voting procedure. Accordingly, the PA and koree cooperate closely. If some-
one wants to make a complaint about wrongdoing, they must initially contact the
committee of the community administration, which will try to solve the case. If
unsuccessful, the community administration will refer the case to the village tri-
bunal (firdi shango),17 which is entitled to judge cases of petty theft and beatings –
except those involving serious injury – and can impose fines or detention for up to
a month, to be served in the prison of the nearest town.
Themembers of the tribunal are not full-time bureaucrats, and are usually fully
integrated into ‘ordinary’ village life as well as in the procedures of elders’ media-
tion. The institution they run nevertheless differs significantly in certain respects
from other elders’ proceedings. Unlike in the typical mediation procedure, where
the offender – who regrets his wrongdoing – sends his elders to apologize, in a
village tribunal, the victim initiates the juridical process by accusing his offender
before the administration. The judicial process is thus not primarily aimed at rec-
onciliation, but at identifying the culprit and punishing him.
The tribunal members draw their judicial knowledge from law workshops that
are held by government officials at irregular intervals in the nearby towns. Some-
times, they are able to obtain typed documents that list the rules and procedures
they are expected to follow. Consequently, the tribunal members are considered to
be representatives of the state law in their local communities. In many respects,
however, they are tied to the ‘local way’ of elders’ mediation, and may consider a
case solved if the culprit can prove that elders have already settled his case. Some-
times, tribunal members themselves act as ‘traditional’ elders. They thus work at
the interface of state law and ‘customary’ procedure.
Town courts and police
Cases that surpass the level of petty crime cannot be dealt with by the village tri-
bunals and are left to the state court (manamurtii) in town. In such cases, the victim
will go directly to the police and accuse the offender. If he can produce three wit-
nesses to prove that his accusation is true, the police and local militia search for the
culprit, arrest him and bring him before a court. While the District Court (which
for the district of Adaʾa Liiban is found in Bishooftuu, also called Debre Zeyt) sees
cases of significant theft, bride abduction, assault and beating, aggravated cases
in the same categories, as well as cases of robbery and homicide, exceed its com-
petence and are dealt with by the High Court in Adaama (also called Nazret).
17 It is also called shanacha.
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Moving between different legal institutions
Many cases move between different legal institutions. An Oromo elder, who him-
self later became a village administrator, gave me the following example of such
institutional cooperation:
A man in a village in Adaʾa was stolen some property. He had a suspicion who
had done it, and it was a person living in the same village. So the man who was
stolen something went to the police to press charges against the suspect. The
police now came into the village and took the suspect with them to the police
station in town and interrogated him. The man that was stolen from now went
to court. When the thief heard about it, he got scared. He sent six elders to the
compound of the victim, himself remaining behind. The elders sat in front of the
victim’s yard-gate, waiting for the victim to come out. The victim finally came out
and agreed to discuss the case with them. They agreed that they would settle the
case inmutual conciliation. The worth of the property, which the thief meanwhile
had sold, was discussed. The elders of the offender rather quickly agreed to the
victim’s demands, as they were glad that he was ready to come to an agreement.
It was consented that the thief would have to reimburse the worth of the loss,
without any penalizing fee being added. Somewhat later, another meeting was
arranged. This time, the elders came together with the thief. As at the first time,
they all remained outside the yard-gate. The victim went out to them. Themoney
was handed over to him, and all six elders, as well as the victim and the thief,
signed a paper. On the paper it was written that the offender admitted to the
wrongdoing, but that the case had been settled amicably. Also the sum that had
been repaid was noted on the paper. The paper was afterwards presented to
the police. The police read it and then closed the case. Therewith, the case was
settled.18
Such transfers of cases between institutions occur not only between state courts
and elders, but also between elders and other institutions, such as spirit cults. A
young woman, for instance, told me what happened after her husband had beaten
her after drinking and quarrelling.Thewoman’s father did not live in the village and
was also unsupportive of his former family, since he had divorced hermother, so the
woman went back to her grandparents’ home, where she had grown up, to search
for shelter and protection.Her grandfather, an Amhara,was a respected elder in the
village and had settled cases of conflict on many occasions. The woman’s husband,
an Oromo, sent two elders to try to convince the old man to begin reconciliation.
The woman provided me with a memory account of the exchange, reproducing the
elders’ speech in the way that she remembered it:
18 Interview Siyyum Ketema, with Felleke Siyyum, Qaallittii, 6 November 1999.
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Both elders were Oromo but spoke Amharic on the occasion.19 They were neigh-
bours from the surroundings, and my grandfather came to the yard-gate to greet
them: ‘Peace be with you! How are you? Come in, come in’, inviting them into the
house. They then discussed the case.
Grandfather: What is your problem? Why did you come?
Elder: So-and-so [name of the husband] sent us.
Grandfather: What did he say?
Elder: So-and-so [name of the wife] shall return home [to her husband].
Grandfather: She has a problem there.
Elder: Well, wait, when she has a problem, then just call us [and we will inter-
vene]!
Other elder (addressing the woman): What is your problem?
Woman: My problem is, why does he drink? Every evening he drinks in my house.
He gets drunk [and is behaving badly].20
The woman also complained that her husband’s father did not support the young
couple when they got into financial problems. The husband’s elders showed their
understanding but tried to convince the grandfather to send the woman back home
to her husband. The grandfather, however, left the decision to her:
Grandfather: She does as she wants to. I don’t know [what is the right thing to
do].
Elder: What is it? Please! She shall return home, please! We will also strongly
advise [the husband to behave correctly]!
Woman: My problem shall not be solved by elders. I want a solution by the
ayyaana (spirit).
Elder: What can we do about it?
The elders now returned to the house of my husband, to bring him the news.
Husband’s father:What problem is there?What was the problemwhen you asked
the old man?
Elder: He [the grandfather] said, she [the wife] can do as she likes. But when we
asked her, she had many problems. She said, ‘I don’t want the elders. The ayyaana
(spirit) is better for us, truth will come from there for me.’Husband’s mother: Her
[the wife] and her grandmother will come to the temple of the spirit. She comes
to the ayyaana (spirit), so we will do the same. We agree.
Husband: We will reconcile through the spirit. I will go with my mother, and she
will go with her mother.
19 They did so because Amharic was the mother tongue of the woman’s grandfather.
20 Interview Seble Getaneh, Qaallittii, 11 October 1999.
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 Woman: At the temple of the spirit, after coffee had been made, the ayyaana
(spirit) approached [and gave advice]. The reconciliation took place. Afterwards,
they accompanied me home [to my husband]. Now, everything is fine.21
The woman seemed pleased with the outcome of the reconciliation. Her strategy
to involve the spirit worked in her favour. In fact, her decision to appeal to the
spirit was not a spur of the moment one; she had planned it beforehand.The spirit
medium whose spirit was invoked during the reconciliation recalled how the wife
had contacted the temple some time before the elders gathered to attempt media-
tion:
When the couple quarrelled, first the wife came here [to the temple]. She came
alone. She cried and told me everything. On another day, the husband came here
and told everything as he had seen it.22 He also was alone. Then they both came
to a wadaaja (ritual session for the spirit at the temple). The oogliya (spirit) spoke,
and they both did reconcile.23
Thereafter, the wife was reassured by the belief that she would be guarded and
revenged by a higher spiritual force if her husband shouldmistreat her again.What
is interesting is that the case was put in the hands of the elders but they left it to be
solved by another institution: the spirit and its medium at the temple.The transfer
of the case, in fact, was a more powerful option for the wife than relying on the
mediation of the elders.
Transfers of conjugal disputes not only occur between elders and spirit medi-
ums, but also between state courts and the elders. An Amhara elder provided me
with the following example of the divorce of a couple from a local village:
A farmer and his wife were quarrelling. She loved another man, who was em-
ployed in the household. They both left the farmstead and started living together
in a rented house in the nearby town. At that time the woman brought charges
against her husband at the police station in town. She had asked her husband to
divorce and share their joint property, but he had refused: ‘Because you [his wife]
left me with my employee!’ The police sent a summons (matriya) to the husband,
and he immediately accused his wife of leaving the house with his employee. The
police asked whether he had a witness (misikkir) for that. He brought three wit-
nesses for his side to the court.
On the day of the court hearing, the wife did not come. The judge heard the three
witnesses, who affirmed that they had seen her leaving with her lover for town.
21 Ibid.
22 The spirit medium had sent for him to come to her temple.
23 Interview Buzunesh Kormee, Qaallittii, 13 October 1999.
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At a second hearing at court, the wife attended. The judge asked her: ‘You have
committed a wrong, is it true?’ At first, she did not admit to it, saying it was not
true. But the judge told her that they had heard three witnesses stating the op-
posite. A third court meeting was set. Both husband and wife were present that
day. The court decided that the wife had to pay 800 Ethiopian Birr to her hus-
band for leaving her home with a lover.24 Then the court decided to give the case
into the hands of the village elders. The court representatives said, ‘It is above
us’, and entrusted the sharing of the couple’s property to the elders. They said to
the couple, ‘You [each] have to select your own elders.’ Both had to sign a paper
wherein they promised that they would accept all that their elders decided on
their behalf.
Both wife and husband now each chose two elders from the village to be their
representatives, opting for people who knew them well and who might possibly
speak in their favour. A week after the court proceedings (which had stretched
over several months) the elders met at the house of the husband. Two people
sent from court also attended the meeting. They did not interfere in the elders’
work but oversaw their doings, and presented them with a paper carrying the
signatures of both husband and wife stating that they truly wanted to divorce.
The elders counted the cattle, the crops, the farmland and any other property,
like cow dung and the like, and estimated the value of the house. While as a rule,
property should be shared equally after a divorce, because of the wife’s ‘wrong-
doing’, her husband was given two thirds of the share, and she was given only one
third. From that sum, the 800 Ethiopian Birr that the court had set as a fine were
further subtracted. Finally, the woman got one oxen, ‘half of the house’, which
amounted to 600 Birr (after the 800 had been subtracted),25 and some farmland
that she could rent out for lease (kontrat), along with 64 eucalyptus trees, which
were growing on the land that remained with her husband. The woman took the
oxen and the other property on the very same day but left the eucalyptus trees
standing. The elders had made a mark on the trees, and she was told that if she
would later come to catch them, and the husband refused, the elders would help
her take her share.
 
The whole meeting had taken some five hours, and afterwards the elders and
court attendants got invited for food and drink to the house of the husband’s
father, and later on the same day to the home of the wife’s sister to ceremonially
confirm the legal act. However, no blessing was given by the elders at the end, as
24 Ca. 28 USD at that time.
25 About 21 USD.
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is usual during legal affirmation acts overseen by the elders. A divorce was not
considered a lucky occasion.26
A question arises: whether state court decisions are always the better option for
women who aim to contest male prerogatives in decision-making, since judges
may also adhere, to a considerable degree, to similar moral values and grounds for
decisions as many village elders.
Legal compatibility, overlapping, tensions
Although the functionaries of state courts and elders may share moral ground,
there are some significant differences between state court and elders’ procedures.
As western-designed criminal law, the Ethiopian Penal Code and its accompanying
procedures do not officially acknowledge agreementsmade by elders that would re-
sult in a relinquishment of criminal persecution.This offers a potential way out for
people who hope to escape the elders’ mediation or want to shape the outcome of
the process in their favour. Indeed, appealing to the courts is one of the most ef-
fective means of ‘pulling the rug’ from under the petitioning side’s ‘feet’: the case
is taken out of the hands of locals and the threat of state-punishment becomes
immediate for the offender. The question is whether consecutive appeals to differ-
ent legal institutions indeed constitutes – as an example of ‘forum-shopping’ – a
problem to the efficacy and legitimacy of the legal process, or whether the cross-
cutting of institutional settings could also be seen, from the point of view of users,
as a legitimate choice. For women, the possibility of appealing to court in addition
to elders or spirit courts can significantly enhance their standing in negotiations,
even if they actually wish to have the case solved through local mediation.
Documents for legal transfer and transmittance
Written documents play a special role at the interface between mediating elders
and legal institutions of the state. An elder outlined for me the procedure in cases
of homicide:
The victim’s side beforehand in the discussions use state law as a threat: ‘If we
don’t get the money, we go to the police station and accuse the killer.’ After an
agreement has been reached during the peace negotiations and an appointment
been set for the killer’s family to raise and hand over the blood-money, the elders
of the victim’s side sign a paper for safeguarding the killer’s side. If he [the closest
relative of the victim] goes to the police station before the appointment day,
26 Interview Getaneh Wolde-Maryam, with Felleke Zewde, Qaallittii, November 1999.
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he can be punished by up to 1000 Ethiopian Birr to be paid to the government
administration, and by up to 500 Ethiopian Birr to be given to the elders.27
Such papers are meant as a safeguard for the offender’s side. There is legal insecu-
rity in the time between when the terms of peace making and amount to be paid
are agreed and when the offender’s relatives have raised enough money to actu-
ally pay the required sum. On the handover day, another document is written that
states that the parties have reconciled and records the amount of blood-money
paid. Both the victim’s and the offender’s parties sign the document. A delegation
of elders from the killer’s side then goes to town and presents the signed document
at the police station. Even though this is not an officially recognised document, it
can still be enough to secure the case’s dismissal, as the elder elaborated:
First, the killer disappears from the area. His father promises to the police: ‘I will
bring you my child. Give me two months for finding him.’ He may also name a
guarantor (was) who will take responsibility for bringing in the son. The police
does wait for it. In the meantime, the father uses the time to initiate a gumaa
(blood-fee payment/reconciliation) process. When the gumaa process has started
and the police come to ask, the father tells them: ‘We are on the way of the gumaa
process.’ Before the deadline for the compensation payment, both sides and their
elders sign a paper that states that they are on their way to making peace. If they
are asked in the meantime, they can show it. On the appointment day [when the
money is handed over], they get another paper, with statements of both sides
that peace has been made. If the police now asks the father, he shows them the
paper. The police then put a copy of this paper in the police station and drop
the case. According to law, the killer would have to appear at court. But if he has
killed unknowingly, he will have to pay only a smaller fee. 28
It is rare, however, for people who committed homicide to easily evade a prison sen-
tence. Certainly, if an offender succeeds in hiding from the police for long enough
that compensation has been paid to the family of the deceased, his prosecution will
most probably be silently dropped. However, a killer who has already been appre-
hended and sentenced to jail is rarely released from prison after the two families
reconcile. A case of homicide cannot be as easily overlooked by the administration
as, for instance, cases of bride abduction, which are often dismissed on grounds
that the families have already reconciled. However, a killer can hope to have his
sentence mitigated at court, his efforts for reconciliation having proved his serious
regret, or to get amnesty before the end of his prison sentence, in consideration of
his good conduct and if the community elders vouch for him.
27 Interview AlemuWube, with Felleke Zewde, 24 October 1999, in Qaallittii.
28 Interview AlemuWube, with Felleke Zewde, Qaallittii, 24 October 1999.
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A question arises with regard to ‘double punishment’ in cases where both state
courts and elders give a verdict, for example, in cases of homicide. From the point
of view of mediating elders, the payment of a blood-fee may be intended not as a
punishment but as compensation for the loss of the bereaved family. While state
courts work on punishing trespassers, elders aim to re-integrate perpetrators and
reconcile their families. The question is then, whose procedures could be consid-
ered redundant and be dispensed with – the state’s or the elders’?
Separate bodies, combined strengths: Emergent joint procedures
Elders, gadaa representatives, priests and spirit mediums agree on the value of rec-
onciliation. This can lead to the building of mutual alliances and the emergence of
joint procedures in conflict settlement. The following account of the settlement of
a homicide case, given by the elder mentioned above, who participated, illustrates
the point:
It was in the early morning, in the dark. The victim was on his way somewhere.
The killer had had a quarrel with another man, and wanted to kill him. So he laid
in wait, with a gun, and when he saw the victim approaching, he thought it was
his opponent, and shot. The victim was dead immediately.
The killer went into hiding. The family of the deceased called the police, who
came from the nearby town of Debre Zeyt. The very same day, family members
and police brought the body to Menelik Hospital in Addis Ababa to be exam-
ined. Later that day, the family of the deceased returned to the village. The killer,
meanwhile, having become aware that he shot the wrong person, told his family
what had happened. They immediately took action and urgently sentmessengers
to near and distant relatives in other settlements to warn them and to quickly
start the reconciliation efforts. The killer’s relatives contacted elders, and these
elders contacted other elders, and so forth, to organize most urgent precautions
to prevent further violence. A whole chain of uproar took place, word of the killing
making the rounds among neighbours and in the surrounding villages.
Two or three days later, more than a hundred elders from five surrounding vil-
lages gathered in the morning on a plateau at the riverside, at some distance
from the dwelling of the bereaved family. They gathered for an isgoota, a ritual
apology and call for peace. All the children of the killer went with the pleading
elders, as did the killer’s father, mother and whole family (the killer himself had
to remain in hiding). The people stood in line and shouted ‘isgoo’ and ‘abet’ for
long, their voices being carried far through the landscape, so that they could be
heard by the family of the victim. In the first line, along with the most respected
elders of the area, there stood two Orthodox priests, who had come from a nearby
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church. They wore their full festive clothes and attire, and carried a cross. Each of
them was accompanied by a deacon who held a brocade umbrella for them. The
elders, furthermore, had brought a saddled horse with them that had no rider.
They had also invited a respected elder from a neighbouring village, who was a
bearer of kallachaa caaccuu (ritual object[s] of special power).29 He had brought
the holy item(s), covered under a cloth, with him, and stood somewhat apart.
The gathered elders and family members called isgoo and abet for quite a while,
standing on the plateau, and waited for a response from the victim’s side that
might show willingness for peace. But no one showed up. After a while, people
gave up and went home.
Two days later, they all gathered again on the plateau, carrying out precisely the
same procedure. Again, there were the priests in their outfits, the horse and over
a hundred elders shouting isgoo and abet. Again, no messenger showed up. Some
days later, they made a third attempt. This time, an elder sent by the victim’s side
approached, and asked what they wanted. The killer’s father and elders said that
the victim was killed by mistake, and they wanted to reconcile. The messenger
returned to the victim’s family to bring them the message.30
The example above illustrates part of a standard procedure applied in most me-
diations over homicide cases all over the wider region. Oromo Orthodox Chris-
tians now mostly understand the involvement of Orthodox priests in the media-
tion procedures to be part of their own cultural repertoire. The way in which the
isgoo pleading is undertaken is close to Christian Orthodox pleas to God in times of
disaster. At the same time, the saddled horse, the elder carrying the kallacha object
and other parts of the procedure hint at an Oromo background. Here, mediation is
practised as a meta-procedure whose details are adjusted according to the need for
a joint venture among the elders of the land.The different authorities involved in a
case all keep their distinct identities: priests remain religious representatives of the
Church, and caffee taa’icha remain titleholders loyal to the laws of the gadaa. Yet, for
the purposes of peace-making, they all partake in the same legal process and com-
ply with the same rules. For the elders, who invite them to join, both priests and
caffee taa’icha are helpful allies, whose presence might convince reluctant parties to
submit to reconciliation.This implies that we need to change our perspective when
29 The kallacha is a metal object said to have fallen from the sky in ancient times, while the
caaccuu is a leather strip embroidered with cowry shells. At the occasion of isgoota, the ritual
objects imply the threat of divine sanction if the plea for reconciliation is rejected by the pe-
titioned side. Both objects are usually brought at the same time for reconciliation purposes,
and the two terms are often blended together into a single term: kallachaa caaccuu (Nicolas
2011:196–199; see also Shewa 2011:57–58).
30 Interview AlemuWube, with Felleke Zewde, Qaallittii, 24 October 1999.
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analysing legal procedures, andmove away from emphasizing the separateness and
autonomy of the different institutions towards analysing a common procedure.
In the above case, both the victim and his killer were Oromo. The proceedings
were mainly organized by Oromo elders. Amhara elders also participated in the
isgoota pleading, as well as in the following meetings. An Amhara man who had
attended the meetings as an elder on the offender’s side, and who had twice before
participated in Oromo homicide proceedings, gave me the following account:
A meeting was arranged somewhat later at another place, under a tree, between
elders and family representatives of both sides. The father of the victim insisted
that his son was killed knowingly, while the killer’s side emphasized that it all was
just a terrible mistake, and the killer had killed him unknowingly. The victim’s
side also found the money offered to them as compensation too little. People
discussed over three hours without coming to an agreement, so they left for the
day and made another appointment.
A week later, they met under the same tree. Altogether, there were now sixteen
people attending, elders of both sides and the two fathers of victim and killer.
The killer’s side had brought one more special attendee, who sat the top of the
elders of both sides and advised them in finding a solution. He said, ‘The child
was killed unknowingly!’ and urged the victim’s side to yield to the reconciliation.
In the end, all the elders decided together that the blood-money would be fixed
at a sum of 9000 Ethiopian Birr,31 a smaller part of which would constitute the
‘money for the soul’ proper, and the larger part would compensate the victim’s
family for their expenses for the hospital, for police, and transport etc. The killer’s
family would pay the money to the family of the bereaved, and no further pun-
ishment should be set.
Two weeks later, the money was handed over to the victim’s family. A ritual rec-
onciliation took place, which was attended by both families, including the killer,
and the witnessing elders.32
According to my informant, the police did not then prosecute the killer. No priest
was present during the negotiations at the meetings described above. In other
cases, the elder told me, priests may be present at the negotiations. They, however,
would usually not attend the same meetings as other traditional authorities, such
as the guest who decided the amount of the blood-fee in the above account. The
elder referred to the man counselling the other elders as a qaalluu, i.e. as a spirit
medium. It is not unlikely, however, that the advisor in fact was a caffee taa’icha,
i.e., an Oromo judge. The caffee taa’icha,who I later met and who the Oromo elders
regularly used to invite to give judgement in homicide cases in the area, usually
31 About 320 USD at that time.
32 Ibid.
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wore a headscarf and an earring and held a whip in his hand on such occasions.
All these were symbols of his membership in the yuba grade, and of his authority
within the gadaa organization. This symbolism, however, was not widely known
to non-initiates, and so he could have easily been taken for a spirit medium by
observers unfamiliar with his background. If this interpretation is right, it also
raises the question of how well different participants in a process actually need to
be informed about each other’s institutional backgrounds in order to partake in a
common legal procedure.
Conclusion
The relation between elders, state, Church, and other institutions is altogether am-
bivalent. On the one hand, there exist close correlations, connections and mutually
supportive arrangements, ranging from silent agreements to regular ‘referrals’ of
clients to each other’s jurisdictions. The institution of elders’ mediation often ben-
efits from the presence of government institutions, since the threat of persecution
by the law regularly leads culprits to admit their guilt and to seek reconciliation
with the offended party. On the other hand, there are significant differences, both
in substance and procedure, among the different institutions’ laws and ways, as
well as some competition for supremacy between them.
However, provided here is also evidence of standardized cooperative proce-
dures emerging between different institutions; for example, in cases of homicide.
Here, representatives of different institutions, such as Amhara priests and Oromo
legal experts, may jointly participate in common legal procedures. These under-
takings represent a sort of ‘meta-procedure’, where the cross-cutting of different
institutions is not an exception but the standard. From a ‘procedural perspective’,
different legal institutions thus become elements of one and the same legal proce-
dure, and their joint involvement can no longer be seen as a ‘switching’ or ‘transfer’
between different legal bodies.
The question is, whether differences in the institutional backgrounds and ques-
tions of belonging of judges, priests, administrators and elders are the sole and
only points for analysing legal processes on the ground. Changing the perspective
from the ‘institutional perspective’ to the point of view of actors, and focussing
on the procedural aims they might jointly pursue, another picture emerges. From
that perspective, the non-linear course of cases, their ‘march through the institu-
tions’, or their conglomerate appearance when looking at the varied institutional
backgrounds of participants in the procedure, appear to follow a distinctive logic.
They happen to be systematic markers of legal diversity, yet they do not prevent
processes of standardization.The methodological implications of such a change of
perspective for a theory of legal pluralism still need to be further explored.
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14. When parallel justice systems lack mutual
recognition




In Ethiopia, the formal criminal justice system holds exclusive control over all crim-
inal disputes. While civil and family cases can be handled in the legal forum of the
conflicting parties’ choice, the system bars customary justice systems from han-
dling criminal matters, although in practice, they continue to be widely used for all
kinds of cases in several parts of rural Ethiopia (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008).
However, the lack of formal recognition for customary systems in the area of crim-
inal justice is creating problems for justice seekers, perpetrators and legal prac-
titioners. While there are numerous studies on customary conflict resolution in
Ethiopia (see for example Dejene 2007, Donovan and Getachew 2003, Pankhurst
and Getachew 2008, Gebre et al. 2012), not much has been written on the norma-
tive and institutional relationship between customary and state law in the settle-
ment of criminal disputes. As this paper will argue, the two systems lack mutual
recognition.
Among the Borana Oromo of southern Ethiopia, both customary and state law
coexist side by side and assert their authorities. Their coexistence has undesirable
effects for their users; for example, by subjecting offenders to sanctions imposed
by both systems for the same crime.This paper explores the nature of the relation-
ship between the state and customary legal systems with particular emphasis on
the handling of criminal matters. It attempts to show the impacts of their coexis-
tence on the Borana people, and to propose possible ways to improve the situation.
By revealing the nature of the problematic relationship between the formal and the
customary criminal justice systems in Borana, it will contribute to the growing lit-
erature on legal pluralism in Ethiopia, and hopefully serve to inform the Ethiopian
government as it endeavours to reform the criminal justice system. The victims
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of crime, offenders and the communities who often are subjected to two justice
systems may also benefit from the findings of the research.1
Over the last years, the idea of engaging with and making productive use of
customary justice systems has gained ground globally (Penal Reform International
2000, Wojkowska 2006). Thus, by showing the available but untapped potential of
customary law to address the shortcomings of the formal criminal justice system,
the research has practical relevance. Of course, all the diverse customary justice
systems in Ethiopia and beyond are not equally user-friendly. In view of this, this
study mainly focuses on exploring the possible ways of making use of the strengths
of the Borana customary justice system.
Conceptual Framework
Legal Pluralism
The term ‘legal pluralism’ is used to refer to the co-existence of two or more le-
gal systems within the same geographical space or jurisdiction (Twinning 2010).
In almost all parts of the world, legal pluralism is a reality that includes the for-
mal justice system (national law, international law) and informal justice systems
(customary law, religious law, and other normative orders).
The relationship between formal and informal justice systems may be harmo-
nious and cooperative, or antagonistic, with divergent effects on the users of the
systems. Where the systems compete with or undermine each other, the setting
is usually unfavourable to the users, especially if there is a lack of clear guidelines
about which system should deal with which criminal cases, as this often results
in people being punished twice. But where the two systems operate in a regulated
and mutually supportive way, users have no difficulty in knowing when and how to
make use of each of the systems (Forsyth 2007, Penal Reform International 2000,
Wojkowska 2006).
1 The study is based on extensive and mostly qualitative ethnographic fieldwork undertaken
from February 2012 to May 2014. It was conducted in Borana Zone of Oromia National Re-
gional State, where the indigenous justice system is prevalent and in competition with the
formal criminal justice system. Data for this paper was mostly collected during interviews
and focus group discussions with individuals living in the study area and who were involved
in the customary criminal justice processes, or affected by the rivalry between the two. They
included prisoners, victims or relatives of victims, clan elders and others familiar with the
justice systems like the police, judges and prosecutors. For some of the informants I used
pseudo names to protect their identity. Wherever that has been the case I marked it in the
text.
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Forsyth (2007:70) described seven models of relationships between the non-
state and state justice systems:
i) repression of non-state justice system by the state system;
ii) tacit acceptance of the non-state justice system by the state without formal
recognition;
iii) active encouragement of the non-state justice system by the state without for-
mal recognition;
iv) limited formal recognition by the state of the exercise of jurisdiction by a non-
state justice system;
v) formal recognition of exclusive jurisdiction in a defined area;
vi) formal recognition of the non-state justice system to exercise jurisdiction by
the state, which lends its coercive powers;
vii) complete incorporation of the non-state justice system into the state system.
In this continuum of relationships, there are two extremes. At one end, the non-
state justice system is outlawed and suppressed; at the other end, the informal
justice system is totally integrated into the formal justice system. In between, along
the spectrum, there are different models of relationships (Forsyth 2007:69).
Restorative versus retributive justice
The notion of restorative justice is underpinned by a worldview that places much
more emphasis on post-crime communal harmony than on the particular criminal
act in question. It refers to a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific
offence collectively deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for
the future (Marshall 1999:5). The central tenet of restorative justice is that damage
caused to the victim of a crime is healed. It aims to restore the relationship between
the victim, the offender and their communities, which has been disrupted by the
wrongful act.
Retributive justice defines a crime as an act that violates state rules. The state
is a victim against whom the wrongful act is committed. Retributive justice mainly
aims to establish guilt and punish the offender. Zehr (1990) described the salient
differences between restorative and retributive justice as follows:
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Table 1: Crime viewed through retributive and restorative lenses (Zehr 1990 184–185)
Retributive Restorative
Crime defined by violation of rules (i.e.
broken rules)
Crime defined by harm to people and re-
lationships (i.e. broken relationships)
Harmdefined abstractly Crime defined concretely
Crimeseenascategoricallydifferent from
other harms
Crime recognized as related to other
harms and conflicts
State as victim People and relationships as victims
State and offender seen as primary par-
ties
Victim and offender seen as primary par-
ties
Victims’ needs and rights ignored Victims’ needs and rights central
Interpersonal dimensions irrelevant Interpersonal dimensions central
Conflictual nature of crime obscured Conflictual nature of crime recognized
Wounds of offender peripheral Wounds of offender important
Offence defined in technical, legal terms Offencedefined insystemic terms:moral,
social, economic, political
The traditional African view of crime is quite different from that of the west-
ern-based formal justice system.The traditional African perspective explains crime
not as a violation of a state rule, but as a disruption of the spiritual harmony of the
community. It offers a more communal approach in which priority is given to the
community rather than the individuals involved in the criminal dispute (Jenkins
2004): crime ‘consists in the disturbance of individual or communal equilibrium,
and the law seeks to restore the pre-existing balance’ (Driberg 1934:231). As it dis-
turbs and harms both individual and social relationships, crime is not a mere act of
law breaking. In indigenous and tribal societies, the dominant philosophy is that
crime is a problem that causes harm to the society, which requires that members
of the society be involved in seeking a solution to the problem (Melton 2004:1).
While Africa is a vast continent of diverse peoples with distinct histories, tra-
ditions and justice systems (Malan 1997:8), the restorative aspect of their justice
system is an important commonality of many African societies. Particularly in ru-
ral areas,many African societies are characterized by strong social ties. As disputes
and conflicts are often viewed as concerning the entire community, customary jus-
tice systems give more weight to the restoration of social harmony in line with the
beliefs, customs and traditions of the local people. Inmost societies, the customary
justice process is not backed up by state coercion and relies on social pressure to
secure attendance and compliance with a decision. In line with the principles of
restorative justice, the procedures employed are informal and participatory. Deci-
sions are based on compromise rather than strict rules of law, and the disputants
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and their supporters play a central role in the decision-making process (Penal Re-
form International 2000:15).
There are, however, a number of constraints to the value of African indige-
nous justice systems within contemporary society. The lack of predictability and
coherency in decision-making is one such constraint. As there are no fixed stan-
dards to guide the elders, judgments are based on the decision makers’ knowledge
and moral values. The flexibility of the rules and procedures of customary justice
systems may result in unpredictable and arbitrary decisions (Harper 2011:22, Wo-
jkowska 2006:20).
In Ethiopia, the formal justice system and the various customary justice
systems operate side by side, often competing instead of supporting and enriching
each other (Macfarlane 2007:501, Tsegaye et al. 2008:64). The relationship be-
tween the systems is “co-existence and collaboration without mutual recognition
(Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:258). Many studies have revealed that informal
justice systems have continued to play a significant role in regulating the day-
to-day lives of the members of various communities in Ethiopia (Dejene 2002,
Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Gebre et al. 2012) as they are ‘more influential
and affect the lives of more Ethiopians than the formal system, which is remote
from the lives of many ordinary people’ (Macfarlane 2007:488). The people favour
these justice systems, which are more easily accessible, flexible, participatory and
relevant to their lives (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008, Tsegaye et al. 2008).
The formal criminal justice system
Court structure and judicial process
Although Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural society with various indige-
nous systems, successive rulers have pursued a policy of establishing a uniform,
centralized andmonist justice system. In the 1950s and 60s, Emperor Haile Selassie
I launched a sweeping codification venture, introducing codes that were meant to
be applied across the whole country and designed to supplant the various indige-
nous justice systems (Fisher 1971). With the adoption of the 1957 Penal Code, the
Ethiopian State consolidated its monopoly over all criminal matters.
The 1995 FDREConstitution has given some room to customary justice systems:
through Articles 34(5) and 78(5) of the Constitution, disputes relating to personal
and family matters can be adjudicated by customary courts based on customary
laws. However, when it comes to criminal matters, Ethiopia continues to pursue its
earlier centralist policy, in which the state assumed exclusive control over the pros-
ecution and punishment of criminal cases.The 1995 Constitution declared Ethiopia
a multicultural federal state with powers constitutionally shared between the fed-
eral government and the nine regional states that are members of the federation.
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The nine regional states are further sub-divided into sub-regional structures, such
as woredas (districts) and kebeles (the smallest administrative unit). The judiciary
maintains a dual system of federal and regional courts. There are three hierarchi-
cal tiers of federal court: the Federal Supreme Court, Federal High Court and Fed-
eral First Instance Court. Likewise, the regional courts are structured into Regional
Supreme Courts, Regional High Courts (also known in the regions as zonal court)
and Regional First Instance Courts (woreda courts) (Art.78 of the 1995 Constitution).
The structure of the regular courts does not extend to the kebele level, which is the
lowest administrative unit. This means that criminal matters have to be sent to
woreda courts, which makes the formal criminal justice system inaccessible to the
rural population of Ethiopia who reside in remote kebeles.2
In terms of the criminal justice process, since crime is considered an offence
against the state, the parties to a criminal dispute are limited to the public prose-
cutor and the defendant. Hence, on receiving information from any source about
a crime, the police will conduct a criminal investigation (Arts. 22 & 23 of the 1961
Criminal Procedure Code). Based on Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code, only
offences punishable upon complaint are left to the discretion of the injured party.
Article 42 of the Code outlines certain cases where criminal proceedings will not be
instituted.3 The Article does not mention cases where the victim and the offender
settle the matter through reconciliation as one of the grounds for not instituting
proceedings or withdrawing a case at any point of the proceedings.
In the sentencing process following conviction, the judge takes the maximum
and the minimum penalty fixed by the law for the crime as a framework, and then
takes aggravating and extenuating circumstances into account. But here again,
reconciliation agreements between the victim and the offender made out of court
under indigenous justice systems are not mentioned as part of the extenuating
circumstances outlined under Article 82 of the Federal Criminal Code.4 In short,
2 Although social courts are found in urban centers, according to my informants, they are in-
effective (interview with Borbor Bule, 2012).
3 According to Article 42 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code, no proceedings shall be
instituted where: (a) the public prosecutor is of opinion that there is not sufficient evidence
to justify a conviction: or (b) there is no possibility of finding the accused and the case is
one which may not be tried in his absence: or (c) the prosecution is barred by limitation
or the offence is made the subject of a pardon or amnesty; or (d) the public prosecutor is
instructed not to institute proceedings in the public interest by theMinister or by order under
his hand. 2) On no other grounds may the public prosecutor refuse to institute proceedings.
3) The public prosecutor shall institute proceedings in cases affecting the Government when
so instructed by the Minister.
4 The general extenuating circumstances under which the court shall reduce the penalty are
enumerated under Article 82, Sub-Article 1 (a-e) of the Federal Criminal Code. But reconcili-
ation made between an offender and victims is not included.
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the diverse customary rules, institutions and procedures seen in Ethiopia have no
officially recognized jurisdictional space in the handling of criminal matters.
Before proceeding to the next section, let us look at some of the criminal mat-
ters covered by Article 538 of the Ethiopian Federal Criminal Code, which states
that whoever causes the death of a human either intentionally or through negli-
gence, no matter what the weapon or means used, commits homicide. Any person,
who commits homicide, whether intentionally or negligently, shall be punished by
a lawful judicial process and in accordance with decisions rendered thereby. The
punishment to be imposed on a person guilty of intentional or negligent homicide
shall be determined depending on whether the homicide was aggravated (Art. 539)
or simple (Art. 540).
Article 539 of the Federal Criminal Code deals with aggravated homicide, stat-
ing that whoever intentionally commits homicide with such premeditation, mo-
tive, weapon or means, in such conditions of commission, as to show that he is
exceptionally cruel, abominable or dangerous, or as a member of a band organized
to carry out homicide or armed robbery, or to further another crime or to con-
ceal a crime already committed, will be punished with rigorous life imprisonment
or death. According to Article 540, the sentence for someone who intentionally
commits homicide neither in aggravating circumstances nor extenuating circum-
stances as in Article 5415 is rigorous imprisonment for between five and twenty
years.The Ethiopian Federal Criminal Code also has a provision dealing with homi-
cide by negligence.6
The Code also includes specific provisions that are relevant to the cases in this
study dealing with bodily injuries. The Criminal Code categorizes bodily injuries
into ‘grave wilful injury’ (Art. 555)7 and ‘common wilful injury’ (Art. 556),8 and any-
one who intentionally or by negligence causes bodily injury to another or impairs
his health, by whatever means or in any manner, is punishable.
5 Whoever intentionally commits homicide: a) by exceeding the limits of necessity (Art. 75),
or of legitimate defence (Art. 78); or b) after gross provocation, under the shock of surprise
or under the influence of violent emotion or intense passion made understandable and, in
some degree, excusable by the circumstances, is punishable with simple imprisonment not
exceeding five years.
6 Whoever negligently causes the death of another is punishable with simple imprisonment
from six months to three years or with a fine of between two thousand and four thousand
Birr.
7 Whoever commits grave wilful injury as provided under this Article is punishable, according
to the circumstances of the case and the gravity of the injury, with rigorous imprisonment
not exceeding fifteen years, or with simple imprisonment for not less than one year.
8 According to this article, anyone who commits wilful injury is punishable, according to the
circumstances of the case and the gravity of the injury, with rigorous imprisonment not ex-
ceeding fifteen years, or with simple imprisonment for not less than one year.
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The Borana indigenous justice system
Institutions, norms and dispute processes
The land of the BoranaOromo is an extensive territory straddling the Kenya–Ethiopia
border (Leus 1995). In Ethiopia, the Borana Oromo belong to the larger groups
of Oromo people with whom they share a common language and basic cultural
values. Borana Zone is one of twenty-one administrative zones of the National
Regional State of Oromia. While the Borana and Guji Oromo constitute the two
major groups in the zone, smaller groups include the Gabra, the Burji and the
Garri. The population of Borana Zone is approximately 1 million (CSA 2008).
Most of the Borana are followers of the indigenous Oromo religion known as
Waqeffannaa (Lasange et al. 2010).
The Borana land is covered with light vegetation/grass that favours pastoral-
ism more than farming. Water and pasture are the two most important natural
resources among the pastoral Borana. The study was undertaken in the semi-arid
parts of Borana Zone where the informal justice system is functioning relatively
well.
At the highest division in the Borana social system are the two exogamous
halves of the society known as Sabo and Gona. These moieties are further sub-
divided or segmented into gosa, often translated as ‘clan’ (Asmarom 1973:39). The
Borana constitute a corporate group, sharing many collective rights and obliga-
tions. Among the Borana, a clan is an enduring group that has considerable in-
fluence over the lives of individual members. Much of the social privileges, rights,
duties, seniority position, and social identity of a person are based on clan mem-
bership. The clan is also the most important descent structure for ‘disposing of a
regular general assembly whose members recognize a common elder, hayyu’ (Bassi
1994:19). While a person’s clan comes to his assistance in times of difficulty, every
member is also obliged to fulfil their obligations to the clan, which may include the
digging and maintenance of water wells and providing contributions to the needy
(Asmarom 1973:38).
The gadaa system
The Oromo are distinguished from many other Ethiopian people by their age- and
generation system known as gadaa. As an indigenous governance system, gadaa has
its own leaderswho conduct political, economic, social, legislative, judicial,military
and ritual responsibilities. Many authors have written about the complex gadaa
system, emphasizing its role in recruiting warriors (Asmarom 2000), keeping the
nagaa boorana – the ideal of keeping peace among all Borana groups (Dahl 1996:174,
Aguilar 1996:191, Bassi 1996:157) –which is believed to be linked to the supernatural.
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Other writers have praised the gadaa system as an example of egalitarian African
democracy (Asmarom 2000).
The Borana gadaa system organizes and governs ‘the life of every individual in
the society from birth to death’ (Asmarom 1973:8). At birth, every male becomes
a member of a generation class (or set) called luba, which is determined by the
generation class of his father. Every eight years, these classes climb up the ‘geron-
tocratic ladder’ and, as they reach the different age-grades, ‘succeed each other ev-
ery eight years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities’
(Asmarom 1973:8). The politically most powerful grade is the gadaa grade, which
every generation set reaches after forty years and retains for eight years. The gen-
eration in power elects the abbaa gadaa9 who, with his councillors, comprises the
legitimate leadership of the Borana. Members of this leadership group are ‘nur-
tured starting from the third gadaa grade to become leaders during the sixth gadaa
grade when they reach the age of forty’ (Ibrahim 2005:18). Women are not elected
to participate in the gadaa governance system (PCDP 2005:26). Some authors seek-
ing change have criticized the exclusion of women from the forums and processes
of the customary justice system (Pankhurst and Getachew 2008:8).
Among the Borana, governing power is vested in the assemblies at various lev-
els, at the apex of which is the gumii gaayoo (assembly of the gaayoo-public meeting
place).10 As an assembly formed from representatives of the major Borana clans,
the gumii gaayoo is a pan-Borana assembly, which takes place every eight years at
the mid-point of an abbaa gadaa period (Shongolo 1994:30). The gumii gaayoo has
supreme authority over law-making and enforcement. During its sessions, the as-
sembly proclaims new laws, amends old ones, and evaluates the abbaa gadaa. As a
supreme judicial body, the gumii also resolves all disputes that could not be resolved
at lower levels. No other Borana authority can reverse decisions made by the gumii
gaayoo (Asmarom 1973, Bassi 2005, Shongolo 1994).
In addition to the gumii, several clan assemblies (kora gosaa) operate at clan
levels.The clan assemblies meet annually and have the power to make decisions on
all matters concerning the clan. They also resolve both criminal and civil disputes
concerning clan members. Both gumii gaayoo and the clan assemblies have similar
procedural rules. Every Borana assembly opens and closes with blessings (Bassi
2005:176).
Since the gumii meets only every eight years, the duty of enforcing laws and
handling conflicts are left to the executive and the council of elders at each level.
Executive power is in the hands of the adulaa council, which is composed of six
elders – three from each moiety. The abbaa gadaa – who is in power for only eight
9 Abbaa gadaa (lit.: ‘father of gadaa’) is the head/leader of the gadaa governance system.
10 The term gumii refers to the assembly while gaayoo refers to the place where the assembly
meets.
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years – presides over the council. The abbaa gadaa and his councillors have atten-
dants called maakkala (messengers) to enforce decisions. Each clan also elects jaal-
labs (representatives of clan assemblies) to enforce the decisions of the gadaa leaders
(Homann et al. 2004:89).
The Borana clan-based social structure integrates cultural and territorial ad-
ministrative arrangements that differ from the formal territorial administrative
structures of the state. The localities are built into wider territorial units starting
with the olla (village), the smallest family-based administrative unit comprising of
about ten households. Next is the jaarsa dheeda, responsible for regulating seasonal
access to grazing and water, and the jaarsa madda, responsible for grazing and wa-
ter management at the local level. Finally, comes the rabba gadda,which has overall,
customary jurisdiction over land, social and cultural issues, including conflict res-
olution (Muir 2007: n.p).
Aadaa seeraa: The Borana normative system
According to Borbor Bule, a well-known Borana oral historian (argaa dhageetii), the
embodiment of Borana codes of conduct for social relations, natural resource man-
agement, food and dress are referred to as aadaa seeraa. The body of customary
norms and laws are recognized by every Borana as binding, and they believe that
the laws have maintained their well-being.11 Depending on the context, aadaa (cus-
tom) has different meanings. In its broader sense, aadaa refers to a way of life that
can be comprehended and reflected through and by one’s daily practices (Bassi
2005:100). The term seeraa specifically refers to authoritative rules that serve as the
basis for judgments given by the hayyuu (elders) in disputes. As Borana laws were
made by the gumii gaayoo at some time in the past and are regularly restated, the el-
ders can easily recall the laws applicable to a given case.12 The Borana have specific
laws dealing with physical injuries, personal property, theft, fines and punishment,
among other things (Asmarom 2000:201).13
In general, among the Borana, the totality of the unwritten laws embedded
in the gada system serves as a tool to determine rightful and wrongful acts and
prescribe the measures to be taken when the laws are violated. As the Borana elder
Jaatani Dida stated, the Borana consider their laws as the strongest instrument
for the safeguarding and maintenance of the nagaya borana (peace of the Borana).14
According to Asmarom (2000:27), ‘how deep the sense of order is among the Borana
can be gleaned from the fact that homicide – within their society – is virtually
11 Summary of an interview, August 2013.
12 As every single law gets discussed and repeated at gumii gaayoo, Borana elders know which
laws are still operating and applicable (Asmarom 1973).
13 Interviews made with Borbor Bule and Waaqo Guyyo, two Borana elders, August 2013.
14 Interview, August 2013.
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unknown’. Nowadays, although homicide is still rare among the remote pastoral
Borana communities, it is on the increase around the towns and among the settled
farming communities.
Borana indigenous dispute processes and outcome
The Borana believe in a cosmic order in which human beings live in harmony with
one another, all beings, earth, nature and heaven (Gufu 1996). In Borana society,
every day greetings constitute a form of preaching peace, and ‘a sustained feud be-
tween groups or individuals is unacceptable’ (Mamo 2008:48). As attested by Bassi,
‘revenge, internal war and reciprocal fear do not have an institutional place’ in the
Borana social system (1994:27). In order to prevent the disruption of social harmony,
the Borana resolve their disputes without any delay (Bassi 2005, Dejene 2002, Tena
2007).
The institution of jaarsummaa handles all kinds of disputes ranging from sim-
ple quarrels to the most serious criminal cases, such as homicide. The term jaarsa
means ‘elders’, and jaarsummaa refers to the ‘process of settling disputes by elders
by way of reconciliation or negotiated settlement’ (Arebba and Berhanu 2008:169).
During jaarsummaa, the elders mainly aim to reconcile (araara) the parties and re-
pair their severed relationship (Tarekegn and Hannah 2008:12). Since Borana laws
do not distinguish between criminal and civil law, the judicial authority of the el-
ders embraces all matters (Leus and Salvadori 2006). As Borbor Bule explained,
disputes are resolved by the clan elders at the lowest possible level and only moved
to a higher level if things cannot be settled.15
The formal dispute settlement process starts with the complainant submitting
his case to the local elders. Every Borana believes that the gaaddisa (‘shade where
the elders sit’) is a dwelling place of Waaqa (God), where only truth is spoken. As
Jaatani Dida, a Borana elder, told me, for the Borana, the most detested act is lying
(soba).16 Having heard from the complainant, the elders ask the defendant to re-
spond.The elders make sure that both parties have exhausted their submissions by
asking them whether there are still things they want to add. Having obtained the
required evidence, the elders discuss the facts and finally give their verdict based
on the rule relevant to the case. If the defendant initially claims innocence and the
evidence produced does not prove his guilt, the elders will declare his innocence. If
the evidence proves the guilt of the suspect, the elders will hand out the appropri-
ate sentence. Depending on the level at which the case was first heard, any party
15 Interview, August 2013.
16 Interview, August 2012.
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dissatisfied with the decisionmay appeal to the next appropriate level, for example,
the kora gosaa (clan assembly).17
Among the Borana, the worst sin against Waaqa and human beings is the in-
tentional spilling of human blood. If a person kills or spills Borana blood, he makes
himself impure (xuraa’a), and he will be expelled from the community to which he
belongs unless cleansed through a reconciliation ritual (Bassi 1994:27). According
to Waaqo Guyyo, a Borana elder, this embedded belief makes intentional killing
rare among the Borana.18 Borbor Bule explained that, if a homicide is committed,
the common practice is that the killer will immediately report to his near relatives
what has happened and go to a temporary sanctuary within his own clan, often
with the clan leader. He will remain at the sanctuary until the victim’s relatives are
approached and the reconciliation process begins. No Borana clan will shelter any-
one who has killed a fellow Borana with a view to hiding them from justice. Every
Borana and every clan collaborates in discovering a killer. With the help of elders,
the relatives of the offender approach the relatives of the victim asking for recon-
ciliation, after which the elders may proceed to handling the case through Borana
customary law.19
As I was told during a focus group discussions in Borana (July 2013), killers
in Borana rarely deny that they have committed a crime. They usually admit their
crime and ask for pardon and purification, so there is little dispute about the facts
of the case. Inmost cases, the elders decide that the killer should pay a fixed number
of heads of cattle as compensation (gumaa) to the victim’s family. Gumaa is an in-
digenous institution that is part of the gadaa system used for settling blood feuds
between persons, families, groups, clans and communities (Dejene 2007:59). The
process of gumaa has ritual and material aspects. Paying compensation in the form
of a fixed number of heads of cattle takes care of the material aspect of the rec-
onciliation. Ritually, the offender provides a sheep for slaughter (ijibbaata), which
symbolically washes away the blood of the deceased shed by the offenders’ actions,
and with this any feud between the parties is removed or avoided. According to my
informants, the Borana have less interest in the material aspect of reconciliation
and do not insist on receiving the whole amount of compensation since there is a
belief that accepting the entire amount may lead to misfortune. According to Bo-
rana customary law, when a member of a clan commits a crime, his clan will pay
the required compensation collectively. When the killer and the deceased belong
to the same clan, there is a tradition of paying less compensation than is normally
paid when the deceased and the killer belong to different clans. The Borana give
17 Summary of an FGD with Borana elders, July 2013.
18 Interview with Waaqo Guyyo, July 2013.
19 Interview, August 2013.
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more weight to the ritual aspect of reconciliation, seeking a genuine apology from
the offender with a view to pardoning him and restoring the disrupted harmony.20
In the rare cases where an accused refuses to admit guilt but is proved to have
committed a crime, ‘he is left in a state of suspension with a terrible sentence hang-
ing over him and even if it is not executed by force, it can have very unpleasant social
repercussions’ (Bassi 2005:210). The formal way of excluding the recalcitrant from
nagaya borana is through cursing (abaarsa) by the gumii gaayoo.The abaarsa excludes
the recalcitrant offender from receiving blessing and prayers and any social and rit-
ual support from all Borana, and even from exchanging greetings with them. In a
pastoral life where everything, including water, is collectively used and adminis-
tered through the clan system, a person cannot survive alone (Bassi 2005:110).
Criminal responsibility is individualized in the formal criminal justice system
but, among the Borana, the principle of collective responsibility operates. Based on
this principle, when a wrong is committed, the wrongdoer’s clan is collectively held
liable and has the responsibility to discipline him. In such a setting, the material
costs of repeated wrongdoing by a habitual offender will generally be ‘too great a
strain on the resource of the clan’ (Driberg 1934:239). To avoid such costs, the clan
will withdraw the privileges and protection that flow from clan membership if a
member repeatedly commits crime.21
The impacts of parallel justice systems with no mutual recognition
As mentioned above, both state law and customary law coexist in Borana, and both
are applied not only in civil and family cases, which are supported by the Constitu-
tion, but also in criminal cases. As a rule, the police take every criminal case except
upon complaint crimes22 to the regular court, regardless of the preferences of the
victim, the offender and the concerned community. Disagreement arises when the
victim, the offender and the concerned community want their dispute to be set-
tled out of court through customary law and the police insist that it be settled in
the regular courts. In cases when the victim wants the case to be settled in the
formal court, the community usually does not insist on having it resolved locally.
However, since there is always a need for reconciliation under customary law, the
offendermay still be required to carry out the necessary conciliatory rituals and pay
some compensation (gumaa) to the victim or their family (Pankhurst and Getachew
2008:30, Bassi 2005:209).
20 Summary of an FGD with Borana elders, July 2013.
21 Summary of an FGD with Borana elders in Gaayoo, August 2012.
22 In an upon complaint crime, the public prosecutor institutes proceedings against the of-
fender at the request of the injured party.
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To understand the impacts of the parallel operation of the Borana indigenous
justice system and the formal justice system, it is necessary to look at some actual
criminal cases.The cases presented here range from serious bodily injury to homi-
cide.They are categorized broadly into cases settled exclusively outside the regular
court, which did not lead to incarceration of the wrongdoers, and cases settled by
the regular court, which led to conviction and imprisonment.23 Cases settled by the
state court were also handled by local elders arranging reconciliation between the
parties in accordance with Borana customary law.
Cases settled outside court
The criminal cases discussed in this section were resolved exclusively through cus-
tomary law.They include two cases of accidental homicide and one of serious bodily
injury. In the case involving serious bodily injury, both the victim and the offender
were interviewed. In the accidental homicide cases, one offender and two relatives
of the victims were interviewed.
Case 1a: Serious bodily injury
The incident took place in Yabello town in the year 2012 as a result of a fight that
broke out between two families. In that fight, Areero Dida was beaten and seri-
ously injured by Kebede’s24 sons. Kebede’s family members had originally came
fromWollo and are Gurage and Amhara mixed ethnically (interview with Areero
and W/o Yeshihune, Kebede’s wife, May 2014).
According to Areero, after the beating, the police arrived at the scene and ar-
rested Kebede. Areero‘s family took the case to court but, immediately after the
incident, Kebede’s family sent elders to Areero‘s family with a view to settling
the case outside court through araara (reconciliation). In the beginning, Areero’s
family refused to accept the proposal, since the elders had failed to bring cer-
tain items needed when asking for forgiveness: daraara (tobacco used to signify
a flower used for ritual purposes) and a sheep. Negotiations resumed once the
elders returned with what was necessary under Borana aadaa-seeraa.
According to the victim, Areero, the elders from both sides wanted to know the
scale of the injury he had suffered before a fair judgment and reconciliation could
bemade. Kebede’s family took Areero to Hawassa for treatment and took respon-
23 The cases were gathered through interviews and focus group discussions with Borana elders,
convicted offenders found in Yabello Zonal Correction Centre and victims of crime or their
relatives.
24 Pseudonyms.
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sibility for covering all the hospital and transport expenses.25 After Areero had
received medical treatment at Hawassa Hospital, Kebede’s family gave his family
a sheep (hoolaa buula) to slaughter for his recuperation. After the reconciliation,
the elders who had participated signed a written confirmation of the reconcilia-
tion agreement and sent it to the court (interview with Areero, May 2014).
When asked about the reconciliation and its outcome, Kebede’s wife26 expressed
her satisfaction. She stated that the court procedure could have taken a very
long time and its outcome could have been much more severe. In her view, by
resolving the case through araara, her husband not only avoided imprisonment,
but a friendship with the victim’s family was also established (interview with
Yeshihune, May 2014). Although the offenders were ethnically, culturally and re-
ligiously different from the victim’s family, they clearly emphasized the merits of
Borana ways of resolving disputes. The victim was also pleased with the outcome
of the reconciliation process. (Interview with Areero, May 2014)
In this case, although the parties to the dispute belonged to different cultural and
ethnic groups, they both appreciated the process and outcome of settling their case
out of court. Regardless of their ethnic background, the reconciliation process and
the restorative outcomeworked in favour of both parties: the harmony disrupted by
the act of the offenderwas restored through the reconciliation; and the family of the
offender covered all medical and other expenses thus avoiding his imprisonment.
Case 1b: Accidental homicide
This case took place in Areero Woreda of Borana in 2004. The perpetrator was
a man called Galmo, who killed a fellow Borana, called Bona, from the Dambitu
clan. The families of the two men were very close, so one day Galmo and Bona
went out together in search of the wild animal that had killed and devoured three
of their cows and escaped into the nearby bush. While in the bush, they spotted
the animal and took cover to shoot it. Galmo thought he saw it behind a bush,
and took aim and fired. Thereby, he accidentally killed Bona.
Immediately after the incident, the elders from Galmo’s clan were sent to Bona’s
relatives. Bona’s family accepted their request for araara, and the necessary ritu-
als were performed. Although the offender’s side was prepared to pay compensa-
tion, Bona’s family declined it, as they viewed their son’s death as an act ofWaaqa
(God). As such, making the offender responsible would be unjustifiable. In the
meantime, the zone’s police had heard about what happened and they arrested
25 The distance between Yabello and Hawassa is 298 km. Transport costs for an emergency pa-
tient are based on the agreement of the parties involved and the time taken, but are roughly
between 750 and 1000 ETB (about 30–40 US Dollars at the time of the research).
26 Kebede’s wife, Yeshihune (the mother of the young boys), was interviewed because Kebede
was not around.
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Galmo. They took him to Nagelle town and kept him under detention for more
than sixty days. When the police came to the area to investigate, both families
stated that, since God took the life of the deceased, there was no need for further
investigation. They asked that Galmo be released, stating that the families had
already reconciled. Since the police saw no point in continuing the investigation
in the absence of witnesses, they set the offender free.27 In the offender’s view,
the outcome of the araara process was the restoration of harmony between the
two families, which was pleasing to both sides. (Summary of an interview with
Galmo, May 2014)
In this particular case, the facts that the killing was purely accidental and the two
families are closely relatedwere important elements.The killing of Bonawas viewed
by his family as an act of God that was not intended by Galmo. With regard to
unintentional killing, the Borana believe that making a person responsible for such
accidental acts would anger God and result in some kind of disaster. Conversely,
the Borana consider the intentional killing or spilling of human blood the most
deplorable act, and believe intentional wrongdoing against another human being
is a wrong committed against God. In intentionally disrupting harmony between
human beings, the wrongdoer disrupts human relations with God (Summary of
interview with Jaatani, August 2013).
Case 1c: Accidental homicide
One late evening in 2011, Teklu (who is a Borana), was driving his car at high
speed towards Yabello town. Just before reaching the town, Teklu’s car hit and
killed Dawit (who is a Burji), who was walking back to Yabello. Immediately af-
ter the incident, elders from Teklu’s side came to the deceased’s family to ask
for reconciliation (araara). Since it is against customary law to refuse araara, the
elders’ request was accepted. The two sides selected elders and formed a council
to handle the matter outside the formal court. The offender took responsibility
for covering all the expenses of the funeral and installing a gravestone at the
burial site, and to cover the costs related to the visitors who arrived during the
period of mourning.
When asked about their view of the reconciliation, Dawit’s (the victim’s) two
sons said that araara mainly aimed to heal the wound caused by the act of the
offender and to restore the harmony that has been disrupted by the offender’s
act. Because of the reconciliation, Teklu (the offender) was able to continue living
with his family and avoid incarceration. Had the case been taken to court, Teklu
himself and his family could have faced difficulties. The brothers stated that the
reconciliation removed the feeling of insecurity and animosity between the two
27 Interview with a police officer, July 2013.
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families. (Summary of an interview with Yonas and Yoseph,28 sons of Dawit, May
2014)
In this case, the compensation paid by the family of the offender was limited to
those expenses required to cover the expenses required for the mourning period
and the building of monument on the burial site. The family did not give heads of
cattle as gumaa as is normally the case.
All three cases discussed here were resolved through reconciliation (araara) be-
tween the parties involved and relatives from both sides.Where demanded, offend-
ers genuinely apologized and paid compensation to the relatives of the deceased or
to the victims for the harm they had caused. In return, they were pardoned, avoided
incarceration and were reintegrated into their communities, which allowed them
to live in harmony with the victim’s relatives. The interviewed victims and/or their
relatives acknowledged the importance of reconciliation in avoiding possible re-
venge and thus future conflict.
Once reconciled, the Borana are usually reluctant to appear and act as witnesses
for the police.This is because appearing as a witness before a court of law and testi-
fying against an offender is seen as disrespectful towards the elders who facilitated
the reconciliation and as contrary to Borana customary law. Such a person would
lose the support of their clan.Therefore, the Borana rarely act as witnesses in court
after reconciliation, leaving the police unable to prove the guilt of a suspect and
forced to release them.
Cases settled inside and outside the court of law
While the above-mentioned cases dealt with bodily injury and accidental homicide
and could be settled exclusively outside the law courts, the following three cases
deal with homicides brought before and resolved in the law courts. All the offenders
were convicted and imprisoned. In addition, reconciliation rituals were performed
and compensation paid in accordance with Borana customary law.
Case 2a: Murder
In the year 1993, a man was killed in a fight between two men. Raji,29 the brother
of the victim, told me that the offender, Malicha, was charged for murder, con-
victed and sentenced to six years imprisonment by the court. Raji claimed that
the killing of his brother, Kutu, had been intentional and therefore Malicha de-
served life imprisonment. But, in the eyes of the law, the crime committed by





The two families also went through reconciliation, with a view to avoiding an-
imosity and revenge. The family of the offender accordingly paid twenty-seven
heads of cattle as gumaa. (Summary of an interview with Raji, May 2014)
Both the formal justice system and Borana customary justice system were involved
in handling this case, and this led to the offender being incarcerated and his family
paying compensation. The offender and his family were dissatisfied with this, as
among the Borana, the total number of head of cattle to be paid as compensation
for a serious crime (qakee) such as killing a fellow Borana is thirty (Bassi 2005:109);
in accepting twenty-seven heads, the victim’s family had not been particularly gen-
erous.30
Case 2b: Ordinary homicide
Xadacha was 56 in 2014 when I interviewed him at Yabello Correction Center. He
was from Yabello Woreda Carri kebele. He was accused of killing a woman whose
name was Lokko B., for which he was convicted and sentenced to eighteen years
imprisonment. During the interview, he claimed that he did not know anything
about what happened at the time of the incident. There was contention over
whether he was mentally well, and he was taken to a mental hospital in Addis
Ababa, where he was given some kind of medicine and declared normal. From
my own observation, Xadacha had some kind of disorder affecting his speech and
acts. Nevertheless, he was found guilty and incarcerated. A letter31 was written
from the offender’s kebele to Borana Zone High Court stating that reconciliation
had been made according to Borana customary law. The letter indicated that ap-
proximately Birr 113,00032 worth of Xadacha’s assets, including cattle and goats,
had been paid to the deceased’s family. The letter was written to the Court with
a view to securing the release of the offender, who had eighteen family mem-
bers to take care of. Xadacha submitted the letter from his kebele to the court but
the release request was rejected. (Summary of an interview with Xadacha, May
2014)33
Although within the range given for ordinary homicide, the eighteen years of im-
prisonment – just two years short of the maximum sentence – given to Xadacha
30 Although thirty heads of cattle is the normal amount of compensation to which the family
of the deceased is entitled in murder cases, they usually receive less than the fixed amount.
31 This official letter Ref/No. W/B/G/C 013/06 datedMiyaziaya 16, 2006 Ethiopian Calendar was
written by the chairman of Carri Kebele, Yabello Woreda.
32 This will be approximately between 4,500 and 5,000 in USD.
33 Out of the more than twenty prisoners I interviewed, six claimed that reconciliation agree-
ments were made between the families in writing, but when presented to the court to seek
release, the requests were rejected (summary of interviews made with prisoners on 29 July
2013 and 12 May 2014).
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show that he did not have credible extenuating circumstance to lessen the pun-
ishment. Besides, the fact that the letter from the kebele did not mention anything
about his mental state and records that he was able to pay a large sum of compen-
sation suggests that the community considered Xadacha to be a person of sound
mind, able to take full responsibility for his criminal act.
In this case, the offender’s claim that he was of an unsound mind was disre-
garded by both systems. Similarly, the punishments imposed on the offender in-
dicate that both systems considered his crime to be serious. This means that with
regard to intentionally committed crime, both systems impose similar sanctions.
Case 2c: Ordinary homicide
In 2003 in Dirre Woreda of Borana Zone, two Borana men got into a fight that
ended in homicide. Huqa and Galagalo went to a deep well (eela) – among the
pastoral Borana, water drawn from such deep wells is used for watering animals
and drinking and domestic purposes. According to Kashane, Galagalo’s wife, there
was a disagreement during which Huqa warned Galagalo that he would kill him.
On their way home from the well, Huqa waited in a roadside bush and killed
Galagalo. Huqa was soon arrested, charged, found guilty of homicide and sen-
tenced to eight years imprisonment because he had admitted his guilt (summary
of an interview with Kashane, May 2014).
While Huqa was in prison, his family sent elders to the family of the deceased to
make the necessary reconciliation. Huqa’s family paid eighteen34 heads of cattle
to Galagalo’s family as gumaa. Kashane’s view regarding the punishment imposed
on the offender by the court was that, since Huqa had killed Galagalo with full
intention, he should have been sentenced to life imprisonment (summary of an
interview with Kashane, May 2014).
In this case, the offender was convicted by a court of law for the crime he had
committed. But all the same, since restoring the harmony disrupted by the crim-
inal act was necessary, reconciliation between the two families was made and
gumaa was paid to the family of the deceased. (Summary of an FGD with Borana
elders, July 2013)
While the family of the deceased agreed to have the case dealt with in the formal
court, they were dissatisfied with the length of imprisonment imposed on the of-
fender. Arguing that that the crime was committed intentionally, they wanted the
court to impose a harsher punishment on the offender.On the other hand, the com-
pensation (gumaa) Huqa had to pay locally was relatively low, as he and his victim
34 Among the Borana, the number of cattle to be paid as compensation is determined by elders
who take into account the nature of crime, for example, the degree of cruelty. When it comes
to the number actually received by the family of the deceased, depending on how they view
the crime, the number may increase or decrease.
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belonged to the same clan. Since the Borana believe the whole clan is responsible
for a crime committed by its member, if a killer and the deceased belong to the
same clan, the compensation is paid by their clan to the family of the deceased. If
the crime was unintentional, compensation may not be received at all, or will be
less.35
When one looks at the cases in both categories, the impacts of the cases settled
outside the courts and those settled both inside and outside the courts are differ-
ent. In the cases settled exclusively outside the court, the offenders paid only the
customarily imposed sanctions and escaped incarceration. In the cases settled both
inside and outside the court, the offenders were subject not only to incarceration
but also to the compensation payment.
The study participants – prisoners, gadaa elders and justice officers – had diver-
gent views on the parallel functioning of the two systems and their outcomes. The
prisoners shared a feeling that they were victims of two competing legal systems.
They maintained that the payment of gumaa in addition to imprisonment was an
unjustifiable punishment. As mere addressees of the two normative orders, with
no liberty to choose their preferred justice system, they felt powerless. They also
expressed that being kept in isolation from their family caused them moral and
material damage. Moreover, since compensation was paid by their families and
clans, it could be seen as a kind of collective punishment and, in the prisoners’
view, the cattle given as gumaa could instead have sustained their families while
they were imprisoned and unable to take care of them.36
Borana elders blamed both the Oromia Regional State and the Federal State
for failing to give some degree of recognition to their justice system. They main-
tained that reconciliation is user-friendlier in its process and outcome, and that,
since the offender, the families from both sides and the community take part in
resolving disputes, their justice system is participatory. In addition, they claimed
that the material aspects of the injury are taken care of by compensation payment
and the spiritual aspects needed to restore the harmony disrupted by the offender’s
wrongful are addressed through the reconciliation ritual. As the ritual of reconcili-
ation requires a genuine apology, the offender is pardoned and continues to live in
his community with no need for incarceration. They see their way of sanctioning
as more constructive than incarceration, which has immense personal and social
costs. The removal and distancing of the offender from his community for a long
period of time is viewed as a vindictive measure with little socially constructive
value.37
35 See case 1b above.
36 Summary of a FGD with offenders, August 2013.
37 Summary of an FGD with elders, August 2012.
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When I asked whether the Borana justice system was effective in sanctioning
criminals, the elders assertively stated that their system was highly functional, as
it has its own mechanisms for punishing or excluding habitual offenders from the
usual protection given to law-abiding clan members. They emphasized that all Bo-
rana share and value the nagaya borana. Since an unruly person disrupts nagaya bo-
rana, no clan wants to harbour a disruptive person. Therefore, generally every clan
sees to it that all its members remain law-abiding in order to avoid compensation
payment. To enduringly enjoy all the privileges and support offered by the clan,
every member usually respects Borana laws. If a clan member becomes a habitual
offender and disruptive, the clan simply withdraws all the privileges and support of
clan membership. Nowadays, elders refer cases involving such people to the formal
justice system.38
Representing the perspective of the justice officers, the President of the Bo-
rana Zone Justice Bureau remarked that the relationship between the two systems
was not defined and regulated properly. Owing to this, he said, both the formal
criminal justice system and Borana customary justice system were settling crimi-
nal disputes, including homicide and physical bodily injury, separately on the basis
of their respective laws, procedures and institutions. As I was informed by a Jus-
tice Bureau officer, some converts to new religions and some individuals living in
towns are now going to court when they think that the prosecutor or the police
do not have the evidence to prove their guilt.39 If the prosecutor fails to prove the
guilt of the offender, she/he will be acquitted.40 Such individuals, one justice of-
ficer from Borana Zone High Court, said, often try to make use of both systems
opportunistically.
When asked when and why, in their opinion, the Borana preferred their own
customary justice system, the justice officers stated that reconciliation based on
customary law was preferred in all cases of accidentally committed homicide or
physical injury. This is mainly because the people are more familiar with the rules,
institutions and process, and because the outcome usually satisfies both parties.41
Mangasha, Taaju and Tosha, three justice officers from Borana Zone High Court,
reported that the families of offenders and victims often submit written requests
38 Summary of an FGD with elders, August 2012.
39 Individuals prefer the formal justice system not just because it is perceived as better but
simply because the prosecutor may not have sufficient evidence to prove their guilt or the
accused can produce false witnesses.
40 As Borbor Bule confirmed in an interview in August 2012. The prisoners also stated that there
were some rich individuals who had escaped imprisonment by bribing judges or simply pay-
ing compensation (FGD with prisoners, July 2013).
41 Although some of the officers came to Borana from elsewhere, they are familiar with the Bo-
rana customary justice system (summary of interview made with justice officers, July 2013).
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to the courts, asking that they accept the reconciliation made out of court, dis-
continue proceedings and release the offenders. In the justice officers’ view, where
the state law has not given the customary justice system the authority to handle
criminal matters, there are no legal grounds for recognizing criminal dispute set-
tlements made under customary laws.42The police and the public prosecutors gave
the same reason for not accepting the written requests submitted to them with a
view to seeking the withdrawal of cases. In short, based on the criminal law of
Ethiopia, the officers stated that they had no legal authority to entertain such re-
quests.43 According to Ethiopian criminal law, a criminal case can only be dropped
when there is a lack of evidence.44Thus, the only possible escape (if fortunate) from
going to court, and the practice usually adopted by the Borana, is to encourage wit-
nesses to refuse to appear or, if they are forced to appear, to withhold the necessary
evidence. In such cases, the court will wait for some time before eventually closing
the case file.45 Although, as lawyers, the justice officers contended that their duties
were to strictly adhere to the provisions of the law, some acknowledged the user-
friendliness of the process and outcomes of Borana customary dispute settlement
system, albeit while voicing some concern about its viability.46
In some cases the two systems overlap.For example, statements from both the
families of victims and Borana elders show that, in cases of intentional homicide,
they prefer the offenders to be incarcerated.47 According to the elders, if those who
intentionally kill others are allowed to avoid incarceration by paying gumaa,wealthy
individuals might be encouraged to commit homicide. Because of this belief, crim-
inals who intentionally commit homicide rarely evade court and escape incarcera-
tion, and – as seen above – victims’ relatives may even express dissatisfaction with
the term of imprisonment imposed by the law.48
In general, the cases presented above have shown that the Borana customary
justice system recognizes the jurisdiction of the formal criminal justice system over
cases of intentional homicide. In such cases, reconciliation between the families
based on Borana customary law may help to create harmony. With regard to acci-
dental or unintentional homicide, however, the lack of mutual recognition between
42 Summary of an interview with Taaju, February 2012.
43 Summary of interviews with Tariku, a police officer in July 2013 and with Abdub, a prosecutor
in May 2013).
44 Article 42 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code.
45 Summary of interviews with police officers, Tariku in 2013, Tosha in July 2013 and Taaru, July
2013.
46 Lack of resources and strong enforcement mechanisms were some of the challenges men-
tioned by the officers.
47 Summary of interview with elders, August 2012.
48 See cases 2a and 2c above.
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the two systems is viewed as a problem, particularly where the families of the of-
fenders and the victims settle their cases out of court and the court disregards
these settlements. With regard to unintentional homicide and physical injury, the
benefits and costs of totally dismissing settlements made out of court have to be
properly evaluated.
Summary and conclusion
Since Ethiopia is a society with pluralist normative orders, the Ethiopian justice
system should be reflective of this reality. Yet, successive Ethiopian rulers have
been reluctant to officially recognize the diverse customary justice systems, and
the formal justice system continues to have exclusive control over the handling
of criminal matters. However, even more than half a century after the sweeping
codification that was meant to do away with normative diversity, the formal justice
system still has not displaced Ethiopia’s diverse customary justice systems.
TheBorana community is one ofmany communities in Ethiopia whose custom-
ary justice system has survived, and the Borana continue to use it alongside the for-
mal justice system, even in criminal matters. Due to its effectiveness in resolving
disputes and maintaining peace and harmony, the Borana want their customary
justice system to be given some degree of formal recognition and be supported by
the Oromia National Regional State.They consider their justice system socially and
culturally most appropriate for their distinct social setting and ask that the peo-
ple’s right to choose between the two systems should be extended to criminal cases,
such as manslaughter (accidental homicide) and bodily injury.49
By giving limited space to the Borana customary justice system, the negative
effects that result from the current lack ofmutual recognitionwould beminimized.
In addition, a reduction in the number of cases going to the courts and in the
number of prisoners would ease the case backlog in the courts of law and reduce
pressure on the prisons. What is more, giving some degree of recognition to the
Borana customary justice system in cases of unintentional homicide and bodily
injury would mean gaining the trust and support of those who want to settle such
cases out of court.
Criminal justice reform would allow the Borana to resolve specified criminal
disputes with Borana customary law. In order to do that, the leadership from
both systems would need to work in partnership to determine the circumstances
49 In the negotiation, they can provide for the possibility of appeal to the regular court, deter-
mine the when and how of appeal of the appeal. Even in such cases the parties’ freedom to
opt for justice system of their own choice has to be respected.
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in which the Borana customary justice system handles cases involving acciden-
tal homicide or bodily injuries. A defined partnership between both systems could
help regulate their relationship and help establish certainty around when decisions
made under Borana customary law in cases of unintentional homicide or bodily in-
juries can be rejected or accepted by the court of law.
Through negotiation, the leadership of both systems could specify how cases
can be referred from one system to the other, and determine the nature of the
relationship with the police and courts. They could also determine and agree upon
the circumstances under which cases in the courts of law might be diverted to
the customary justice system. When there is a defined and effectively regulated
relationship between the two systems, the courts of law should have no difficulty
in determining the particular criminal disputes over which Borana customary law
has jurisdiction.
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15. Combatting infanticide in Bashada and Hamar




The Bashada and Hamar people are agro-pastoralists who live in a rather isolated
part of southwestern Ethiopia where, until recently, the intrusion of the state was
rather limited. Infanticide of allegedly impure children has been common and con-
tinues to exist today, despite the efforts by the government and NGOs to eliminate
the practice. Abandoning the practice, as this paper argues, is so difficult because
infanticide is linked to complex cultural explanations and beliefs that must be ad-
dressed in order to enable the people to lose their fears that change will affect their
lives in an uncontrollable way.
Infanticide or infant homicide has existed in many societies on all continents,
and continues to be practised in many of them. It is banned in most constitu-
tions and has been the subject of debate at national and international levels as it
contradicts universal human rights.1 Legal prosecution, however, has not helped
to lessen the occurrence of infanticide: while certain forms of infanticide that are
deeply rooted in local culture have been driven underground, others, such as fe-
male foeticide, have been transformed into selective abortion and are, due to the
availability of pre-birth sex-determination technologies, on the rise.
From the perspective of human rights, a child is a human being as soon as
it is born. However, this is not a universally accepted understanding. Different
societies or cultural contexts have differing ideas about the beginning of human
life: its could be at the moment of conception, after certain months of pregnancy,
after birth, or even several months after birth. Also, what makes a human being a
social person and accepted member of a society varies, as humans are not merely
1 See the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, especially article 6, which grants
‘life, survival and development of every child’, as well as Article 24(3), demanding that State
Parties ‘take all effective and appropriatemeasureswith a view to abolishing traditional prac-
tices prejudicial to the health of children’ (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 2013).
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biological, but also social bodies who are culturally constructed throughout their
lives (La Fontaine 1985, Carrithers et al. 1985). In many societies, it is name-giving
that marks the recognition of a baby as a social person (Lancy 2014), and this can
be days, months or even years after birth. Once a child has been given a name, it is
an acknowledged member of society, and infanticide – where it exists – is usually
no longer a possibility (Feitosa et al. 2010:860).
Worldwide, the known reasons for infanticide (and/or abortion) also vary.They
include a child’s illegitimacy (concealing the pregnancy to avoid shame for the
mother), poverty, preferences for a particular sex (usually for males), physical de-
formity of the child, unusual circumstances during the birth (breech births, foot-
first births, vertex births, twin births), lack of time between two births (less than 2
years), and accusations of witchcraft.The decision to eliminate a child may lie with
the community (if the child is believed to be abnormal or dangerous), or themother
(who might feel she cannot care for a baby born shortly after the birth of a sibling,
for a handicapped child or for more than one child born at a time). Children are
either actively killed by the parents or by members of the community, or indirectly
killed through abandonment, neglect or harsh treatment. Often, infanticide is the
result of a failed abortion (Encyclopedia of Population 2018:np).
Infanticide was common in Ancient Greece and Rome. Today, it is rather un-
commonly done for cultural reasons in European and other Western countries.2
Instead, factors such as poverty and parental mental illness play a greater role
(Friedman and Resnick 2007). In many societies, such as in India and China and
certain countries in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, the preference for the
male sex is a reason for infanticide (also called ‘femicide’ or ‘gendercide’) (Warren
1985, http://www.gendercide.org/case_infanticide.html). The increased availability
of prenatal sex-determination techniques has reduced the occurrence of infanti-
cide in the last decades (Bashir 2011:48), but sex selective abortion (mostly female
foeticide) seems to be on the increase (Working Group on the Girl-Child 2007:7,
UN News 2003). Recently, ‘reproductive tourism’, e.g. when parents travel to coun-
tries such as Thailand where sex selective abortion is legal, seems to contribute to
worsening ratios of female to male children, especially in China, India and Eastern
Europe (ACHR 2016:5, 34–36). 3
2 Infanticide was forbidden in Judaism and Christianity and strictly prohibited and severely
punished in the Middle Ages. Possibilities to anonymously abandon an unwanted child and
the legalization of abortion have greatly contributed to diminishing infanticide (Moseley
1985–86)
3 Liechtenstein has the highest differential between boys and girls with 126 boys to 100 girls. In
Asia, the highest rate of male births is in China, with 115 boys to 100 girls. In Africa, the ratio
between male and female births is relatively even, with Tunisia having highest differential:
107 boys to100 girls (ACHR 2016:3).
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Infanticide is also still common in some indigenous communities, and poses
major political and legal challenges to the governments concerned. In Brazil, for
example, infanticide is practiced among certain groups in Amazonia. Their case
has given rise to academic as well as political and legal debate on how to handle
the issue. Some scholars, acknowledging cultural difference, argue that ‘there is
no moral difference between abortion, broadly legalized in most of the world, and
the death of new-borns’ (Singer 1993 in Scotti 2017:394, see also Feitosa et al.2010).
Others emphasize that universal human rights should be given priority, stating that
‘culture is not the greater good to be preserved, but the human being is’ (Barreto
2006 in Scotti 2017:394). Feitosa et al. (2010) propose a middle way, suggesting that
external agents (individual or institutional) should only intervene in indigenous
societies in a way that allows and persuades the people to deliberate on certain
cultural practices. External agents should stay out of the issue except to offer in-
formation and raise awareness, thereby providing the conditions for discussion.4
Legal prosecution and the criminalization of indigenous people practicing infanti-
cide, it is argued, would eventually worsen their social marginalization and might
lead to the transformation of practices like infanticide into ‘symbols of cultural
identity’ by the most conservative members of minority groups, and thus to their
reinforcement (Scotti 2017:403).
In Africa, illegitimacy and the belief in witchcraft and curses appear to be im-
portant factors contributing to infanticide, while sex preference and poverty play a
lesser role. Churches, especially those belonging to the Pentecostal and prophetic
movements (charismatic, revivalist, etc.), are also contributing to the ‘diffusion and
legitimization of fears related to witchcraft, and in particular, child witches’ in
Africa (Cimpric 2010:15). Very little has been written on cultural explanations for
infanticide in Ethiopia. Milner (2000:464) briefly mentions that twin births among
the Amhara people are seen as abnormal. Without going into detail, Asmarom
(1973) stated that among the Borana-Oromo, children who did not fit the rules of
the gada generation system experienced various forms of infanticide or were put
up for adoption. In the last decade, however, several groups living in South Omo
Zone have become ‘infamously famous’ for the infanticide of children considered
as ‘impure’ or ‘cursed’ (http://www.refworld.org/docid/559bd56b3b.html). National
and international media have reported on such cases and the Ethiopian govern-
ment and NGOs have been trying to address the issue.5
4 For more details on the legal debate on infanticide among Amazonian groups see Schramm




pia.html, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/peculiar-case-mingi, https://www. ch
ristianitytoday.com/ct/2011/august/ethiopiariverdeath.html
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‘Impure children’ in Bashada and Hamar
Among the Hamar, Bashada, Banna and Kara people,6 certain pregnancies and
children are perceived as ritually impure and dangerous to their families and/or
the whole community. Among the children perceived as such are those conceived
by unmarried girls, by betrothed girls who have not moved in with their husbands,
and bymarried women who have not performed the necessary preconception rites.
Once born, they are said to afflict their families, causing drought, disease, failed
harvests, bird and pest plagues and the like.7 People believe that aborting the foetus
or eliminating the child after birth, followed by the performance of certain purifi-
cation rituals, can avert such calamities.
When I beganmy research in Bashada in 1994/95,8 I had already heard and read
about the prohibition on girls conceiving or giving birth beforemoving inwith their
husbands. I had also heard about the ‘mingi children’, allegedly impure childrenwho
were identified by the growth of their upper incisors before the lower ones. I knew
girls and women who underwent abortions and sometimes heard rumours about
infanticide, though mostly people talked about it as if it was history.
While most of the time the topic was avoided, the case of a girl who had grown
her second teeth on the upper jaw first proved impossible to conceal, even though
the mother tried to protect her daughter by hiding her. Initially, the community
seemed to have tolerated her presence. However, whenever a harvest failed or rain
shortage occurred, rumours surfaced that it was due to themingi girl.The rumours
were further reinforced, and allegedly confirmed, whenever the diviner consulted
6 The Bashada people speak the same language as the Hamar and Banna people and have an
almost identical culture. Together with the Kara, these three groups form a cultural unit (Ly-
dall 1976:393), within which intermarriage is allowed and common, and warfare prohibited.
Officially labelled as a subgroup of the Hamar ethnic group, the Bashada people have their
own history and origin, their own territory and their own ritual leader (bitta). In the past, they
claim to have had cultural proximity to the Kara, withwhom they reportedly share a common
origin (see Epple 2010). In recent times, innovations and cultural change seem to occur first
in Banna, which is geographically closer to Jinka, the zonal capital. Conversely, the southern
parts of Hamar and Bashada, which are located far from urban influence, appear to be more
conservative and resistant to interventions from outside.
7 The concept of human impurity exists also among other groups in South Omo, though with
different implications. In the past, the concept ofmingi, as well as the practice of infanticide,
existed also among the Aari and Arbore people, though in a slightly different form from that
of the above-mentioned groups.
8 I began research in Bashada in 1994 for my MA thesis and continued in 1998 for my PhD.
Since my first stay I have visited Bashada regularly. The research for this chapter was done
in the context of a project on legal pluralism in Ethiopia financed by the German Research
Foundation (DFG) between 2016 and 2019 while I was hosted at the Frobenius Institute at
Frankfurt University and an associate researcher at the South Omo Research Center (SORC)
in Jinka, Ethiopia.
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the sandal oracle about the reasons for the disasters.9 This went on for several sea-
sons until, in 1998, the community decided that the girl had to die or leave the
area. While the mother had considered taking her child to the bitta Adeno (the rit-
ual leader of the neighbouring Banna people who was said to be able to ritually
cleanse mingi children), there was no guarantee that the community in Bashada
would acknowledge the ritual cleansing. The family’s second option was to con-
vert to Christianity and move to town. In the end, the mother settled for a third
option and gave her daughter to the Catholic Mission in nearby Dimeka town.10
From there, the girl was later adopted by a foreign family living in Addis Ababa.
Though many people in Bashada were convinced that she had caused the repeated
calamities, all seemed relieved to see her leave the village alive.11
While the lives of this girl and others could be saved, efforts by the govern-
ment, NGOs and individuals to convince the local population of the harmlessness
of children labelled as mingi have been only partially successful. In Kara, for exam-
ple, infanticide is said to have been widely given up, and some mingi children are
now being raised in their villages. The same is true in a few settlement areas in
Banna, Hamar and Bashada, but in most other places, premarital pregnancies are
still ended through aborted, and mingi children are either given away for adoption
outside the community, or secretly eliminated.
This paper aims to understand the local practice of infanticide, its underlying
ideas and beliefs, and the reasons why these beliefs have been abandoned in some
areas and not in others. Specifically it will focus on:
1) the local views, values, meanings and explanations pertaining to the practices
of abortion and ritual infanticide within the context of harmful traditional
practices (HTPs);
2) the strategies employed by government officials, NGOs and local private citi-
zens to combat these practices;
3) the local reactions, forms of open and hidden resistance and consequent set-
backs experienced;
4) the creativity, flexibility and patience of various actors that have led to partial
changes and success stories.
9 Diviners (moara) in Bashada and Hamar claim to have the ability to find out the causes of
disease andother individual or community levelmisfortunes by tossing apair of ritual leather
sandals (locally called dunguri) and interpreting the way they land on the ground.
10 A nearby small market town and seat of the district administration.
11 Anthropologist Nicole Poissonnier was doing research at that time in the same village. She
was a close friend to the family and not only followed the case closely, but also helped to save
the girl by communicating with the mission and finding an adoptive family.
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Though the research focuses mainly on Bashada and Hamar, connections will be
drawn with Kara and Banna, where local dynamics have led to a different handling
of infanticide and abortion.
Human rights and local values: The contradictions
The relationship and contradictions between universal human rights standards and
customary laws and values, as well as the problems arising during their imple-
mentation in local contexts, have stimulated scholarly debate in anthropology for
a while.12 The implementation of women’s and children’s rights into local contexts
appears especially problematic, as the idea of gender equality and the emphasis
on the rights of the individual often contradict and collide with local norms and
values (Merry 2006, Hodgson 2011). Thus, while many officers argue for the strict
employment of international standards worldwide at the international level,13 at
the grassroots level, local officials are struggling with the obvious contradictions,
ethical dilemmas and local resistance, and finding that legal enforcement and the
criminalization of culture do not necessarily lead to sustainable success, but often
lead instead to conflict and resistance.
Local practices inconsistent with human rights have been labelled as ‘harmful
traditional/cultural practices’. While activists seem to have no doubts that certain
practices deserve to be eradicated, some scholars have raised doubts about whether
the labelling of certain practices as harmful is a viable or useful way of categorizing
discriminatory practices across cultural contexts (Longman and Bradley 2015b).14
Some went so far as arguing that emphasizing the harmfulness of certain cultural
12 See for example An-Na’im 1992, F. von Benda-Beckmann 2009, Eriksen 2001, Preis 1996. For
case studies see Cowan et al. 2001, Foblet and Yassari 2013, Langfield et al. 2010.
13 For example, the ‘Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women’ (CEDAW), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 aims to eliminate all
practices that discriminate against women, even if it means changing cultural values,
and even if women belonging to the culture concerned do not perceive them as harmful
(www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw).
14 The term ‘harmful cultural practices’ was first coined in the 1950s in UN circles when calls
were made to abolish ‘customs, ancient laws and practices related to marriage and the fam-
ily inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Longman and Bradley
2015b:11). See also Longman and Bradley (2015b) for the emergence of the term. Critiques
of the term have said that the voices of the people concerned are often over-heard, thus
labelling certain practices as harmful is yet another expression of Western dominance, as
the definition of what is actually harmful, lies in the hands of the powerful. Besides, similar
practices in the West are ignored in such debates and never labelled as culturally based and
harmful (Grünbaum 2015, see Jeffreys 2005 on ‘Harmful cultural practices in the West’.
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practices is a way of distracting public attention from more severe problems af-
fecting women and children, such as poverty.
Harmful traditional practices (HTPs) in Africa and Ethiopia:
The policy contexts
The fight against ‘harmful traditional practices’ (HTPs) is mentioned as part of
the ‘Millennium Goals’ and ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ of the African Union,
which places a strong focus on women’s and children’s rights, and particularly on
addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), removal of choice in mar-
riage, sexual initiation, female genital cutting (FGC), opportunity marginalization
(social and economic), and land and inheritance exclusion (African Union Commis-
sion 2012).
The African Union Commission (2012:2) has defined harmful traditional prac-
tices as ‘forms of physical or psychological violence that prejudice the bodily in-
tegrity ormental well-being of women or girls on the basis of their inferior position
in the social grouping that are considered to be long-established and community
accepted practices deserving tolerance and respect.’ Due to the continent’s cultural
diversity, there is no standardized list of harmful traditional practices in Africa.
However, female genital cutting, sex and gender-based violence, violence related
to bride price, forced and child marriage, wife inheritance and nutritional taboos,
among others, exist in many African societies.
Ethiopia adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and re-
lated conventions and treaties, and included laws protecting human rights of the
individual into its 1995 Constitution and into numerous government and NGO pro-
grammes. The combatting of HTPs and the empowerment of women and children
is among the country’s top priorities as it endeavours to develop and modernize.
In 2013, the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs prepared the ‘National
Strategy on Harmful Traditional Practices (HTPs) against Women and Children
in Ethiopia’ in collaboration with development partners. The document defined
HTPs as ‘traditional practices, which violate and negatively affect the physical,
sexual, psychological well-being, human rights and socio-economic participation
of women and children’ (UNICEF 2015). According to UNICEF (2015:vi), there are
about 140 HTPs that affect mothers and children in Ethiopia, and at least some of
them exist in almost all ethnic groups. As they are part of local customs, they are
defined as ‘resistant to change’, and UNICEF recommends the design of appropri-
ate strategies for affecting change. However, as in other parts of the world, efforts
to raise awareness and legal intervention have led to only partial successes and a
variety of responses.
According to Jones et al. (2018b), over the last couple of decades legislation and
policy concerning girls’ and women’s well-being and empowerment in Ethiopia has
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improved significantly, and a strong commitment to eradicating HTPs can be ob-
served. Nevertheless, practical progress has been slow, and gender norms are prov-
ing particularly difficult to overcome. As Jones et al. (2018a) showed in a recent study
in Amhara regional state, despite efforts by the government and NGOs to support
girls’ education and gender equality, many adolescent girls continue to face gen-
dered discrimination.The authors also mention a kind of cultural backlash arising
from the intensity of the government’s discourse on women and children’s rights.
This backlash is reportedly evidenced by attempts to cover up weddings of under-
aged girls and boys by pretending that they are baptisms or other religious events
(Jones et al. 2018:58). Other studies on southern Ethiopia have also reported on local
resistance and clashes between government authorities and local population.15
Infanticide, abortion, and physical injury in Ethiopia: The legal contexts
The Ethiopian law deals with harmful traditional practices in various legal codes.
Under the socialist Derg regime (1974–1991), efforts were made to unify all
Ethiopian societies under a modernized umbrella, and many local practices were
condemned. Since the EPRDF took over government, cultural difference has been
celebrated and supported, albeit with limitations (see Epple/Thubauville 2012).
Any practices that contradict international human rights standards are labelled
as HTPs and legally sanctioned. Articles 561 to 570 of the Criminal Code deal with
‘Crimes committed against life, person and health through harmful traditional
practices’, especially those ‘endangering the lives of and causing bodily injury to
pregnant women and children’ (Articles 561 and 562).16 Such practices are punish-
able with ‘fines or simple imprisonment from three months to one year’. Article
563 (Discretion of the Court) grants some flexibility in the application of the law,
stating that the court may take a perpetrator’s age, education, experience or social
status into account and choose to give only a warning.
Article 544 specifically deals with ‘infanticide’, stating that it is punishable with
simple imprisonment if committed by the mother while in labour (544(1)), and
treated as homicide if the child is killed intentionally or by negligence (544(2)). The
same laws apply to any instigators or accomplices to infanticide.
15 See for example LaTosky (2012, 2014) on the lip plates of Mursi women, Thubauville (2012) on
bridal seclusion among theMaale, Epple (2012a) on girls’ education in Bashada andYohannes
(this volume) on a major conflict between the Hamar and government authorities related to
clashing values.
16 These include abortion, excision of the uvula of a child, removal ofmilk teeth, and preventing
a child from being vaccinated as well as other practices considered as harmful by themedical
profession.
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Abortion is only allowed for medical reasons, for example, if either the health
of the child or the mother is affected, or if the pregnancy is the result of rape or
incest (Art 551).17
HTPs in South Omo Zone and Hamar Woreda
The South Omo Zone in SNNPR is home to sixteen officially recognized ethnic
groups and known for its cultural diversity.The level of education among themostly
agro-pastoral or agrarian population is generally still low and, due to the relatively
late penetration of the state in the area, knowledge about the national law is rather
limited and scattered. The handling of HTPs in South Omo is particularly chal-
lenging because its cultures are quite diverse, and the people react differently to
interventions from the outside.18
The zone and districts cooperate to identify HTPs. The Women and Children’s
Affairs offices in the various districts regularly visit the villages and, together with
the local population, identify practices that could be considered as harmful. They
then prepare and update the list of HTPs for their own district and submit it to
the zonal authorities, where the lists are compiled and progress and setbacks eval-
uated. As the Head of the zonal Women and Children’s Affairs Office, explained,
these lists are updated annually to show which practices have been abandoned,
continue to exist, or have been revived.The lists are then sent to the regional office
in Hawassa. From there, further instructions on how to continue the work are sent
back to the zone and from there to the districts. In addressing HTPs, the govern-
ment gives the highest priority to those that threaten human life or cause physical
injury.
At the zonal level, seventy-seven HTPs were listed as existing in six pastoral
districts of South Omo in 2016 (South Omo Zone Women, Children and Youth’s
Affairs Department 2016). While some of them are unique to one or two of the
respective ethnic groups (such as female circumcision in Arbore and Dassanetch,
17 Otherwise, abortion is punishable (Article 545,1) and leads to the imprisonment of thewoman
(and possible assistants) (Article 546). If the abortion was done against the will of the preg-
nant woman, it leads to rigorous imprisonment from three years to ten years of the ‘aborter’
(Article 547). If the abortion is done for financial gain, the ‘aborter’ also has to pay a fine, and
if it was done by a professional – such as a doctor or nurse – he or she can be prohibited from
practicing medicine for a limited period or even for life if they have undertaken numerous
abortions (Article 548, 1, 2, 3).
18 See for example the baseline study on Hamar, Dassanech and Nyangatom districts by Save
the Children Norway-Ethiopia (2011). See also LaTosky (2012, 2013, 2015) on Mursi women’s
lip-plates, Thubauville (2012) on bridal seclusion in Maale, and Epple (2012b) on whipping
and physical punishment.
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infanticide in Hamar, Banna-Tsamay and Maale, or the wearing of lip-plates in
Mursi), there are practices that exist almost everywhere (for example, bride wealth,
polygamy, reluctance to send girls to school).
HTPs in Hamar Woreda
Hamar Woreda has twelve listed HTPs. As the Head of the Women and Children’s
Affairs Office at the district level told me,19 after years of awareness raising and
information campaigns, certain practices have been abandoned, some are being
practised less severely, and others have continued as before.The fight against HTPs
related to themodification of the body for aesthetic reasons has beenmost success-
ful, since these practices are voluntary and bear few ritual and social implications,
serving rather as signs of strength, courage and social recognition.20 HTPs related
to marriage, including early marriage (below the age of 18), arranged marriage, ab-
duction, polygamy, bride wealth, ghost marriage (marriage to a deceased person)
and wife inheritance have proved to bemore difficult to suppress, probably because
giving them up has further implications for age and gender relations.21
The ritual whipping of girls and women during male initiations and the whip-
ping of wrongdoers by their age-mates are likewise considered as cultural assets
and have not been abandoned, although the severity of them has been reduced.The
top priority, and the most difficult HTP to address, has been abortion and ritual
infanticide.22 While infanticide has reportedly been abandoned in Kara, it contin-
ues – along with abortion – in Hamar and Bashada for various reasons that will be
explored in this paper.
19 Interview 24 March 2017 in Jinka.
20 In Bashada and Hamar these practices include the wearing of heavy iron rings around the
arms and legs (zau) and the neck (isante), the breaking out of the lower incisors, and the
cutting of decorative scars (paala). Decorative scars are commonly applied to the shoulders
and chests of men who have killed an enemy. As homicide is prosecuted, such scarring of the
chest is now only done is secret. The skin is sometimes still cut for medical purposes – such
as to cure rheumatic pain – mostly by women.
21 In the 2016 report by the South OmoWomen, Children and Youth Affairs Office (2016) ghost
marriage (that is ‘marriage to a deadman’) and ‘marriage through abduction’ are said to have
been eradicated. However, in conversations with the Women and Children’s Affairs Office,
it was said that abduction is still a problem, though on the decrease. During my stays in
Bashada in 2016 and 2017 it was also clear that forced marriage and abduction is still preva-
lent, which shows how difficult it is not only to change certain practices, but also to follow up
on practices that are illegal.
22 Another major priority is female circumcision in Arbore. The Arbore speak a different lan-
guage and are also culturally quite different from the Hamar, Bashada and Kara, yet they
share the same district. Over the last few years, female circumcision has been reduced in
severity, although there is also resistance to change among the communities.
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Abortion and infanticide
Abortion and infanticide based on the belief that a child is ritually impure is com-
mon in Hamar, Bashada, Banna and Kara.23 The origin of the belief and exact be-
ginning of the practice of infanticide is not known. When asked, people mostly
explained that it has always been part of their culture.24 Local explanations for the
tradition emphasize the ‘non-human’ status and ritual pollution of such children.
Mingi children – e.g. children born without the proper performance of precon-
ception rites or whose teeth grow first on the upper jaw – are believed to harm
their family. It is said that such children bring disease and misfortune, causing
the deaths of their father, mother, and all their siblings, until they remain the sole
survivor in the family and keep the family property to themselves.They are also be-
lieved to cause disasters that affect the whole community. When there is a severe
drought or an invasion of pests in the fields, usually an oracle is consulted to iden-
tify the cause. If there is a child who has been suspected of being mingi, diviners
may read in the oracle that they are responsible. In this way, the child becomes the
scapegoat for a calamity (Lydall 2005).25
When members of the community come to forcefully take a mingi child away
from their family, the parents usually try to protect their child vehemently. Families
with many male members can resist more vigorously, so that those who came for
the child may have to stay several days, trying to convince the family to voluntarily
give up the child. The child is then taken to the bush and abandoned.
The alleged impurity ofmingi children is strongly connected to the performance
of the bridal and the preconception rituals that a woman has to undergo with her
mother-in-law every time she wants to get pregnant. As Brüderlin (2012:100) has
23 Variations of the concept exist also inMaale andAri. As one elderly Ari woman explained dur-
ing aworkshop at the South OmoResearch Center (Epple/Brüderlin 2002:97–98), a childmay
only be conceived once the so-called ‘feeding ritual’ of its elder sibling has been performed
(five months after birth), otherwise it will be mingi. The women from Ari, Hamar, Bashada
and Banna who participated in the workshop all agreed that pregnancies conceived before
the mother has had her first period after giving birth are especially dangerous or, as they
expressed it, ‘very, very mingi!’ One of them called the concept of mingi a unifying cultural
element of their cultures, which are also historically connected (Epple/Brüderlin 2002:99).
24 According to Lale Labuko the Kara speak of a child born several hundreds of years ago whose
top teeth came first. The community suspected it might be a curse and when there was a
drought some years later, the elders of the village related this to the child. The ritual lead-
ers of Kara, Hamar and Banna then came together and decided that such children were
impure and needed to be killed in order to prevent future calamities (https://www.there-
porterethiopia.com/article/peculiar-case-mingi). Thedocumentary film TheRiver and the bush
(http://omochildmovie.com) highlights the impressive effort and success of Lale Labuko in
combatting infanticide in Kara.
25 In a way, the elimination of the child provides the community with a feeling of control over
natural disasters and is, as such, comparable to witch-hunts.
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explained, the prohibition on premarital pregnancies and the belief in the impurity
of children conceived without the performance of the preconception rites serve as
an indirect means of social control over married couples and their procreation, and
gives a lot of power to mothers-in-law (see also Lydall 2005:163).
As local contraceptives do not exist and people have limited knowledge of fer-
tile and non-fertile days, the only really effective method of avoiding an unwanted
pregnancy is celibacy.26 However, as virginity is not a precondition for marriage,
premarital pregnancies occur from time to time. Sometimes, a betrothed girl may
be impregnated by her prospective husband, who abducts her after getting tired
waiting for his wife’s father’s consent to let her move in with him. During such ab-
ductions sexual intercourse is common, so that even girls who do not have a secret
boyfriend may get pregnant and have to undergo an abortion.27 A child conceived
by a girl who has not moved in with her husband is referred to as anzamo-nas (lit.:
‘girlhood child’). No matter who their biological father is, the parenthood of an an-
zamo-nas is neither socially nor ritually acknowledged, so the child is illegitimate
and not considered as a fully human being (edi).
Within wedlock, the ideal time between pregnancies is considered to be two to
three years. Once a child is strong enough to be weaned, its mother will perform
the gungulo ritual with her mother-in-law, after which she is allowed to get preg-
nant again. If she gets pregnant before that, her child will be mingi. Husbands are
advised to avoid sexual intercourse before the gungulo ritual has been performed,
but as wives cannot easily reject a pushy husband, unwanted pregnancies within
wedlock do occur. While still in the mother’s womb, such children are called wuta
(‘unclean pregnancy’). If abortion fails and such a child is born, it will be mingi
(‘ritually impure’).28
26 The performance of this ritual can be considered as a traditional kind of birth control that
lies in the hands of the mother-in-law. It guarantees that the age gap between two siblings
is not too short.
27 I was told during a conversation with two young Bashada women that if a girl refuses to
have intercourse during abduction by her husband, he would suspect that she has a secret
boyfriend (31 January 2017).
28 The concept ofmingi appears also in other contexts of Hamar/Bashada culture, in the classi-
fication of animals, nature, and the temporal status of humans. Humans can be irreversibly
mingi by birth (if the necessary rites were not performed before conception), by accident (if
the genitalia or breasts of a man or woman are injured), or by impure behaviour (having sex-
ual intercourse with a cow). Members of some ethnic groups or status groups are also called
mingi, for example, the Tsamay (Tsamako), who have a reputation for being magicians, and
blacksmiths, who are considered ritually impure. The ritual or magical abilities of these peo-
ple is nevertheless venerated and used. The bajje people, amarginalized subgroupwith great
ritual responsibilities, are also sometimes calledmingi, mainly because they do not kill chil-
dren whose teeth grow on the upper jaw first, which means that in theory all of them could
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The abortion or infanticide of a child of a premarital pregnancy is handled se-
cretly to ensure that the prospective husband does not hear about it – unless he
caused the pregnancy.29 In cases where a married woman is known to have repeat-
edly carried and aborted a wuta (‘unclean pregnancy’), her husband will be made
responsible and accused of impregnating her with ‘non-humans’.His agemates will
warn him to avoid sexual intercourse until his wife has performed the necessary
rites, so that she can bear an edi (‘real human being’).30 If after this, the woman gets
pregnant with a wuta again, the husband will be sanctioned and severely whipped
by his agemates.
Both, anzamo-nas and mingi children are believed to bring misfortune such as
drought, disease and plagues of pests or birds that eat the harvest.The only remedy
is to remove them from the community. In Hamar and Bashada, the first choice is
usually to terminate such pregnancies in the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy.31
When abortion fails, the pregnant girl is kept hidden, perhaps in the fields, until
the birth, and then the child is abandoned in the bush.32 If the child of a married
woman grows its first teeth in the upper jaw rather than the lower jaw,33 this is
interpreted as an indication that the mother has laid with the father before being
ritually prepared, and the child therefore becamemingi. In rare cases, children grow
their adult teeth, rather than their milk teeth, in the upper gums first. This means
they are identified as mingi only at the age of 7 or 8, but their fate is the same as
that of younger children.The belief that if amingi child is left alive all of its younger
siblings will also become mingi puts extra pressure on the parents.
be children ofmingi parents. See Brüderlin (2012:95ff) for a detailed summary of the existing
literature.
29 According to Dal’o, a youngmarried Bashadaman, husbands are scared that their wifemight
die during an abortion, which is another reason why they get angry and threaten their wives’
lovers. See also Brüderlin (2012) on different cases of premarital pregnancy in Hamar.
30 Girls andwomenwhomourn the death of their children are comforted with the words: ‘Don’t
cry, this was not a human. You will give birth to a human in the future!’
31 Premarital pregnancies and abortions are kept secret from the girl’s father, elder brothers
and prospective husband, as these would try to get hold of her secret boyfriend and beat
or even kill him. For the same reason, girls try to hide the name of their lovers. To end a
pregnancy, a local female expert will exert pressure on the girl’s abdomen, though there is a
belief that if a girl does not disclose her boyfriend’s name, the abortion will fail.
32 During my research, I heard of several unwanted pregnancies. My impression was that the
girls had internalized the idea that premarital pregnancies should be ended and therefore
usually consented to an abortion. It is common for their secret boyfriends to contribute to
the cost of the abortion, and youngmen assist each other in finding the necessary resources.
Such pregnancies are usually an open secret among the youth and the female relatives of the
pregnant girl.
33 See Brüderlin (2012) for a detailed description of marriage and bridal rituals, as well as the
concepts of wuta, mingi and dakka used to refer to unclean conceptions and ritually impure
children.
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A woman carrying a wuta and mothers of mingi children are likewise consid-
ered unclean, and their pollution extends to their families and fields. Such women
cannot fetch water, as this would allegedly pollute and dry out the waterholes.Their
fields and crops are also considered mulimidi (polluted),34 so that they can only be
eaten but not be used as seeds or in exchange for goats or cattle. Their husbands
cannot go hunting, as it would put them at risk to die, and none of the woman’s
close family members can go to initiations, as the cattle over which an initiate is
supposed to leap would go wild.While a mingi child must be killed, its mother and
her family and homestead can be ritually cleansed and reintegrated into commu-
nity life. The procedure involves the slaughtering of a goat on a central path (zarsi
goiti) by a ritual expert who then blesses and cleanses her homestead by spilling
some of the goat’s stomach contents in every corner. The slaughtering and cleas-
ning is done in public so that everyone knows that after an unclean conception has
been removed or a mingi child eliminated the appropriate cleansing rituals have
been performed.The same rituals are done when a woman had a spontaneous mis-
carriage.35
Meeting the challenges in combatting abortion and infanticide
The settlement areas in Hamar and Bashada are relatively remote and scattered,
making it difficult for the government to reach out and employ controlmechanisms
over their inhabitants. Besides which, abortion and infanticide take place in secret,
so enforcing the law in this context is almost impossible unless people report such
incidents to the police. Therefore, the government’s emphasis has been on raising
awareness in the region in the hope that this will slowly change the minds and
beliefs of the people. Although, it has also taken action to exert legal pressure as
well.
In the past two decades, the infrastructure in Hamar and Bashada has been
improved, and all-weather roads have been built to most settlement areas. Health
centres, schools, agricultural extension offices have been built in all kebeles, and
local committees have been formed to address major issues in collaboration with
the likamamber (lit. Amharic: ‘chairperson’), who acts as an intermediary between
the local community and the government.
However, the strong belief that children conceived and born without the proper
ritual preparation bring disease and misfortune to the whole community is puting
34 The term mulimidi is, unlike the term mingi, also used in ordinary contexts to mean ‘dirty’,
especially for water that has become muddy.
35 The cleansing is done by the bajje-man (ritual expert from a special subgroup living among
the Hamar and Banne).
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a lot of pressure on individual community members.Most government officials are
well aware of the force of these beliefs, as they are native to the area themselves.
Therefore, their work lies in both raising awareness raising and supporting indi-
viduals, while warning the community of the legal consequences of anyone caught
committing infanticide. Delegations from the Women and Children’s Affairs Of-
fices, the Cultural Office, the Educational Office, the Justice Office and the Health
Office regularly visit the villages to educate them about the harmfulness and ille-
gality of certain practices, and to follow up on the changes people have promised
to make.
In an effort to gain more control over childbirths and with the hope that this
will help prevent abortion and infanticide, pregnancies are nowadays documented
and followed up. In cooperation with the district Women and Children’s Affairs Of-
fice, NGOs, the local health centres, and local health committees, pregnant women
are identified and visited regularly and encouraged to go to the health centres in
Dimeka or Turmi (small towns in Hamar district) when near to delivery. There, ev-
ery pregnant woman is given free accommodation and health care until her baby is
born and both are strong enough to return home.Through vaccination campaigns,
the names of children are registered and their growth monitored. In the near fu-
ture, the zonal administration is planning to issue birth certificates for all children,
even those born in remote lowland areas. In collaborationwith international NGOs,
such as Save the Children, and with funds from UNICEF and the African Medical
and Research Foundation (AMREF), financial support is being provided to individ-
uals willing to raise anzamo-nas or mingi children. Omo Child – a local NGO – is
helping raise awareness and providing shelter for such children in their orphan-
age in Jinka. The police and court are also involved through prosecutions and by
raising awareness of the laws around infanticide. However, as mentioned above it
is extremely difficult for them to locate cases of abortion or infanticide, and there
have been very few convictions so far.36
In the following, some of the measures taken to reduce infanticide and abor-
tion, as well as the local reactions towards them, are discussed in more detail.
36 Any major criminal issues and all cases of homicide are sent to the zone, so that cases of
abortion and infanticide are sent to and handled at the Jinka court, e.g. the zonal capital. The
former head of the prosecutors’ office in Jinka, explainedwhy the court has to show flexibility
in handling cases ofHTPs, “(…) The law says that one should keep lawandorder byprevention,
e.g. teaching the people, and if after that the law is broken we have to prosecute them. But
one cannot arrest all who violate the law here. If we do that, one would have to arrest almost
all people. So, if for example someone’s lower incisors are broken out by force here in Jinka,
we have to act. But if it is done it Hamar (e.g. in the lowland villages), we leave it.” (24 March
2017)
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Saving lives through adoption
Encouraged by the government, some parents decide to give their children away
for adoption, as mingi children raised outside the community by non-Hamar are
no longer considered dangerous. The former representative of the Hamar people
in the national parliament recalled how adoption was introduced under pressure
from the socialist Derg regime (1974–1991),
Already under the Derg it was said that people should not kill themingi children.
They said, ‘It is a crime, it will be prosecuted. If you really believe that these
children are impure, give them to the town’s people, let them grow up there!’ (…)
People say that the rain would stop falling and there would be disease. But since
the Derg, there have been many mingi children growing up in town, and today
there still are. People have seen that there is disease in town and in the villages;
rain is falling equally in towns and villages, there is no difference. It is a question
of barjo (here: ‘good fortune’), not of mingi children. (1 June 2017)
Many of these children grew up in Dimeka and Turmi, small towns in Hamar, or
in Jinka, the zonal capital. Their relatives could see them – though not visit them
– when they went to the weekly markets. Some of the children adopted during the
Derg regime are among the first educated Hamar and have achieved high positions
as officials in the local administration or as legal experts. As adults, they do not
pose any risk when they visit the villages and eat and drink with the people and are
treated like any guest from outside Hamar.37
While in the past only non-Hamar were willing to adopt and raise mingi chil-
dren, today there is an increasing number of educated Hamar people living in the
towns who believe that there is no danger in bringing upmingi children.38TheNGO
Omo Child has saved the lives of around fifty children who were given to them by
parents or found abadonded in the bush.39 However, while the orphanage s open
to all children labelled as mingi or anzamo-nas, people in Bashada have said that
37 One of them, for example, became a lawyer and worked as head judge of the Zonal Court in
Jinka. Another one was chief administrator in Hamar Woreda for some years. He underwent
a purifying ritual as a young adult, was allowed to undergo initiation andmarried a local wife.
As far as I could observe, the local reactions to this diverged: while some say that he was ‘re-
born’ and is a full Hamar now, others say that he is not fully charangi (‘ritually pure’). Both have
become active also in attempting to fight infanticide with the help of international NGOs
and churches (see http://gtliconnect.blogspot.de/2011/11/creating-mingi-friendly-communi-
ties.html, and http://galataministries.org).
38 Themother of the currentWomen and Children’s Affairs Officer of HamarWoreda, for exam-
ple, is bringing up two mingi children in Dimeka. She found one of them abandoned in the
bush, while the other one was brought to her by its father.
39 The NGO recently changed its name to Omo Hope (see https://www.omohope.org). Besides
the orphanage, the organization is very active in raising awareness and has significantly con-
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parents who do not know any of the NGO’s staff personally are still hesitant to
approach the organization.
Enforced and supported upbringing of impure children
Nowadays, the government is making increased efforts to convince families and
communities to keep theirmingi children. In the 1990s and early 2000s, there were
no mingi children growing up in the villages, but during my research in 2016 and
2017, I heard of several cases.
During meetings organized in Turmi and Dimeka, government officials had
discussed the issue with the likamambers from the various kebeles, asking them to
convince their communities. An elder from Bashada remembered these meetings
as follows:
The government said to us (aboutmingi children), ‘You are giving them to the gal
(non-Hamar). And then, when they study, grow up and come back, they eat and
drink in your houses. Why are you eating with them? You used to kill them! You
used to throw them down crevices! You said the sun would get hot, and the rain
would stop falling. But now that is not the case. Now (as they were saved and
grew up in town), the rain never stopped falling. You were wrong!’
(After they talked like that we said), ‘Eeeh, we have accepted that.’
Now, the government is saying that we should raise them in the villages. Over
there in Dalmi (settlement area in Bashada), there are two children. There is
also one in Argude (settlement area in Bashada), it is raised here. (Interview, 19
November 2016)
While this elder gives the impression that many people are now convinced that
mingi children are harmless, others said that acceptance is limited to a few places
in Hamar. Both, local people as well as government workers told me that they knew
that infanticide had not been given up. Many local people also expressed their
doubts that mingi children were really equal to other children. Although leaving
them alive was seen as generally good, it was suggested that they should go to
school and live a town life rather than be locally initiated and married.
The former Women and Children’s Affairs Officer of Hamar Woreda recounted
the case of an anzamo child who, at the time of the interview in 2016, was 4 or 5
years old and living around Turmi town. She had become involved in the case when
she took the child to the hospital after birth and fed it until she could convince the
mother to keep it. To protect both child and mother from the enraged husband,
she had also had to involve the police. Later, she convinced the community elders
tributed to the abandonment of infanticide in Kara, the birthplace of Omo Child’s founder,
Lale Labuko.
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to let the mother and child return. Finally, the husband accepted the child and,
after some years, the wife gave birth to more children with him.40
While there aremore andmore individual cases of survivingmingi children and
anzamo children, there seems to be a growing and more outspoken resistance to
the acceptance of anzamo-nas in the communities. During my fieldstay in 2016, the
case of two Hamar girls who had refused to abort their premarital pregnancies was
discussed widely in Bashada.The girls were taken to the clinic in Turmi, where they
were given health care, protection from their families and support during delivery.
The Head of the Women and Children’s Affairs Office in Hamar district explained
the strategy behind giving them shelter and financial support in town for a couple
of years:
The mothers should start loving their children. Once they got used to their chil-
dren, we will send them back to the village. That is the psychology (she used the
English word here) we want to use. The girls’ husbands, hopefully, will later also
accept the children as theirs. (Interview, 27 March 2017)41
After returning to the villages, I was assured, the mothers and their children will to
be regularly visited by government officials and receive financial support to ensure
their wellbeing. In addition, the families will have to sign a document saying that
they would do no harm to them, in the knowledge that they will be sent to prison
if anything did happen to the children.42
The case of these two girls stirred discussions in Bashada, and some people
openly opposed bringing up an anzamo-nas. A Bashada elder summarized people’s
feelings:
The people here say, ‘Why should we accept such a child? The family of the man
who impregnated her has to raise the child! (…) We do not agree with the gov-
ernment!’ When we said so the government people responded, ‘So, advise your
40 Summary of an interview held on 25 January 2017.
41 She added that people in Kara were now raisingmingi children in the villages without prob-
lem, and that such families received some financial support. According to her, in 2017 there
were fifteenmingi children being raised in Dus village (the biggest settlement area in Kara).
42 The formerWomen and Children’s Affairs Officer of HamarWoreda recounted the case of an
anzamo-nas, then aged around 4 or 5, living around Turmi town with the support of Save the
Children and the Women and Children’s Affairs Office. The husband has accepted it and the
couple subsequently had more children together. She explained: ‘For that case, the elders
had calledme (to take the child to town). After the child was born, I took it to the hospital for
18 days. I fed the baby and finally convinced the mother, and later the community elders, to
keep it, so that eventually the mother and child could return. In the beginning, I worked on
this alone. But then I had to also involve the police, because the husband of the girl was bad
at first and threatened to kill the baby, so the police had to stop him.’ (Interview, 25 January
2017).
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daughters (not to get pregnant)!’ (Then we said), ‘Eh, so we will better hand over
our daughters to their husbands at early age, before they grow up and start play-
ing around with boys!’ We have accepted the mingi talk, but we did not accept
the talk about the wuta and anzamo children. (Interview, 19 November 2016)
As is indicated here, the unclear social status of an anzamo child creates a problem,
as by local definition social descent is only determined once a wife has moved in
with her husband and performed all necessary rituals, nomatter who the biological
father of a child is.Therefore, children born before that cannot becomemembers of
the husband’s lineage. On the other hand, any child born after the necessary rites
have been performed will be fully accepted and considered as the child of their
social father, even when it is known that someone else fathered the child.43
In the above account, the elder suggested that to prevent premarital pregnan-
cies girls could be given to their husbands at an early age, knowing that underage
marriage is another target of the government. In the past, Hamar girls moved over
to their husbands’ homes at a young age, and grew up under the supervision of
their in-laws until they were physical maturity enough to be given to their hus-
bands. While Hamar girls often still get married (i.e. the marriage is sealed) at an
early age, they now grow up in their parents’ house until the age of 18 and older.
This has made it difficult to prevent premarital relationships, and the risk of pre-
marital pregnancy has increased immensely. With his remark, the government’s
demand to let girls get betrothed and married at adult age was indirectly chal-
lenged: it was shown that from a local perspective it is contradictory to control the
girls and avoid premarital pregnancies, and at the same time forbid abortions and
infanticide.44 Without saying it directly, it was indicated that abortion and infan-
ticide of anzamo children would continue if the problem of premarital pregnancies
is not be addressed otherwise.
43 There are cases in which a husband was absent for several years (in prison) and later thanked
themanwho slept with his wife while he was away, thereby enabling him to return to a fully-
grown family. In other cases, where husbands are not happy that their wives have given birth
to children from a secret lover, their anger should only be addressed towards the lover, and
not toward the children.
44 Efforts to inform the youth about contraception, as well as awareness raising on HIV, free
distribution of hormone injections or condoms seem not to reach everywhere and are not
always effective. During a conversation with a young Bashada women, I learned that many
fear that they would not be able to get pregnant for some time after receiving a hormone in-
jection or that condomsmight get lost inside the body of a woman. Therefore, they claimed,
many females did not use them.
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Expanding control mechanisms, awareness raising and legal prosecution
As indicated earlier, both abortion and infanticide are done secretly and hardly
ever reported to the police and the court. Consequently, government institutions
depend on the cooperation of the community to prosecute such cases. Efforts to
register pregnantwomen and newborn children have given some control over newly
born children.
According to a prosecutor at Hamar Woreda Court, very few parents have
sought legal support after their child was labelled mingi and killed. He suspected
that social pressure played a major role in preventing parents from coming for-
ward. As many people continue to be convinced that these children are dangerous,
parents fear being ostracized by the community if they refuse to hand over their
child. Therefore, even individuals who do not believe in mingi tend to give their
child away for adoption.
Equally rare are reported cases of abortion. The majority of girls who get preg-
nant before marriage comply with an abortion, as they have internalized that it is a
cultural prerequisite to live with their husband and bear socially accepted children.
Besides, as shown above, bringing up an anzamo-nasmeans having to withstand the
whole community, live in town for a while – if not forever if the government offi-
cials’ negotiations are not successful – and risk the marriage. A judge at the Hamar
Woreda Court remembered only one case of a reported abortion. Here, an elderly
woman had forced her daughter-in-law to interrupt her pregnancy:
When her daughter-in-law moved in with her son, she was already pregnant
[by someone else]. The mother-in-law said, ‘This child is not my son’s child. We
have not finished the (bridal preconception) rituals!’ and aborted the child by
force. Later, she was accused of murder here in town. Her daughter-in-law had
submitted a letter [to the police]. ‘My child was killed! This old woman killed
my child! I am not going to live in that place anymore! I will go to school now!’
she said, and then the police arrested the mother-in-law. The young woman is in
school now. (Interview, 29 March 2017)
This case of forced abortion was especially delicate. Though I did not have the
chance to talk to her in person, reporting hermother-in-law to the policemust have
been a drastic step for the young woman. As custom dictates that cases should first
be discussed with the elders and reported to the police only through the militia or
the likamamber, circumventing the elders is strongly disapproved. Anyone doing so
is locally perceived as d’abbi (wrongdoer) and has to pay a fine to the elders or is
otherwise sanctioned. In this case, the woman had to sever relations with all her-
in-laws and move to town.
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Government collaboration with ritual leaders
Despite years of awareness raising and legal pressure, abortions and infanticide
have still not been abandoned. Therefore, the government recently decided to in-
volve the ritual leaders (bitta) to ban these practices through local custom.
The ritual leaders in Hamar, Bashada and Banna 45 are said to be descendants
of brothers who once left Aari and migrated south and there is a strong connection
between the ritual leaders of the three groups. Until today, the bittas are venerated
for their ritual power, though some of the former prohibitions surrounding their
hereditary office have been weakened: while in the past the bittas were not allowed
to leave their own territory and meet other bittas face-to-face, today, they often
meet duringmeetings organized by the government in Dimeka and Turmi, in Jinka
(the zonal capital) and even in Hawassa (the regional capital).
One of the Banna bittas, Adeno Garsho, was already known in the 1990s to have
developed a ritual that could cleanse mingi children: through a kind of symbolic
rebirth he could turn them into ‘real human beings’.46 However, when during my
fieldstay in 1998–99 people in Bashada mentioned him to me, many also expressed
their doubts on the effectiveness of his ritual. Those who believed he coud really
turn a mingi child into a ‘real human’ feared that the transformation would not be
accepted in Bashada and their children remain outcasts.
When harmful traditional practices began to be addressed under the EPRDF
regime, bitta Adeno offered to be of help. During a Banna-Tsamay Woreda council
meeting in 2005, his son, Kotsa Adeno, declared that they would do all they could to
stop certain HTPs. During the course of numerous field visits and talks, seventy-
two practices were identified as HTPs, of which forty-eight were considered as
being most critically affecting human life. The highest priority was given to the
practice of killing mingi children. A young educated man47 from Banna recounted:
Bitta Adeno Garsho called the representatives from the Women and Children’s
Affairs Office, and also the kogos and parkos48 from their respective areas in Ban-
naland. He also invited the Banna representatives in the national parliament, the
zonal administrators and regional government bodies to his own home. Here, he
slaughtered a pure female sheep that had never given birth before (yati sebani)
45 There are two bittas in Banna, two in Hamar and one in Bashada.
46 Bitta Adeno’s grandmother originally came up with the idea of abandoning the killing of
mingi children (Gele Bani, 30 May 2018).
47 He is the son of a kogo (ritual expert and fire-maker), has a university degree and has been
working for the local government in Banna and Jinka.
48 Kogo and parko are ritual experts.While the kogo is a ritual firemakerwhoperformsprotective
rites for the cattle, the parko is the counterpart to the bitta and performs rituals for the cattle
and the bees. The parko is also said to be able to move the stars when they have left their
usual paths, and thereby prevent drought and disaster.
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at his ritual gateway (kerri) and addressed his ancestors [asking them to allow
him to abandon infanticide]. Next, he took parts of the sheep’s heart, tongue
and stomach and put them onto the gateway [for the ancestors]. He ate some
of it himself and then shared it among the elders and the people, saying: ‘From
this day on I have abandoned this practice! Let my children grow up in peace
and freely!’ About one year later, around forty-eight HTPs, including mingi, were
registered as being abandoned in Banna land. 49 (Interview, 30 May 2018)
Other bittas followed Adeno’s example and began denouncing the killing of mingi
children. The former Hamar representative in the national parliament recounted:
First bitta Adeno stopped it, maybe 5 or 6 years back. He also stopped the killing
of the first-born child [of the Gatta clan].50 (…) Then bittaMuga [the other Banna
bitta] followed. In Lala, the Hamar bitta Bankimaro said during a public meeting,
‘These are children of humans! If their teeth grow first on the upper jaw, to call
themmingi is the talk of the past. Let it be gone!’ (…). There is also, Elto [the other
Hamar bitta]. But his talk is moving back and forth. He accepts some things and
rejects and resists to others. (Interview, 1 June 2017)
However, despite the bittas’ efforts, infanticide has not been easily given up and
continues in many places.
Local reactions to external interventions
Generally, there appears to be no linear progression in combatting HTPs in Hamar
and Bashada: the changes are scattered and not sustainable everywhere. This be-
49 According to him, todaymost of the Banna people go to Adeno’s house if one of their children
appears to be mingi (i.e. their first teeth in the upper jaw), especially since 2006. Nowadays,
there are many children in Banna who have been ritually cleansed and have grown up with
their families. Some live in Jinka, in the Omo Child orphanage. Most of these former mingi
children are still underage and have not yet married. He expects that themingi children who
were cleansed can participate in any ritual and marry anyone from Banna. To understand
whether such children have been totally accepted locally onewould have to observe themar-
riage choices of individual families.
50 The different clans have their own prohibitions, abilities and rules. In the past, the Gatta
clan used to kill all women’s first-born children. In Bashada, I was told that it was their parko
(ritual expert) Nakwa, my host father, who first abolished the killing of first-born girls and
later also of first-born boys. Being Gatta himself, when his wife she finally gave birth – after 8
years of trying – he decided that the child should not be killed. Later, when his own son’s wife
gave birth to a boy, he also decided that the child should not be killed as his daughter-in-law
had lost twins before. Though he abandoned the practice for Gatta children, this abandon-
ment did not automatically oblige others to follow and I heard of a subsequent case of Gatta
infanticide in a different family.
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came sadly obvious in 2014 and 2015 when, in an act of resistance against the gov-
ernment, infanticide was revived in an area in Hamar where some parents had
been raising their mingi children in the village.
Revitalization of infanticide as resistance
According to informants from the area, in the past they had been pressurized to
send the mingi children to school. Some of those who received an education in
Dimeka and Jinka made a career and came back as government officials.They were
locally accepted, though again not without some pressure from the government
side. The fact that they were able to support their families and communities fi-
nancially also gave them some local leverage. 51 More recently, children were also
educated in the newly built schools in the villages.
In 2014 a violent conflict erupted between some kebeles in Hamar and the gov-
ernment. Though the causes of the conflict and its triggers are complex, the main
underlying reasons were related to continuous pressure from the government to
sendmore children (especially girls) to school, to stop hunting in the national parks,
and to end certain cultural practices (see Yohannes, this volume, for details). When
the situation escalated at the end of 2014, the Hamar physically attacked the dis-
trict administrator, police and other government representatives, destroyed gov-
ernment institutions, such as schools and health posts, and decided to return to
their own ways. As part of their resistance, they revived certain practices in order
to strengthen their own identity and as a sign that they rejected the new culture
imposed on them. Among those practices was infanticide.
The former chief administrator of South Omo Zone and by then representative
of the Hamar in the national parliament was called to help resolve the conflict.
He recounted how the elders of the area emphasized their autonomy when they
revitalized the practice of infanticide:
With this conflict they have started it again. They said, ‘In the past, this was our
custom. This government told us to stop, but now we will do it again! We will
turn back to our old practices!’ (…).
It was mainly the zarsi [community of males]. ‘We are the ones who make the
bitta a bitta, we are the ones who select the ayo (spokesman)! When we, the zarsi,
say so, it will be given up! But if we say that there exist mingi children, there will
be!’
So, now they are killing them again. By then, there were four or five children
killed, even big children who were attending school. (…). (Interview, 1 June 2017)
51 Oral information from Yohannes Yitbarek, who has been doing research in the conflict areas
since 2016.
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During the time of the conflict, some parents moved to town or gave their children
to friends in town in order to save their lives. The discord between government
and local popluation only really calmed down in 2017, partly because some of the
government officials who had contributed to the escalation were taken to prison.
The killing ofmingi children who had been living in the community can be seen as a
drastic way of restastance against the government when the pressure got too high.
Faking rituals
When the conflict became less severe, the government organized more meetings
in an attempt to pick up its own efforts and reinforce the bittas’ efforts to end the
most prioritized HTPs.
In June 2016, for example, representatives from the local and regional govern-
ment, with support from Save the Children, organized a meeting in Turmi involv-
ing men and women from Hamar and Bashada. The three ritual leaders (two from
Hamar and one from Bashada) were invited to ritually abandon several harmful
traditional practices, including the ritual infanticide of mingi children, early mar-
riage, the exclusion of girls from education and the ritual whipping of girls and
women during male initiation.52
Theabandonment ritual was held again in Bashada,with only the Bashada bitta.
However, it later came out that the rituals had not been done properly, neither in
Hamar nor in Bashada. In both cases, certain ritual elements – invisible to out-
siders – were changed, which rendered the whole event ineffective and non-bind-
ing. As a young Bashada man, who had participated in the ritual in Bashada, ex-
plained, no one felt obliged to abide by the ritual until it was repeated in the proper
way:
The first time the branches they used were from the wrong tree, a kind we don’t
use for rituals. ‘These are gal [highland Ethiopians] coming to the ritual. What
is the problem [with using the wrong tree]?’ people had said [laughs]. ‘They are
like small children, they don’t know!’ The people tricked the government simply
to appease them.
But the administrator of Hamar Woreda was also there. He is Hamar and he
had understood what the elders had done. So, he called them back! ‘These were
wrong trees that you used! Erect baraza [tree used for rituals]! Slaughter a sheep,
52 Save the Children has been involved in raising awareness on harmful traditional practices
in Hamar, Dassanech and Nyangatom since 2010. It cooperates with the Women and Chil-
dren’s Affairs Offices and some other relevant stakeholders. As part of a revised strategy, and
with funding from Save the Children Italy, in collaboration with the regional government,
it organized the above-mentioned ritual (https://ethiopia.savethechildren.net/news/hamer-
community-says-we-no-longer-tolerate-violence-against-children).
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go down to the river! I know all about it!’ And then they did it all again, this time
in the right way. (Interview, 27 March 2017)
The involvement of the bittas was not without pressure from the government side.
As the bittas need the support of their communities to change cultural practices,
they could not force their people to abandon the belief that mingi children were
dangerous and give up infanticide. Instead, they pretended to cooperate with the
officials, but actually altered the ritual.53 Currently, new efforts are being made by
the government to discuss with the communities, especially in those kebeles where
resistance has been strong and violence has erupted.
Summary and conclusion
The practice of infanticide and abortion in Bashada and Hamar (as well as in Banna
and Kara) is closely linked to the idea of personhood. Children conceived before
marriage (anzamo-children) are considered as illegitimate and can never achieve
the status of an accepted social person (edi). Such pregnancies, therefore, are usu-
ally ended through abortion. If the abortion fails, the children are eliminated after
their birth. Accepting these children as persons seems most difficult in Bashada
and Hamar, where people have resisted accepting them despite pressure from the
government and many attempts to raise awareness of its undesirability. The sta-
tus of children considered as ritually impure (mingi children) is only visible several
months after birth: when their first teeth grow on the upper instead of the lower
jaw, this indicates that preconception rites were not performed properly.Their sta-
tus allegedly makes them – similar to child-witches in other countries – danger-
ous for their families and the whole community. They are believed to be equipped
with supernatural powers who can afflict and kill their parents and siblings and
bring disease and drought to all. Explanations for the status of such children dif-
fer: while an anzamo child cannot be a social person because it lacks a social father
and therefore identity, a mingi child has been born outside the ritual order, which
is believed to make them hazardous and a carrier of imbalance and disaster. The
elimination ofmingi children provides the local population with a feeling of control
over uncontrollable events (like any other ritual or magic), and restores the social
and ritual order. Defining births as legitimate only after marriage (until recently
common also in the western world) and the performance of bridal rituals grants
53 Also, in Kara, where the practice of infanticide is said to have been abandoned completely,
there are still few individuals who are not following the decision of the majority and ritual
performance of their ritual leader, so that the awareness raising efforts of NGOs and govern-
ment are continuing there, too (oral information by the managing director of the NGO OMO
child).
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a clear social status to all legitimately conceived children, even if their biological
father is different from the social one.
The belief in mingi children also serves as an identity marker, especially in op-
position or confrontation with the cultural other.During an intercultural workshop
in which many women from different ethnic groups in South Omo participated,
several women from Banna, Bashada, Kara and Ari explicitly drew a boundary be-
tween their groups and others from Arbore and Dassanech, emphasizing that they
had certain rites necessary for a child to become human and that they practised
infanticide on impure children (see Epple/Brüderlin 2004:chapter 7.14). Although
I do not know how common the view is that infanticide creates a feeling of unity,
the revitalization of the killing ofmingi children that emerged from the armed con-
flict between the Hamar and the government in 2014 showed that infanticide can
easily be evoked as an identity marker. As several informants from those rebellious
kebeles confirmed, the reinvigoration of infanticide was not only a return to past
traditions that were only reluctantly given up under government pressure, it was
also an act of revenge, demonstrating distance and resistance to the pressure to
change. It emphasized the Hamar people’s otherness and independence, as Scotti
(2017:403) predicted.
Efforts to combat abortion and infanticide must take all these cultural mean-
ings and beliefs into account, and acknowledge that too much pressure and the
criminalization of culture can have adverse effects. At the official level, it appears
that this has been accepted, and is reflected in the emphasis on awareness raising
over strict law enforcement. Practically, however, it seems that too many meetings
and one-sided discussions have led to fatigue and frustration among the local pop-
ulation, who – feeling pressurized – pretend to agree and fake rituals to please the
government.
So, what can be done?The results of the combination of efforts (awareness rais-
ing, support for individual families, offers to adopt children, pressure from the
government) made in Kara, where infanticide of mingi and anzamo children has
almost stopped, is encouraging, and interventions should continue, with a focus
on providing information on issues related to infanticide. To avoid frustration in
the communities, which might lead to more resistance, rather than placing too
much stress on values and laws, continued education on the real causes of natural
disasters and disease would help reduce the fear of mingi children. Better expla-
nations about birth control and provision of contraceptives could help avoid un-
wanted pregnancies from the beginning. Debates on values, and possibly on the
outside image of the groups, might help them question their identity markers and
lead to changes in attitude. As one Kara man said after years of awareness raising
and discussions with the government, NGOs and educated Kara men: ‘We do not
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want to be known for killing our children anymore!’54 Yet, as Feitosa et al. (2010)
have suggested, such discussions should probably be done in a more participatory
way, and not provide all the answers from the beginning.
Despite the many drawbacks and problems, as the Head of the Women and
Children’s Affairs Office in Hamar Woreda (herself from Hamar) positively and re-
alistically remarked:
What is called dambi (tradition, custom) will not disappear in one day! It is some-
thing that needs a lot of time! (Interview, 27 March 2017)
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HamarWoreda is a district in southern Ethiopia that has, until recently, been rather
detached from the centre. Likemost of their ethnic neighbours in South Omo Zone,
theHamar people are agro-pastoralists who have lived somewhat autonomously for
a long time in the district. Despite their incorporation into the Ethiopian nation
state in the late-nineteenth century, the Hamar were able to continue an indepen-
dent lifestyle, with limited contact with the subsequent central governments. Since
the mid-1990s, the government’s attempts to actively include all ethnic groups and
develop remote areas have changed many things, and interactions between local
communities and government have become frequent. These encounters between
different people and their value systems have led to innovations, but also ten-
sions and conflict. In 2014/5, growing tension between the local authorities and
the Hamar community over their clashing values escalated into a serious armed
conflict. The resolution of the conflict could only be achieved with much effort,
concessions on both side, and a better understanding of and respect for some of
the key values of Hamar society. This chapter looks at the causes of the tension,
the reasons for the escalation of the conflict and the efforts made by both sides
to resolve it. In doing so, I explore the differing value positions, perspectives and
strategies employed by local government agents and the Hamar people to achieve
their goals.1
1 The fieldwork for this research has been done as part of my PhD project at the Max Planck
Institute (MPI) for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany. All fieldwork expenses were
covered by the department of Integration and Conflict ofMPI. I have conducted fieldwork be-
tween September 2016 to September 2017. The data for this research was gathered through
structured and semi structured interviews with local people and local government authori-
ties in Hamar.
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The Hamar and their relation with the Ethiopian state
The Hamar are one of the largest groups in South Omo Zone of the Southern Na-
tions, Nationalities and People’s Regional State (SNNPRS). According to the Cen-
tral Statistical Agency, the Hamar population was estimated to be 59,160 in 2007
(CSA 2008). The Hamar speak their own South Omotic language. Their economy
combines the rearing of animals (goats, sheep, cattle), farming (sorghum, maize,
varieties of beans), apiculture, and hunting and gathering (Strecker 2010:87). They
live in mountainous and lowland areas, in settlement areas consisting of several
homesteads. Close relatives are usually clustered together within one homestead.
The Hamar social and political organization is rather egalitarian and could be
called acephalous or, as Amborn (2018), puts it ‘polycephalous’, which means that
they have no central leader or chief; rather they live a kind of ‘regulated anarchy’,
where seniority and the rhetorical skills of individuals play a role in daily affairs
and conflict resolution.The Hamar have two ritual leaders, locally called bitta,2 one
from the Gatta clan and the other from the Worla clan, who are responsible for the
spiritual well-being of the country, but do not have any political power. They have
twenty-four exogamous clans under two moieties (Strecker 2006b:87).
Like the other groups in South Omo, the Hamar were incorporated into the
Ethiopian state by Emperor Menelik II at the end of the nineteenth century (Don-
ham and James 2002, Lydall 2010, Strecker 2013, Tsega-Ab 2005). Under the suc-
ceeding governments of Ethiopia, they were governed by rulers whose staff con-
sistedmainly of central and northern Ethiopians. As Jean Lydall (2010:322) noted, in
the immediate period afterMenelik’s conquest and also later during Emperor Haile
Selassie’s rule (1931–1974), the governorsmade no effort to condemn the culture and
tradition of the conquered groups; instead they emphasized cultural difference to
justify their dominance. Their relations with the local community were confined
to issues concerning the ‘adjudication of inter-group conflicts’ and the ‘collection
of taxes’ (Lydall (2010:322). With the coming to power of the socialist Derg regime
(1974–1991), a few development projects (schools, road, market schemes and relief
aid programmes) loaded with ‘a civilizational bias’ (Abbink 1997:2) were introduced
to the Hamar, as well as to other groups in Southern Ethiopia.
After the downfall of the Derg in 1991, the change of government significantly
transformed the relationship between the central state andmost of the local groups
in Ethiopia, including the Hamar. The ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revo-
lutionary Front (EPRDF), adopted the language of democracy, peace and devel-
opment, and abandoned a highly centralized, unitary state in favour of what is
2 The term ‘bitta’ literally means ‘the first’ and refers to the first ancestor of the Hamar to settle
in the area. It also means ‘the first’ in authority and ‘the first’ in transcendental and ritual
power (see Strecker 1976:30).
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commonly known as ‘ethnic-based federalism’, giving constitutionally based equal
power to all ethnic groups and individuals (Belete 2008:447). Since then, theHamar,
like other groups in Ethiopia, have been exercising the right to govern their own
affairs. They are also entitled to the ‘right to development’, to education, health
services, markets and infrastructure.
Although introduced with the objective of improving living standards (FDRE
2015), these development packages contravene Hamar values and have triggered
conflicts between the local population and the district administration. Over the
past few years, the relationship between the local population and the administra-
tion of Hamar Woreda has been increasingly tense. Numerous small and large dis-
putes led to an open and armed confrontation that reached a climax in 2015 when
open war broke out between the Hamar and the district police. In its aftermath,
the conflict continued to engage local, regional and national officials as well as the
Hamar people, and to this day it has not been fully settled.
The issues that led to the outbreak of the conflict have been topics of intense
debate among the Hamar community, the local authorities, residents of Dimeka,
and others who were directly or indirectly involved or affected by the conflict. The
Hamar mention two major issues as the causes of the conflict: the denial of access
to the Mago National Park; and problems related to the schooling of girls. On the
other hand, the local authorities blame the Hamar for being resistant tomodernity,
characterizing the communities involved in the conflict as rather ‘closed’, locked
in their own traditions and stubbornly opposed to any change, citing the Hamar
people’s rejection of education and their insistence on hunting game and grazing
in the Mago National Park as evidence.
Having looked deeper into the topic and talked to many individuals on both
sides, I will argue here that the main cause of the conflict is the clash between two
different value systems: the rather mobile agro-pastoral production of the Hamar
and the top-down development approach of the government.
Universal human rights, particular cultures and national interests
Over the past decades, social and economic development programmes aimed at
changing the lifestyles of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities have been widely
introduced by the Ethiopian government. Education provision and the need to re-
duce gender disparity in the schooling system and other social service projects
are among the key priorities of the government’s social development programme.
These programmes are usually framed in the context of universal human right dis-
courses, such as the ‘education for all’ programme established at the Dakar UN
Forum in 2000, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. The implementation of these
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social development programmes has generated different responses among local
communities, local administrations, national governments and international or-
ganizations. To understand these dynamics, it is necessary to contextualize the
discussion within the broader debate and negotiation about and legal uses of ‘hu-
man rights’ and their conjunction with ‘particular cultures’ (Cowan et al. 2001:1,
Johansson 2017:611). The pervasive use of ‘universal rights’ and the way these rights
are implemented in local contexts, and resisted by and negotiated in particular
cultures and societies offers a more meaningful insight to comprehend the appli-
cability of universal rights in local settings.
According to Johansson (2017:613), the debate between ‘universal rights’ and
‘particular cultures’ has existed since the adoption of Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) in 1948.The preamble of the UDHR affirms that ‘Peoples of the
United Nations (…) faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small’ (UN 1948:1). The assembly also proclaims the UDHR as ‘a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ (ibid). Following the adoption
of the UDHR, countries around the world, including Ethiopia, have ratified sev-
eral human right conventions. Many have even gone further, enacting legislation,
creating mechanisms and putting into place a range of measures to ensure the
protection and realization of rights within their jurisdictions. Anthropologists and
other social scientists have nevertheless criticized this universalistic approach to
the implementation of human rights on the basis of cultural relativism.
Cultural relativism, which has been advocated since the early twentieth cen-
tury by the American anthropologist Franz Boas and his students, has become the
core of the human rights discourse. The main argument of cultural relativism is
that all cultures and value systems, despite their diversity, are equally valid (Dahre
2017:616), and that culture is a complex whole with parts so intertwined that none
of them can be understood or evaluated without reference to the other parts and
the cultural whole (Lawson cited in Hossain 2015:3). Hence, according to the cul-
tural relativist view, human rights cannot be universal but are culturally relative.
Moreover, advocates of universalism have been criticized for their failure to detail
the circumstances of implementation of rights in particular cultures and societies.
Hossain (2015:1) for example, argues that ‘in states where arranged marriages are
common, one would expect clause 2 of Art 16 of the UDHR (“marriage shall be en-
tered in to only with the free and full consent of the intending spouse”) to be rou-
tinely disregarded’.Thus, some authors argue, as universal rights are unresponsive
to cultural differences, they are instruments of oppression (Forst 1999:35). Certain
rights – such as women’s, marriage, social and economic rights and the right to
education – have even been criticized as attempts to universalize western values
and impost them on non-western societies (Hossain 2015).
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Thediscussion on universalism and cultural relativism seems to be animated by
a contest between the desire to establish universal rights on the one hand, and the
awareness of cultural differences on the other (Cowan et al. 2001:4). At times, ar-
guments promoting or opposing either universalism or relativism are instrumen-
talized to advance the political and economic interests of certain groups. In the
context of the conflict between the Hamar and the government, for example, one
can see the inconsistent position of the government in its advocacy of certain rights
over others. For example, the right to education for girls is among the cardinal is-
sues in the rights discourses of the government. As such, it was among the main
reasons for the 2015 open confrontation between the police and the Hamar com-
munities. The Hamar refused to send their girls to school due to certain cultural
norms, and their resistance was aggravated by serious problems, such as sexual
harassment, at the schools in town. The other trigger for the Hamar–government
conflict was the government’s restriction of the Hamar people’s right to hunt and
graze their animals in the Mago Park and its surroundings. The government con-
sidered such behaviour to be damaging towildlife and biodiversity and did not view
it as part of the social and economic rights of the indigenous people, as stipulated
in Art. 5 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP).
The lack of uniform positions towards universal rights and particular cultures
makes the debate between universalism and relativism more compelling, and
shows how both concepts are essentialized by different actors to promote their
interests. Hence, as Cowan et al. (2001:6) argue, rather than seeing universalism
and cultural relativism as two opposing forces, one should see the tension between
the positions as part of an on-going social process in which universal and local
values are negotiated and evaluated in relation to each other. Furthermore, posing
the choices in such a dichotomous way ignores the extent to which the different
actors – local people, governments and international organizations – have negoti-
ated these contradictions and redefined both the meanings of rights and culture
(Merry 2001:32).
Recent national development priorities in Ethiopia
According to government reports, Ethiopia is working towards achieving broad-
based, accelerated and sustained economic growth in order to outpace the predica-
ments posed by poverty. In the public discourse, poverty is considered as an exis-
tential threat to the country and its people (FDRE 2015:4). The only viable option
considered by the government to tackle these challenges of poverty was to design
a comprehensive national development plan aimed at bringing fast and sustained
economic growth. Hence, since 2002, the Ministry of Finance and Economic De-
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velopment (MoFED) has implemented four successive national development plans
guided by an overall development policy agenda of eradicating poverty. These in-
clude the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP),
the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), the
First Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I), and the Second Growth and Trans-
formation Plan (GTP II).
The first, the SDPRP (2002/03–2004/05), emphasized the transformation of the
rural economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular. The plan’s over-
riding focus was on agriculture as the engine of growth with a huge potential to
fuel the growth of other sectors of the economy by facilitating surplus produc-
tion, market creation and provision of raw material and foreign exchange (FDRE
2002:iii).
The second, PASDEP (2005/06–2009/10), built on the goals pursued under the
SDPRP.The plan was designed to bring accelerated growth to the economy through
a particular focus on private sector development and commercialization of agricul-
ture, industry and urban development (MoFED 2007:1).
The third, the GTP I (2010/11–2014/15), was designed with the objective of
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It focused on improving
the quantity and quality of social services, especially education, health and other
infrastructural developments, thereby hoping to achieve macroeconomic stabil-
ity and enhance productivity in agriculture and manufacturing sectors (FDRE
2010:7). During the GTP I period, several massive development projects were
implemented, such as the construction of dams for hydroelectric power, sugar
factories and cotton plantations as well as the creation of mechanized agricultural
estates, especially along the major river valleys of the Awash, the Gibe-Omo, the
Wabe Shebelli, the Beles, and the Abay (Blue Nile). Many of these development
projects are situated in the pastoral and agro-pastoral inhabited lowland periph-
eries of the country, which are considered by the government as ‘less inhabited’
and endowed with ‘abundant’ and ‘virgin’ land.
According to government reports, the main aim of these development projects
is to improve the living standards of the pastoral and agro-pastoral population,
mainly by integrating them into themainstream national economy and by facilitat-
ing social development though improving pastoral livelihoods and asset bases, ba-
sic social services, and institutional setup (FDRE 2008:8). In doing so, various gov-
ernment and non-government organizations (NGOs) are working towards chang-
ing the lifestyle of these communities.
Generally, since the introduction of GTP I, and evenmore so since the fourth na-
tional development plan, the GTP II (2014/15–2019/20), emphasis has been given to
boosting the national economy and improving the standard of living of all citizens,
in order to maintain the vision of Ethiopia becoming a ‘middle income country by
2025 through sustaining the rapid, broad based and inclusive economic growth,
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which accelerates economic transformation and the journey towards the country’s
renaissance’ (FDRE 2015:2).
The four national development programmes mentioned above share a focus on
modernizing agriculture as the main driver for rapid economic growth and de-
velopment. Additionally, the programmes presume the move toward the middle-
income country can be achieved through centrally planned and installed develop-
ment plans.
The type of development approach promoted by the EPRDF basically emanated
from and is guided by the developmental state3 ideology of the government. The
developmental state ideology – often associated with the economic polices fol-
lowed by East Asian governments (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) – underscores
the importance of state intervention, shared vision orientation, central planning,
coordination of development projects, and commitment to building human capital
(Planel 2014:421). It has been Ethiopia’s overarching development approach since
2001 (Fana 2014:67). Under the developmental state ideology, the government has
promoted state intervention in economy and society, or ‘a revolution from above’
(Aaron 2017:48), to transform the economy. This kind of development approach
usually disregards local realities, values and complexities and is geared towards
securing fast national economic growth.
Development and related conflicts in South Omo
As mentioned earlier, the government considers the lowland peripheries as impor-
tant outlets for its ambition to foster fast and sustained economic growth (Markakis
2011:291). In South Omo, recent projects include the Kuraz Sugar Development
Project (KSDP) along the banks of the Omo River, and the villagization programme
in the woredas of Bodi, Mursi, Gnangatom,4 Dassanech and Hamar. Several other
state-backed but privately owned large-scale agricultural investments have also
been put in place in the last few years.
Presently, the KSDP is the largest irrigation-based agricultural development
scheme in the country, with 175.000 hectares of land and a plan to build five sugar
factory units. The KSDP project area encompasses Salamago and Gnangatom
Woredas from South Omo, the Surma and Meinit-Shasha districts of Bench-Maji
and Diecha district of Kefa Zone. Most of the people living in and around the
3 Even scholars continue to debate the conceptual understanding of developmental state, fol-
lowing Mkandawire (2001:3), I define ‘developmental state’ as a state ‘whose ideological un-
derpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative
and political resources to the task of economic development’.
4 Also: ‘Nyangatom’.
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project area are agro-pastoralists who rely on animal husbandry and flood-retreat
cultivation from the Omo River. With regard to the transformational impact of
the KSDP project, Kamski (2016:6) has noted two main impacts: ‘the alteration of
the natural landscape’ and the abrupt transformation of the socio-cultural sphere
caused by migrant labour workers and the state-directed villagization of local
people.
Although the project has so far not been implemented across all 175,000
hectares of land, the land-clearing process and the construction of waterworks
and roads have brought new challenges to the local people and their environs.
Buffavand (2018:298), for example, has noted with regard to the Mela:5
When the bulldozers had just started to raze the bush belt to the ground, large
animals in particular were in disarray, having lost their shelter. (…) Mela certainly
deplored the loss of their resources: game meat but also diverse edible plants,
medicinal plants, trees for house and bee-hive construction, dry-season grazing
plants for cattle, etc., were disappearing with the bush belt.
The conversion of riverbank land for estates and the construction of the Gibe III
dam have also greatly affected the practice of flood recession agriculture (Turton
2011:166, Kamski 2015:6).
As the construction of the Kuraz sugar factories in Salamago and Gnangatom
Woredas is still on-going, everyday resistance in its different forms is arising from
the local groups near the project areas. One source of conflict in Bodi and Mursi
areas, for example, is the issue of accidents and injuries to people and their cattle
caused by the sugar plantation’s vehicles on the areas bumpy and damaged roads.
On 4 December 2017, for example, twelve truck drivers were killed by the Bodi after
a Bodi man was killed in a car accident. Public and private trucks frequently run
between Jinka, headquarters of the South Omo Zone, and Hana, the small town
near the sugar factory, and factory workers are often the targets for retaliation for
accidents on the road.
Privately owned large-scale agricultural investments are another cause of con-
tention, as illustrated by the case of the conflict that arose between a cotton planta-
tion investment near the Woito River, the Birale Agricultural Development Private
Limited Company and the Tsamakko community in South Omo. The Tsamakko
were dispossessed of their land by the cotton farm and, in the confrontations that
resulted, workers from the farm and members of the Tsamakko community were
killed (Gabbert 2014:29, Melese 2009:280). Such conflicts between private investors
and local communities are also very common in other regions of Ethiopia (for ex-
ample Gambella).
5 The Mela people also called under the ethnonym Bodi.
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South Omo has also attracted the attention of the government in the area of
eco-tourism development, as is evidenced in the strict enforcement of wildlife pro-
tected areas (WPAs). These include the Omo National Park, Mago National Park,
Tama and Chelbi Wildlife Reserves, Murle and Welishet Sala Controlled Hunting
Areas. In order to protect the animal population, the local population are prohib-
ited from entering such areas to hunt or to graze their animals, while tourists are
allowed in to both see the animals and sometimes to hunt. The prohibitions have
been enforced more strictly in the last decade, which has led to repeated conflicts
between WPA scouts6 and the local communities.
The Hamar, Banna, Bashada, Ari and the Mursi are among the groups who live
in the adjoining area of one of the recently contested protected areas – the Mago
National Park. They enter the park to hunt wild animals and graze their cattle and
the recent stricter enforcement of the law become a source of conflict, causing the
loss of human life among the local hunters and the scouts been hired by the gov-
ernment to protect the area.When four scouts in the Mago Park were killed during
a clash with poachers in 2015, the relationship between the local communities and
the park authorities became very tense and full of ambivalence.
Another area of development intervention in South Omo is the provision of
schooling and other social service projects7 aimed at improving the standard of
living of the agro-pastoralists. Numerous primary schools have been built in differ-
ent woredas (districts) of South Omo, and special awareness programmes have been
organized to convince parents to send their children to school. Recently, more and
more pressure has been exerted on parents who have resisted. This and the issue
of the protection given to girls who have run away from home to join school have
become another major source of conflict between the administration and some
groups in the region (Epple 2012, Maurus 2016). In particular, the campaign to
send girls to the boarding schools in town is being more and more resisted, as
there have been many cases of undesired marriage with town people (and aban-
donment of previously arranged marriages), unwanted pregnancies and abortion,
and a general abandonment of local values.
Conflicts between the Hamar and the government
The conflict that arose between the Hamar and the woreda administration in 2015
can be considered as the third in a line of wars fought since the incorporation of the
6 Most of the scouts working in the Mago Park are from the neighbouring groups: Banna, Ari
and Hamar.
7 The social service projects being implemented in the region include: primary and secondary
schools, public health services, veterinary services, market and rural road construction pro-
grammes.
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Hamar into the Ethiopian state. The first war was fought with the soldiers of Em-
peror Menelik’s army when they invaded and incorporated the Hamar and neigh-
bouring groups into the Ethiopian state. In an account given by Baldambe, aHamar
elder, of his father’s experiences during that time, he recounted how the Hamar
had first fought and resisted and were later devastated by Menelik’s army (Strecker
2013). Their catastrophic defeat by Emperor Menelik’s army cost the Hamar an en-
tire generation, and they were forced to live in exile in the lands of the Dassanech
for many years.
The second violent encounter took place in a place called Assile in southern
Hamar in 1948. This conflict with Emperor Haile Selassie’s soldiers is still fresh
in the memory of the Hamar and is remembered as the ‘Assile war’. The Hamar’s
frequent cattle raiding of the Borana and the intervention of Haile Selassie’s ad-
ministration to secure the return of the looted cattle are considered as the causes
of the Assile war.The war was devastating and took numerous human lives on both
sides. Cattle died and Hamar houses were burnt down. For almost fifty years after
the Assile debacle there was not any open conflict between the Hamar and govern-
ment soldiers. The third and most recent conflict between eight Hamar kebeles8
and the Hamar Woreda administration erupted in January 2015.
According to informants from both sides, the animosity between the adminis-
tration and the community started in 2012, when the Woreda administration in-
troduced a rifle registration programme with the objective of controlling illicit arm
possession among the community.TheHamar were unhappy with the programme,
insinuating that the local administration was helping the government to abuse the
gun registration and licensing system so that they could later confiscate the guns
from the people who had registered. They traced an analogy from Haile Selassie’s
time when, after much debate, the Hamar had handed over their arms to the gov-
ernors for registration, only to find the weapons were never returned but sent in-
stead to the central administration in Addis Ababa. They feared the same thing
would happen during the 2012 registration programme.
The government considered the resistance of the Hamar to the rifle registra-
tion programme as a violation of the rule of law and a sign of disobedience to the
government. As higher officials in the Woreda administration told me, because of
Hamar resistance, the administration failed to meet its obligations with regard to
the registration and licensing programme.
The already unpleasant relationship between the Hamar and the authorities be-
came worse in the context of the open confrontations with poachers in the Mago
8 TheHamar kebelesmost vigorously involved in the conflict with the government wereWorro,
Shanqo Qelema, ShanqoWolfo, Lala, Achi Mussa, Achi Algone, Kufur and Gedback. The gov-
ernment and the town people alike refer to these kebeles as the ‘security cluster kebeles’.
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National Park and repeated cases of Hamar girls running away to the towns for ed-
ucation. In 2015, the Woreda administration’s attempt to bring poachers to court
and to try to stop any future encroachment in to the park turned into an open con-
frontation between the Hamar youngsters and the police in a place called Worro.
The clash resulted in the deaths of six policemen and one elementary school teacher,
and in the destruction of public service centres, including schools and health cen-
tres. From January 2015 to November 2017, government activities in these villages
were curtailed by the security problem and no public servant dared to work in those
villages. In the following, a detailed account of the main conflict will be given, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the events and circumstances that led to it.
The armed conflict
The open confrontation between the police and the Hamar took place in a village
called Worro on 15 January 2015. On that day, a team from the Hamar Woreda
administration that included the police, the vice administrator and the head of
security, as well as representatives of local elders from the nearby villages,9 went
to Worro to bring poachers, accused of poaching in the Mago Park, to the court. 10
Before that day, the Hamar Woreda administration and the Mago Park Office
had held a series of consultative meetings with the community of Worro, Shanqo
Qelema, ShanqoWolfo and Lala kebeles on how individual and group-hunting activ-
ities in Mago Park were damaging its fauna and flora. In those meetings, represen-
tatives of the local administration had asked that the Hamar hand over poachers
to the police. In Worro kebele alone, the local administration had listed seventeen
suspected poachers sought by the police. After a long discussion, the elders of the
village through their bitta (ritual leader) requested the government to let the poach-
ers pay fines instead of going to court.However, the government rejected the appeal
and instead to send the police into the villages.
The team went to Worro with the aim of peacefully negotiating the issue of
poachers and girls’ education with the community. However, the police officer I in-
terviewed from the team explained to me that, since the Hamar in Shanqo Qellema
village had severely beaten the Chief Administrator and other officials at a previous
9 Community elders included in the teamwere fromBashada, ErräQaisa, ErräUmbule, Shanqo
Qelema and Lala kebeles. The elders were selected on the basis of their closeness to the kebele
administration and their perceived community influence.
10 According to my informants from the Mago National Park Office, in the years from 2012/13
to 2014/15, of the 65 registered poaching cases, 43 were from Hamar kebeles, mostly Dimeka
Zuria, Worro, Shanqo, and Lala.
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meeting,11 the security office found it necessary that the team go with an armed
police force, carrying Kalashnikovs and machine guns.
Two days before the team went to Worro, the police fired machine guns in the
outskirts of Dimeka town. The sound of the gunshots was heard all over Hamar.
According to the police, the machine guns were fired for two reasons: to see if they
worked, as they were remnants from the Derg’s regime and had not been used
for the last two decades; and to intimidate the people in Worro and neighbouring
kebeles,who were known to be resistant, and convince them to hand over the poach-
ers to justice. Having tested the machine guns, the team entered Worro kebele in
the evening of 14 January 2015. One of the policemen who was part of the group
remembered the situation as follows:
We arrived in Worro at 4:00 pm in the afternoon. We wanted to spend the night
in some of the rooms atWorro Elementary School. Soon, ourmembers (the police
members) went to fetch water in the nearby river to cook food for dinner. At that
time, we were in peace. Later when it got darker, we sent those elders who were
with us to the village to inform the community about the arrival of the team and
a plan to hold a meeting the next day. But the elders who carried our message
were chased away by the Worro community who told them that they were gal
(literally: enemy), not Hamar. Shortly after, a woman from the village came and
told us that we were surrounded by armed Hamar men from the village. She
said, ‘You have to go…you have to escape…go…go…!’ But the higher officials from
the woreda administration refused the woman’s advice. We spent a very tense
night. Outside, we heard shouting, war songs and the firing of rifles by the young
Hamar.
The next morning, we woke up early. Again we sent the elders to the village to
appease and persuade the people to come talk with us. When some members
of the police went to the river to fetch water and prepare breakfast, the Worro
youngsters started firing at them. The elders were also chased and even beaten
up by the ‘resistant fighters’. Everything went out of control. Our police members
flew into the bush and escaped to Dimeka town. The elders also ran to other
villages. A few policemen, including me, and the woreda authorities remained
in the school. There followed a time of shooting with the Hamar during which
two policemen were killed and four highly wounded. We were encircled from all
sides. Of course, we did not have the basic knowledge of the terrain. The ‘resistant
fighters’ came and said ‘put down your rifles!’ When we put down our rifles, they
11 The beating of the Chief Administrator and other officials happened shortly before theWorro
conflict. According to some Hamar and government official informants, the beating was at-
tributed to the grievances that the Hamar have in relation to the pressure of girls’ education
and the problems in the park. Some informants also told me that the beating was started by
some drunk Hamar youngsters in the village.
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took our Kalashnikovs and our machine guns and then we remained alone. To be
frank, the police did not shoot at the people, we were actually firing into the sky.
The authorities who were with us ran to one elder’s house, near the school.
Around 12:00 am, a special police force came from Jinka, the headquarters of
the South Omo Zone administration. First, they took the wounded policemen to
hospital. The bodies of those who had been killed were down at the river area.
When the special police force asked the community to give them the bodies,
the Hamar refused. Then, the Special Police Force and the Hamar fought in the
afternoon and four more members of the police and one female teacher from the
village were killed. The day passed without any achievement on the side of the
police. At night, it was decided that all of us should retreat to town. We dispersed
in different directions, left the dead ones in the village and returned to Dimeka
(to the town) during the night. (Interview, 4 December 2016, in Dimeka)
Soon after, the Hamar began to destroy all public centres in Worro, including
schools, health centres and veterinary service centres. Properties were taken. The
news quickly spread all over Hamar, and people in other places, such as Shanqo
(both Shanqo Qellema and Shanqo Wolfo), Lala, Achi Mussa, Achi Algone, Kufur,
also started destroying public service centres. All the government workers fled to
the towns and the eight villages remained inaccessible to the government until
Feb 2017.
The roots of the conflict
‘Territorialisation of conservation space’ versus local economy and social
identity
As mentioned above, one of the contested arenas for the Hamar and the local gov-
ernment is the ‘territorialisation of conservation space’ (Robbins 2004) in the Mago
National Park. The Park, with 2,162 km2, was established in 1978 with the assump-
tion that the area was ‘uninhabited’ and ‘free from human activity’ and therefore
required protection from human and animal encroachment (Turton 2011:166). In
reality, there are six groups – the Banna, Hamar, Kara, Muguji, Mursi and Ari –
living in and around the Mago Park (Nishizaki 2005:32, Turton 2011:150). Others,
such as the Tsamakko, Konso, Arbore and Dassanech, come from further away to
hunt animals for trophies and meat, place beehives, and extract timber (Strecker
2006b:135).
As part of the current government’s commitment to promoting eco-tourism
development and building a climate-resilient green economy, laws prohibiting en-
try to and hunting in the park are being enforced more strictly than at any time in
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the past, and sanctions range from the financial to imprisonment. The strict en-
forcement of the law collides with the interests of the pastoralists, who feel that
not only their livelihood but also the key values of their culture are under threat.
One Hamar elder explained:
We have a long tradition of going to the bush to hunt game. In the past, when
our sons herd cattle, they used to go with spears, nowadays they have guns […].
They need them for two reasons: first, to protect the cattle from raiders and from
dangerous animals such as hyenas; and second, to prove their manhood by killing
trophy animals so that the community knows they are ready for marriage.
We were told that our boys are killing animals and that these animals are sources
of income for the government. So, the government is very concerned about them.
They (the government) told us that tourists from far away are visiting to take
photos of these animals and that they are paying money for that […]. We have no
problem with that. Our problem is the grazing land. We worry about where to
graze our cattle and goats. That is why our boys travel such a long way to Mago.
(Interview, 2 December 2016, in Lojera)
As the account shows, hunting plays an important role in the socialization ofHamar
men, who want to prove their manhood by killing game – a venture a male should
go through in order to become a donza, a married and ‘competent adult man’ (Ly-
dall and Strecker 1979b:77). Though not a compulsory precondition for marriage,
hunting is considered important in the eyes of the community. Successful hunters
of big game are given special recognition and celebrated for a whole season, dur-
ing which they adorn themselves and paint their foreheads with clay.12 While men
traditionally go on special hunting trips, herders also kill wild animals to protect
their herds and their own lives from dangerous animals, as I was told by Hamar
herders I spent some days with in their cattle camps near the Mago Park and the
adjoining area of Omo river.
The Mago Park is used to graze cattle especially in times of drought. Accord-
ing to the Hamar Woreda Pastoral Affairs Office, the dramatic increase in the en-
croachment of herders into the park seen over the past 10–15 years. This has been
caused by a shortage of grazing land resulting from an increasing cattle population,
drought and the allocation of land to investors. In the past, when they had fewer
cattle, the Hamar used to graze their animals near their homesteads, and only sea-
sonally took their animals to places further away. Over the past two decades they
have started to travel with their herds to Kizo, an area near the Omo River, close to
the Karo community settlement area. As the Kizo area has been under the control
12 For example, when someone kills a hyena he shaves off all his hair. He takes some pure white
paint and smears it on his head. When a person kills an elephant, lion, leopard or buffalo, he
smears red ochre on his forehead (see Lydall and Strecker 1979b:78).
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of the Ethiopian Rift Valley Safari (also called the Murle Controlled Hunting Sta-
tion) since 1984, the Hamar face difficulties grazing and watering their cattle in the
area.The scouts andmanager of the hunting station told me that when the herders
encroach on the controlled hunting territory, they sometimes shoot game indis-
criminately, which causes disputes between the scouts and the herders. Moreover,
the size of the Kizo area was reduced in 2012 by the allocation of 10,000 hectares
of land to foreign investors, who established the Omo Valley Cotton Farm.13 Since
then, the Hamar have had little access to the grazing land in the area and to the
Omo River to water their animals. Even worse, many goats, sheep and cattle have
fallen into the large ditches dug by the investors to fence their farmland. This all
led to disputes with the investors14 that eventually forced the Hamar to move their
animals further, to the Mago Park, and led them again into conflict.
In the Park, as I observed, the Hamar have recently begun to build cattle
camps and live there more permanently. Repeated attempts to remove herders and
hunters from the Park territory has resulted in conflict and the deaths of some
scouts.
The woreda administration and the Mago Park authorities organized several
meetings with community elders and herders during which they suggested the
destocking of cattle and promoted other income-generating economic activities.
In an interview, a local expert of pastoral affairs told me:
The Hamar give high value to the size of their herds. They do not worry about
the quality of their cattle. What they worry about is to maximize the herd size
and thereby increase their social status. We told them to decrease their herd, to
sell some and diversify their income strategies outside the pastoral economy.
Recently, we have been observing a change in climate, and there is a lack of
grazing land and water […]. Some people have accepted our advice and started
to live a ‘modern life’. You can see, for example, Hamar guys transporting people
from their village to the town by motorbike. But these are only few. Most still
continue to keep their cattle […]. Because of the lack of pasture, they recently
moved their herds to Mago National Park. It is this encroachment to the park,
which later caused the Worro conflict. (Interview, 16 May 2017, in Dimeka)
13 The plantation was established in June 2013 by Turkish investors, mainly to supply cotton to a
sister company called ELSEAddis Industrial Development PLC, located in Adama town.When
I arrived in Hamar for fieldwork in September 2016, the investors had been expelled by the
government for issues pertaining to their failure to repay a loan they had received from the
Ethiopian Development Bank.
14 Government officials from Hamar Woreda told me about a case from 2014. Hamar herders
were grazing their cattle near the farmwhen some of the animals entered the farm territory.
The cattle were detained for a day and this caused an open clash between the farm’s guards
and the herders. The dispute was only settled by the intervention of the woreda administra-
tion.
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This account shows that authorities accuse the Hamar pastoralists of having ‘irra-
tional’ cultural norms related to their cattle that drive them to own large herds as
a symbol of wealth, status and prestige. This is a common misconception held by
many policy makers in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in the world. The govern-
ment, on the other hand, argues in terms of market economy and financial bene-
fit, encouraging the Hamar to reduce the size of their herds, start ranching, fatten
their animals and supply them to the market. This, it is argued, is the best way to
diversify their means of income, which would improve their standard of living. In
addition, it would reduce the damage done to the Park and the surrounding envi-
ronment by the cattle. During meetings, I heard government officials addressing
notable cattle owners among the Hamar, asking them why they did not sell some
of their cattle, build dorms for rent in the town, buy motorbikes, and wear clothes
like the town people. However, the Hamar, particularly the older generation with
whom I held focused group discussions, are reluctant to take such advice from the
authorities.15
One of the reasons for this reluctance is the wide-ranging social, economic, and
ritual importance livestock has among the Hamar. For example, besides being used
for food in the household (for milk and meat), cattle serve an important function
in social bonds and networks. A typical kind of social relationship in South Omo
is the institution of bondfriendship (Girke 2010), in Hamar called beltamo. Among
males, bondfriendship exists over territorial and even ethnic boundaries. Bond-
friends exchange and herd each other’s cattle, and support each other in difficult
times.16
For the Hamar and other neighbouring groups, sharing animals has a num-
ber of advantages over the cash economy. Hence, the institution of bondfriendship
plays a significant role in maintaining social and economic cooperation and soli-
darity among the community and beyond. For cattle owners, it is an opportunity
to establish a widespread social network on which they can fall back in times of
need. It is also a mechanism for spreading one’s cattle over a wide territory and
thereby making it less vulnerable to epidemics affecting only one area. For poorer
or young men, it provides a means of establishing their own herd, or overcoming
15 There are a very fewHamar who have built houses, boughtmotorbikes, andwear clothes like
the town people. Most of them are close to the administration and arementioned as positive
exemplars during such meetings.
16 The cattle exchanged are called bannewak. Often, such an exchange begins with someone
asking a cattle owner to give him a cow so his children can drink milk. The person making
the request may give a gift such as honey in return. If the owner agrees to give a cow, the
receiver has an obligation to look after the cowwell. He is not allowed to slaughter or sell the
cow or its offspring, but he may use the milk. Some of the calves will go to the owner, others
are kept by the receiver.
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difficult times, for example, when someone who owns no cattle needs to feed small
children.
The economic system of theHamar is thus very different from the government’s
market-oriented system. It is not, as Jean Lydall (2010:315) noted, primarily in-
tended for commercial exchange, but rather has an equalizing effect: poor families
receive cattle from the rich, and ‘any produce in excess of domestic needs is used
for special events (e.g. initiation or marriage), celebrations (e.g. harvest festival),
exchange (e.g. goats for grain in time of hunger) or marriage (e.g. bride wealth)’.
‘National educational’ imperatives versus the place of girls in Hamar
Modern education in Hamar and inmost of southern Ethiopia was introduced dur-
ing the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie (1931–1974). The Emperor placed a strong
emphasis on the expansion of education to strengthen the national unification
project and to bring about the country’s development. In southern Ethiopia, the
establishment of schools was mainly targeted towards educating the children of
administrators, police and settlers from the north. Sending children from local
communities to school was not common except and only a few children of local
dignitaries (such as ritual leaders) went to a boarding school in Addis Ababa (Epple
2012:198, Lydall 2010:7).
During the Derg regime (1974–1991), there was an emphasis on the expansion
of education in rural areas. As Lydall (2010:15) pointed out, ‘one of the first things
the Derg did after taking power was to establish schools in rural towns where pre-
viously there were none. In Hamar, for example, schools were set up in Turmi and
Dimeka’.
The EPRDF government has labelled education as one of the fundamental hu-
man rights of school age children in Ethiopia. Education is considered a key to
development, democracy and peace-building within and among the Nations, Na-
tionalities and People of Ethiopia. The emphasis on the expansion of education is
evidenced in the construction of numerous schools even in remote areas. InHamar,
there are twenty-three primary schools in five clusters (Dimeka, Turmi, Shanqo,
Kara, and Arbore), and two secondary schools in Dimeka and Turmi towns. The
current Hamar local administration is committed to the expansion of education
and other social services in the woreda. One of my informants from the local Edu-
cation Office explained the office’s recent efforts in Hamar Woreda as follows,
For a long time the Hamar were among the less privileged and disadvantaged
groups in South Omo. Most of them are still illiterate and only look after the
cattle. They do not have educated boys and girls; they do not really know the
world outside their own […].
With our developmental government, a new hope and vision is in the making.
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The government is committed to expanding different infrastructures in the whole
country especially to benefit groups that were disadvantaged under the previous
regimes […].
In Hamar, we are working hard to implement the ‘education for all’ programme
of the government. Education is a key to the development of a community and
it broadens the horizon of people’s life. We are building schools, health centres,
and veterinary posts with the aim to improve the way of life of our community.
(Interview, 10 November 2016, in Dimeka town)
The five-year education plan17 (2014/15–2019/20) of Hamar Woreda shows that the
administration is striving to expand the coverage of primary school education to
all the woreda’s kebeles, and to reduce gender disparity in the enrolment children to
schools. To attain its vision, the office has been undertaking a series of awareness
raising activities, including meetings with the community and campaigning about
the importance of education for the future of the country, the pastoral and agro-
pastoral community and their children.
From these campaigns, it is obvious that education has become loaded with
expectations of a good life andwell-paid job in town.When I askedmy host brother,
a Hamar schoolboy, to explain what modern life means to him, he told me it meant
‘to be able to wear gal18 clothes, to ride a motorbike, to have a mobile, to eat injera,19
to live in Dimeka town and to get a government salary’. At the same time, among
those who are educated and close to towns life allegiance to the Hamar way of life
has become stigmatized as ‘traditional’, ‘backward’ and ‘resistant to development
and modernity’. My informant from the Education Office stated:
The Hamar are conservative and stick to their traditional way of life […]. One
manifestation of this is their lack of interest in sending their children to school,
especially the girls. They don’t know the value of education. For example, they
don’t send boys (especially first born sons) to school because they believe an
educated boy will not bury his father, inherit his father’s property and continue
the Hamar way of life. With the girls, the problem is even worse. The Hamar
believe that if a Hamar girl moves to a town, she will never come back. They also
use their girls as a means to accumulate wealth through bride wealth, which
often enables them to get many cattle and goats […].
17 The five-year education plan was prepared by the Hamar Woreda Education office to attain
the vision of the National Growth and Transformation Plan on Education.
18 The term gal literary means ‘enemy’ (see Lydall 2010). It is also used to refer to non-Hamar,
mainly highland Ethiopians.
19 Injera is a fermented sourdough flatbread traditionally made from teff flour. It is the main
staple food in highland and Central Ethiopia, and has recently also become popular in other
parts of the country.
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Nevertheless, over the past years, the woreda administration has been working
hard to tackle these ‘traditional’ attitudes despite resistance and conflict. (Inter-
view, 21 December 2016, in Turmi)
In the discourse of the woreda’sWomen, Children and Youth Office, girls are com-
monly depicted as ‘slaves of their husbands’, ‘exploited creatures’, ‘sold for cows’
and ‘forced by their parents into marriage’, sometimes with old men. This repre-
sentation is presented in opposition to women’s rights and the public discourse on
gender equality, as prescribed by international human rights advocacy groups and
the Ethiopian government.
As part of their efforts to get more Hamar girls into school, annual educational
campaigns, led by Hamar Woreda’s Education Office, Women Children and Youth
Office, and administration, are being organized in all kebeles. The main agenda
of these campaigns pertains to the right of girls to education. The denial of this
right, it is propagated, will result in bad consequences for the parents, such as
fines and even imprisonment. Concomitantly, girls are told about their right to go
to schools and that they should report any denial of this right to their respective
kebele administration and/or to the police or the Woreda Court.
This high-level campaign is highly controversial in Hamar and generates much
resistance for various reasons. First, girls in Hamar are seen as indispensable to
continue Hamar culture and economy. A good/respected Hamar girl is one who
is skilful and knowledgeable of all agro-pastoral and household tasks: she collects
firewood, fetches water, grinds flour and prepares food and coffee, cleans the com-
pound and, most importantly, cultivates fields of sorghum, beans and other pro-
duce. People fear, and experience has shown, that if girls go to school they do not
learn to become competent Hamar women capable of coordinating and running
an agro-pastoralist household (Lydall 2010:323).
Second, the Hamar are worried about voluntarily and involuntarily pre-mari-
tal sexual affairs and pregnancy, which occur in the context of school education,
especially among those who live in the hostels at town.While virginity is not a con-
dition for marriage in Hamar, premarital pregnancies are traditionally considered
as impure and need to be aborted or the children killed after birth. As abortion and
infanticide are prohibited by the law, schoolgirl pregnancies create a lot of prob-
lems for the girls and their families. Therefore, parents find it hard to send their
daughters to hostels, where they are not properly supervised.
Third, educated girls usually insist on choosing their own partner, whichmeans
that Hamar parents are unable to arrangemarriages for them and that they will not
receive any bridewealth. Suchmarriages,made outside the agro-pastoral economy,
do not bring any livestock to the family, and are less likely to expand the social
and kinship network of the household. Moreover, as descent is patrilineal, if a girl
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marries a non-Hamar her own children will not be considered as Hamar and are
thus lost to the community. One Hamar elder told me:
I have a daughter, she is my second daughter. Now, she is grown up. I raised her
like the other small girls in Hamar. She used to fetch water for her mother, clean
the enclosure of goats and the homestead. Later, when she became a matured
girl she was engaged to a Hamar boy from Assile area […]. Shortly after her en-
gagement, she joined the school at Dimeka.
I had a difficult time with her future husband and his family, as they were dis-
appointed with her education. Even worse, she is not living in Dimeka anymore.
What would you do when your daughter disappear in the bush, in the town? I
have lost my daughter. She is now in Jinka, I heard that she is a cleaner of a ho-
tel in Arkesha (part of Jinka). She is neither attending school nor coming back
to Hamar. Her family begged her to come back to us, but she is not listening
anymore (Interview, 20 February 2016, Lojera).
The above case shows that it is difficult for her parents to stay in control of a girl’s
life once she has gone to school.Many such girls are regarded as lost to their Hamar
families and the community; no longer fully integrated into Hamar society, they
are seen as destined to live in the towns. As a counter reaction, some Hamar have
become active ‘traditionalists’, who strongly oppose girls’ education.
As became clear during interviews and many informal conversations, it has
become common for girls in several villages in Hamar to be sent to school and their
resistant parents sanctioned.The pressure put on the families played an important
role in causing the 2015 conflict in Hamar. One case in particular aggravated the
hostility between the Hamar and the woreda administration. Muga, one of the two
Hamar bittas, told me about the sudden disappearance of seven girls and the shock
it caused in Hamar.
In Hamar, we have a special place for girls. You see, the girls are the future moth-
ers. They take care of their children; they are responsible for the continuation of
Hamar as a community. We need our young girls to learn about Hamar culture.
Recently, the government has been forcing the Hamar to send their children to
school. But, it should not be forces. It is our own sons, the educated Hamar men
who are now administering the country, who are lobbying and persuading our
girls to go to town for schooling against our will.
Within one week, seven girls from my country ran away to Dimeka: three from
Buska, three from Lala, and one from Shanqo Wolfo. First, we did not know that
they were in Dimeka. We, the Hamar, were worried and started to search for
them in different villages. Six of the girls except the one from Buska village had
already been engaged and their parents had received bride wealth, from their
future husbands (Interview, 8 March 2017, Buska).
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When the Hamar requested the return of the girls, they were told that it was the
right of the girls to go to school and that they would stay in town to do that. The
family’s feelings and interests, as well as their wish that their daughters become
‘competent Hamar wives and mothers’ (Lydall 2010:12) and fit into the local forms
of life and obligations to kin were discounted.
Albeit with difficulty, I had the chance to meet and talk to one of these seven
girls, who was at the time in the fourth grade at the Dimeka Boarding School. She
told me the reasons why she ran away from her family. These included her interest
in attending school and becoming a civil servant like Goiti, Head of the Women
and Children’s Affairs Office and the only Hamar woman in the woreda cabinet.
She explained that her father had died when she was small, so she grew up with
her mother and brothers. When her older brother chose a husband for her, she
disagreed and went to Dimeka. Right now, she is the only one of the seven girls
attending school in Dimeka.The other girls, as the Head of Women and Children’s
Affairs Office told me, are in Jinka; some are selling coffee on the streets and others
are, according to rumours, working in the hotels as bar ladies. Her office, together
with the woreda administration, was planning to convince the girls to return to
school in Hamar or reunite with their parents.
During the Worro conflict, when the woreda police and the security team
marched to Worro to bring poachers to the court, the Hamar were already resent-
ful because of the situations of these and other girls, and this fuelled the open
confrontation.
Efforts to resolve the conflict
A few days after the Worro conflict, the Southern Nations Nationalities and People
Government took the initiative to start a peace dialogue with notable elders of the
Hamar.The proposed strategy was to persuade the Hamar to attend a peace meet-
ing, and to find a ‘trustable’ mediator who could serve as a peace broker between
the community and the government.The man identified was Awoke Aike.20 Awoke
is among the first educated generation of the Hamar and was Chief Administrator
of South Omo Zone from 2000 to 2006 and served as a representative of the Hamar
in the Ethiopian Parliament from 2007 to 2016.
In the days after Awoke’s arrival in Hamar, he and other government officials
started to deliberate on possible ways to convince the Hamar to enter the peace
dialogue.They first approached Elto Gino, one of the bittas, to help them.After a few
20 He is the son of Aike Berinas (also called Baldambe), a former spokesman of the Hamar and
friend and key informant of the anthropologists Ivo Strecker and Jean Lydall (see Lydall and
Strecker 1979b).
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days of negotiation, the bitta agreed to hold meetings with the government people,
who guaranteed him that neither police nor security would make him accountable
for the mess in Worro.
The first peace meeting was held between the Hamar bitta, some Hamar elders
who accompanied him, and government representatives at the Kaeske River, near
Dimeka town. The two main issues discussed were firstly, the government’s desire
that the elders persuade the young Hamar men to stop the war and refrain from
destroying further public service centres; and secondly, that the rifles taken from
the police and the property stolen from schools and health centres (such as chairs,
tables, refrigerators) be returned.
Before entering the discussion, the elders requested that the authorities first
talk about who was responsible for causing the war.The bitta and his spokespersons
argued that the government soldiers who came with machine guns to attack the
peaceful community were liable for the trouble. They added that the community,
and particularly the Hamar youngsters, did nothing wrong except defend them-
selves from the bullets of the soldiers. The elders made clear that the government
and its police force were at fault. The elders also mentioned that making peace in
any way would only be attainable if the government was willing to allow the elders
to solve problems in their own way and not insist on ‘rigid rules’, sending the police
to the community and bringing the so-called ‘criminals’ in to court. As bitta Elto
recounted:
I said to Berki, then chief administrator of Hamar, and to Burka, head of security,
to give us time to talk with our sons, with those they call poachers. I also said
to them ‘Do not insist on deadlines!’, for they gave us a two week time frame to
handover the poachers to the police.
We Hamar said to them: ‘Bringing peace is not like buying coffee from the mar-
ket! It requires time and will only be achieved gradually.’
The elders from the far away areas like Assile, Wungabaino, Bashada, Errä Um-
bule and Errä Qaisa also told them: ‘Do not send police to the peaceful settlement
areas.’ We also told them that the poachers would pay fines in cash but not go to
jail. But they (the government officials) did not agree and sent police (Interview,
20 May 2017, in Worro).
Theway the Hamar manage conflicts and ensure order is completely different from
what the government officials aspired to do. Among theHamar, any cases of wrong-
doing are presented to the zarsi, the community of adult men sharing a common
residence area. Depending on the issue at stake, after careful deliberation, the
wrongdoer might be told to apologize and to give a cow or goat as compensa-
tion to the person he has harmed. In some cases, he will be asked to slaughter a
cow to the zarsi and feed them. The main aim is to restore social peace between
conflicting parties and to reintegrate the wrongdoer into the community. As such,
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the Hamar practise what is called ‘restorative justice’ (Damren 2002:83). State law,
based on the principle of retributive justice is meant to punish wrongdoers, so that
‘the issue of bringing the poachers and others who resisted girls education to the
court was a matter of enforcing “rule of law”’, as one of my informants from the
woreda administration put it. It was with this orientation that the police and the
security team went to Worro, and this was strongly criticised by the Hamar elders
during the peace talks.
Informants from both sides recounted that Awoke and a few government offi-
cials accepted the view of the elders and confessed that the administration’s deci-
sion to send police had been completely wrong. But other officials opposed it and
did not show any sense of guilt. Instead, they insisted on identifying those Hamar
who had killed policemen and destroyed public property. Therefore, the first peace
meeting ended without any meaningful consensus or detailed discussion of the
agendas set by the authorities. The officials who felt that their previous decisions
had been right later put bittaElto in jail for four months, claiming that he had insti-
gated theWorro conflict.The imprisonment of the bitta in Dimeka caused a second
violent clash between the Hamar and government soldiers in May 2015, a situation
that was only ended when he was freed.
A second peace meeting was then held in November 2015, in the presence of the
president of SNNPR.This time, bitta Elto refused to attend out of fear and distrust
of the government officials. In themeeting, the president openly offered an apology
for what had happened in Worro because of the administration’s decision to send
the police force. He also announced that the government had pardoned all Hamar
involved, including those who had killed police officers in Worro and those who
had destroyed public service centres. It was also promised that those officials who
had given the command to the police would be held accountable for their decisions
and removed from their positions.The regional government’s vigorous response to
the situation laid the foundation for a new administration in Hamar and facilitated
a real peace dialogue between the authorities and the community.
Following this meeting, the new administration in Hamar soon organized
meetings in the different kebeles. The new administrator, Walle Alma, wanted to
speak to bitta Elto in person, but only managed to do so with the intervention
of the ayo (spokesman) of Worro.21 Finally, Walle was allowed to come to Worro
on the condition that he comes alone, without any police (security guards) or car.
Walle agreed and went the next day, bringing coffee as a gift to the bitta to ask him
for forgiveness.The bitta accepted the apology wholeheartedly and blessed the new
21 He travelled twice to the village butwas not able tomeet the bitta. Instead, the ayo told him to
leave a message for the bitta. WhenWalle insisted on meeting the bitta personally, with the
intention of admitting the mistakes of the government and asking for the bitta’s blessings,
finally the ayo agreed to help him.
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administrator. This was the beginning of a new phase in relations marked by real
peace dialogues.
I attended several meetings in Turmi and Dimeka during which the Hamar and
the new administration agreed to set up a joint peace committee, which included
elders, herders, women and local government representatives. Once it had been es-
tablished, the peace committee agreed to communicate community concerns to the
government and to consult one another. Some of the rifles that had been taken dur-
ing the war were also returned to the administration, and the residents of Worro
agreed to restore the public service centres.
However, the main causes of the conflict – hunting and grazing in the Mago
Park and the issue of girls’ education – remain unresolved. Park authorities con-
tinue to blame the Hamar for hunting in Mago Park, even though the Hamar usu-
ally express their willingness to stop hunting and tend to condemn poachers in
meetings. The Hamar are more concerned about herding and grazing in the Park
and are asking the government about the future of their local economy. And, I have
observed that the government allowed the Hamar and other neighbouring groups
to graze inside the park, and also supplied fodder from far away areas – fromMaze
Park, near Gofa, and from the Kuraz Sugar Factory – during the 2017 drought in
the region.
Summary and conclusion
To fully understand what led to the 2015 conflict between the Hamar and the local
government it has been necessary to study the relationship between both parties,
taking their respective values, intentions and motivations into account. These in-
cluded the wider social, cultural and economic base of the Hamar and the devel-
opmental priorities of the Ethiopian government.
From theHamar side, three factors can be seen as the underlying causes of their
conflict-laden relationship with the local administration: their strong attachment
to hunting as a mechanism for proving manhood and elevating one’s social status;
their subsistence economy, which is partly based on cattle herding and demands
the constant search for grazing land and watering points; and the value given to
girls as agents for the continuation of the Hamar as a group and as a source of
bride wealth.
From the local administration’s side, centrally designed development projects
– such as the conservation schemes to foster eco-tourism development, the strict
enforcement of law, and the ‘education for all’ programme – along with the view
that these programmes are inviolable prerequisites for the eradication of poverty
and fostering of economic development are responsible for the contention with the
local community.
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The case presented here is that the escalation of the conflict when the Hamar
Woreda administration decided to send armed police to Worro resulted in un-
wanted consequences for both sides and – in hindsight – could have been avoided.
As the accounts fromHamar elders reveal, the contested issues –hunting and graz-
ing in the Mago Park and female education – could have been addressed and at
least partly resolved through an open dialogue between the elders and the woreda
officials.
Given the high social value attached to hunting game among the Hamar, their
suggestion that illegal hunters pay fines to the government instead of going to jail
was in fact an offer to compromise with the park authorities. Yet, it was interpreted
as resistance to government authority. As the president of the SNNPR and the new
administration admitted during the post-conflict peace meetings, the order given
to the police was a serious mistake that caused the loss of human life on both sides
and the destruction of public property. The overgrazing and entry of herders into
the Mago Park was, at least partly, the result of the allocation of grazing land to
investors, which restricted the herders’ access to grass and watering points. As the
Hamar economy is to a large extent derived from animal husbandry, the devel-
opment programmes implemented in the area should have considered this reality
and ensured the availability of livestock routes and access to riverbanks. Hamar
resistance to sending their girls to school was only partly based on the important
role played by girls in the Hamar household economy and their central place in the
continuation of Hamar as a group.These cultural aspects may not change fast, but
Hamar concerns about their daughters’ security in the boarding schools in towns
could be more easily addressed. Instead of exerting pressure on parents to send
their daughters to school, more attention should be given to awareness raising
and ensuring the overall protection and wellbeing of girls in the towns.
To conclude, the Worro conflict and its resolution can teach us a lesson about
how and why things can go wrong when two different values systems come to-
gether. While in such situations the more powerful partner – usually the govern-
ment – often ‘wins’ and subjugates the weaker one, the Hamar case was different as
their land is still rather inaccessible and they are heavily armed. Besides, nowadays
many local government officials are native Hamar, which means that they have a
good knowledge of the local culture and values, even if they no longer share it. The
way the issue was finally resolved shows that not only mutual understanding, but
also tolerance, flexibility and patience are needed to live peacefully together in a
culturally and legally plural country.
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17. Glossary
A
aadaa custom, tradition, culture (Oromo)
aadaa seeraa Borana normative system
Aariaf (also: Aaraf) language of the Aari
abaarsa curse (Borana)
abbaa bokkuu lit: ‘father of the sceptre’, senior position in Oromo lineage system
and in gadaa, responsible for decision-making
abbaa gadaa lit.: ‘father of gadaa’, leader of the gadaa governance system (Oromo)
abbaa seeraa legal expert (Oromo)
abegar conflict resolution mechanism practised by elders who claim to have hered-
itary divine power (Amhara of Wollo)
abunzimediation system in Rwanda
ad’a culture (Siltie)
adulaa council composed of elders from each moiety holding executive power (Bo-
rana), senior councilor within the gadaa-system (Oromo)
afaan OromoOromo language
afi evil eye (Aari)
aish person with the evil eye (Aari)
akonatari lit.: transferor of land in traditional land transactions (Sidama)
alem world (Amharic), self-designation of non-Protestants in Aari, where it could
be translated as ‘traditionalist’
anje blessings (Aari)
ansewa Siltie highlanders




argaa dhageetii oral historian/oral history/anecdote (Borana)
atbia dagnia local judge (Amharic), established by the government
awliyā saint, guardian (pl.) (Arabic)
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awneyamarginalized craft workers (blacksmiths, tanners, and potters) among Siltie
people
awraja third administrative tier below the province/region during the Imperial
(1931–1974) and the Socialist Derg regime (1974–1991)
awraja qadis judges assigned to a specific area (see awraja)
‘Ay berimka’ ‘Do not judge!’ (Aari expression)
Ayidama customary mechanism to resolve conflicts between different Gamo com-
munities
ayle slave descendants (Gamo)
ayo spokesman and intermediary between the local communities and the govern-
ment (Bashada, Hamar, Banna, see also: likamamber)
aysafte woni heathen work (Aari)
B
babi hereditary ritual king (Aari)
bajjemarginalized subgroup with ritual responsibilities (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
balabat landlord during the Imperial regime (1931–1974)
baliqe elder (Siltie)
bannewak cattle exchanged among bondfriends in Hamar
barjo good fortune (Bashada, Hamar)
bashi displaying fear (Aari)
berche notions of the right to justice in Siltie, see also tur and fero
bida’a unwanted innovation (Siltie)
birr Ethiopian currency
bitta lit.: ‘the first’ (Hamar), refers also to ‘the first’ in authority and transcendental
and ritual power, title for ritual leader among Hamar
bul lit.: untied, also: absolved (Aari)
buts to acknowledge/confess wrong-doing (Aari)
C
caffee places of law-proclamations, law-giving assembly (Oromo)
caffee taa’icha lit.: ‘[he] whowas at [the place of] the law gathering’, (also: jaarsa caffee),
expert in customary law (Oromo)
chako oath (Gamo)
charangi ritually pure (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
D
d’abbi wrongdoer (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
dakerka imprison (imperative, Aari)
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dakri lit.: tying, term is used for imprisonment in the kebele prison, and for ban-
ning a wrongdoer from active religious participation for a specified number of
months (Aari)
dannawa form of land tenure in Sidama, (communal land)
danya judge (Amharic)
daraara tobacco used ritual purposes (Borana)
dax’ilsi offence (Aari)
dem adreq shimgilinna conciliation aimed at stopping a lengthy conflict between
families that involved a cycle of retaliatory killings (Amhara)
deme keleb lit.: ‘impure blood’ (Amharic)
demutha religious experts (Gamo)
dere (plural: dereta), self-administered community in Gamo
dere cima council of elders in Gamo
dere dulata public assembly in Gamo
detsmi lit.: heaviness, also greatness of a person (Aari)
digela (also tsoma or manna), craftworkers (Gamo)
dofen norti girank lit.: truly from the stomach, full heartedly (Aari)
dosi potsh opening a dossier (Aari)
dubusha public assembly place in Gamo
E
edi human being (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
eela deep well (Borana)
ensete false banana
ercho certain grass used to purify the wrongdoers and their relatives from gome
(ritual pollution in Gamo)
erq conciliation between disputants whose relationship had already broken down
in an earlier conflict (Amhara)
F
fenter special feast in Sidama to mark the conclusion of a kontract (hybrid form of
land law)
fero notions of the right to justice in Siltie, see also tur and berche
ferezagegne local cassation court judges (in Siltie)
Fetha Nagast ‘law of the kings’ (Amharic)
foollee one of the stages in the gadaa grade system (Tulama Oromo)
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G
gaaddisa shade where the elders sit, dwelling place of god (Borana)
gabinti economic growth (Aari)
gacaca Rwandan customary courts
gadaa (also: gada) age and generation system of Oromo people
gadho traditional palace in Gamo, residence of the kawo
gal enemy (Bashada, Hamar, Banna), term also used for highland Ethiopians
galta elders (Aari)
gemet assessment (Amharic)
gasaa maga (also: ogade), mediator between two or more communities (Gamo)
gerad clan leader (Siltie)
geta elders from related lineages serving as ritual helpers (Aari)
gichit aswegaj lit. ‘conflict prevention/resolution’ (Amharic), quasi-formal, state-ini-
tiated conflict resolution institution consisting of elders and representatives of
government offices
gika beat (Aari)
godmi hereditary ritual specialists (Aari)
gome transgression of a social norm or sin that causes pollution of the wrongdoer
and misfortune, disease and natural calamities for the whole society (Gamo)
gosa clan (Sidama, Oromo)
gote smallest state administrative level below kebele, consists of less than 500 people
(in Siltie)
gumaa blood price/compensation to victims of crime (Tulama-Oromo, Borana)
gumii gaayoo pan-Borana assembly, taking place every eight years at the mid-point
of an abbaa gadaa period, has supreme authority over law-making and enforce-
ment
gumma blood money/compensation in case of homicide (Siltie)
gurri afak lit.: done just with the mouth, not full-heartedly (Aari)
H
halaqa initiate in small sized dere in Gamo
hadiya gifts (Islamic law, Siltie)
hayyuu senior position in Oromo lineage system and in gadaa; lineage senior acting
as judge (Oromo)
hiba gift (Sharia law)
hisbint dassken helping people up, refers to duty of offender to provide food and
drink for all cell members who participated in conflict resolution (Aari)
hoolaa buula sheep slaughtered for recuperation of sick person (Borana)
huduga initiate in medium sized dere in Gamo
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I
iddir informal burial insurance and bereavement association common in many
parts of Ethiopia
ijibbaata sheep for ritual slaughter (Borana)
‘indapsi antam ay kashishka!’ lit.: ‘Do not make your brother pay!’ (Aari expression
implying that being a Christian one should forgive)
injera fermented sourdough flatbread traditionally made from t’eff flour
irkimother’s brother (Aari),
isante iron rings worn by girls and women around their necks (Bashada, Hamar,
Banna)
isgoota pleading ceremony, during which a killer’s side plead for reconciliation
(Tulama-Oromo)
J
jaallaba representative of clan assembly enforcing decisions of the abbaa gadaa (Bo-
rana)
jaarsa elder (Tulama-Oromo)
‘jaarsaaf jeedhi!’ lit.: ‘For the sake of elders!’ (part of blessing, Tulama-Oromo)
jaarsa dheeda administrative unit responsible for regulating seasonal access to graz-
ing and water (Borana)
jaarsa madda administrative unit responsible for grazing and water management
at the local level (Borana)
jaarsaWaaqaa lit.: ‘elder of God’, member of a court run by spirit mediums (Oromo)
jaarsummaa conflict resolution through elders (Oromo)
jahil ignorant of Islamic knowledge (Siltie)
K
karta tradition (Aari)
kashi beday ‘There is not a lot of fines!’ (Aari expression)
kashka fine (imperative, Aari)
kawo title for hereditary ruler in Gamo
kebele lowest administrative level
kerri ritual gateway (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
k’esh customary mode of dispute resolution, reconciliation (Aari)
kilil region (Amharic)
k’itat punishment (Amharic)
kisi lawsuit (Amharic), term used in Dell/Aari for the process of dealing with dis-
putes through state institutions
kogo ritual fire maker (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
kontract new hybrid form of land law in Sidama
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koota sharecropping arrangement used to match land with labour and/or other in-
puts in Sidama
kora gosaa clan assembly (Borana)
kotsa share-cropping arrangement (Aari)
L
lafa abba torbbaatama lit.: ‘land of seventy people’; referring to a specific piece of
land over which 70 people are claiming ownership in Tulama-Oromo land
lafa etege land of Empress Menen, wife of Emperor Haile Selassie (Tulama-Oromo)
‘Lafaaf jedhi!’ ‘For the sake of earth!’ (part of blessing, Tulama-Oromo)
likamamber (from Amharic: ‘likamenber’), spokesman and intermediary between
the local communities and the government (Bashada, Hamar, Banna, see also:
ayo)
liqa form of dispute settlements based on local holy men (waliye) among the Siltie
(see also mawlid and warrie)
luba generation class (or set) among the Borana
M
mad’a customary courts of the Afar people
maga kind of mediator within the same dere (self-administered community in
Gamo)
mahberawi firdebet Social Court for property and monetary claims in Dell/Aari
(Amharic)
makkala messengers enforcing decisions of abbaa gadaa and council of elders (Bo-
rana)
malla farmers (Gamo)
majlis institution administering Muslim affairs
mana craft workers (Gamo, Aari)
mashayik religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized as honourable Islamic
symbols by the majority of Muslims (see also waliye)
mawlid form of dispute settlements based on local holy men (waliye) among the
Siltie (see also liqa, and warrie)
mawlid-un-nabi Prophet Mohammed’s birthday celebration
mawlid al-mashayik local religious leader/figure’s celebration day where by a dispute
settlement is conducted (Siltie)
mele’ata guba’e assembly delegates; platform for reconciliations by Church elders
(Amharic)
mengist government (Amharic)
mengiste higi law of the government (Amharic), expression used in Aari
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meret komitee committee for legal issues at the kebele level dealing with land disputes
in Dell/Aari (Amharic)
mesaki family head (Siltie)
miks begging (Aari)
militia auxiliary policeman
mingi ritually impure (Bashada, Hamar, Banna, Kara)
mikitil woreda lit.: ‘subdistrict’, administrative unit below the woreda (district) in the
past
moara diviner (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
moro head of sub clan (Siltie)
mulimidi polluted (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
mushro disease affecting anyone breaking an oath (Amhara)
N
nagaa boorana peace among all Borana groups
negane forgiveness (Aari)
nisah teykate to take confession (Aari expression referring to the Christian duty to
confess wrongdoings).
norti stomach, locus of feelings (Aari)
nikah Islamic marriage contract (Siltie)
O
Odaa Nabee tree serving as regional assembly place for the Tuulama-Oromo
ogade (also: gasaa maga), mediator between two or more dere (self administered
communities in Gamo)




paala decorative scars (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
parko ritual expert (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
Q
qaalluu ritual leader, also spirit medium (Oromo)
qadi judge in Sharia court
qalla lowlanders (Siltie)
qakee serious crime and sanction (Borana)
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R
raga local legal expert (Siltie)
raaba gadda administrative unit having customary jurisdiction over land, social and
cultural issues, and conflict resolution (Borana)
S
‘Sabi an negane!’ ‘May God forgive you!’ (Aari)
sabite gami divine punishment (Aari)
sabite higi God’s law (Aari)
sabite woni service to God (Aari)
seeraa Oromo law
Shafie Islamic school of thought
sharafic upper class people tracing their origin to the Hashemite and the Prophet
Mohammed’s family among the Siltie people
shimma coolness, harmony (Aari),
shimagillé lit.: ‘old’ (Amharic); refers to elder assigned for conflict resolution
(Amhara)
shimgilinna lit.: ‘aging’ (Amharic), conflict resolution through elders (Amhara)
soba lie (Borana)
songo highest clan council (Sidama)
susaa qantso compensation (Gamo)
T
talak unilateral divorce or release of wife from marriage (Sharia law)
tekonatari transferee of land in traditional land transaction (Sidama)
toidi lineage head (Aari)
toksi belittling someone (Aari)
tsha’x’a testify under oath (Aari)
tsoma (also: manna or digela), craftworkers (Gamo)
tur notions of the right to justice in Siltie, see also fero and berche
U
utuwa form of land tenure in Sidama (private land)
W
waliigaltee agreement (Tulama-Oromo)
waliye religious figure, dead or alive, popularly recognized as honourable Islamic
symbols by the majority of Muslims (see alsomashayik)
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wakf inalienable charitable endowment in Sharia law
Waaqa higher spiritual being, sky, God (Oromo, Borana)
‘Waaqaf jeedhi!’ ‘For the sake of God!’, (part of blessing, Tulama-Oromo)
wana firdebet Main Court (Amharic)
Waaqeffannaa indigenous Oromo religion, (also neo-traditional)
warrie form of dispute settlements based on local holy men (waliye) among the Siltie
(see also mawlid and liqa)
wesiya last will (Islamic law, Siltie)
wofa legesse spirit medium used by people seeking remedies to resolve conflict
(Amhara people of North Shewa)
woleba dominant majority of farmers and traders (Siltie)
woreda district (Amharic)
wule contract (Amharic)
wuta unclean conception or pregnancy (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
Y
yati sebani female sheep that never gave birth, used for ritual slaughtering (Bashada,
Hamar, Banna)
xuraa’a impure (Borana)
ye-akkababi bahil lit.: according to the local culture (Amharic), refers to customary
law
ye-abatader hig lit.: the laws of the fathers (Amharic), refers to long-established sys-
tem of beliefs, values, and norms used for promoting peace and resolving con-
flicts (Amhara)
ye-afer seb low class people believed to be native to the Siltie area
ye-bad baliqe
shengo/chale local chiefs’ assembly (in Siltie)
ye-bahil meberez lit.: dilution of culture (Amharic), expression used by elders refer-
ring to loss of conflict resolution culture among the youth and general commu-
nity (Amhara of Ankober)
ye-betezemed guba’e lit.: family council (Amharic), settles disputes that arise between
husbands and wives (Amhara)
ye-burda baliqe shengo hamlet elders assembly (Siltie)
ye-giligil shimgilinna conciliation between parties in an on-going disagreement
(Amhara)
ye-hager shimgilinna lit.: country level conciliation (Amharic), larger and complex
conflicts resolved by influential elders selected from the wider community
(Amhara)
ye-mewta baliqe supra-village assembly (Siltie)
ye-sebeka guba’e
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shimagillée lit.: council of parish elders (Amharic), council of respected community
andChurchmembers operating between churchmembers (Amhara of Ankober)
ye-sefer shimgilinna lit.: village conciliation (Amharic), small or relatively uncom-
plicated conflict in a neighbourhood or village handled by the village elders
(Amhara)
ye-siltie serra local mode of governance among the Siltie people
Z
zarsi community of adult men of a given residence area (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
zarsi goiti central path where many people pass (Bashada, Hamar, Banna)
zera fine (Amharic)
zia local representative of the ritual king (Aari)
zau iron rings worn by women around arms and legs (Bashada, Hamar)
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